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Bo'osae v Gapirongo [2025] SBHC 164; HCSI-CC 350 of 2025 (26 November 2025)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 350 of 2025

BETWEEN:

BEN TO’OROMOI BO’OSAE
(Representing the family of late Barnabas Bo’osae of Tawatana village, Arosi 1, West Makira)
Claimant

AND:

DAVID GAPIRONGO, ALFRED KARIBONGI, HARRY DREW MAORI
First Defendant

AND:

MADALENE THOMPSON
Second Defendant

AND:

MARY CHOW
Third Defendant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF LANDS
(Represented by the Attorney Generals Chambers)
Fourth Defendant

Date of Hearing: 26 November 2025
Date of Ruling: 26 November 2025

Counsel;
Mr R Tovosia for the Claimant
Ms A Willy for the First Defendant
Mr J To’ofilu for the Second and Third Defendant
Mr S Lapo for the Fourth Defendant

Nott; PJ

RULING ON APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT CLAIM

This is an application by the First, Second, Third and Fourth Applicants to strike out the Statement of Claim filed on 26 August 2025. The application is brought pursuant to r 9.75(a) and (b) of the Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007, on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious, and that the Claimant lacks locus standi.

Background

1. A Statement of Claim was filed by the Respondent on 26 August 2025.
2. The Respondent, as claimant in the substantive proceeding, pleads that Waimarae land, now Parcel 237-002-1, was originally purchased by the British Solomon Islands Protectorate administration in 1912 from the customary owners, and that a Fixed Term Estate was later granted in 1934 to Mrs Yee Lin. It is alleged that Mrs Yee Lin’s son, Richard Leong, subsequently administered her estate.
3. From about 1986, the Respondent’s grandfather, the late Mr Bo’osae, is said to have worked in a longstanding business relationship with Mr Leong and to have contributed substantial labour and resources to the development of Parcel 237-002-1. The Respondent pleads that various debts owed by Mr Leong to Mr Bo’osae remain unpaid. In 1994, Mr Bo’osae allegedly paid SBD 20,000 to Mr Leong as part of an agreement for the Fixed Term Estate to be transferred to him, but no transfer occurred.
4. In June 1996, Mr Bo’osae lodged an application with the Commissioner of Lands for the Perpetual Estate, supported in writing by Mr Leong. The application was never determined. Instead, in November 1996, the Perpetual Estate was transferred to the First Applicant. The Respondent alleges that the First Applicant, then said to be an officer of the Ministry of Lands with an interest in the land, procured the transfer through fraud, mistake, conflict of interest and procedural impropriety.
5. The Respondent further pleads that in 2003 Mr Leong executed a power of attorney authorising the Respondent and others to develop and manage the land, and that the Respondent has since maintained the land and continued the obligations undertaken by Mr Bo’osae. Following Mr Leong’s death, a later power of attorney was granted by the administrator of Yee Lin’s estate to the Fourth Applicant, who is said to have interfered with the Respondent’s occupation.
6. The Respondent contends that Mr Leong held any interest in the land on a constructive trust for Mr Bo’osae; that the 1996 transfer was unlawful for want of procedural fairness; and that, through proprietary estoppel or licence, it would be inequitable to deny the Respondent’s continued occupation and interest in Parcel 237-002-1.

Application for Strike Out

7. The Applicants seek to strike out the proceeding on four grounds: (i) that the Respondent lacks standing, as he seeks to assert alleged rights said to belong to his deceased grandfather without any grant of probate or letters of administration; (ii) that the claim is frivolous and vexatious, particularly as against Mr Gapirongo, who is said not to have been employed in the Ministry at the material time; (iii) that the allegations of fraud and mistake are unsupported and unparticularised; and (iv) that the claim is statute-barred, the impugned transfer having occurred in 1996.
8. Part 9 of the Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 provides two distinct regimes under which a proceeding may be struck out. Rules 9.71- 9.74 address circumstances where a claimant has failed to take the procedural steps required to progress a matter or has not complied with a court order, including where no step has been taken for 6 or 12 months. Those provisions concern want of prosecution and non-compliance. There is no suggestion in the present case that the Respondent has failed to prosecute this proceeding or has disobeyed any order of the Court. Accordingly, r 9.71-9.74 are not engaged.
9. Although the Applicants frame their application as one to “strike out” the claim, the four grounds relied upon do not concern delay or procedural default. They go instead to the substantive viability of the proceeding. In substance, the application is properly brought under r 9.75, which empowers the Court, on the application of a party or on its own initiative, to dismiss a proceeding where it is frivolous or vexatious, where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or where it is an abuse of process. Rule 9.76 provides that the Court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application under r 9.75.
10. One of the grounds advanced, lack of standing, raises a threshold question. Remedies are correlative with rights, and a proceeding brought by a person with no legally recognisable right or authority cannot, as a matter of law, disclose a reasonable cause of action for the purposes of r 9.75(b), even if all pleaded facts are assumed to be true. It is therefore appropriate to consider the issue of locus standi first, as its absence is dispositive of whether any maintainable cause of action is disclosed at all.

First Applicants Submissions

11. The First Applicant is the registered proprietor of the Perpetual Estate over land known as Parcel 237-002-1, Makira Province. The Second Applicant, Ms Madalene Thompson, is the administrator of the Fixed Term Estate over Parcel 237-002-1. The Third Applicant is an adult citizen of Solomon Islands and is alleged to hold a power of attorney in relation to the Fixed Term Estate. The Fourth Applicant in this proceeding is the Commissioner of Lands.
12. In terms of locus standi, the First Applicant submits that the Respondent does not assert any rights of his own. Rather, he seeks to advance the alleged rights and interests of his late grandfather and adopted father, Mr Bo’osae, in relation to the Perpetual Estate and Fixed Term Estate over Parcel 237-002-1. However, the Respondent has not obtained any grant of probate or letters of administration authorising him to administer or litigate on behalf of Mr Bo’osae’s estate. In the absence of such authority, he cannot lawfully pursue the rights or interests of the deceased.
13. The First Applicant further submits that the claim is vexatious because the allegations made against Mr David Gapirongo are demonstrably unfounded. The Respondent alleges that Mr Gapirongo, as an officer within the Ministry of Lands in 1996, improperly procured the transfer of the Perpetual Estate. However, the sworn statements of Mr Gapirongo filed on 14 and 31 October 2025, together with Exhibit BT-2 to the sworn statement of the Respondent, establish that at the relevant time he was employed by Solomon Housing Limited, not the Ministry of Lands. The Applicants contend that this evidence shows the allegation is baseless, made without any factual foundation, and brought for ulterior purposes, rendering the proceeding vexatious and warranting dismissal under r 9.75(a). This conclusion is underscored by the Respondent’s own material: Exhibit BT-2, relied upon by the Respondent himself, corroborates that Mr Gapirongo was not employed by the Ministry at the material time.
14. The First Applicant also submits that the pleadings are insufficient to disclose any viable allegation of fraud. Paragraphs 10, 15 and 22 of the Statement of Claim contain only broad assertions that the 1996 transfer was procured through “fraud”, “mistake” or “unprocedural” conduct, but they do not identify the acts said to constitute fraud, when they occurred, what representations were made, or how any Applicant engaged in dishonest conduct. As the authorities make clear, an allegation of fraud must be pleaded with particularity and must demonstrate that the registration of the proprietor involved dishonest behaviour. No such particulars are provided here. The submissions argue that, in the absence of any pleaded facts identifying the alleged fraudulent acts, the Statement of Claim discloses no maintainable cause of action in fraud, and therefore these allegations cannot stand.
15. The First Applicant finally submits that the claim is statute-barred. The allegations against the First Applicant, namely the alleged improper transfer of the Perpetual Estate in November 1996, concern events said to have occurred 29 years ago. Under s 9(2) of the Limitation Act (Cap 18), any action for the recovery of land must be brought within 12 years. The pleaded matters therefore fall well outside the statutory limitation period. In addition, the doctrine of laches applies: the Respondent offers no explanation for the extraordinary and prejudicial delay in asserting rights said to belong to his late grandfather. Equity will not assist a party who has slept on his rights. On this basis, the Applicants contend that any cause of action arising from the 1996 transfer is now extinguished and cannot be maintained.

Second and Third Applicant

16. The Second and Third Applicants adopt the submissions of the First Applicant and further submit that the claim against them must also fail because it rests entirely on an alleged understanding between the late Mr Bo’osae and Mr Leong. Even accepting the Respondent’s account at its highest, Mr Leong was not, at any material time, the registered proprietor of Parcel 237-002-1, nor did he hold the Perpetual Estate, the Fixed Term Estate, or any other legal or equitable interest capable of conferring rights upon Mr Bo’osae. The assertion that Mr Leong acted as “administrator” of the land is denied, and no evidence is produced to support it. Absent a legally recognisable interest in the land, Mr Leong could not have entered into any binding agreement or understanding capable of granting Mr Bo’osae rights over the property.
17. The Second and Third Applicants submit that accordingly, any claim derived from Mr Leong is fundamentally misconceived and cannot be sustained. Further, even if such an arrangement had existed, any cause of action said to arise from dealings in the 1980s and 1990s would now be statute-barred under s 5 of the Limitation Act, and cannot be pursued against the Second or Third Applicants.
18. They further submit that the pleading of fraud falls well short of the legal requirements. Fraud must be specifically pleaded and fully particularised; the Respondent must identify what conduct is alleged to be fraudulent, when it occurred, how it was carried out, and what representations or actions amounted to dishonesty. Here, under the heading of “Fraud” in the substantive claim, only two short paragraphs appear. Paragraph 22 merely asserts, in broad and conclusory terms, that the First Applicant procured the 1996 transfer through fraud while “serving in the Ministry of Lands”. No particulars are provided.
19. The Second and Third Applicants point out that, on the evidence, the First Applicant was not employed in the Ministry of Lands at the relevant time, and therefore could not have engaged in the acts alleged. Moreover, even if he had been a serving officer, that fact alone could not transform a lawful acquisition of land into fraud. On the Respondent’s own case, the pleaded conduct could equally describe a lawful transfer. The allegations therefore lack any factual foundation, fail to meet the pleading standard required for fraud, and cannot sustain a cause of action.

Fourth Applicant

20. The Fourth Applicant adopt the submissions of the other Applicants as they apply to his client.

Summary of Respondents Submissions

21. The Respondent denies that he lacks standing. He states that he is the adopted son of his late grandfather, Mr Bo’osae, and has been directly involved in the management and development of PN 237-002-1 since childhood. He contends that his standing is not solely derived from his adopted father. He says that he was also an employee and agent of Mr Leong, who personally entrusted him with authority and appointed him as attorney, authorising him to deal with matters relating to the parcel of land.
22. The Respondent states that on 1 July 1985, Mr Leong appointed Mr Bo’osae as manager of the land, and that under Mr Leong’s authorisation Mr Bo’osae developed the land by planting coconuts and cocoa and constructing houses. The Respondent says that Mr Bo’osae was related by blood to the original landowners.
23. The Respondent understands that the current legal ownership of the land remains with Mrs Yee Lin as holder of the Fixed Term Estate. He says that he and his parents continued to assist Mr Bo’osae in developing the land.
24. The Respondent submits that he has standing to bring the claim on two bases. First, he argues that he holds standing through an enduring power of attorney allegedly granted to him by Mr Leong in 2003, which he says authorised him to manage and deal with the land on behalf of the late Mrs Yee Lin. He relies on exhibits said to show that a power of attorney was registered and that Mr Leong appointed him as attorney.
25. Secondly, the Respondent submits that he holds standing by virtue of an equitable interest in Parcel 237-002-1. He claims that he, his parents, and his late grandfather worked on and improved the land over many years, planting crops, maintaining the property, and building structures, and that these contributions give rise to an equitable right or interest sufficient to allow him to bring the proceeding.
26. In terms of the allegations about wrongful dealing with the land by the First Applicant, the Respondent submits that whether Mr Gapirongo was an officer of the Ministry in 1996 is a disputed factual question that cannot be resolved on a strike-out application. He maintains that Mr Gapirongo’s involvement created an opportunity for conflict of interest central to the allegations of fraud in the registration of the land under the First Applicant.
27. The Respondent contends that the pleadings disclose sufficient particulars to identify the nature of the alleged fraud and mistake, and that any further particulars can be provided at trial. Any insufficiency of detail, he says, is not a ground for striking out.
28. As to limitation, it is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that, pursuant to s 17 of the Limitation Act (fraud, mistake or concealment), the limitation period begins to run only when the claimant first became aware of the fraud or could reasonably have discovered it. It is said that only eight years have elapsed since 2017, which falls within the twelve-year period under s 9(2).

Response by First Applicant

29. In reply, the First Applicant submits that Parcel 237-002-1 is registered land, and that any person seeking to assert rights or interests in relation to that land must do so through a lawful grant of probate or letters of administration where those rights arise through a deceased estate. As the Respondent has not obtained any administrative order in respect of the estate of his late grandfather, Mr Bo’osae, he has no legal standing to bring this proceeding.
30. The First Applicant notes that paragraphs 7–24 of the Statement of Claim concern alleged rights said to belong to the late Mr Bo’osae, not to the Respondent personally. The Respondent is therefore attempting to assert rights of a deceased person without any authority to administer the estate. The only paragraphs relating to the Respondent personally are paragraphs 24–25, which refer to a power of attorney said to have been granted by Mr Leong. The First Applicant submits that the power of attorney did not confer ownership of the land on Mr Leong, nor did he ever hold any estate or interest capable of being transferred. Only the registered proprietors, the First and Second Applicants, could lawfully convey interests in the Fixed Term Estate or Perpetual Estate. Accordingly, the claim must be dismissed for want of standing.
31. The First Applicant further submits that the Respondent’s evidence regarding the timing of his knowledge is inconsistent. Although the Respondent asserts in paragraph 4 of his sworn statement that he became aware of the transfer only in 2007, his submissions state that he discovered “irregularities” in 2003, when he was formally appointed under the alleged power of attorney.
32. Ultimately, the Applicants maintain that, in addition to the absence of standing, the claim is statute-barred under the Limitation Act, and should be dismissed.

Response by Second and third Defendant’s

33. The Second Applicant submits that the Respondent cannot rely on any alleged power of attorney to establish standing. The letter dated 2 December 1997, relied upon by the Respondent as “confirmation” of a power of attorney, does not identify who held the power, nor does it establish that Mr Leong was acting as attorney in 1996, the year in which some of the pleaded events are said to have occurred. On the evidence, there is at least a one-year gap during which Mr Leong may not have held any power of attorney at all.
34. Counsel for the Respondent referred to Exhibit BT-11, an enduring power of attorney purportedly granted under s 38 of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act. The Second Applicant submits that s 38 expressly limits the scope of such powers: an enduring power of attorney cannot extend to, dispose of, transfer, or create any legal rights in land. Accordingly, even if the Respondent had held an enduring power of attorney, it could not lawfully confer any rights or interests in the land in question.
35. Finally, the Second Applicant submits that any proposed amendment to the Statement of Claim would be futile. The defects are not matters of pleading but matters of legal incapacity. Without a grant of probate or letters of administration for the estate of the late Mr Bo’osae, the Respondent cannot acquire standing under any formulation of the claim. The proceeding is fundamentally incurable, and no amendment can overcome the absence of authority to administer the estate or assert the deceased’s rights. The claim must therefore be struck out in its entirety.

Locus standi

36. The threshold question for the Court to determine is whether the Respondent has standing to bring this proceeding. The authorities are clear.
37. In Ombudsman v Attorney-General [1987] SILR 75, the Court held that a claimant must show that his interest is “peculiarly affected” by the impugned conduct, and that standing will not be granted where the interest is “too indirect or insubstantial”.
38. These principles are further supported by the Court of Appeal in Simbe v East Choiseul Area Council [1999] SBCA 9, which confirmed that the High Court cannot be used to bypass proper forums or to advance unrecognised rights.
39. In Veno v Jino (Civil Case 152/2003), the claimants lacked standing because they produced no evidence of ownership from land courts or chiefs. The Court held that bare assertions of ownership are insufficient to ground relief.
40. In Joshua v Valahoana Company Integrated Development [2013] SBHC 113, the Court reaffirmed that standing requires evidence that the claimant’s interests are peculiarly affected, and that ownership must be supported by a chief’s decision or land court determination.
41. In Malaita Maasina Forum Trust Board Inc v Attorney-General [2014] SBHC 12, the Court struck out the entire proceeding under r 9.75 on the basis that the claim was frivolous, vexatious and disclosed no reasonable cause of action, emphasising that a claimant must demonstrate standing grounded in a recognisable legal right:
    • “The principles governing the issue of locus standi are clear. It has always been an important limitation on the availability of remedies that they are awarded only to those who have sufficient standing. The law starts from the position that remedies are correlative with rights and that only those whose rights are at risk are eligible to come to court and seek remedies and no one else... This simply means that only persons whose rights are under threat have standing to seek redress. Otherwise, they do not have that standing...”
42. The Respondent’s own sworn statement confirms the absence of any legally recognisable interest capable of conferring standing. First, none of the exhibits demonstrate that he holds any title, estate, licence, or registrable interest in Parcel 237-002-1. On the contrary, his sworn statement repeatedly affirms that the 1934 Fixed Term Estate remains vested in Mrs Yee Lin, and nothing in the material suggests that the Respondent, or his late grandfather Mr Bo’osae, ever acquired that estate or any derivative lawful interest.
43. Secondly, the evidence establishes that the Respondent’s case is brought entirely through the alleged rights of Mr Bo’osae, relying upon historic dealings, managerial roles, and labour contributions. However, the Respondent produces no grant of probate, no letters of administration, and no document authorising him to act on behalf of Mr Bo’osae’ estate. Under Veno v Jino, bare assertions of lineage or involvement do not constitute evidence of authority or ownership.
44. Thirdly, parts of the sworn statement rely on inference rather than evidence. Several key assertions, particularly those concerning historic dealings and the status of earlier occupants, are unsupported by any primary material. However, even if those assumptions were correct, they would not confer any legally recognisable interest on the Respondent, nor would they substitute for the required proof of title, authority, or estate administration necessary to establish locus standi, consistent with Ombudsman v Attorney-General and Joshua v Valahoana.
45. Fourthly, none of the exhibited documents confer on the Respondent any right of suit in his own capacity.
46. Finally, the allegation that the current Perpetual Estate was obtained under “questionable circumstances” is unsupported by a single document or fact, and therefore falls squarely within the reasoning of Malaita Maasina Forum, where claims founded on unsubstantiated assertions were held to disclose no enforceable right and were struck out. Taken as a whole, the Respondent’s evidence does not establish standing; it affirmatively confirms that he has none.
47. The Perpetual Estate and Fixed Term Estate over Parcel 237-002-1 are registered land interests. It is uncontroversial that the First Applicant is the legal owner of the Perpetual Estate and the Second Applicant is the administrator of the Fixed Term Estate.
48. Here, the Respondent does not hold the Fixed Term Estate, the Perpetual Estate, or any registered interest in Parcel 237-002-1; he brings the claim not on his own rights but through his late grandfather, Mr Bo’osae, yet he has no grant of probate, letters of administration, or authority to assert the deceased’s estate rights. Further, even if the Respondent sought to bring the claim in his own right, he identifies no personal proprietary or equitable interest capable of sustaining standing. In either case, no legally cognisable foundation for locus standi is established.
49. The Respondent seeks to overcome this difficulty by relying on an enduring power of attorney and an alleged equitable interest. As to the power of attorney, the evidence relied upon, principally BT-7 and BT-11, does not establish the foundation required for standing. BT-7 merely shows that a power of attorney was registered but does not identify the attorney. The bar-table assertion that it was granted by Mr Leong is unsupported by any documentary evidence before this court. BT-11 shows that in 2003 Mr Leong purported to execute an enduring power of attorney in favour of the Respondent. Even accepting that at its highest, an attorney may only exercise the powers actually held by the donor. Mr Leong did not possess the Perpetual Estate, the Fixed Term Estate, or any proprietary interest in Parcel 237-002-1. Accordingly, he lacked legal capacity to transmit, create, or authorise the assertion of any land rights on behalf of the Respondent. A power of attorney, enduring or otherwise, cannot manufacture standing where the donor himself has no estate or interest to confer.
50. Even if Mr Leong had been a person entitled to a grant of administration for the Yee Lin estate, the enduring power of attorney relied upon could not of itself vest the Respondent with authority to act for that estate. The probate provision invoked by the Respondent does not operate automatically: it permits the Court to issue a limited grant of administration to the attorney of an overseas executor or administrator, but only upon application and only by court order. There is no evidence that such limited grant was ever sought or made. Without a court-issued grant, a power of attorney cannot authorise the administration of an estate or the commencement of proceedings on its behalf. Accordingly, even on the Respondent’s most favourable hypothesis, the alleged power of attorney does not confer locus standi.
51. As to the claim of an equitable interest, the Respondent suggests that his work, occupation and improvements give rise to a proprietary equity. That submission cannot be sustained in the context of registered land. Under s 110 and 114 of the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133), the rights of the registered proprietor are indefeasible except as expressly provided in the Act. Improvements, occupation and personal contributions do not fall within any of the Act’s recognised overriding interests. No promise, representation or assurance by the registered owner is alleged; no contract is pleaded; and the statutory requirements for prescription under s 224 are wholly unmet. As consistently affirmed by the authorities, including Bird v Registrar of Titles [1980–81] SILR 47, improvements alone cannot generate an equitable proprietary interest capable of defeating title or conferring standing.
52. No authority has been cited to me in which improvements or developing the land in themselves have been held to produce an equitable proprietary interest capable of defeating the registered title or conferring standing. The courts have consistently required either (a) compliance with the statutory prescription requirements; or (b) a recognised equitable foundation such as a promise or assurance by the registered proprietor, reliance, and detriment of the kind required for proprietary estoppel, or a contract for the sale or transfer of land supported by acts of part performance. No such promise, representation, agreement, reliance, or detriment is pleaded or suggested in the present case. On the Respondent’s own account, his activities on the land were motivated by his belief in his late grandfather’s historic involvement with the land, not by any conduct of the current registered owner.
53. Accordingly, neither the alleged power of attorney nor the asserted improvements give rise to any legally recognisable right or interest capable of grounding standing.

Determination limited to Locus Standi

54. The Applicants advance four grounds for striking out the claim: lack of standing, frivolity and vexation, absence of particularised fraud, and statutory bar. However, it is unnecessary for me to traverse the remaining grounds because the issue of locus standi is dispositive. The Respondent brings this proceeding entirely through rights said to belong to his late grandfather, Mr Bo’osae, yet he holds no grant of probate or letters of administration, and therefore no legal authority to assert or litigate any right or cause of action said to vest in the deceased.
55. His own sworn statement confirms that he has no registered interest in the land, no recognised customary interest, and no document conferring personal rights capable of supporting a claim. Under the authorities of Ombudsman v Attorney-General, Joshua v Valahoana, Veno v Jino, and Malaita Maasina Forum, the absence of a legally recognisable right is fatal: a claimant who has no right cannot maintain a proceeding. On standing alone, the Statement of Claim is not maintainable, and the proceeding must therefore be struck out under r 9.75(b) without the need to consider the remaining grounds.
56. For completeness, nothing in this decision should be taken to cast doubt on the honesty, diligence, or propriety of any person who has worked on, developed, or administered Parcel 237-002-1 over many years. The sole basis for this determination is the Respondent’s lack of standing in law; the Court makes no findings on the merits of the historic dealings between the parties. This ruling does not preclude any properly authorised person or estate representative from pursuing whatever rights the law may recognise. The sole basis for striking out the proceeding is the Respondent’s lack of standing.

Orders

1. The application by the First, Second, Third and Fourth Applicants to strike out the Statement of Claim filed on 26 August 2025 is granted.
2. The Statement of Claim filed on 26 August 2025 is struck out in its entirety pursuant to r 9.75(b) of the Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 on the ground that the Respondent lacks locus standi and the proceeding discloses no reasonable cause of action.
3. The proceeding, Civil Action 350/2025, is dismissed.

By the Court
Hon. Justice Gina Maree Nott
Puisne Judge