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Regina v Sulega [1999] SBHC 42; HC-CRC 133 of 1999 (23 April 1999)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

HC-CRRC No: 133 of 1999

class="MsoNoMsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> REGINA

ass="Mss="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> -V-

TIMOTHY SULEGA

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

(PALMER J.)

CRIMINAL REVIEW CASE NO. 133 OF 1999

DATE OF REVIEW: 23RD APRIL 199pan>

PALMER J.: This case was initially brought up for review under section 46 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, for purposes of reviewing the order of the Principal Magistrate issued on 18th December 1998, which had ordered removal of disqualification of Timothy Sulega from holding or obtaining a licence. The accused Timothy Sulega had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence for twelve (12) months on 3rd March 1998 following a conviction on a charge of driving whilst unfit to drive through drinks. After perusing the file however, I have decided to make some general comments on the case as a whole although I appreciate I am functus officio in respect of the sentence and order of disqualification issued on 3rd March 1998. The purpose of these comments is to ensure Magistrates are aware of what can and should be done in the future if a similar case arises. I should also point out the file was not earlier brought up for review as there was nothing on the returns to give me concern to request that it be brought up. On the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the sentence and order imposed. However, having now had the opportunity to peruse the file, I feel there are certain matters which needed to be highlighted for future purposes.

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The accused, Timothy Sulega had been charged with the offence of driving whilst unfit to drive through drinks contrary to section 42(1) of the Traffic Act (now section 43(1) of the Revised Edition 1996). From the start it must be pointed out that this is a serious offence. The facts then go on to read as follows and I quote from the typed statement submitted to court by the Police Prosecutor:

"On the 14th day of February 1998 about 23:00 hrs defendant Timothy Sulega was driving ming motor vehicle reg No A-5562 travelling at westly (sic) direction along Mendana Avenue. However the defendant was travelling at that time impaired on his driving, started to drive fast on a wrong lane right travelling westly direction.

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Just in frf the Honiara Casino, the defendant could not controlntrol the vehicle, because he was unfit to drive, as a result collided to a taxi reg No. A 5268 with severe damages. Passengers Joyce Alasina was injured. The matter was reported to Kukum Police, police carried out examination on defendant and discovered Timothy Sulega was unfit to drive at that time. His eyes blood shot, his breath strongly smelt of intoxicating liquor.

lass="Mss="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> Defendant was placed in cell for further investigation, and later bailed to courtcourt for 3rd March 1998."

Already one can see that the facts revealed a serious case of driving whilst under the influence of liquor. There was speed involved, driving on the wrong side of the lane, and a serious accident occurred causing serious damage to another vehicle and injuries to an innocent passenger in the other vehicle. The accused admitted the offence and was fined by the learned Magistrate for $150-00 and disqualified for 12 months under section 29 of the Act. The learned Magistrate noted the following in favour of the accused: that the accused was a first offender, entered a guilty plea and was remorseful. At the same time he noted the seriousness of the offence. Unfortunately the sentence imposed did not well reflect the seriousness of the offence when all had been said and weighed. As I have said earlier, whilst on one hand the sentence imposed was not wrong, it was more on the lenient side. A fine of $300-00 in the circumstances would not have been excessive, or a short sharp custodial sentence of one to two months. It will be noted the maximum fine under section 43(1)(b) had recently been increased to four hundred dollars (for a Magistrate's Court) from $150-00 previously, to reflect the seriousness with which Parliament viewed this offence. The courts must therefore continue to maintain that same vigilance when dealing with such offenders. If a person's means are to be taken into account when considering the level of fines, then perhaps more time can be given, say a fine of $300-00 payable over a period of 28 days; the first half of $150-00 to be paid in 14 days and the balance the remaining 14 days. I hope what is said above will not be taken as an unfair criticism but more in the light of a specific illustration and as a guideline for dealing with similar cases in the future.

The Police are doing their part in arresting, charging and bringing such offenders to c the public are cryincrying out for tougher penalties, the courts however must continue to maintain a balanced approach, and that includes balancing the sentence to be imposed. As a guideline the minimum fines to be imposed on drunk driving offences should not be less than $200-00. Only for very good reasons should they go below $200-00 and must be stated in the sentence. For second offenders, I would expect a custodial sentence to be imposed unless there are exceptional reasons for not doing so.

THE ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION

As well as being fined, the accused was disqualifor the statutory minimum period of twelve months with with effect from 3rd March 1998. Note this is the minimum period. If the court considers it appropriate to impose a longer period it most certainly can do so under section 29(1) of the Traffic Act. The expiry date of that disqualification order would have been on 3rd March 1999.

THE ORDER FOR REMOVAL DISQUALIFICATION

On 18th December 1998 (approximately 9 months later), the accused applied to the court to his disqualificationation removed. He did not state what provision of the Traffic Act he was relying on. The learned Principal Magistrate dealing with the application also did not state what provision of the Act he was relying on in his reasons to grant the application. It is always a useful practice to get the party or person making an application to state what provision of the law he/she is relying on and also for the court to be aware what powers it has in respect of that matter.

From my perusal of the Traffic Act it appears section 31 of the Traffic Act was relied on for the application and also relied on by the learned Magistrate to grant the application. The relevant provisions for our purposes are subsections 31(1) and (2). I quote:

"31.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this sectionction, a person who by an order of a court is disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence may apply to the court by which the order was made to remove the disqualification and on any such application the court may, as it thinks proper, having regard to the character of the person disqualified and his conduct subsequent to the order, the nature of the offence, and any other circumstances of the case, either by order remove the disqualification as from such date as may be specified in the order or refuse the application.

(2) &nbssp; Nl appiocation shal shall be made under the foregoing subsection for the removal of a ualifon bethe expiration of whichever is relevantevant of t of the he following periods from the date of the order by which the disqualification was imposed, that is to say -

(a) &ntwo years, if the d disqualification is for less than four years;

(b) hale of t e peri period of the disqualification, if it is for less than ten years but not less than four years;

(c) five years in any other case;

class="MsoNormal" style="mle="margin-left: 36.0pt; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0">

lass="Mss="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> and in determining the expiration of the period after which under this subsection a person may apply for the removal of a disqualification, any time after the conviction during which the disqualification was suspended or he was not disqualified shall be disregarded."

Subsection 31(1) of the Traffic Acs provide for an application to be made to the court for reor removal of the disqualification imposed. However, and this is the crucial part, subsection (2) imposes limits under which an application can be made. A disqualified driver therefore does not have right to apply at any time, and the court does not have right to entertain any such application unless it falls within those limits set by law. What are those limits?

The limit set under paragraph 31(2)(a) and which e relevant part here is that, a person can only be qu qualified to apply under section 31(1) if at least two years of his disqualification period had expired, and provided his order for disqualification was less than four years. So if a person had been disqualified for say three years, the minimum period of two years must have expired before he can apply under section 31. But what if his disqualification period is only 18 months? The same rule applies. He must have had two years before he can apply. It follows a person disqualified for anything less than two years cannot apply for removal of his disqualification (see Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences Eighth Edition page 646). There is no discretion involved. If the accused disagrees his only recourse is by way of appeal to this Court.

In this case, where the accuse was disqualified for only twelve months, he does not qualify to apply under sectioection 31 of the Traffic Act for removal of his disqualification and the learned Principal Magistrate had no right to grant same under the said section. The order granted by the learned Principal Magistrate accordingly on 18th December 1998 is null and void and must be set aside. The driving licence (D/L No. 26023) of the accused must be returned to the learned Principle Magistrate so that the error can be corrected.

I note the twelve months period for which his licence was disqualified had already lapsed on 3rd March 1999. I had considered re-imposing the remaining part of the period of disqualification from 18th December 1998 to 3rd March 1999 but realise I have no power to do that. The error in this case accordingly must lie where it has fallen.

class="MsoNoMsoNormal" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0"> ORDERS OF THE COURT:

1. ;&nbssp; bET ASIDE THEE THEE THE ORDER OF THE MAGISTRATE'S COURT DATED 18TH DECEMBER 1998 REMOVING DISQUALIFICATION OF TI SULEspan>/p> p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: -34.9pt; margin-left:left: 70.9 70.9pt; mpt; marginargin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0">

2. ;&nbssp; bIRECT THAT THAT THAT THE DRIVING LICENCE BE ENDORSED BY THE MAGISTRATE'S COURT TO REFLECT THE CORRECT PERIOD OFUALIFON OFVE MO

THE COURT


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