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Talengemalefo v Lamani [2025] SBHC 59; HCSI-CC 410 of 2022 (8 May 2025)

HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOLOMON ISLANDS
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Case No. 410 of 2022

BETWEEN:

LAMANI LAUTA TALENGEMALEFO AND TUITA KOFELA
(Representing Lolobuma tribe)
Claimants

AND:

JOHN BEUI LAMANI AND FRANK DAOGA
(Representing Fogu tribe)
First Defendants

AND

COMMISSIONER OF LANDS
Second Defendant

AND:

REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Third Defendant

Date of Hearing: 8 May 2025
Date of Extempore Ruling: 8 May 2025

Mr. F. S. Kaki for the Claimants
Mr. S. Toito’ona for the First Defendants
Mr. H. Lapo for the Second and Third Defendants

RULING

AULANGA; PJ:

1. In this application, I will determine whether the Claimants’ category C claim filed on 15^th September 2022 for rectification of title in respect of a portion of a customary land in Manaoba Island in Malaita, acquired and registered as PE No. 135-005-1 under the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133) approximately 13 years ago, and permanent injunction to restrain the First Defendants from carrying out developments on the said registered land, should be allowed to proceed or be dismissed on the basis that it is a frivolous and vexatious proceeding, or for disclosure of no cause of action or is an abuse of the Court’s process under Rule 9.75 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.
2. The application is filed by the Second and Third Defendants and supported by sworn statements. The First Defendants support the application. The Claimants contest the application and filed relevant documents to support their case.

Background facts

3. The undisputed facts showed that in 2011, the land was acquired through an acquisition process under Part V of the Land and Titles Act (Cap 133). The Acquisition Officer made his determination and identified the rightful trustees of the land. The names of the trustees were recorded in the Perpetual Estate Register annexed “LLT 4” of the First-Named Claimant's sworn statement filed on 11^th September 2024.
4. In 2012, it was formally registered as Perpetual Estate No. 135-005-1 (PE: 135-005-1). This determination was not appealed within the statutory period of 3 months as prescribed under section 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act.
5. The Claimants, after a period of over 11 years, filed this proceeding in the High Court relying on a 2022 decision of the Baefua Council of Chiefs purporting to recognise them as the true customary owners of the land. They ask this Court to rectify the title in the name of their Lolobuma tribe with a consequential order to restrain the First Defendants from undertaking any development activities on the land.
6. Based on the facts described, all the Defendants contend that this proceeding should be struck out on the grounds outlined at paragraph 1 above.

Issues for determination

7. From the materials, the pertinent issues for me to determine are: (i) whether the Claimants’ claim is barred due to failure to appeal within the statutory timeframe; (ii) whether the claim is frivolous and vexatious, or does not disclose any cause of action, or is an abuse of the Court’s process; and (iii) whether the Baefua’s Chiefs’ decision can override a lawfully registered title in PE: 135-005-1 under the Land and Titles Act.

Court’s analysis and findings
Claim barred due to failure to appeal within the statutory timeframe

8. The land in question was registered as PE: 135-005-1 through the acquisition process. It therefore loses its customary nature by virtue of registration under the Land and Titles Act. In Poso v Kuvia [2014] 98, the Court said at paragraph 10:
   • “The law is clear that on registration, customary land loses its customary nature and becomes registered land so that ownership is no longer determined on the basis of previous ownership of the land in custom but on the fact of registration. In other words, the register is everything so that the person whose name appears in the register is the owner of the land. This is what is now known as the Torrens system of land ownership”.
9. To defeat the title, it has to be considered in the manner prescribed under the Land and Titles Act.
10. Section 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act provides as follows:
    • “(1) Any person who is aggrieved by any act or determination of the Acquisition Officer may within three months from the date of the record or determination appeal to a Magistrate's Court and such court may make such order as it considers just.”
11. The Acquisition Officer’s determination, if unchallenged within the time prescribed by section 66 (1) of the Act above became final and binding.
12. The doctrine of finality in administrative lawful decisions is a foundational legal principle, ensuring certainty and stability in land registration processes, especially in Solomon Islands where customary land tenure is intertwined with statutory law.
13. The determination in question was made on 14^th March 2011. No appeal was filed by the Claimants within the three-month timeframe or thereafter. Thus, if the statutory appeal process was available and not pursued by the Claimants, they cannot later seek an alternative remedy to indirectly overturn the determination of the Acquisition Officer. This is especially so when the time lapse herein is extreme, that is, 11 years. The determination of the Acquisition Officer, therefore, in my view, attained finality in June 2011, and the registration in 2012 gave legal effect to the acquisition.
14. In this case, section 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act provides a specific route for the Claimants to challenge the Acquisition Officer’s determination by way of an appeal to the Magistrates Court. They cannot bypass that process by filing a separate proceeding in a different forum, especially after they had failed to exhaust this prescribed statutory process. The Claimants’ attempt to re-litigate this matter more than a decade later, in my view, falls well outside the period permitted by section 66 (1) of the Land and Titles Act, and is contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
15. Put another way, what the Claimants seek is, in effect, a review and reversal of the Acquisition Officer’s decision made in 2011, though not an appeal or judicial review proceeding, but by filing of a claim for rectification of title at the High Court. This amounts to a collateral attack on the finality of the decision made under the Land and Titles Act by the Acquisition Officer. This Court will discourage such practice, as it in effect undermines the rule of law, the administrative finality of the decision, and the integrity of statutory processes that resulted in the registration of the land under consideration.

Frivolity, lack of cause of action, and abuse of the Court’s process

16. Rule 9.75 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 states:
    • “9.75 If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings:
    • (a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious; or
    • (b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or
    • (c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court;
    • the court may, on the application of a party or on its own initiative, order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim”.
17. A proceeding is caught under Rule 9.75 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 when it lacks merit or is brought for improper purposes, or causes unnecessary hardship to the other party without legal basis. In Beni v Karena Heights [2019] SBHC 73, referred to by counsel Lapo for the Second and Third Defendants, the Court said:
    • “To say a claim is frivolous and vexatious means, the claim lacks merit and was brought for an ulterior purpose or is devoid of all merit and cannot succeed and that no reasonable person could properly conclude that the grievance is bonafide”.
18. In Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1981] UKHL 13; [1982] AC 529, Lord Diplock noted that attempting to relitigate decided matters, or using new proceedings to mount an indirect challenge to a decision, amounts to abuse of the process.
19. The undisputed facts in this case revealed that the Claimants have relitigated the issues that were or could have been addressed earlier. By bringing this proceeding under an ordinary civil claim at the High Court, it undermines the final decision made by the Acquisition Officer under a lawful process. The filing of this proceeding at this Court also shows that it has bypassed the appeal process.
20. Given the above factors, the extensive delay of 11 years and lack of justification for not adhering to the prescribed route under the Land and Titles Act to overturn the decision of the Acquisition Officer, I agree with counsel for the Second and Third Defendants that this proceeding is caught by Rule 9. 75 of the Solomon Islands Courts (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007.

The effect of Baefua’s Chiefs’ decision to the land in dispute

21. There is no issue that the decision of the Baefua Council of Chiefs was given more than a decade after the land was acquired and registered. Further, there is no issue that the Baefua Chiefs’ decision was given in favour of the Claimants’ tribe.
22. In my view, while this customary decision made by the Baefua Council of Chiefs can carry significant cultural and legal authority under the Local Courts Act (i.e. section 14 (1) of the Local Courts Act), it does not override or invalidate any registered legal interests or statutory procedures under the Land and Titles Act. The Baefua Council of Chiefs’ decision rendered more than a decade after the land was registered cannot retroactively alter or invalidate the title to the present land that has already been lawfully acquired and registered under the statute.

Conclusion and Orders

23. In light of the above findings, I do not find it necessary to address the misclassification of the claim as a separate ground for striking out the proceeding. Even if I were to consider that argument in detail, it would not affect my decision in this matter. Accordingly, the application by the Second and Third Defendants to strike out the proceeding is granted. I therefore make the following orders:
    1. The application to strike out the proceeding is granted.
    2. Consequently, the claim filed on 15^th September 2022 is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
    3. Costs to be paid by the Claimants to all the Defendants on a standard basis.

THE COURT
Hon. Justice Augustine Sylver Aulanga
PUISNE JUDGE