IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TONGA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
NUKU'ALOFA REGISTRY	

CV 68 of 2019

BETWEEN:
TONGA CABLE LIMITED (“TCL”)	Claimant 
-and-
DS VENTURE LIMITED (“DSV”)	Respondent

TCL’s claims for interest and costs of the claims phase

RULING

BEFORE:	LORD CHIEF JUSTICE WHITTEN KC
Appearances:	Messrs David KC, McCarthy and Edwards for DSV
	Messrs McBride, Frawley and Bloomfield for TCL
Hearings:	16 August 2022, 21 September 2022
Submissions:	TCL – 31 August 2022, 16 and 22 September 2022
	DSV – 9 and 30 September 2022
Ruling:	17 October 2022

Introduction
1.	This is (expected to be) the final ruling in this long running proceeding. 
2.	To recap:
(a)	DSV is the owner of the ‘Duzgit Venture’ tanker vessel. On 20 January 2019, the vessel’s anchor damaged one of TCL’s undersea communications cables connecting Nuku'alofa, Ha’apai and Vava’u with Fiji (“the incident”). As a result, Tonga was without cable telecommunications for almost three weeks. TCL initially claimed damages from DSV in the sum of US$1,237,890.06.  
(b)	On 20 December 2019, DSV commenced proceedings for a decree of limitation of its liability for the incident pursuant to s.2 of the Shipping (Limitation of Liability) Act 1980. 
(c)	On 22 December 2020, the Court granted the decree. A limitation fund was established by Letter of Undertaking from DSV’s insurers in the sum of TOP$952,407.70, inclusive of interest, as calculated in accordance with the relevant international convention. DSV was also ordered to pay TCL’s costs of and incidental to the limitation proceedings up to 10 July 2020.
(d)	On 12 July 2021, DSV admitted TCL’s amended claim totalling US$238,721.64 as admissible against the limitation fund.
3.	This ruling concerns events since then and final disputes in relation to costs and interest. 
4.	On 22 October 2021, the parties filed a consent order in respect of TCL’s costs in the sum TOP$32,524.  TCL subsequently made a claim on DSV for additional costs of the claims phase. DSV contended that the agreement underpinning the consent order was intended to settle all TCL’s costs of the proceeding. 
5.	TCL also claims interest up to judgment. The parties remain in dispute about the applicable rate and period over which such interest should be allowed.
Interest
6.	On 31 January 2020, it was ordered that the interest rate to be applied in determining the amounts for the establishment of the limitation fund shall be 10% per annum. That rate was suggested by DSV at the time, without demurrer from TCL.  The fund was then established in respect of DSV’s statutory maximum liability under the applicable Convention of TOP$859,403.82 plus interest of TOP$93,003.98, making a total limit of liability in sum of TOP$952,407.70.  
Submissions 
7.	In its original counterclaim, TCL pleaded a claim for interest on any award of damages. TCL now seeks an order for interest on the amount of its admitted claim from 1 March 2019 to date at 10% per annum. It relies on the discretion conferred by s.5 of the Supreme Court Act which provides, relevantly, that the Court shall have power to “make orders that interest accrue on debts and other moneys payable for such period and at such rates as the court considers appropriate, in accordance with rules of the Supreme Court”. TCL also submits that the said period for interest is appropriate because despite DSV’s acceptance of its claim in July 2021, DSV has not paid the claim and TCL “has been kept from recovering the funds owing to it to date”.
8.	DSV initially agreed that interest is payable on the claim admitted against the fund. It submitted, however, that the Court has a discretion as to the period over which interest is ordered to be paid. In that regard, DSV submits thay TCL has conducted the  proceedings in a manner which has caused considerable delay in bringing them to a conclusion and that this should be taken into account by the Court in any award of interest. More specifically, DSV contends that TCL prolonged the proceedings by delays in or caused by:
(a)	the time it took before accepting that the limitation decree should be granted (four months);
(b)	making an initial claim which was grossly inflated followed by subsequent reductions before presenting the claim which was accepted by DSV in July 2021;
(c)	submitting a bill of costs for the limitations phase (about four months after the order);
(d)	the subsequent process of assessing those costs and a late (and unsuccessful) application by TCL for costs at a higher rate; and
(e)	its response to the proposed consent orders issued in November 2021 only to then claim further costs for the claims phase (six months).
DSV submits that, all up, those delays should be reflected by reducing the period for interest to 18 months at 10% per annum. 
9.	TCL denies that it delayed the limitation proceeding, which it describes as DSV “seeking an indulgence”. TCL says that it only took a few months to consider its position once DSV presented its case for limitation and which occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic.  TCL submits that it has been out of pocket since the incident in January 2019 and therefore it is entitled to be compensated by an award of interest. 
10.	Following a directions hearing on 21 September 2022, in which I referred the parties to the decision in Luna'eva Enterprises Ltd v Manu [2020] TOSC 1 for a discussion on whether this Court has power to award prejudgment interest, further submissions were filed.
11.	In detailed submissions supported by a number of UK and New Zealand authorities, TCL  fortified its position not only on this Court’s power to award pre-judgment interest but also in relation to the proposed rate of 10% per annum and the term, that is, from 1 March 2019 to date. Ultimately, after synthesising the relevant principles from those authorities, TCL submitted that:
(a)	as this is a claim for delayed payment in an Admiralty action for damages, interest must be awarded;
(b)	in the Admiralty Court, there is no requirement to plead and prove a claim for interest, particularly when the Court has already required interest at 10% on the establishment of the limitation fund;
(c)	there is no such thing as a ‘correct’ rate of interest, but the rate must be ‘commercially realistic’;
(d)	it is illogical for the interest rate on the establishment of the fund to be different from the rate paid on admitted claims;
(e)	absent some statutory requirement, term deposit rates are not a realistic reference for setting interest rates in the current low interest environment to compensate a claimant for being kept out of funds;
(f)	in the current environment, a more appropriate and realistic measure is to treat the claim in damages as tantamount to an interest-free, unsecured advance to a defendant for which it must now pay a commercial interest rate to the claimant;
(g)	the Court can and should take judicial notice of retail commercial lending rates in Tonga which, according to the World Bank, were between 10.5% an 11.9% during 2020 and 2021; and as at 6 September 2021, the BSP’s base lending rate for business loans and overdrafts was 9.65% with a risk margin of 0 to 7%; and
(h)	in those circumstances, a rate of 10% is ‘entirely appropriate’.
12.	In equally helpful and erudite reply submissions, DSV further contended, in summary, that:
(a)	the Supreme Court has power to award prejudgment interest from the time the cause of action arose;
(b)	the Court’s exercise of that power involves determining whether to award interest, the rate of interest and the period over which it should run, which are discretionary matters based on all the circumstances of the case including the extent to which parties have been diligent in pursuing claims;
(c)	rates of prejudgement interest in Admiralty cases remained fairly stable for the best part of two centuries before becoming subject to regulations under the Merchant Shipping Acts;
(d)	when voluntarily constituting the limitation fund, and by erring on the side of caution, DSV and its insurer applied the Tongan judgment debt rate of 10% per annum to the limitation amount, which was adopted in the court orders of 31 January 2020;
(e)	notwithstanding, the rate of any prejudgement interest remains a matter for the court’s discretion;
(f)	DSV acknowledges that in its memorandum dated 9 September 2022, it proposed orders which included a rate of 10%;
(g)	in all the circumstances of the case, the rate of 6.5% applied in Luna’eva would be realistic and appropriate.
Consideration
13.	It is now common ground that the Court has power to award prejudgment interest and that interest should be awarded in this case. The only live issues are the rate and term. 
14.	Having considered the parties’ submissions on this issue and the history of the proceeding, I agree:
(a)	with TCL that the appropriate rate is 10% per annum; and
(b)	with DSV that TCL has been guilty of some delay in its conduct of the proceedings which has unnecessarily disadvantaged DSV and prolonged the overall time taken for the proceedings to be completed and that, therefore, the period over which prejudgment interest is to be calculated should be reduced.
15.	I consider that the appropriate rate here should reflect the commercial nature of the parties involved and the nature of losses to be compensated (mostly repair costs) and the commercial lending rates applicable here in Tonga (unlike investment rates as considered in Luna’eva). The instant case is distinguishable from Luna’eva which involved interest on default judgement for a debt. Acceptance of the rates submitted by TCL is fortified by the Tonga Development Bank’s current business lending rates being “from 10%”. That rate is also consistent with DSV’s expectation and preparedness to provide for interest on the fund at 10%. 
16.	While there is obvious merit in TCL’s submission that DSV could have stopped interest running by paying the agreed amount of TCL’s claim, I consider it was reasonable for DSV to await the outcome of Ezinet’s claim (the timing of which could not be controlled by either TCL or DSV) before proceeding to accept TCL’s final revised claim and distribution of the fund. 
17.	Further, I consider that the period over which interest is to be calculated, as claimed by TCL (which, to date, is 43 months), should be reduced by reason of TCL delays in relation to:
(a)	abandoning its opposition to the limitation decree in November 2020 in circumstances where it did not have (despite earlier indications that it would file) any evidence of negligence on the part of the shipowner;
(b)	making an initial (counter) claim in January 2020 effectively of US$1,237,000, the vast majority of which was patently unsustainable only to iteratively reduce its claim down to US$238,721 which was accepted by DSV in July 2021;
(c)	submitting a bill of costs for the limitations phase about four months after the order for those costs was made;
(d)	belatedly (and unsuccessfully) applying for a higher costs order several months after an almost identical application by DSV had been refused;
(e)	its dilatoriness in responding to DSV’s proposed dispositive orders circulated in November 2021, which included reference to costs in the sum of TOP$32,544 being agreed "in full and final settlement of all claims for costs in the proceedings"; 
(f)	to then several months later dispute any such agreement as to costs; and
(g)	finally, several months after that, presenting a bill of costs for the claims phase.
18.	It must be accepted, however, that some of those delay periods ran concurrently with other events during the proceedings such as the progression of Ezinet’s claim, and which necessarily, and independently, prolonged the proceedings. 
19.	Therefore, and without any attempt at surgical or mathematical precision, but in the informed exercise of the discretion required for such an assessment, I consider that the appropriate period over which interest is to be calculated is 2 ½ years (or 30 months).
20.	Accordingly, interest on the claim shall be allowed at US$59,690.
21.	Although it was not directly addressed by DSV, TCL’s claim for interest on the agreed costs of the limitation proceeding (TOP$32,524) should be allowed. However, for the reasons canvassed above, particularly in respect of the events of the last 12 months, I reduce that amount by half making a total of TOP$1,626. On current exchange rates, that equates to US$662.
22.	Interest post judgment is provided for by Order 30 rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, and in this case, will continue at the rate of 10% per annum until the judgment is satisfied. 

TCL’s claim for costs of the claims phase
23.	On 29 September 2021, I refused Ezinet’s claim on the fund. In the final paragraph of that ruling, I stated that I would hear from DSV and TCL as to the form of final orders to be made for the administration and distribution of the limitation fund, “including TCL’s costs of the claims phase”.
24.	As noted above, on 22 October 2021, the parties filed consent orders in relation to orders for costs to that date. The orders the subject of the parties’ agreement were stated to be those made on 22 December 2020, 18 September 2020 and 31 May 2021. Order 8 of the principal orders on 22 December 2020 required DSV to pay TCL’s costs of and incidental to “the limitation proceedings” (up to and including 10 July 2020). By a process of set off between the various orders for costs, the parties agreed on a net amount payable to TCL of TOP$32,524. 
25.	At the time of filing the consent orders, TCL had not made (nor even intimated) a claim for any additional costs of the claims phase.  It was not until April 2022, that it did. Subsequently, directions were made for TCL to file a bill of costs claimed in taxable form. 
26.	On 30 August 2022, TCL filed a bill of costs said to be in respect of the claims phase. Apart from a few lump sum items, the bill is based on the Tongan scale (or party/party) rates as determined by ruling dated 31 May 2021, in respect of 509 items from 31 March 2019 to 29 August 2022, plus disbursements, totalling TOP$76,778.40.
Submissions 
27.	DSV opposes TCL’s claim. The grounds for its opposition may be summarised as follows:
(a)	even though, generally, a party in DSV’s position which brings proceedings for a limitation decree pays the costs of obtaining the decree and the costs of a defendant and other claimants that establish claims against the fund, any decision on costs remains a matter of discretion for the Court or Registrar; 
(b)	as the costs order of 22 October 2021 was negotiated at a time when the Ezinet claim had been determined to be inadmissible, and the claim by TCL had been reduced and accepted without any hearing process, the parties were negotiating to finally resolve all costs issues between them;
(c)	it is extraordinary that TCL did not protest when its lawyers received DSV’s  memorandum on 1 November 2021 proposing final orders;
(d)	there should be no award of costs to TCL on its claim because there was no reference or hearing process on the TCL claim;
(e)	alternatively, if there was a such a process, the same result should obtain because TCL made an inflated claim;
(f)	if TCL is entitled to any award for costs, then they should be limited to the costs necessary to submit and establish the claim against the fund taxed under the applicable Tongan procedural rules; 
(g)	the necessary legal costs of bringing a claim against the fund, to assess the TCL claim, obtain the necessary documentary support for the repair costs and submit them should be measured in terms of one or two-days’ legal work; 
(h)	similar to its original bill of costs in the limitation proceeding, TCL’s bill of costs for the claims phase appears to incorrectly include every cost it says it has incurred in relation to its claim against the fund;
(i)	of the 10 authors claimed for and over 320 hours of charged time:
(i)	over 50 hours are claimed before the issue of the limitation proceedings;
(ii)	about 145 hours are claimed in the period before the decree was granted addressing various issues;
(iii)	over 60 hours are for after the decree was granted to the time when the affidavit to substantiate the sum claimed was filed; and
(iv)	over 60 hours are for work after DSV brought the issue of costs back to the court;
(j)	other more specific categories of objection include:
(i)	items 1 to 170 were all in TCL's revised bill of costs of 15 June 2021 for the limitation phase;
(ii)	a number of items have not been claimed on a party party basis;
(iii)	the same work has been performed by a number of lawyers (i.e. duplication); and
(iv)	claims for research are not allowed.
28.	TCL refutes DSV’s objections and maintains that it is entitled to an order for its costs, as claimed, because, in summary:
(a)	the ruling on 29 September 2021 recorded the "foreshadowed hearing of an application for costs by TCL for the claims phase”;
(b)	therefore, the consent order for costs in October 2021 could not have included costs of the claims phase;
(c)	the court’s ‘quintessential' discretion in relation to costs must be exercised judicially and in accordance with established principles;
(d)	TCL's costs of the claims phase include, relevantly, the cost of identifying and addressing its loss and damage suffered as a result of the incident, assessing the quantum of its loss, preparing and submitting its claim against the fund, preparing for and appearing at various directions hearings, advising TCL as to quantum and liability issues and preparing for and appearing at the hearing on 16 August 2022;
(e)	TCL's actual solicitor/client costs for the claims phase including disbursements is TOP$188,146.71 compared to its claim here “for taxation purposes” of $76,778.40;
(f)	all hourly rates have been claimed in accordance with the Tongan scale and the Court ruling of 31 May 2021;
(g)	per practice direction 4 of 2003, the law involved was novel and of unusual complexity in that it concerned legal principles and processes predating the 1976 Convention and was a "relatively rare and novel type of case in Tonga”;
(h)	despite repeated invitations to strike a settlement, DSV adopted an unduly technical approach to the proceedings and persisted with its insistence on a limitation process thereby causing TCL to incur significant costs pursuing its claim;
(i)	the absence of a hearing in relation to TCL's claim cannot “save” DSV because if DSV’s submission in this regard were correct, a recalcitrant defendant could refuse to admit a claim, put the claimant to the cost of proving it and then discontinue on the eve of the hearing, which is disingenuous and contrary to settled costs principles;
(j)	DSV’s submission that costs should lie where they fall because TCL’s claim was inflated ignores the various settlement offers by TCL which it says DSV ignored;
(k)	DSV’s failure to engage in settlement negotiations earlier resulted in TCL having to incur significant legal costs “endeavouring to understand and apply the Tongan limitation regime and determine which of its considerable losses was actionable at law”; and
(l)	as TCL’s claim for costs has been calculated on the Tongan rates (rather than the Australian and New Zealand rates it actually incurred), any “further winnowing of those claims will start to become farcical in the sense that TCL should not have bothered making any claim at all against DSV due to the entirely disproportionate costs that have been inflicted on it through the procedure invoked by DSV…”.
29.	TCL also responded generally to the specific categories of objection raised by DSV and accepted none of them.
30.	During the hearing on 21 September 2022, Mr David KC rejected TCL’s criticisms of DSV failing to properly engage in timely settlement negotiations. He submitted that there can be no criticism of a ship owner who does not respond to offers in relation to individual claims until it has a limitation decree. 
Consideration
31.	At the conclusion of that hearing, the parties agreed that I should determine whether costs on the claims phase are payable and, if so, to assess (or ‘tax’) the quantum of those costs. In agreeing to that course, the parties also acknowledged that unlike in a conventional taxation hearing before the Registrar (which in this case would likely have taken several days), I would necessarily be undertaking the task at a relatively high level with a broad-brush approach. In doing so, I have been informed by the relevant principles, the detail in the bill of costs, the submissions for and against the claim, my previous experience as a practitioner and my current experience of having managed, heard and determined the proceedings. 
32.	The first issue is whether the consent orders as to costs dated 22 October 2021 effectively bar TCL from making the current claim for costs of the claim phase. In my view, they do not. A plain reading of the terms of that order, combined with a recollection of the expectation in relation to a future claim for costs of the claims phase recorded in the ruling on 29 September 2021 and the fact that the principal order referred to being that of 22 December 2020 (which effectively concluded the limitation proceeding and commenced the claims phase) expressly provided only for (limited) costs in relation to the limitation proceeding, clearly shows that the only costs being considered to that point were those of the limitation proceeding. It was those costs which the parties went on to debate before agreeing on the net figure of TOP$32,524. To that point, TCL had not raised any claim for its costs of the claims phase.
33.	Secondly, and for the reason advanced by TCL, I do not accept DSV’s submission that there should be no award of costs because there was no reference or hearing process in respect of TCL’s claim. Unsurprisingly, the submission was unsupported by any direct authority. Once DSV refused TCL’s pre-litigation claim and embarked upon the limitation proceedings, TCL was always going to be required to present and prove its claim for damages whether for adjudication by the Court or to the satisfaction of DSV. It is therefore entitled to recover such costs as were reasonably necessary or proper to establish its claim. 
34.	Thirdly, I do not agree with DSV’s submission that TCL should be denied any costs simply because its earlier claims were inflated. In my view, the appropriate approach to such conduct is to disallow or discount the claimed costs of any work performed in relation to aspects of TCL’s claim which it subsequently abandoned as being unsustainable and which should never have been claimed (i.e. other than for commercial settlement reasons). One example of that were the alleged customer (Digicel and TCC) credits. 
35.	Fourthly, after having considered the submissions as summarised above and every item in TCL’s bill of costs, I agree with DSV, effectively, that TCL’s costs claim is manifestly excessive.   In order to explain that assessment, and address the balance of DSV’s complaints and TCL’s submissions in defence of its claim, my key findings, observations and reservations are as follows.
36.	First and foremost, it is important to recall that the ultimate product of the costs claimed was a two page affidavit from Mr Panuve, TCL’s CEO, sworn 28 June 2021 which exhibited 50 pages of invoices and other documents evidencing TCL’s then claim of US$238,721.64, of which $233,853.63 represented repair costs. It is almost impossible to reconcile, from the information provided in the particulars of the work performed in the bill of costs, the costs claimed with that relatively modest and simple document. I do accept, however, that viewing that output in isolation is an unrealistic measure of other costs which might reasonably and necessarily be incurred, including, for example, to investigate the incident and damage suffered, to advise TCL on its claim and the process required to advance it and for appearances at hearings during the claims phase.  On the other hand, the size and relative simplicity of Mr Panuve’s affidavit as the final presentation of TCL’s claim is relevant when considering proportionality. 
37.	The amount of costs claimed can only be understood, at least in part, by recognition of the fact that a considerable number of items in the current bill of costs were also included in TCL’s bill of costs for the limitation proceeding. During the last hearing, Mr McBride accepted that fact but sought to explain it on the basis that those items had been included because they had not been accepted in the limitations proceeding. In my view, it does not necessarily follow that those items can all be characterised as costs of the claims phase. Pertinent examples include the many items expressly relating to the limitation proceeding and work in respect of TCL’s claim on its insurer.  
38.	It is clear, in my view, that the approach taken by TCL has been to include all items of work for which it has been charged, albeit at the lower Tongan rates. Numerous items lack sufficient description by which any nexus between the work performed and the claims phase could be identified. On the contrary, and by way of example, the numerous items involving "strategy" (whether in relation to settlement or otherwise) must be regarded as falling outside the ambit of costs reasonably necessary for the presentation of what was a relatively simple claim. 
39.	Numerous items, again by way of description only, appear to have involved more than one lawyer or operator performing work on the same task whether by way of perusing, reviewing, drafting or amending some document. While there may often be collaboration between solicitors in a firm on a particular task or matter, and between them and counsel briefed on the matter, the essential nature of the claim here for TCL’s costs of repairs and some minor consequential losses was so relatively straightforward as to render the number of persons recorded as performing on individual tasks (including the creation of simple documents) excessive. It is easier to understand the amounts claimed and work performed in relation to issues concerning the limitation proceeding and the comparative novelty of such proceedings in Tonga, but those costs have already been claimed and agreed separately and ought not have been included in the costs of the claims phase.
40.	Similarly, I consider the number of items for amending various documents, (even where, by their description, they appear relevant to the claims phase) including, in particular, reductions to TCL’s claims, to be inordinate and not something for which DSV should be required to pay.
41.	Claims for research (approximately 20) predominantly related to the relevant statutory framework pertaining to limitations proceedings and/or Tongan civil procedure including applications for costs at higher rates. Neither are relevant to the claims phase.
42.	Costs claimed in respect of work clearly relating to the limitation proceedings have been disallowed.
43.	Costs claimed for work which appeared to relate to both the limitations and claims phases have been apportioned and reduced accordingly.
44.	In response to Mr McBride’s somewhat understandable lament to effect that any further reduction in the claim for costs would result in a ‘farcical’ situation for TCL and run the risk of rendering the pursuit of its claim nugatory, it appears to me that much of that disappointment may be due to TCL engaging foreign lawyers, which it was most entitled to do (and which arguably the case necessitated, at least in relation to the limitation proceedings), but without making an application for costs at higher rates at the appropriate time in accordance with Order 47 rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules and the Tongan authorities in relation to such applications. Had such applications being properly made, they would more likely than not have been granted. However, and for the reasons previously explained on this issue, TCL has incurred substantial costs which cannot be recovered under the Tongan procedural scheme. That unhappy outcome is all the more bemusing when TCL’s legal team comprised ten lawyers including local counsel. In that regard, and even though the bill of costs includes reference to consulting with Mr Bloomfield on matters such as the requirements for foreign lawyers to practice in Tonga on the case, it does not appear that he was asked for advice on the procedural requirements for applications for costs at higher rates which accounts for most of the deficit in TCL’s recovery prospects.
45.	TCL’s submission that it was forced to incur greater costs in relation to the claims phase because DSV refused to engage earlier in settlement negotiations cannot be accepted:
(a)	Firstly, it is difficult to see how TCL was forced to incur additional costs because DSV refused to accept its earlier claims which TCL repeatedly reduced.
(b)	Secondly, it was entirely reasonable for DSV to defer such negotiations until it had secured the limitation decree. There was no way of knowing before then how many other claims, in number and value, may have been presented. The issuing of the limitation decree was delayed by reason of TCL's opposition which, for the reasons referred to above, was without an evidential basis. While TCL was entitled to effectively put DSV to proof, having elected to do so, it now lies ill in the mouth of TCL to criticise DSV for taking a "technical approach" to those proceedings. 
(c)	Thirdly, even though Ezinet’s purported claim combined with TCL's final claim (July 2021) was unlikely to have exceeded the limit of the fund, it will be recalled that only a couple of months beforehand, TCL submitted a claim for US$393,546.64 (about two thirds more than its final claim). And, approximately a month before that, TCL had submitted a claim for its costs of the limitation proceeding in the sum of AUD$171,283.06. In circumstances where that claim was eventually "winnowed" down to TOP$38,000, it was reasonable, in my view, for DSV to be cautious about TCL’s downwardly cascading offers on its claim. Ultimately, it was for TCL to prove its claim for legitimate loss and damage suffered as a result of the incident. It chose not to do that until July 2021.
46.	Based on the aforesaid, I have considered all the items in the bill of costs. My assessments have been recorded in an additional column in the electronic version. A hard copy of the complete document will be provided to the parties as a form of annexure to this ruling. 
47.	The resulting balance of amounts allowed is just over TOP$36,000. However, given the vicissitudes inherent in a task such as this, I consider it appropriate to round that up to TOP$40,000.
Result
48.	The parties have substantially agreed on the form of the final orders to be made which will be separately issued with this ruling which now provides the final insertions for those orders, namely, that DSV is to pay TCL:
(a)	interest on its claims and costs (of the limitation proceeding) in the total sum of US$60,352; and
(b)	costs in the total sum of TOP$72,524.
			
NUKU’ALOFA		M. H. Whitten KC	
17 October 2022		LORD CHIEF JUSTICE