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Chapter 20: Parties to Offences

 Table Of Contents  

[20.0] Introduction 

This chapter will examine the law relating to: 

[i] 'Parties To Offences Generally'; 

[ii] 'Accessories After The Fact'; 

[iii] 'Accomplices'; and 

[iv] 'Conspiracy'.

[20.1] Parties To Offences Generally

[20.1.1] Section 21 – Penal Code 

Section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed [ie., assumed in law] to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say – 

(a)                every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence; 

(b)               every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence; 

(c)                every person who aids or abets another person in committing the offence; 

(d)               any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence; 

In the last – mentioned case he may be charged either with committing the offence or with counseling or procuring its commission. 

A conviction of counseling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence. 

Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on his part, is guilty of the offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment, as if he had himself done the act or made the omission; and he may be charged with doing the act or making the omission.' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

Section 3 of that Code states: 

'This Code shall be interpreted in accordance with the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and the principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, and expressions used in it shall be presumed, so far as is consistent with their context, and except as may be otherwise expressly provided, to be used with the meaning attaching to them in English criminal law and shall be construed in accordance therewith.' (emphasis added) 

[20.1.2] When An Offence Is Committed 

The meaning of term 'When an offence is committed' was examined in R v Wyles; Ex parte Attorney - General [1977] QdR 169. 

Lucas J, with whom Hoare and Matthews JJ concurred, stated at page 176: 

'In my opinion the construction adopted by the learned judges places too much emphasis on the opening words of the section "When an offence is committed". These words do not in my view mean that before section 7 can come into operation one must find a completed offence committed under a section of the Code; the words have no temporal connotation. The section is brought into operation by the commission of the offence itself.' 

Hoare J, with whom Matthews J concurred, stated at pages 179 – 180: 

'It is clear that at the time the Code was enacted the criminal law has developed in a way which could sheet home criminal responsibility by a jury being able to look at the totality of the acts where it could be inferred that the persons acted in concert, one doing the one thing and others doing other things, all leading to the completion of the incident which constituted the offence. In such cases each of the perpetrators was held to be liable as a principle. He was treated as if he had "actually committed the offence".' (emphasis added)

See also: R v Webb, Ex parte Attorney – General [1990] 2 QdR 275.

[20.1.3] Doer

Section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states (in part): 

'When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say – 

(a)                every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence;' (emphasis added) 

In a simplistic example suppose a defendant walked into a bank and demanded money with violence. That defendant would be covered by this section, and therefore guilty of the offence of 'Robbery' because he/she actually did the act/s which constituted that offence. 

In R v Webb, Ex parte Attorney – General [1990] 2 QdR 275 Macrossan CJ, with whom Thomas and Lee JJ concurred, stated at page 283: 

'It is now settled that section 7(a) can include cases where there are several persons acting in concert each doing some act so that the actions, in totality, would constitute all of the elements if the offence were committed by one person.' 

In another simplistic example suppose three defendants walk into a bank but only defendant demanded money whilst the other defendants pointed their firearms at customers and bank employees. Each of those defendants would be covered by this section, and guilty of the offence of 'Robbery'. 

That offence is examined commencing on page 602.

[20.1.4] Enabling Or Aiding 

Section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states (in part): 

'When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say – 

[…] 

(b)               every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence;' (emphasis added) 

In R v Alfred Maetia & Newton Misi (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 42 of 1992) Muria ACJ stated at pages 8 – 10: 

'The general principle of law is that a criminal offence may be the subject of aiding and abetting provided the person accused of aiding and abetting knows the facts constituting the principal offence and actively assists and encourages the principal offender. […] There are numerous authorities on the law on aiding and abetting. However, it is suffice to refer to the case of Johnson –v- Youden [1950] 1 KB 544 where at pages 546 – 547, Lord Goddard CJ said:- 

"Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence he must at least know the essential matters which constitute that offence. He need not actually know that an offence has been committed, because he may not know that the facts constitute an offence and ignorance of the law is not a defence. If a person knows all the facts and is assisting another person to do certain things, and it turns out that the doing of those things constitutes an offence, the person who is assisting is guilty of aiding and abetting that offence, because to allow him to say, "I knew of all those facts but I did not know that an offence was committed", would be allowing him to set up ignorance of the law as a defence." 

[…] 

The authorities […] clearly show that for a person to have aided and abetting the commission of an offence there must be established that he is present (actual or constructive); that he knows the facts necessary to constitute the offence, and that he is actively encouraging or in some way assisting the other person in the commission of the offence. Knowledge of the actual offence committed is not essential.' (emphasis added) 

In Director of Public Prosecutions v Merriman (1972) 56 CrAppR 766; [1972] 3 WLR 545 [[1973] 3 AllER 42; [1973] AC 584; [1973] CrimLR 764] Lord Diplock, with whom Lordships Reid & Salmon concurred, stated at pages 796 & 564 respectively: 

'I conclude, therefore, that whenever two or more defendants are charged in the same count of an indictment with any offence which me can help one another to commit it is sufficient to support a conviction against any and each of them to prove either that he himself did a physical act which is an essential ingredient of the offence charged or that he helped another defendant to do such an act, and, that in doing the act or in helping the other defendant to do it, he himself had the necessary criminal intent.' (emphasis added) 

In Lee Karani & Eddie Aimondi v The State (Unrep. SC540; 27 & 29 November 1997 & 31 December 1997) the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea stated: 

'At the material time the two accused were policemen stationed at Kimbe Police Station. They were charged with being involved in the robbery of the Spirit of West New Britain Company store in Kimbe on 14 September 1997. They were charged under S. 386 of the Criminal Code in connection with S. 7 of the Code, in aiding and abetting the commission of the robbery by some other persons by supplying a pistol, namely a Ruger Magnum .357 Pistol, for use in the robbery. In the robbery large sums of money in cash and cheques and a motor vehicle were stolen. 

The issue before the trial judge was whether "the accused (got) possession of the pistol and whether they supplied it to those persons who actually committed the robbery, knowing that it would be so used." This is the same issue raised in this appeal by the two Appellants in their respective grounds of appeal. To the extent that the two Appellants raise this issue, we take it that they do not contest the trial judge's findings that at all material times the said pistol belonged to Kimbe Police, that prior to the robbery it went missing from the Kimbe Police Firearms Armoury and that the same pistol was used by those other persons to commit the robbery. 

[…] 

[…] The trial judge was entitled to hold that they [ie., the Appellants] took possession of the pistol. There was also sufficient evidence to show that the two Appellants were in possession of the pistol before and after the robbery and that they gave the pistol to those persons who committed the robbery of Spirit of West New Britain Co. Store. 

The question is whether it was necessary for the prosecution to show that when they handed over the pistol, they knew that the pistol was going to be used for this particular robbery, namely robbery of the Spirit of West New Britain Co. store on 12 April 1995. This is where the application of the principles of R v Bainbridge [1959] AllER 200 becomes relevant. […] 

[…] 

[…] In refusing to criticise the trial judge's direction to the jury and dismissing the appeal, Lord Parker, who delivered the judgment of the Court [of Appeal] said (at p. 203): 

"The court fully appreciates that it is not enough that it should be shown that a person knew that some illegal venture was intended. To take this case, it would not be enough if the appellant knew – he says that he only suspected – that the equipment was going to be used to dispose of stolen property. That would not be enough. Equally, this court is quite satisfied that it is unnecessary that knowledge of the intention to commit the particular crime which in fact committed should be shown, and by 'particular crime' I am using the words in the same way as that in which counsel for the appellant used them, on a particular date and particular premises." 

[…] 

The trial judge in the present case said this of the application of the above principles in R v Bainbridge: 

"Their involvement is by virtue of S. 7 of the Criminal Code as aiding and abetting by supplying a pistol to persons they knew were going to use the pistol in a robbery or robberies. The fact that they may not have known the exact details of the time and place of the robbery or robberies does not matter as the principles are quite clear. It is well established in authorities that it is enough if a person supplies items or materials in order that a crime of a particular kind can be committed but without knowing the details of the crime. See R v Bainbridge […]." 

[…] 

We are of the view that the principles set out in R v Bainbridge is sound law and were correctly adopted and applied by the trial judge to the facts of the present case. We agree with the trial judge that on the evidence, it was safe for him to find that: 

The two Appellants knew that the gun was required to be used by these persons to commit certain robberies, that some money or goods were to be obtained in the process of the robbery and that they would be given a portion of the proceeds of the robbery in payment for the use of the pistol. 

These persons committed several robberies using the pistol and one of them was the robbery of the Spirit of West New Britain Co. store. In return for the pistol, the two Appellants were given portions of the proceeds of this robbery. 

'In these circumstances, "It is unnecessary that knowledge of the intention to commit the 'particular crime' … namely, on a particular date and particular premises" should be shown by the prosecution. It is sufficient that a crime of a particular kind was intended namely, robbery of a person involving actual or threatened violence using the pistol, which involved the obtaining of property in the form of money or valuable goods. It was unnecessary for the State to show that the Appellants at the time they gave the pistol specifically intended that these persons would rob the Spirit of West New Britain Co. store on the 12th of April 1995 [… at] the particular time. In any case, the Appellants received part of the proceeds of several robberies committed using the same pistol including the robbery of Spirit of West New Britain Co. store and it was open for the trial judge to find that the Appellants aided the commission of the robbery of Spirit of West New Britain Co. store.' (emphasis added) [words in brackets added] 

In R v William Taupa Tovarula & others [1973] PNGLR 140 Minogue CJ, sitting alone, stated at page 196: 

'Section 7(b) attaches criminal responsibility to those who do not in fact aid in the commission of an offence but who engage in conduct for the purpose of aiding. I agree with Mr Brennan's proposition that under this subsection an offender who has tried to aid may be guilty of the crime committed even though he did not succeed in aiding. But as will be apparent when I come to consider the individual accused I do not regard this subsection as being relevant in this case.' (emphasis added) 

In R v Umarum [1969 – 70] PNGLR 190 Clarkson J, sitting alone, held at page 191: 

'[I]t is clear from the authorities that mere prior knowledge of what is intended is in itself not sufficient to bring the accused within the section.' (emphasis added) 

In a simplistic example suppose if an employee of a store ensured that the back door to a store was unlocked but closed after the store was closed so that another person could enter and steal some of the property. That employee would also be guilty of the offence of 'Break & Enter & Steal' by virtue of this section because he/she either: 

·                     did an act; or 

·                     omitted to do an act 

thereby ensuring that the back door was unlocked and the unlocking of that door either: 

·                     enabled; or 

·                     aided 

that other person to commit the offence. 

The prosecution would not have to prove that the employee knew which items of property the second defendant intended stealing. However, if the second defendant after stealing some property set the store alight, the employee would not be guilty of 'Arson', unless he/she was aware of that intended action on the part of the second defendant by virtue of section 22 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) as examined commencing on page 417. 

The offence of: 

·                     'Break & Enter' is examined commencing on page 491; and 

·                     'Arson' is examined commencing on page 524. 

See also: R v Witrasep Binengim [1975] PNGLR 95 at page 97 & R v Ancuta [1991] 2 QdR 413 at page 418. 

In Attorney – General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 AllER 684; [1975] QB 773 [(1975) 61 CrAppR 118; [1975] 3 WLR 11] Lord Widgery CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at pages 686 and 778 respectively: 

'Of course it is the fact that in the great majority of instances where a secondary part is sought to be convicted of an offence there has been a contact between the principal offender and the secondary party. Aiding and abetting almost inevitably involves a situation in which the secondary party and the main offender are together at some stage discussing the plans which they may be making in respect of the alleged offence, and are in contact so that each knows what is passing through the mind of the other. [...] The fact that so often relationship between the secondary party and the principal will be such that there is a meeting of minds between them caused the trial judge in the case from which this reference is derived to think that this was really an essential feature of proving or establishing the guilt of the secondary party and, as we understand his judgment, he took the view that in the absence of some sort of meeting of minds, some sort of mental link between the secondary party and the principal, there could be no aiding, abetting and counseling is concerned we would go a long way with that conclusion. It may very well be, as I said a moment ago, difficult to think of a case of aiding, abetting or counseling when the parties have not met and have not discussed in some respects the terms of the offence which they have in mind. But we do not see why a similar principle should apply to procuring.' (emphasis added)

[20.1.5] Aids Or Abets 

Section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states (in part): 

'When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say – 

[…] 

(c)                every person who aids or abets another person in committing the offence;' (emphasis added) 

In R v Allan, Boyle, Ballantyne & Mooney (1965) 47 CrAppR 243; [1965] 1 QB 130 Edmund Davies J, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at pages 246 – 250 & 135 – 138 respectively: 

'The locus classicus on this branch of the law is the majority decision of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved in CONEY (1882) 8 QBD 534, whereby the conviction of more spectators of a prize – fight as being aiders and abettors in the fight was quashed. Before proceeding to quote from HALE and from FOSTER, Cave J said at p.539: "Now it is a general rule in the case of principals in the second degree that there must be participation in the act, and that, although a man is present whilst a felony is being committed, if he takes no part in it, and does not act in concert with those who commit it, he will not be a principal in the second degree merely because he does not endeavour to prevent the felony, or apprehend the felon." […] 

[…] 

In our judgment, encouragement in one form or another is a minimal requirement before an accused person may properly be regarded as a principal in the second degree to any crime.' (emphasis added) 

'It is not enough, then, that the presence of the accused person has, in fact, given encouragement. It must be proved that he/she intended to give encouragement; that he willfully encouraged', see R v Clarkson, Dodd & Carroll (1971) 55 CrAppR 445; [1971] 1 WLR 1402. 

In R v Gray (1917) 12 CrAppR 244 Lord Reading CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, held at page 246: 

'It is not necessary that a man, to be guilty of murder, should actually have taken part in a physical act in connection with the crime. If he has participated in the crime – that is to say, if he is a confederate – he is guilty, although he has no hand in striking the fatal blow. Equally it must be borne in mind that the mere fact of standing by when the act is committed is not sufficient. A man, to become amenable to the law, must take such a part in the commission of the crime as must be the result of a concerted design to commit the offence.' 

In R v Betts & Ridley (1930) 22 CrAppR 148 Avory J, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 154: 

'It is clear law that it is not necessary that the party, to constitute him a principal in the second degree, should be actually present, an eye – witness or ear – witness, of the transaction. He is, in construction of law, present aiding and abetting if with the intention of giving assistance, he is near enough to afford it, should occasion arise. Thus, if he be outside the house, watching to prevent surprise, whilst his companions are in the house committing a felony, such constructive presence is sufficient to make him a principal in the second degree.' 

In Attorney – General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 AllER 684; [1975] QB 773 [(1975) 61 CrAppR 118; [1975] 3 WLR 11] Lord Widgery CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at pages 686 and 778 respectively: 

'Of course it is the fact that in the great majority of instances where a secondary part is sought to be convicted of an offence there has been a contact between the principal offender and the secondary party. Aiding and abetting almost inevitably involves a situation in which the secondary party and the main offender are together at some stage discussing the plans which they may be making in respect of the alleged offence, and are in contact so that each knows what is passing through the mind of the other. […] The fact that so often relationship between the secondary party and the principal will be such that there is a meeting of minds between them caused the trial judge in the case from which this reference is derived to think that this was really an essential feature of proving or establishing the guilt of the secondary party and, as we understand his judgment, he took the view that in the absence of some sort of meeting of minds, some sort of mental link between the secondary party and the principal, there could be no aiding, abetting and counseling is concerned we would go a long way with that conclusion. It may very well be, as I said a moment ago, difficult to think of a case of aiding, abetting or counseling when the parties have not met and have not discussed in some respects the terms of the offence which they have in mind. But we do not see why a similar principle should apply to procuring.' (emphasis added) 

See also: R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402; (1971) 55 CrAppR 445; R v Jones & Mirrless (1977) 65 CrAppR 250; Wilcox v Jeffrey [1951] 1 AllER 464; R v Rubens & Rubens (1909) 2 CrAppR 163 at page 167; Awap Omowo & Warsa Yirihim v The State [1976] PNGLR 188; Porewa Wani v The State [1979] PNGLR 593; The State v Laiam Kiala & Meiri Gomosi [1977] PNGLR 470; The State v John Badi Woli & Pengas Rakom [1978] PNGLR 51; McCarthy & Ryan (1993) 71 ACrimR 395; Jeffries v Strucke [1992] 2 QdR 392; R v Jervis (1991) 56 ACrimR 374 at page 377 & R v Beck [1990] 1 QdR 30; (1989) 43 ACrimR 135. 

[20.1.6] Counsel Or Procure

[A] Statutory Provisions

Section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states (in part): 

'When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say – 

[…] 

(d)               any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence; 

In the last – mentioned case he may be charged either with committing the offence or with counseling or procuring its commission. 

A conviction of counseling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence. 

Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on his part, is guilty of the offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment, as if he had himself done the act or made the omission; and he may be charged with doing the act or making the omission.' (emphasis added) 

Section 23 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'When a person counsels another to commit an offence, and an offence is actually committed after such counsel by the person to whom it is given, it is immaterial whether the offence actually committed is the same as that counseled or a different one, or whether the offence is committed in the way counseled or in a different way, provided in either case that the facts constituting the offence actually committed are a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel. 

In either case the person who have the counsel is deemed to have counseled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him. 

If the facts constituting the offence actually committed are not a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel, the person who gave the counsel is not deemed to be responsible.'

 See: R v Richards [1974] QB 776; [1973] 3 AllER 1088; [1973] 3 WLR 888; (1974) 58 CrAppR 60.

[B] Counsel 

The ordinary meaning of the term 'Counsel' is to 'incite', 'solicit', 'instruct' or 'authorise'. 

In R v Calhaem [1985] 2 AllER 267 [[1985] QB 808; (1985) 81 CrAppR 131; [1985] 2 WLR 826; [1985] CrimLR 303] Parker LJ delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, held at page 272: 

'The natural meaning of the word ['counsel'] does not imply the commission of the offence. So long as there is counseling […], so long as the principal offence is committed by the one counselled and so long as the one counseled is acting within the scope of his authority […] we are of the view that the offence is made out.' [word in brackets added] 

In Attorney – General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 AllER 684; [1975] QB 773 [(1975) 61 CrAppR 118; [1975] 3 WLR 11] Lord Widgery CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at pages 686 and 778 respectively: 

'Of course it is the fact that in the great majority of instances where a secondary part is sought to be convicted of an offence there has been a contact between the principal offender and the secondary party. Aiding and abetting almost inevitably involves a situation in which the secondary party and the main offender are together at some stage discussing the plans which they may be making in respect of the alleged offence, and are in contact so that each knows what is passing through the mind of the other. In the same way it seems to us that a person who counsels the commission of a crime by another, almost inevitably comes to a moment when he is in contact with that other, when he is discussing the offence with that other and when, to use the words of the statute, he counsels the other to commit the offence. 

The fact that so often relationship between the secondary party and the principal will be such that there is a meeting of minds between them caused the trial judge in the case from which this reference is derived to think that this was really an essential feature of proving or establishing the guilt of the secondary party and, as we understand his judgment, he took the view that in the absence of some sort of meeting of minds, some sort of mental link between the secondary party and the principal, there could be no aiding, abetting and counseling is concerned we would go a long way with that conclusion. It may very well be, as I said a moment ago, difficult to think of a case of aiding, abetting or counseling when the parties have not met and have not discussed in some respects the terms of the offence which they have in mind. But we do not see why a similar principle should apply to procuring.' (emphasis added)

[C] Procure 

In Attorney – General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 AllER 684; [1975] QB 773 [(1975) 61 CrAppR 118; [1975] 3 WLR 11] Lord Widgery CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at pages 779 & 121 respectively: 

'To procure means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by setting out to see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening. We think that there are plenty of instances in which a person may be said to procure the commission of a crime by another even though there is no sort of conspiracy between the two, even though there is no attempt at agreement or discussion as to the form which the offence should take.' 

[D] Withdrawal 

In R v Whitefield (1984) 89 CrAppR 36 [[1984] CrimLR 97] Dunn LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, held at pages 39 – 40: 

'The law upon withdrawal is stated in BECERRA AND COOPER (1976) 62 CrAppR 212 and GRUNDY [1977] CrimLR 543. So far as material to the facts of this case, the law may be shortly stated as follows. If a person has counseled another to commit a crime, he may escape liability by withdrawal before the crime is committed, but it is not sufficient that he should merely repent or change his mind. If his participation is confined to advice or encouragement, he must at least communicate his change of mind to the other, and the communication must be such as "will serve unequivocal notice upon the other party to the common unlawful cause that if he proceeds upon it he does so without the aid and assistance of those who withdraw."' 

[20.1.7] Sentencing Of Co - Defendants 

All defendants are equally culpable for offences committed, see Adifaka v Director of Public Prosecutions [1984] SILR 44 at page 50 & Gimble v The State [1988 – 89] PNGLR 271 at page 273. 

In Adifaka v Director of Public Prosecutions (supra) White ACJ stated at page 50: 

'[N]ot all disparities in sentence result in reductions and that it was necessary to show that the disparity was such as to justify "a real and genuine grievance." The principles are stated by the Court of Appeal in Magu v R [1980/81] SILR 40, 42. 

[…] 

Bearing in mind the salutary provisions of S. 21 of the Penal Code, making all persons who take part in offences as there stated guilty of the offence committed, it is necessary to examine "the relevant considerations affecting the individual appellant", the general rule being that where two or more offenders are concerned in the same offence a proper relationship should be established between the sentences passed on each offender […].' (emphasis added) 

In Magu v R (supra) Spreight JA, on behalf of the Court of Appeal, held at page 42: 

'The principles relating to disparity are well known. Where one prisoner has received a sentence which is disproportionately low, that is no ground for reducing a proper sentence on another. But where it is shown that the sentence under review is very heavy and out of proportion to the majority of punishments for comparable offences it is the duty of the Court to ensure that there is a degree of consistency. In comparable cases the level of punishment to be meted out should not ebb or flow in a marked way otherwise there will be room for prisoners who have been heavily and disproportionately sentenced to have a legitimate grievance and this encourages resentment and lack of confidence in the judicial system among the public at large.' (emphasis added) 

For the disparity to be 'objectionable' it must be shown that one of the two or more defendants received a more severe sentence than the other and that the difference is not justified by any relevant distinction in their culpability or personal circumstances, see R v Alulu & others (Unrep. Criminal Review Case No. 147 of 1991; Muria ACJ). 

Therefore, if 'mitigating factors' which only apply to one defendant result in a reduced sentence, the co - defendant/s should not be given that same benefit, see Attorney General's References Nos. 62, 63 & 64 of 1995; R v O'Halloran & others [1996] 2 CrAppR(S) 233 & Attorney General's Reference No. 73 of 1999; R v Charles [2000] 2 CrAppR(S) 210. 

In considering whether there is 'objectionable' disparity the question to be asked is "Would right – thinking members of the public, with full knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances, learning of the sentence consider that something had gone wrong with the administration of justice?", see R v Fawcett (1983) 5 CrAppR(S) 158. 

It is immaterial that proceedings have not been instituted against all defendants. 

In Jack Igi & others v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 47 of 1996) Palmer J held at pages 3 – 4: 

The fact that there may have been hundreds others who have never been arrested and charged does not alter the fact that that these Appellants had taken part in a grave criminal offence. Lord Justice Sachs in R v Caird [(1970) 54 CrAppR 499] describes this ground as the "Why pick on me?" argument. He states: 

"It has been suggested that there is something wrong in giving an appropriate sentence to one convicted of an offence because there are considerable numbers of others who were at the same time committing the same offence, some of whom indeed, if identified and arrested and established as having taken a more serious part, could have received heavier sentences. This is a plea which is almost invariably put forward where the offence is one of those classed as disturbances of the public peace – such as riots, unlawful assemblies and affrays. 

It indicates a failure to appreciate that on these confused and tumultuous occasions each individual who takes an active part by deed or encouragement is guilty of a really grave offence by being one of the number engaged in a crime against the peace. It is, moreover, impracticable for a small number of police sought to be overwhelmed by a crowd to make a large number of arrests. It is indeed all the more difficult when, as in the present case, any attempt at arrest is followed by violent efforts of surrounding rioters to rescue the person being arrested. 

… If this plea were acceded to, it would reinforce that feeling which may undoubtedly exist that if an offender is but one of a number he is unlikely to be picked on, and even if he is so picked upon, can escape proper punishment because others were not arrested at the same time. Those who choose to take part in such unlawful occasions must do so at their own peril."' 

As regards 'Wilful Damage by Rioters', see Solomon Keto & 6 others v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 9 of 1982; Daly CJ). 

See also: R v Robert Mani (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 29 of 1997; Palmer J; at page 3); R v Tremarco (1979) 1 CrAppR(S) 286 & R v Strutt (1993) 14 CrAppR(S) 56. 

[20.2] Prosecution Of A Common Purpose 

[20.2.1] Statutory Provisions 

Section 22 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence.' 

See also: section 3 of that Code.

[20.2.2] Elements 

In R v Victor Tadakusu (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 239 of 1999) Palmer J stated at pages 2 – 3: 

'The crucial elements in section 22 are: 

(1)               a common intention, 

(2)               to prosecute an unlawful purpose, 

(3)               an offence is committed, 

(4)               it is a probable consequence arising from the prosecution of such purpose.'

[20.2.3] Common Purpose 

In R v Peter Fitali & others (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 39 of 1992) Muria CJ stated at page 8: 

'[T]he existence of a joint enterprise must be first established. Then it must be proved that the accused were all parties to that joint enterprise and that the acts of the accused were done in furtherance of that joint enterprise or common purpose.' 

In R v Ben Tungale & others (Unrep. Criminal Case No. 12 of 1997) Lungole – Awich J stated at pages 17 – 18: 

'The law of joint liability is that when more than one persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts of the others, done in pursuance of that joint enterprise and that includes liability for unusual consequences if they arise from the execution of the joint enterprise. Each one is, however, not liable if one of them acts beyond what was expressly or tacitly agreed as part of the joint enterprise; he is not liable for the consequences of unagreed and therefore unauthorised act of the others. That rule was firmly established in the English case of Anderson and Morris [1966] 50 CrAppR 216, [1966] 2 QB 110, confirmed in the case of John David Ward [1987] 85 CrAppR 71.' 

In R v Powell & Daniels; R v English [1998] 1 CrAppR 261 Lord Hutton, with whom their Lordships Goff of Chieveley, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle and Lord Steyn concurred, stated at pages 274 – 287: 

'In Anderson and Morris (1966) 50 CrAppR 216, [1966] 2 QB 110 the primary party (Anderson) killed the victim with a knife. The defence of the secondary party (Morris) was that even though he may have taken part in a joint attack with Anderson to beat up the victim, he did not know that Anderson was armed with a knife. In his summing – up the trial judge told the jury they could convict Morris of manslaughter even though he had no idea that Anderson had armed himself with a knife. The Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection in respect of Morris and quashed his conviction for manslaughter. 

In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal Lord Parker CJ accepted, at p. 221 and p. 118, the principle formulated by Mr Geoffrey Lane QC (as he then was) on behalf of Morris: 

"where two persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts done in pursuance of that joint enterprise, and that includes liability for unusual consequences if they arise from the execution of the agreed joint enterprise but (and this is the crux of the matter) that, if one of the adventurers goes beyond what had been tacitly agreed as part of the common enterprise, his co – adventurer is not liable for the consequences of that unauthorised act. Finally, he says it is for the jury in every case to decide whether what was done was part of the joint enterprise, or went beyond it and was in fact an act unauthorised by that joint enterprise." 

[…] 

Later at p. 223 and p. 120B I consider that Lord Parker applied the test of foresight when he stated: 

"It seems to this Court that to say that adventurers are guilty of manslaughter when one of them had departed completely from the concerted action of common design and has suddenly formed an intent to kill and has used a weapon and acted in a way which no party to that common design could suspect is something which would revolt the conscience of people today." 

[…] 

In this judgment I have cited two passages from the judgment of Lord Parker in Anderson and Morris (1966) 50 CrAppR 216, [1966] 2 QB 110. One passage commences at p. 221 and p. 118F, the second passage commences at p. 223 and p. 120B. Trial judges have frequently based their directions to the jury in respect of the liability of a secondary part for an action carried out in a joint venture on the first passage. There is clearly no error in doing so. However in many cases there would be no difference in result between applying the test stated in that passage and the test of foresight, and if there would be a difference the test of foresight is the proper one to apply. I consider that the test of foresight is a simpler and more practicable test for a jury to apply than the test of whether the act causing the death goes beyond what had been tacitly agreed as part of the joint enterprise. Therefore, in cases where an issue arises as to whether an action was within the scope of the joint venture, I would suggest that it might be preferable for a trial judge in charging a jury to base his direction on the test of foresight rather than on the test set out in the first passage in Anderson and Morris. But in a case where, although the secondary party may have foreseen grievous bodily harm, he may not have foreseen the use of the weapon employed by the primary party or the manner in which the primary party acted, the trial judge should qualify the test of foresight stated in Hyde (1991) 92 CrAppR 131, [1991] 1 QB 134 in the manner stated by Lord Parker in the second passage in Anderson and Morris.' (emphasis added) 

See also: Foster & others v R (Unrep. Criminal Appeal Case No. 8 of 1994; Court of Appeal); R v Gilmour [2000] CrAppR 407; R v Pridmore (1913) 8 CrAppR 198 at pages 202; R v Reid (1976) 62 CrAppR 109; R v Grant & Gilbert (1954) 38 CrAppR 107; R v Becerra & Cooper (1976) 62 CrAppR 212; Chan Wing – Sui & others v R (1985) 80 CrAppR 117; [1980] AC 168; R v Barr & others (1989) 88 CrAppR 362 & R v Slock (1989) 88 CrAppR 252.

[20.2.4] Summary 

Section 22 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) has no application in the circumstances where (A) and (B) form a common intention to commit an offence and in fact do nothing further except commit that proposed offence. For example, if (A) and (B) decide to commit the offence of 'Robbery' then section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) applies and there is no need to consider section 22, as (A) and (B) are equally culpable. 

However, if during the course of the robbery (A) kills a teller, the question to be decided is whether (B) is also culpable for that offence. In this case section 22 is applied to decide this because the unlawful killing now becomes an additional offence to that originally intended. The important consideration would be whether the resorting to actual violence was a probable consequence of the original intended offence of committing the 'Robbery' on the bank.

Therefore, if the prosecution is relying on section 22, co – defendants may be charged conjointly with different offences because that section does not deem that co – defendants are always equally liable. 

The offence of 'Robbery' is examined commencing on page 602.

[20.3] Withdrawal 

In R v Rook [1993] 2 AllER 955; (1993) 97 CrAppR 327 [[1993] 1 WLR 1805] Lloyd LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated at pages 961 – 962 and 333 respectively: 

'In Whitehouse [1941] 1 WWR 112, 115, Sloan JA said: 

"Can it be said on the facts of this case that a mere change of mental intention and a quitting of the scene of the crime just immediately prior to the striking of the fatal blow will absolve those who participate in the commission of the crime by overt acts up to that moment from all the consequences of its accomplishment by the one who strikes in ignorance of his companion's change of heart? I think not. After a crime has been committed and before a prior abandonment of the common enterprise may be found by a jury there must be, in my view, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, something more than a mere mental change of intention and physical change of place by those associates who wish to dissociate themselves from the consequences attendant upon their willing assistance up to the moment of the actual commission of that crime. I would not attempt to define too closely what must be done in criminal matters involving participation in a common unlawful purpose to break the chain of causation and responsibility. That must depend upon the circumstances of each case but it seems to me that one essential element ought to be established in a case of this kind: Where practicable and reasonable there must be timely communication of the intention to abandon the common purpose from those who wish to dissociate themselves from the contemplated crime to those who desire to continue in it. What is 'timely communication' must be determined by the facts of each case, but where practicable and reasonable it ought to be such communication, verbal or otherwise, that will serve unequivocal notice upon the other party to the common unlawful cause that if he proceeds upon it he does so without the further aid and assistance of those who withdraw. The unlawful purpose of him who continues alone is then his own and not one in common with those who are no longer parties to it nor liable to its full and final consequences." 

In Becerra (1976) 62 CrAppR 212 the Court approved that passage as a correct statement of the law. The facts in Becerra were that the victim was killed in the course of a burglary. The appellant had provided the knife shortly before the murder. The court held that the appellant's sudden departure from the scene of the crime with the words "Come on let's go" was an insufficient communication of withdrawal. So the appellant's conviction as a secondary party to the murder was upheld. In Whitefield (1984) 79 CrAppR 36, 39, 40, Dunn LJ stated the law as follows: 

"If a person has counselled another to commit a crime, he may escape liability by withdrawal before the crime is committed, but it is not sufficient that he should merely repent or change his mind. If his participation is confined to advice or encouragement, he must at least communicate his change of mind to the other, and the communication must be such as will serve unequivocal notice upon the other party to the common unlawful cause that if he proceeds upon it he does so without the aid and assistance of those who withdraw."' (emphasis added) 

See also: R v Perman [1996] 1 CrAppR 24.

[20.4] Accessories After The Fact 

[20.4.1] Offence 

Section 387 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'Any person who becomes an accessory after the fact to a felony is guilty of a felony, and shall be liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for three years.' 

See also: section 3 of that Code.

[20.4.2] Wording Of Charge 

'[Name of Defendant] at [Place] on [Date] was an accessory after the fact to a felony to wit [Specify the felony] committed by [Specify the name of this person] at [Specify the place] on [Specify the date].'

[20.4.3] Elements 

A. Defendant 

B. Place 

C. Date 

D. Accessory After The Fact 

E. Felony 

F. Principal Offence 

[20.4.4] Definition 

Section 386 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'A person who receives or assists another who is, to his knowledge, guilty of a felony in order to enable him to escape punishment, is said to become an accessory after the fact to the felony. 

A person does not become an accessory after the fact of an offence of which the person's spouse is guilty by receiving or assisting the spouse in order to enable the spouse to escape punishment; or by receiving or assisting in the spouse's presence and by the spouse's authority another person who is guilty of an offence in the commission of which the spouse has taken part in order to enable that other person to escape punishment.' (emphasis added) 

The term 'Felony' is defined in section 4 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) as meaning: 

'an offence which is declared by law to be a felony or, if not declared to be a misdemeanour, is punishable, without proof of previous conviction, with imprisonment for three years or more.'

[20.4.5] Escape Punishment 

In Sykes v Director of Public Prosecutions (1961) 45 CrAppR 230; [1961] 3 WLR 371 [[1962] AC 528] Lord Denning commented at pages 247 & 382 respectively: 

'[I]t has been said that, the assistance must be given to the felon personally, in order to prevent or hinder him from being apprehended or tried or suffering punishment […]: so that if the assistance was not given the felon personally, but only indirectly by persuading witnesses not to give assistance against him […], or if the facts of assistance were done, not to hinder the arrest of the felon, but with another motive, such as to avoid arrest himself […] or to make money for himself without regard to what happened to the felon […], he would not be guilty as an accessory after the fact.' (emphasis added) 

As regards the term, 'or to make money for himself without regard to what happened to the felon', see R v Andrews & Craig (1962) 47 CrAppR 32. 

In The State v Roy Nana [1986] PNGLR 83 the Court held: 

To be an accessory after the fact a defendant must do some act in order to enable the principal offender to escape detection and punishment. 

At page 87 Mc Dermott AJ, sitting alone, stated: 

'What the accused were doing in this case was going around trying to find buyers for the stolen goods. The could not be found guilty of being an accessory after the fact, if this activity was for their own gain and unrelated to giving assistance to the principal to avoid apprehension. There has to be such connection before one can be considered an accessory.' 

In R v Winston [1995] 2 QdR 204 the Court of Appeal held: 

The authorities show that under section 10 some positive act has to be found in an aspect of the behaviour of the person charged directed towards the principal offender before it can be said that he/she has been assisted or received. [at page 207] 

To 'receive' implies an act of acceptance of the offender into an area or location which the accessory controls or over which he/she exercises some influence and it will involve some measure of positive support for the principal. It can be expected that it will be included within the scope of assisting, which is a more embracing term. Viewed in this way receiving will constitute a particular form of assistance and a whole range of acts of assisting will not involve any aspect of receiving. [at page 208] 

In R v Barlow (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 756 the Court held: 

The fact that a person accepts a lift in a car at a time when he realises that the driver has earlier stolen it does not, of itself, make him an accessory after the fact to the stealing of the car; it is necessary to show that he was intending to assist or was in fact assisting the driver to escape punishment.

See also: R v Jones (1948) 33 CrAppR 33; R v Helley (1963) 47 CrAppR 13; R v Levy [1911 – 13] AllER Rep 222; [1912] 1 KB 158; (1912) 7 CrAppR 61; R v Angie – Ogun [1969 – 70] P&NGLR 36 & The State v Amoko – Amoko [1981] PNGLR 373 at page 385.

[20.4.6] Principal Offence 

In R v Tevendale [1955] VLR 95 the Court held: 

It is necessary before a person can be convicted of being an accessory after the fact that the Court be satisfied that he/she did know that the principal offence had been committed by the principal offender. 

See also: R v Middap (1992) 63 ACrimR 484 & R v Carter [1990] 2 QdR 371. 

In Mahadeo v R (1936) 2 AllER 813 the Privy Council held: 

An accessory is entitled to: 

·                     insist on the proof of the commission of the offence by the principal offender; and 

·                     challenge the evidence of it even if the principal offender had pleaded guilty. 

The conviction of the principal offender can be proved by tendering a certificate under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Ch. 7). 

In R v Carter & Savage, Ex parte Attorney – General [1990] 2 QdR 371 the Court of Appeal held: 

Upon the trial of an accessory after the fact, proof of the conviction of the principal offender was admissible and constituted prima facie evidence that the principal offender did the acts and possessed the state of mind necessary to constitute the principal offence; and 

A confession made by the principal offender was not sufficient proof for that purpose. 

See also: R v Dawson [1961] VR 773. 

In R v Anthony (1965) 49 CrAppR 104 Lord Parker CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 107: 

'In the opinion of this Court, there is certainly no principal of law that a man cannot be found guilty of being an accessory unless the principal felon is brought to book and convicted. What has to be proved is the felony […].'

 An accessory can not convicted if the principal offender has been acquitted, see Hui Chi – Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34; [1991] 3 WLR 495; [1991] 3 AllER 897; (1992) 94 CrAppR 236; [1972] CrimLR 446 and therefore, the guilt of the principal offender should be determined before a plea of guilty is taken from an accessory, see R v Rowley (1948) 32 CrAppR 147; [1948] 1 AllER 570. 

The law relating to 'Proving The Criminal Convictions Of Witnesses' is examined commencing on page 305

[20.4.7] Sentencing 

Section 387 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'Any person who becomes an accessory after the fact to a felony is guilty of a felony, and shall be liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for three years.' 

Refer to the section which examines 'Sentencing – Co-defendants' commencing on page 961.

[20.5] Accomplices 

An 'accomplice' is a person who can be prosecuted: 

[i] for actually committing an offence; 

[ii] for being a 'party' to an offence within the meaning of section 21 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26); or 

[iii] for being an 'Accessory After The Fact' to an offence within the meaning of section 387 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26). 

The law relating to 'Accomplices Giving Evidence' is examined commencing on page 298.

[20.6] Conspiracy 

Section 383 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'Any person who conspires with another to commit any felony, or to do any act in any part of the world which if done in Solomon Islands would be a felony, and which is an offence under the laws in force in the place where it is proposed to be done, is guilty of a felony and shall be liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for seven years, or, if the punishment to which a person convicted of the felony in question is liable to less than imprisonment for seven years, then to such lesser punishment.' 

Section 384 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'Any person who in Solomon Islands conspires with another to commit a misdemeanour, or to any act in any part of the world which if done in Solomon Islands would be a misdemeanour, and which is an offence under the laws in force in the place where it is proposed to be done, is guilty of a misdemeanour.' 

Section 385 of the Penal Code (Ch. 26) states: 

'Any person who conspires with another to effect any of the purposes following, that is to say 

(a)                to effect any unlawful purpose; or 

(b) to effect any lawful purpose by any unlawful means, is guilty of a misdemeanour.' 

The crime of conspiracy requires two or more person to commit an unlawful act with the intention of carrying it out. It is the intention to carry out the crime that constitutes the necessary mens rea, ie., 'intention' for the offence, see Yip Chui – cheung v R [1994] 3 WLR 514; [1995] 1 AC 111; (1994) 99 CrAppR 406. 

In R v West, Northcott, Weitzman & White (1948) 32 CrAppR 152 [[1948] 1 AllER 718; [1948] 1 KB 709] Humphrey J, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated at page 160: 

'The definition of conspiracy to be found in the speech of Lord Bampton in the House of Lords in the case of QUINN v LEATHEM [1901] AC 495, at p.528, is as follows: "A conspiracy consists of an unlawful combination of two or more persons to do that which is contrary to law, or to do that which is wrongful and harmful towards another person", and His Lordship continued by quoting with approval the language of Willes J in MULCAHY (1868) LR 3 HL 306, at p.317, in delivering the unanimous opinion of himself and four other Judges whose opinion had been asked for by the House of Lords, "A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, is punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means."' (emphasis added) 

In R v Simmonds & others (1967) 51 CrAppR 316 [[1967] 3 WLR 367; [1967] 2 AllER 399; [1967] 1 QB 685] Fenton Atkinson J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated at page 332: 

'[I]f two men agree on a particular day to embark on a course of criminal conduct over a period of months, the offence of conspiracy is committed at the moment of agreement. But they remain conspirators and their conspiracy continues until either the criminal purpose has been achieved or their agreement has been brought to an end. The offence of conspiracy has, clearly over the centuries, been committed by being a member of what in the old books is referred to as a "confederacy" – that is to say, being one of two or more persons acting or planning to act in concert under some agreement (be it express or implied) in pursuit of a criminal design. Furthermore, it is well established law that if A and B conspire together to carry on, for example, a course of fraudulent trading, C may join in (or in the older phraseology "adhere to") the conspiracy at a later date and then A may drop out and be replaced by D. But it all remains a single conspiracy as long as all of them are for the period of their participation acting in combination to achieve the same criminal objective.' 

In Churchill v Walton (1967) 51 CrAppR 212 [[1967] 2 WLR 682; [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 1 AllER 497] Viscount Dilhorne, with whom their Lordships concurred, held at page 232: 

'[I] would say that mens rea is only an essential ingredient in conspiracy insofar as there must be an intention to be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act; that knowledge of the law on the part of the accused is immaterial and that knowledge of the facts is only material in so far as such knowledge throws a light on what was agreed. 

In cases of this kind, it is desirable to avoid the use of the phrase "mens rea", which is capable of different meanings, and to concentrate on the terms or effect of the agreement made by the alleged conspirators. The question is: "What did they agree to do?" If what they agreed to do was, on the facts known to them, an unlawful act, they are guilty of conspiracy and cannot excuse themselves by saying that, owing to their ignorance of the law, they did not realise that such an act was a crime.' 

The law relating to 'Ignorance Of The Law' is examined on page 430. 

Conversations between conspirators may be used as evidence against them, see Archbold 'Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice' 2002, at page 2680. 

See also: R v Devenport & Pirano [1996] 1 CrAppR 221; R v Phillips (1988) 86 CrAppR 18; R v Donat (1986) 82 CrAppR 173; R v Ayres [1984] 2 WLR 257; [1984] AC 447; [1984] 1 AllER 617; [1984] CrimLR 252; (1984) 78 CrAppR 232; Attorney – General's Reference No. 1 of 1983 (1983) 77 CrAppR 9; R v Longman & Cribben (1981) 72 CrAppR 121; [1981] CrimLR 38; R v Thomas & Ferguson [1979] 1 AllER 577; (1978) 68 CrAppR 275; R v Nock & Alsford (1978) 67 CrAppR 116; R v Coughlan & Young (1976) 63 CrAppR 33; R v Green [1976] 2 WLR 57; [1975] 3 AllER 1011; [1976] QB 985; (1976) 62 CrAppR 74; Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819; [1974] 3 AllER 1032; [1974] 3 WLR 741; (1975) 60 CrAppR 124; [1975] CrimLR 94; Withers & others v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] 3 WLR 751; [1974] 3 AllER 984; [1975] AC 842; (1975) 60 CrAppR 85; [1975] CrimLR 95; Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1974] 3 WLR 717; [1975] AC 717; [1974] 2 AllER 1009; (1974) 59 CrAppR 250; [1975] CrimLR 703; R v O'Brien (1974) 59 CrAppR 222; R v Jones & others (1974) 59 CrAppR 120; Kamara & others v Director of Public Prosecutions (1973) 57 CrAppR 880, [1973] 3 WLR 198; [1973] AllER 1242; [1974] AC 104; [1974] CrimLR 39; R v Greenfield & others (1973) 57 CrAppR 600; R v Shannon & others (1973) 57 CrAppR 13; R v Ardalann & others (1972) 56 CrAppR 320; R v Cox (1968) 52 CrAppR 106; [1968] 1 AllER 410; [1968] 1 WLR 88; R v Thomson [1966] 1 WLR 405; [1966] 1 AllER 505; (1966) 50 CrAppR 1; R v Froggett (1965) 49 CrAppR 334; R v Thesiger (1965) 49 CrAppR 317; R v Fountain (1965) 49 CrAppR 315; R v Griffiths & others (1965) 49 CrAppR 279; [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 2 AllER 448; [1965] WLR 405; R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd & Blamire (1963) 47 CrAppR 272; R v Dawson & Wenlock (1960) 44 CrAppR 87; [1960] 1 AllER 558; [1960] 1 WLR 163; R v Davey & Davey [1960] 1 WLR 1287; [1960] 3 AllER 533; (1960) 44 CrAppR 11; R v Hammersley, Heath & Bellson (1958) 42 CrAppR 207; Board of Trade v Owen & Seth – Smith (1957) 41 CrAppR 11; [1957] 1 AllER 411; [1957] 2 WLR 351; [1957] AC 602; R v Owens & others (1956) 40 CrAppR 103; R v Cooper & Crompton [1947] 2 AllER 701; (1947) 32 CrAppR 102; R v Meyrick & Ribuffi (1929) 21 CrAppR 94; R v Pepper & Platt (1921) 16 CrAppR 12; R v Higgins (1919) 14 CrAppR 28 & R v Rogerson, Nowytarger & Paltos (1992) 174 CLR 268; (1992) 107 ALR 225; (1992) 66 ALJR 500.