Supreme Court of Palau

[ 5] We revie Land CourtRt’s denial of a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion. See KSPLA v. PPLA, 22 ROP 30, 35 (2015). “Generally, &#[a] discretionary act or ruling under review is presumptiveptively correct, and the burden is on the party seeking reversal to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.’” Island Paradise Resort Club v. Ngarametal Ass’n, 2020 Palau 27 12 (quoting Ngoriakl v. Gulibert, 16 ROP 105, 107 (2008)). However, a court abuses its discretion “when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered, when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight, or when all proper and no improper factors are considered, but the court in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Eller v. ROP, 10 ROP 122, 128-29 (2003)). Finally, “[a] trial court decision must contain sufficient findings supporting its conclusions to allow for appellate review.” Yano v. Yano, 20 ROP 190, 199 (2013) (quoting Ngirutang v. Ngirutang, 11 ROP 208, 211 (2004)).

DISCUSSION

[ 6] As we hreviously explaixplained, in evaluating a motion to intervene, the Land Court must consider three factors—the timeliness of the motion, the underlying merf the motion, and the prejudice to the current rights-holdeholder. Etpison, 2020 Palau 14 23. Our review of the appealed decision convinces us that the Land Court failed to engage in the full-scale analysis required by our prior opinion. Indeed, the only factor analyzed with any detail was the timeliness of the motion, whereas the findings of prejudice were conclusory, and an evaluation of the motion’s merits is entirely absent. Given the absence of any analysis with respect to the merits of the motion, it is perhaps not surprising that the Land Court also failed to engage in balancing the factors. Because it is not the role of this Court to analyze and balance the factors in the first instance, a remand is necessary.
[ 7] emand, the Land Court murt must distinctly and explicitly conduct an analysis of each of the three factors: (1) the “legit” of Etpison’s claim—that is, whether his claim on its merits is “f220;frivolous or has little chance of success,” or rather “raises substantial arguments”; (2) whether Etpison’s motion is timely; and (3) what prejudice Rechucher, as the current rights-holder, would suffer should he have to defend against the claims underlying Etpison’s motion to intervene as well as should the disputed land be allocated to Etpison.^[3] See Etpison, 2020 Palau 14 20-23. In doing so, the Land Court must consider the evidence in the record, including the evidence underlying the Trial Division’s vacated decision, and resolve any material issues of fact that are present in the record and necessary to making a determination on each of the three factors.^[4]
[ 8] The Land Court must then conduct a balancing analysis and decide if the weight of the factors on either side militates for or against permitting intervention. We note that at some point the prejudice to the current rigolder and considerations ofns of timeliness, which encompass the importance of finality in legal disputes and recognition of a litigant’s responsibility to diligently pursue his rights, will “outweigh even the most meritorious motion to intervene.” Id. 22. Unlike a bright line rule, however, the circumstances of each particular case must be given due consideration when balancing the competing factors. We continue to offer no opinion on whether, once the factors are properly considered, Etpison’s motion should be granted and leave this balancing to the sound discretion of the Land Court.

CONCLUSION

[ 9] The Lanrt’s July July 29, 2020 Order denying Etpison’s motion to intervene is VACATED. The matter is REMANDED to the Land Court for iconduct a proper analysis consistent with the above and ourd our opinion in Etpison v. Rechucher, 2020 Palau 14.

BENNARDO, Associate Justice, dissenting:

[ 10] majority does not cut tcut the Land Court enough slack. This is, after all, supposed to be abuse of discretion review, and, as the majority rightly noted, “[a] discretionary act or rulnder review is presumptiveltively correct.” Island Paradise Resort Club v. Ngarametal Ass’n, 2020 Palau 27 12. Despite this acknowlengement, the majority chooses to read the Land Court’s opinion in an unnecessarily unfavorable light.
[ 11] Therity opines that reat remand is necessary because it is convinced that the Land Court failed to analyze the three necessary factors and failed to balance the factors against each other. Majority Opinion 6. As a refr, the three faee factors that we instructed the Land Court to consider and balance on remand were the timeliness of the motion tervene, the prejudice that intervention would cause to the current rights-holder, and the pthe potential merits of the movant’s claim. Etpison v. Rechucher, 2020 Palau 14 19-23.
[ 12m Addly, the majorityty’s reading of the Land Court’s opinion is a possible one. The Land Court’s opinion fails to communicate the scope s ana in an ideal way. After reading the Land Court&#urt’8217;s opinion, I am less than absolutely certain that the Land Court considered and balanced the three factors that we instructed it to.
[ 13] But the may’s in;s interpretation of the Land Court’s opinion is not the only possible one. In my view, there is another, equally plausible way to read the Lourt’s opinion. The final sentence of the Land CourtCourt’s opinion says the following: “And while the Land Court recognizes its inherent authority to correct errors in closed matters, the Land Court declines to exercise this inherent authority in this matter when Etpison had prior opportunities to raise his claim for the alleged error, but decided otherwise.” Order Denying Mot. to Intervene at 4 (July 29, 2020). One interpretation of that passage is that the Land Court found that the first two factors—timeliness and prejudice—weighed so heavily against intervention in this case that the third factor—the potential merits of Etpison’s claim—essentially became irrelevant. Finding that even the most meritorious claim cannot overcome the untimeliness and prejudice of intervention is a permissible analysis. After all, we contemplated that exact possibility in our opinion remanding this matter to the Land Court when we said that “at some point the prejudice to the current rights-holder would outweigh even the most meritorious motion to intervene.” Etpison, 2020 Palau 14 22.
[ &#4] To me,o me, this appeal comes down to the standard of review. The Land Court’s opinion is not as clear as I would prefer. From the face of the opinion, I don’t know for certain whether the Land Court did its job sloppily or properly. Would it have been better for the Land Court to separate its analysis with section headings to clarify exactly where it was considering each of the three factors and balancing them against each other? Of course.
[ 15t perfection is not the sthe standard here. Rather, review for abuse of discretion requires that I approach the Land Court&#8217inion with a presumption of correctness. Island Paradise Resort Club, 2020 Palau 27au 27 12. When such presumpti apis applied, I do not believe that the majority gave the Land Court’s opinion a fair shake. Thus, I would vote to affirot because the Land Court’s opinion is ideal, but because, when read in light of a pr a presumption of correctness, it is good enough.