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Jagroop v Sokai and the Kingdom of Tonga [2001] TongaLawRp 41; [2001] Tonga LR 234 (27 July 2001)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TONGA
Court of Appeal, Nuku'alofa

CA 7/2001

Jagroop

v

Sokai and the Kingdom of Tonga

Burchett, Tompkins, Spender JJ
25 July 2001; 27 July 2001

Practice and procedure – appeal against strike out – cause of action may succeed – appeal allowed
Negligence – breach of duty of care – proximity and liability of police

The Appellant asserted that he was induced by a man Teg Rajan, who had arrived in Tonga on a Fijian passport, to lend him the sum of $1500. The Appellant discovered the next day that he had been duped, and so procured Mr Rajan's passport from him and went to the police. A few days later, the police arrested Mr Rajan on a charge of obtaining the sum of $1500 by false pretences, and got possession of the passport from the Appellant. The police told him that the charge against Mr Rajan would be prosecuted. There was some discussion between the Appellant and a police officer about whether the Appellant would bring civil proceedings. The police officer told him the police "would proceed and prosecute Rajan for obtaining by false pretences and to leave everything for them to do". But the police did not proceed with the prosecution; instead, they returned Mr Rajan's passport and ticket to him, and allowed him to leave Tonga. The Appellant lost any opportunity of proceeding against Mr Rajan before his departure, and was unable to recover the money lost. The Appellant sued the police officer, the first respondent, and the Kingdom of Tonga. He claimed that they were in breach of a duty of care owed to him and so were liable in negligence. The Respondents moved to strike out the claim on the grounds that the relationship between the parties lacked the proximity necessary for the existence of a duty of care and that, in any event, public policy would deny the plaintiff any cause of action, in the circumstances, for breach of a duty of care. The Supreme Court struck out the claim; the Appellant appealed.

Held:

1. It was alleged that the police officer "told the Plaintiff that they, the police, would proceed and prosecute Rajan ... and to leave everything for them to do". Evidence to that effect could have lead to a finding, at a trial, of an "assumption of responsibility by the police" which induced the Appellant to refrain from taking steps himself to ensure a recovery of the money. Even if the success of any of the steps open to him, had it been taken, were doubtful, it could be said he had now lost a chance of success.

2. If the Appellant had a cause of action which may possibly succeed, he was entitled to pursue it.

3. The appeal was allowed with costs. The orders under appeal were set aside and, in lieu of those orders, it was ordered that the application to strike out the statement of claim be dismissed with costs.

Cases considered:

Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328

Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1993] 3 All ER 193

Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] 1 All ER 833

Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53

Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344

Ramanlal & Sons Company Ltd v Cater [1999] Tonga LR 45

Swinney v Chief Constable [1996] 3 All ER 449

Yuen Kun-ueu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1987] 2 All ER 705

Counsel for appellant : Mr Niu
Counsel for respondent : Miss Tupou

Judgment

[1] The Appellant asserts that he was induced by a man Teg Rajan, who had arrived in Tonga on a Fijian passport, to lend him the sum of $1500. The pretence which persuaded the Appellant to part with his money was that it was needed to pay customs duty in respect of a container of goods then on the wharf. In fact, according to the Appellant's account, the goods did not exist, and when he discovered the next day that he had been, as he alleged, duped, the Appellant procured Mr Rajan's passport from him and went to the police. A few days later, the police arrested Mr Rajan on a charge of obtaining the sum of $1500 by false pretences, and got possession of the passport from the Appellant. He was told by the police that the charge against Mr Rajan would be prosecuted.

[2] There was some discussion between the Appellant and a police officer about whether the Appellant would bring civil proceedings. The upshot was that the police officer told him the police "would proceed and prosecute Rajan for obtaining by false pretences and to leave everything for them to do". But in reality the police did not proceed with the prosecution; instead, they returned Mr Rajan's passport and ticket to him, and allowed him to leave Tonga. That happened a little over a week after the assurance was given. No warning or information was provided to the Appellant, who lost any opportunity of proceeding against Mr Rajan before his departure, and has been unable to recover the money lost.

[3] Upon these facts, the Appellant sued the police officer, the first respondent, and the Kingdom of Tonga. Although the Statement of Claim is less than precise, he claims that they are in breach of a duty of care owed to him - in short, that they are liable in negligence. The issues have come before this Court because the Respondents moved to strike out the claim on the grounds that the relationship between the parties lacked the proximity necessary for the existence of a duty of care and that, in any event, public policy would deny the plaintiff any cause of action, in the circumstances, for breach of a duty of care. The learned judge below having acceded to these submissions and struck out his claim, the Appellant appeals to this Court.

[4] The principle upon which an application to strike out a claim may be entertained by the Court is clear. No party should have his claim denied without a hearing in the ordinary way, except where the claim is so hopeless that it cannot possibly succeed.

[5] In the present case, the learned judge thought the Appellant's claim was in conflict with the principle which protects from the imposition of a duty of care the function of the police in the investigation and prosecution of crime: see Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328; Yuen Kun-ueu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1987] 2 All ER 705. Even if a relationship of proximity sufficient to give rise to a duty of care could otherwise be established, his Honour considered the claim would be excluded upon grounds of public policy: Swinney v Chief Constable [1996] 3 All ER 449; Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344; Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] 1 All ER 833 at 840-841, per Steyn LJ, as Lord Steyn then was.

[6] It is not to be doubted that these principles apply, in general, to the investigation of crime by the police, and to their decisions concerning prosecution, in Tonga. But an important qualification was stated by Steyn LJ in Elguzouli-Daf at 841:

"Putting the decision in Hill in perspective I would only add that it does not follow that the police may not be held liable in a case where there is some form of assumption, of responsibility by the police."

[7] This dictum of Steyn LJ is reflected in the pleading in the present case, which specifically alleges that the police officer "told the Plaintiff that they, the police, would proceed and prosecute Rajan ... and to leave everything for them to do". Evidence to that effect could well lead to a finding, at a trial, of an "assumption of responsibility by the police" which induced the Appellant to refrain from taking steps himself to ensure a recovery of the money. Even if the success of any of the steps open to him, had it been taken, may be doubtful, it could be said he has now lost a chance of success. Perhaps he could have obtained the issue of a writ of ne exeat reano or some other relief, such as arrest on mesne process (if available in Tonga). It has been held that a writ of ne exeat regno is available, although it may be hard to establish a case for it: Ramanlal & Sons Company Ltd v Cater [1999] Tonga LR 45. Or, if told of the change of mind on the part of the police officer, the Appellant might have been able, before it became too late, to make successful representations to a superior officer.

[8] If the Appellant has a cause of action which may possibly succeed, he is entitled to pursue it. In Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1993] 3 All ER 193, which was concerned with the question whether a claim for negligence in the taking of a decision to exercise a statutory discretion, relating to the taking of a child into care, was or was not justiciable, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said (at 197), referring to an earlier speech of his own:

"I pointed out that unless it was possible to give a certain answer to the question whether the plaintiff's claim would succeed, the case was inappropriate for striking out. I further said that in an area of the law which was uncertain and developing (such as the circumstances in which a person can be held liable in negligence for the exercise of a statutory duty or power) it is not normally appropriate to strike out. In my judgment it is of great importance that such development should be on the basis of actual facts found at trial not on hypothetical facts assumed (possibly wrongly) to be true for the purpose of the strike out."

[9] Applying the same approach to the present case, this Court should allow the appeal with costs; set aside the orders under appeal; and, in lieu of those orders, order that the application to strike out the statement of claim be dismissed with costs.