HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No. 345-06

JOHN A KENIAPISIA
AND ROBERT HITE

–V-

SOLOMON ISLANDS FOOTBALL FEDERATION
and CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL DISPUTES
TRIBUNAL

Date of Hearing: 6th October 2006
Date of Judgment: 6th October 2006

J. Keniapisia in person ex parte

Palmer CJ:

I dismissed this application ex tempore with brief reasons given on Friday 6th October 2006. I now give details in writing of those reasons.

Mr. John Keniapisia and Robert Hite ("the Applicants") were appointed as referees on or about 27th February 2004 by the Solomon Islands Football Federation ("SIFF") to officiate over what was described as the "S" League 2004; this is the highest soccer competition within the country. Following disagreements with their terms of engagement as referees, sometime after 28th February 2004, the Applicants were dropped as referees and others engaged to take their place. This came not only as a surprise but a big disappointment and they sought to challenge their termination. No reason was given for their removal. 

They immediately came to court to challenge their termination by way of judicial review. This was denied by his Lordship Brown J. as misconceived. He pointed out that the relief sought by the Applicants was to be found in the private law domain and not in public law remedies; judicial review was not available to the Applicants for what was essentially a private law claim. His Lordship pointed out that the source of power which the Applicants sought to challenge did not emanate from any "public law" but out of a body of rules adopted and called the SIFF Constitution. Those rules affect only those wishing to be so bound.

Following dismissal of their case, the Applicants came back to court for redress this time under section 18(1) of the Constitution, alleging their fundamental rights had been breached by SIFF and the National Disputes Tribunal when they failed to convene within a reasonable time to hear their dispute. 

The National Disputes Tribunal ("NDT") is a body set up under Article 16.13.1 of the SIFF Constitutiton to adjudicate over disputes inter alia:

"To arbitrate, conduct hearings and sit in judgments on all disputes involving members clubs, officials, players, referees, coaches, spectators, games, tournaments, leagues and any matter referred to it for decision."

Mr. Keniapisia says that despite referring their dispute to that tribunal it had never convened and thereby denying their fundamental rights under the Constitution to have their dispute heard within a reasonable time. Mr. Keniapisia argues that because the NDC is a body set up under the auspices of the SIFF Constitution, which in turn is a member of the Solomon Islands National Sports Council, a creature of statute, it exercises public responsibilities and therefore amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. He says the NDC is an adjudicating authority prescribed by "private law" to adjudicate over disputes to determine civil rights and obligations between SIFF and its referees.

There are a number of flaws obvious to this application for which this application must be dismissed.

1.	The application for leave is procedurally defective. It does not have a "Statement Accompanying the Application for Leave" as required under Order 61A rule 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1964 ("the Rules"). Mr. Keniapisia relied on a Statement of Claim which he had filed but that is not a "Statement Accompanying the Application for Leave" for a Writ and Statement of Claim can only be filed when leave had been obtained. Where leave had not been granted it was presumptuous to file a Writ and Statement of Claim at the outset. The application ought not to have been listed for hearing in the first place.

2.	The application is misconceived in assuming that relief lie under the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution when there is no basis for it. The Applicants are not agitating any civil right or obligation against the State. The human rights provisions are rights conferred upon individuals by the State. It follows then, that the cause complaint lies against the State. Where a complaint lies against a private body, the cause must necessarily be shown to principally be the responsibility of the State (eg. a State instrumentality – the National Referral Hospital or any Governmental authority, officer, or Government representative). In this case, the "S" League is not a state instrumentality. As pointed out by his Lordship Brown J. (ibid) at page 2 paragraph 1 of his judgement, the power which Mr. Niel Poloso sought to wield at that occasion did not emanate from any Statute, Regulation, By-Law or Directive, but out of a body of the body of rules adopted and called the "Solomon Islands Football Federation Constitution". 

This Court has jurisdiction to deal with administrative law disputes but they relate to administration in the sense of State responsibilities towards its citizens. It cannot be extended to maladministration of private bodies. The dispute between the Applicants and the soccer body is not a "public law" dispute. It is principally a private matter/affair between him and SIFF after having their appointments terminated as referees for the "S" League in 2004. Their relief lies squarely under private law. 

3.	The only document which the Applicants can rely on is the letter of appointment sent to them by Neil Poloso (Referee Coordinator/Inspector of the "S" League 2004) appointing them as part of the fifteen referees for the "S" League for 2004. What that document generates is to be confined solely to "private law" remedies and not in "public law". To try and couch aggrievement in terms of human rights violation in this instance is a step too far.

4.	Time is obviously against the Applicants in their quest for relief against SIFF. Had they taken the right road for relief in 2004, not only damages but injunction and specific performance would have been available as possible alternative remedies. At this point of time, even the question whether damages are available is as much a remote possibility. 

The application for leave to commence an action for redress under section 18(1) of the Constitution must be dismissed.

The Court.