HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

Civil Case No. 362 of 2006

QUITALES PROPERTIES LIMITED

-V-

LESLIE MASON AND SELINA MASON

Brown J.

Date of Hearing: 2 March 2007
Date of Ruling: 2 March 2007

Mr. Makario Tagini for the Plaintiff
Mr. Andrew Radlcyffe for the 1st Defendant 
Mr. John Sullivan QC and Mr. Thomas Kama for the 2nd Defendant 

RULING on application for judgment by the defendants for that the plaintiff’s claim does not disclose any interest in land to support a caveat and consequent orders directing the removal of such caveat as it affects land of the defendants.

Brown, J: I’ve listened carefully to the argument which Mr. Sullivan has presented in support of his motion for judgment on the 2nd defendants part. I propose to give short reasons and written reasons will follow expounding on the material on which the court relies. Mr. Radcliffe for the 1st defendant supports the argument of the 2nd defendant and seeks similar orders dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with a verdict and judgment for the 1st defendant.

Mr. Tagini for the plaintiff has explained that he has been incommoded through an eye complaint and has not replied to the affidavit material on which the 2nd defendants have relied. The flaw in Mr. Tagini’s argument is that the material forming part of the 2nd defendant’s two affidavits addresses the issues raised by the plaintiff in its statement of claim in associated case cc 363/06.

The option agreement to purchase on which the plaintiff seeks to rely has been pleaded. The basis of the claim to caveatable interest has been shown by the documents exhibited in those affidavits to which I referred and the option to which the plaintiff referred is also exhibited.

The letter seeking to extend the option agreement is as Mr. Sullivan says a unilateral claim by Quitales to extend the option term without evidence of any consent of the grantor and which does not consequently affect the option agreement. The letter has not been adopted (on the plaintiff’s own pleading) by the 2nd defendant or the 1st defendant.

The payments of $70 k are referrable to the option agreement. That agreement clearly provides for a time period and the resultant effect where settlement of the sale contract is not concluded. It provides the option moneys are forfeit to the Masons. There is no plea by the plaintiff that the sale contract has been concluded. The terms of the option agreement are plain.

So far as the document which Mr. Tagini says will prove to the court otherwise, as I say, the 2nd defendant’s affidavits provide the documentation referred to in the plaintiff’s statement of claim. The letter is but that, a letter purporting to unilaterally vary an agreement but cannot affect the contractual arrangement evidenced by the earlier agreement.

The 2nd block; -56 – is subject to different considerations for the 2nd defendant is the registered proprietor. As such the proprietor is entitled to an indefeasible title. Clearly Mr. Sullivan’s argument on s. 221 of the Land and Titles Act must stand. Mr. Tagini has not been able to satisfy me on his argument that factors other than those brought to the courts attention by Mr. Sullivan, overcome the effect of s. 221. It is trite to argue the alleged fraud by public officers when no particulars are pleaded and on the face of the transfer documents, the plaintiff has been unable to point to any fraud of the 1st or 2nd defendants.

Mr. Sullivans points to a claim by the plaintiff, perhaps of a claim as unpaid vendor but while that found an echo in Mr. Tagini’s argument (for that the plaintiff points to the $70k paid subsequent to the option), a money claim does not evince an interest in land and cannot support a caveat.

For the reasons as argued by Mr. Sullivan and supported by the material read and supported by Mr. Radclyffe for the 1st defendant. I make orders in terms of the notice of motion dated 7 February 2007, of 1(4) with the exception that the plaintiff pays compensation to the 2nd defendant for wrongful maintenance of the caveats; failing agreement to be assessed.

I also give liberty to apply in respect of the compensation issue.

It follows a verdict and judgment having been given for both defendants that the defendants shall also have their costs.

THE COURT