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High Court of Solomon Islands |
HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
(PALMER CJ.)
Criminal Case Number 265 of 2006
REGINA
V
JOHN OME AND DAVID SUITI
HEARING: 22-25 March, 28-31 March, 1st April, 4-5 April, 8 April 2011
JUDGEMENT: 6 May 2011
J. Naigulevu and J. Seuika for the Crown
L. McSpedden and S. Kalu for John Ome
R. Tovosia for David Suiti
Palmer CJ.
The accuseds, John Ome ("Ome") and David Suiti ("Suiti") were each charged with 8 counts of offences. Counts (1) and (2) relate to the attempted murder of Fangidua Kirite'e and John Suifasia respectively. Count (3) was in respect of the arson charge over the burning of the buildings and structures of Fangidua Kirite'e and his family at Abuna'ai village, East Kwara'ae. Count (4) relate to the discharge of firearms in a public place; count (5) to the offence of going armed in public with two automatic assault rifles without lawful occasion and causing fear to persons within the village at Kona; count (6) possession of firearms without firearms licence; count 7 intimidation; and count 8, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Ome entered not guilty pleas to all 8 counts; Suiti entered guilty pleas on all counts save counts 1-3. The offences were alleged to have occurred on 16th September 2000 at Kona village apart from the arson offence which occurred at Abuna'ai village.
The offence of attempt to murder.
Section 215(a) of the Penal Code prescribes the offence of attempted murder as follows:
"Any person who –
(a) Attempts unlawfully to cause the death of another; ... is guilty of a felony, and shall be liable to imprisonment for life."
Section 378 defines attempt as follows:
"When a person, intending to commit an offence, begins to put his intention into execution by means adapted to its fulfilment, and manifests his intention by some overt act, but does not fulfil his intention to such an extent as to commit the offence, he is deemed to attempt to commit the offence.
It is immaterial, except so far as regards punishment, whether the offender does all that is necessary on his part for completing the commission of the offence, or whether the complete fulfilment of his intention is prevented by circumstances independent of his will, or whether he desists of his own motion from the further prosecution of his intention.
It is immaterial that by reason of circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in fact to commit the offence."
The issue is whether prosecution have established to the requisite standard, that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the crucial element of intention on the part of the defendants to kill Fangidua Kirite'e ("Kirite'e") and John Suifasia ("Suifasia"). Intention can be established by words usually in the form of threats[1] and accompanied by corresponding action, referred to as the overt act.
Evidence of intention.
Similar threats were repeated by Amota on 9 September 2000 that if they did not pay for those coconuts the MEF would come and burn their place and kill them. He also set a dead line for 13 September 2000 when they would return to collect the money.
On 13 September they attended at their place and attacked members of the Kirite'e family. Those who were involved in that attack were Luina, Kakomae and Amota. They were armed with a stick, iron bar, knife and a sling. David Kirite'e lost two of his front teeth from a sling shot, Suifasia suffered an injury to his arm from being hit with the iron bar and Kirite'e dazed on the back of his head also with the bar. Ome and Suiti however were not involved in that incident or the issue of any previous threats. The prosecution however have sought to link Ome by marriage to the Luina family; he married the daughter of Luina's sister. Suiti too was connected as a close relative; he is Luina's nephew.
Prosecution's case is that the events of 16 September 2000 should be viewed together with the earlier threats that made by members of the Luina family and that Ome and Suiti were engaged or became involved through their close association with them. They were also members of the MEF.
On 16 September 2000, on arrival at the village of Kona, a warning shot was fired by Ome, followed immediately by a demand for the payment of $1,800 for compensation for coconut trees that had been felled, and a threat that they would burn their village and kill them if they did not give the money. I am satisfied that the events of the 16th September 2000 were related to previous threats and that Ome and Suiti became embroiled in that long standing dispute by their involvement that day.
The critical question however remains whether on that day they had intention to kill or came with intention to kill. I have had opportunity to carefully assess the evidence on this issue but do not find that prosecution have established to the requisite standard that at that point of time they had the necessary intent to kill. I am not satisfied they can be described as killers and came with intention to kill any member of the Kirite'e family. There is no evidence to suggest that at that point of time anyone in particular was targeted or the focus of that visit.
The threats that had been earlier issued were only general threats. The threat made by Ome on their arrival that day was also a general threat that he was going to shoot them all if they did not give the money. This in my view is relevant to the charge of attempted murder which relate specifically to two members of the Kirite'e family and not others.
This case can be contrasted with the case of Salafilamo v. Regina (ibid), where the threat issued by the defendant (Salafilamo) was specific to the victim (Eto'o Gwaoka), that he would kill her if she left him and to kill anyone who tried stopping him from marrying her.
The facts in this case showed that when the rest of the Kirite'e family fled out of fear for safety, one of the sons, Stephen Mani ("Mani") actually remained behind. They did not shoot him however and instead pursued the other two who ran off. If there was an intention to kill at that time, there is no reason why they did not shoot Mani who was standing right in front of them. This in my view does not support the submission of a nexus between the threats and intent to kill.
Also I find that because the threat issued was conditional; if they did not give the money demanded, and that everything happened so fast, there was hardly time for Kirite'e to respond, whether to accept or refuse. There is no evidence to suggest that there had been a refusal to the demand which would have given cause to the defendants to shoot them. The nexus between the demand, the threat and intent would seem to break down in that regard, if not ambiguous. It appears that as soon as the warning shot was fired and threat made, Kirite'e and his family ran off immediately, apart from Stephen Mani. I find insufficient evidence to support Prosecution's case that they formed the intent there and then, to kill those who were running away.
This raises the next crucial question whether at any other time Ome and Suiti formed the intent to kill, whether at the time they gave pursuit or when they fired aimed shots at Kirite'e and Suifasia.
There is un-contradicted evidence which showed that Ome fired a shot at Kirite'e but did not give chase. It was Suiti who gave chase instead. Did Ome intend to kill Kirite'e when he aimed his rifle at him and fired a shot? Taking aim and firing a shot with reckless indifference whether death is caused or not, where death does not occur, is not evidence of intent[2]. In this particular instance, it is my considered view that there is insufficient nexus between the intent and the overt act complained of. I have pointed out during submissions that Ome could have shot straight at them when they arrived at the village but did not.
Prosecution however have submitted that the warning shot could have been fired to give opportunity to Ome and Suiti and the others to round them up before killing them. There is nothing on the evidence though to support such submission. It could equally have been so that they would gather them to talk to them. In my view the evidence does not support the submission of Prosecution of an intent to kill, for not only was one shot fired but when Suiti caught up with Kirite'e, he did not shoot him, even though the opportunity to do so was there. Even when the rifle was pointed at his head, I am not satisfied it had established that Suiti was going to shoot him at that moment. In his evidence Kirite'e had told the court that he grabbed hold of the barrel of the rifle because he thought Suiti was about to shoot him then. He says that a struggle ensued and in the melee which followed a shot was discharged. I am not satisfied however that the shot was intended to kill him. It is equally possible the shot was discharged as a result of the struggle that ensued. This is consistent with the events that transpired thereafter because after the struggle, Kirite'e was dragged towards their vehicle on the road. Along the way Talen Suiti kicked Kirite'e on the leg and Suiti hit him with the butt of the rifle on his ribs. There was opportunity again for him to shoot him at that time but he did not do so. Suiti has pleaded guilty to the charge of assault occasioning bodily harm in respect of that assault.
The charge against Ome and Suiti of attempted murder in relation to Kirite'e therefore has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and they must be both acquitted of that charge.
The evidence before this court was that these were aimed shots directed at him. The issue however is whether it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that these aimed shots were intended to kill? Prosecution relies on the earlier threats and threat issued that day, the relentless pursuit of the two victims, in this case Suifasia and the aimed shots; in Suifasia's case it was two shots. I am not satisfied however that prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that there was sufficient nexus between the threats, the pursuit and the aimed shots, as being necessarily consistent with and reflective of an intent to kill. Apart from the threats there was nothing else said which would support prosecution's case of an intent to kill. The shots could equally have been intended to frighten him so that he does not run away or to stop him from getting away, including merely to injure him but not to kill. I have pointed out in this judgement that taking aim and firing a shot with reckless indifference whether death is caused or not, where death does not occur, is not evidence of intent[3]. Accordingly I cannot be satisfied that prosecution had established the element of intent to kill and dismiss this charge also against both defendants.
The prosecution's case for arson is primarily based on circumstantial evidence. They say that after the group had attacked the Kirite'e family at Kona village, they went back to Auki and dropped off there before catching a separate lift in another vehicle driven by Ronny Maefasia ("Maefasia") who dropped them off at Foubaba village. From there they walked to Abuna'ai village, razed it to the ground, shot one of Kirite'e's pig, took his shell money (called in the local dialect "Baniau ono") and returned through Foubaba village again. They were seen on their return carrying a dead white pig. The prosecution say this white pig belonged to Kirite'e which was left at his village when they vacated the property on 13 September and went to stay at Kona village. The Baniau ono was seen when it was presented by Amota at the supposedly reconciliation ceremony on 18 September 2000 and identified by Kirite'e and his family as the one they had left locked in their store. They say it was taken by the same group at their village when they went to burn it down on the 16th September 2000.
The evidence. I find the following facts established beyond reasonable doubt.
4.1 Although Samani did not recognise these two defendants, he knew and recognised Salole, one of the members in the group. Salole was also one of the persons that had accompanied them to Kona village earlier that day. Samani saw him at Foubaba village with a group of men, including two whom he described as "militants" carrying a "gun" each. This is entirely consistent with the description of these two defendants who were seen earlier at Kona as the only two carrying an assault rifle each.
4.2 He also gave un-contradicted evidence that Salole told him that they were going to burn Abuna'ai village. He also saw two containers of what he believed was petrol which they carried.
4.3 This witness also saw them returning later carrying a dead white pig with them, which is consistent with the evidence of Kirite'e that he had two pigs, one white in colour which he had left behind at Abuna'ai village. The description that it was a big pig coincides with his description of a grown up pig.
There is no evidence to suggest that the village was burnt anytime before that or after Sunday 17 September. When their group left Kona village on the morning of 16 September 2000, Abuna'ai village could not have been burnt down as yet, because they would not have issued any threats to burn the village if it had already been burnt.
Amota also presented a shell money but which Kirite'e and his family later identified as their own baniau ono which they had left locked behind in their store. I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the shell money belonged to them. How they came into possession of that shell money further supports prosecution's case that they somehow had involvement in the burning of Abuna'ai village and no one else. That shell money had been locked up in their store when they left and no one else could have accessed it apart from those who had gone to destroy their village. No other evidence has been adduced other than mere assertions, that the shell money was anything apart from the one belonging to the Kirite'e family. The identification of their shell money used in the reconciliation ceremony is consistent with the prosecution version they were responsible for the burning of Abuna'ai village.
ORDERS OF THE COURT:
i. Arson contrary to section 319(a) of the Penal Code;
ii. Discharging firearms in a public place contrary to section 44 of the Firearms and Ammunitions Act (cap. 80);
iii. Going armed in public contrary to section 83 of the Penal Code (cap. 26);
iv. Possession of firearms without firearms licence contrary to section 5(2) of the Firearms and Ammunition Act (cap. 80); and
v. Intimidation contrary to section 231(2) of the Penal Code (cap. 26).
The Court.
[1] See Salafilamo v. Reginam [1995] SBCA 8; CA-CRAC 10/94 (12-04-95), at page 2, para. 4
[2] See Alister v. The Queen [1984] HCA 85; (1984) 154 CLR 404, 50 ALR 41, per Gibbs CJ, who quoted with the approval this statement in R. v. Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 per Lord Goddard (at 146-147).
[3] See Alister v. The Queen [1984] HCA 85; (1984) 154 CLR 404, 50 ALR 41, per Gibbs CJ, (ibid)
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