IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF WESTERN SAMOA
HELD AT APIA

C.A. 6/96

BETWEEN

ASIATA SALEIMOA VAAI
of Siusega and Vaega, Matai
Appellant

AND

TAVUI LENE 
of Pitonuu and Tafuna, Matai
First Respondent

AND

MASE TOIA
of Apia Chief Returning Officer and Registrar of Electors and Voters
Second Respondent

Coram: The Rt Hon. Lord Cooke of Thorndon, President
The Rt Hon. Sir Gordon Bisson
The Hon. Mr Justice Sheppard

Hearing: 28 August 1996

Counsel: Appellant in person and T. Malifa
No appearance for First Respondent
Brenda P. Heather and Potoa'e Tanielu for Second Respondents

Judgment: 29 October 1996

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY SHEPPARD J.

This proceeding purports to be an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Western Samoa (Sapolu C.J.) delivered on 11 July 1996. There is to be determined first of all a preliminary question concerning the competence of the appeal. The question arises because of the presence in the Electoral Act 1963 of s.117. It provides that all decisions of the Supreme Court under Part X of the Act shall be final and conclusive and without appeal, and shall not be questioned in any way. If that section is a valid exercise of legislative power, it operates to bar the appeal which the appellant wishes to bring. The question to be determined is whether the section is valid.

In due course it will be necessary to refer to other provisions of Part X of the Electoral Act, to provisions of the Constitution of Western Samoa and to provisions of the Judicature Ordinance 1961. Before that is done, it is necessary to give a brief account of the nature of the proceedings which were before the Chief Justice. The matter which came before him was an election petition presented to the Supreme Court by the appellant. Joined as respondents to the petition were Ms Tavui Lene, the successful candidate for the constituency in question, Fauatea Sale, one of the unsuccessful candidates, and the Registrar of Electors, more properly described as the Chief Returning Officer and Registrar of Voters and Electors (hereafter referred to as ‘the Returning Officer').

Fauatea Sale was not joined as a respondent to the appeal. Ms Lene was but she has not taken any part in the proceedings before this Court.

In the proceedings before the Chief Justice, the appellant alleged a number of corrupt practices in relation to the election which was held in Western Samoa on 26 April 1996. These were claimed to have been committed by Ms Lene and, to a degree, by Fauatea Sale. The appellant's contentions were upheld. That is not a matter before this Court. Ms Lene had filed what is described as a counter petition in which she claimed that corrupt practices were committed by the appellant. The Chief Justice found that the appellant had improperly given the sum of $20 to an elderly blind woman in order to induce her to support him in the election in which he was a candidate. That was found to be a corrupt practice. The Chief Justice also found that, by giving a delegation of electors from his village drinks, food and money on 2 and 3 April 1996, the appellant had engaged in an illegal practice. But the Chief Justice did not find that that conduct amounted to a corrupt practice. He said that, after consideration of the relevant evidence, he had come to the conclusion that there was a reasonable doubt whether the appellant's real purpose in providing drinks, food and money to the delegation which came from Satupaitea was to comply with Samoan custom or to induce these electors to continue their support for the appellant and to vote for him at the election. Accordingly, this counter-allegation of corrupt practice against the appellant was dismissed. But because of his finding in relation to the sum of $20 given by the appellant to the blind woman, the Chief Justice found misconduct not only against Ms Lene, but also against the appellant himself. In addition, the Chief Justice found the appellant was not qualified to stand as a candidate because he had not been resident in Western Samoa for the period of 12 months prior to the holding of the election.

It is against these two findings that the appellant wishes to appeal. He does not seek any relief in relation to the further election which is to be held as a consequence of the Chief Justice's findings. He does not wish to participate in that election but he wishes to clear his name of the finding of improper conduct and also to have it declared that he was resident in Western Samoa for the requisite period notwithstanding absences from Western Samoa during that time at the Australian National University.

Section 104 of the Electoral Act deals with the method of questioning an election. So far as it is relevant, the section provides as follows:

104. Method of questioning election - (1) No election and no declaration of result or report to the Head of State shall be questioned except by a petition complaining of an unlawful election or unlawful declaration or report (in this Act referred to as an election petition) presented in accordance with this Part of the Act.

Section 105 provides that an election petition may be presented to the Supreme Court by any of a number of specified persons including a person claiming to have had a right to be elected or returned at the election. The member whose election result is complained of shall be the respondent to the petition. If the petition complains of the conduct of any official, the Returning Officer is also to be a respondent. There was such a complaint made in this case but it was dismissed by the Chief Justice.

Sections 106 and 107 deal respectively with the time for the presentation of an election petition and with security for costs. It is unnecessary to mention the detail of these provisions. Section 110 provides that every election petition shall be tried by the Supreme Court. Section 111 deals with the trial. This section is of general relevance to the matter but it is unnecessary to refer to it in its entirety. However, subsec. (6) of s.111 is as follows:

(6) On the trial of an election petition complaining of an unlawful election declaration or report and claiming the seat for some person, the respondent may give evidence to prove that that person was not duly elected, in the same manner as if he had presented a petition against the election of that person.

Section 112 of the Electoral Act provides that where a candidate who has been elected at an election is proved at the trial of a petition to have been guilty of any corrupt practice at the election, his election shall be void. Part IX of the Act deals with corrupt and illegal practices. Section 96 deals with bribery. That offence is committed by every person who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, gives any money or procures any office to or for any elector or voter in order to induce an elector or voter to vote or refrain from voting. Bribery is a corrupt practice. It was the corrupt practice found against the appellant.

Section 116 of the Electoral Act deals with irregularities which are not to invalidate an election. It is followed by s.117, to which we have referred. Section 118 is as follows:

118. Report of court as to corrupt or illegal practices - At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Court shall determine whether the member whose election or return is complained of, or any and what other person, was duly elected or returned, or whether the election was void, and shall forthwith certify in writing the determination to the Speaker and the determination so certified shall be final to all intents and purposes.

Subsection (1) of s.119 is as follows:

(1) Where in an election petition any charge is made of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election, the Court shall, in addition to giving a certificate and at the same time, report in writing to the Speaker as follows:

(a) Whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or has not been proved to have been committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any candidate at the election, and the nature of the corrupt or illegal practice:

(b) Whether any of the candidates has been guilty by his agents of any corrupt or illegal practice in reference to the election:

(c) The names of all persons proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and whether they have received certificates of indemnity.

(d) Whether there is reason to believe that corrupt or illegal practices have extensively prevailed at the election.

Section 121(2) provides that on being informed by the Speaker of the certificate and any report of the Court, the Legislative Assembly shall order the same to be entered in the Journals of the Assembly and shall give the necessary directions for confirming or altering the result or for issuing a public notice for a new election, or for carrying out the determination as the circumstances may require.

On 25 July 1996, the Chief Justice made a report to the Speaker pursuant to s.119. The report is in accordance with the findings made in the Chief Justice's judgment.

It was submitted by the appellant that s.117 of the Electoral Act was invalid because it offended certain provisions of the Western Samoan Constitution, namely the provisions of Art. 9 dealing with the right to a fair trial and Art. 15 dealing with freedom from discriminatory legislation. Art. 9(1) is as follows:

Right to a fair trial

9. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any charge against him for any offence, every person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established under the law. Judgment shall be pronounced in public, but the public and representatives of news services may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.

Article 15, so far as relevant, provides that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection under the law.

The Court of Appeal of Western Samoa is provided for in Part VI of the Constitution which is entitled ‘The Judiciary’. Article 75 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Court, the Judges who are to be members of it, and for the period of appointment of those Judges. Article 79 provides for the general jurisdiction of the court. Also relevant by reason of the submissions which were made to us are Arts. 80 and 81. Articles 79, 80 and 81 are as follows:

General jurisdiction of Court of Appeal

79. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals (including proceedings removed by order of the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal) as may be provided by the Act.

Jurisdiction on constitutional questions

80. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the Supreme Court in any proceeding, if the Supreme Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation or effect of any provision of this Constitution.

(2) Where the Supreme Court has refused to give such a certificate, the Court of Appeal may, if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation or effect of any provision of this Constitution, grant special leave to appeal from that decision.

(3) Where such a certificate is given or such leave is granted, any party in the case may appeal to the Court of Appeal on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided and, with the leave of that Court, on any other ground.

Jurisdiction in respect of fundamental rights

81. An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the Supreme Court in any proceedings under the provisions of Article 4.

We reject the submission that s.117 of the Electoral Act is invalid by reason of the operation of Art. 9 of the Constitution. That article provides that every person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established under the law. The Supreme Court is such a tribunal. It is established under the law, it being provided for in Art. 65 of the Constitution. It has the jurisdiction provided for in Art. 73. The provisions of Part X of the Electoral Act earlier referred to do provide for a right to a fair and public hearing in matters such as this where there are allegations of corrupt practices in connection with the holding of elections. The Act enables a party such as the appellant here to bring before the Supreme Court a petition to have the matters which are relied upon by that person determined by the Supreme Court. In certain circumstances the conduct of a person such as the appellant here who has brought an election petition may be the subject of counter allegation. If that occurs those allegations must be determined at the fair and public hearing for which Part X of the Electoral Act provides.

It was argued by the appellant, who appeared in person, that the notion of a fair trial in Art. 9 should be understood to include a right to pursue a cause of action not only at the trial level but through whatever appellate hierarchy was provided for in the relevant procedural statute. In our opinion this submission is misconceived. He also submitted that s.117 is arbitrary and does not provide any safeguards against abuses of power by a single judge. He contrasted the position in New Zealand under its Electoral Act which provides for electoral petitions to be heard by three judges of the High Court. We do not consider the question whether there should be a right of appeal as an issue dependent on whether the trial should be before one judge or more than one judge. We note that by s.32 of the Judicature Ordinance, hearings in the Supreme Court of Western Samoa may be before one or more judges and that by s.52 the Supreme Court may state a case to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. The appellant accepted that these provisions applied to election petitions.

What is guaranteed by Art. 9 is a right to a fair trial. The relevant legislation provided for such a right. In order to give effect to the appellant's submissions one would need to conclude that the right to a fair trial involved also a right to pursue an appeal. In our opinion, this is not the meaning to be accorded to the provision. We refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Ward v Bradford Corporation (1971) 70 LGR 27 which was concerned with the review of the decision of a college disciplinary committee. There Lord Denning MR said (at 35) that natural justice did not require the provision of an appeal. So long as the party concerned had a fair hearing by a fair-minded man or body of men that was enough. In the same case Phillimore L.J. said, after stating the requirements of natural justice propounded by Lord Hodgson in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 132, that the rules of natural justice did not require that there should be a right of appeal.

Support for the view that a right to a fair trial does not carry with it a right to an appeal is also to be found in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium (‘The Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2)’) 1 EHRR 252 (European Human Rights Reports). Article 9 of the Western Samoan Constitution may be compared with Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides that, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The Court said (at 283) that Art. 6 of the Convention did not compel States to institute a system of appeal courts. A State which sets up such courts consequently goes beyond its obligations under Art. 6. It went on to say, however, that a State would violate Art. 6, read in conjunction with Art. 14 (we shall mention Art. 14 in a moment) were it to debar certain persons from these remedies without a legitimate reason while making them available to others ‘in respect of the sate type of actions’. The emphasis is added. Reference may also be made to the Delcourt Case noted in 47 International Law Reports at 182.

Section 117 of the Electoral Act is not an unusual provision in legislation of this kind. It has its counterparts in similar statutes in other countries. We instance s. 242 of the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s. 368 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) in Australia and s.169 of the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 (NSW). The reasons for such provisions are clear. There needs to be finality of the result o£ an election as soon as possible after it is held. Uncertainty about the result of the election for even one constituency may cause difficulties in relation to the proper working of the legislature. Barring further litigation after a final hearing in the Supreme Court avoids what may turn out to be a very long and drawn out process.

It is to be observed that the Constitution itself does not contemplate there being an appeal in every case decided by the Supreme Court or indeed, by other courts. Article 79 provides that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals as may be provided by Act. It is true that the opening words of Art. 79 make it subject to the provisions of the Constitution but, although that is so, it is plain that the drafters of the Constitution contemplated that there would not necessarily be an appeal from every decision of the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal. What was contemplated was that the appeals which were to come to the Court of Appeal were those which were provided for by an Act of the legislature. Although the words, `Subject to the provisions of this Constitution', must be given full effect, giving them the effect contended for by the appellant would require one to read Art. 79 as if it provided that there was a general right of appeal from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal in every case decided by the Supreme Court. That was not the meaning Art. 79 was intended to have.

It follows that we are of the opinion that there has been no infringement of Art. 9 of the Constitution because the ability of a person such as the appellant to lodge a petition and to have it tried by the Supreme Court under x.111 does give to the persons who are parties to that trial the fair and public hearing for which Art. 9 of the Constitution provides, a right of appeal not being an essential element of that fair and public hearing. We would add, however, as the appellant submitted, that s.117 does not deprive any party of a remedy if the trial is unlawful by reason of the denial of a fair hearing. The appellant does not claim this to be the case. If a litigant believed that there had not been a fair trial, for instance because of a failure to observe the rules of natural justice, an application could be made to the Supreme Court under Art. 4 to enforce the right to a fair trial. Pursuant to Art. 81 any decision by a judge of the Supreme Court in proceedings under Art. 4 may be the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

We turn to the submissions based upon Art. 15 of the Constitution. In order to consider these submissions, we need to refer to certain of the provisions of the Judicature Ordinance 1961. A reading of that Ordinance shows that, although its provisions limit the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal in a variety of cases, there is, broadly speaking, a right to appeal, or to apply for leave to appeal, from all decisions of the Supreme Court. Section 117 of the Electoral Act operates to deny such a right to parties to election petitions. In this respect there is an apparent conflict between it and the provisions of the Judicature Ordinance. But, subject to the question of validity which arises for determination, that conflict is resolved by giving 

[MISSING PAGE 10]

would have had the right to apply for leave under s.64 if it emerged that there was no other provision which applied to his case.

The analysis of these provisions which has been undertaken demonstrates that, although there is not in Western Samoa an unlimited right of appeal to the Court of Appeal in every case where a party to a proceeding in the Supreme Court is dissatisfied with its decision, the sections of the Judicature Ordinance to which we have referred ensure that in all appropriate cases a party dissatisfied with the decision of the Supreme Court will have an opportunity of approaching the Court of Appeal albeit that in numbers of cases that approach will, in the first instance, be limited to a right to apply for leave.

Article 15 provides for freedom from discriminatory legislation. For present purposes its provisions guarantee that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection under it. The fundamental submission made by the appellant is that x.117 denies this protection to parties to election petitions because they are deprived of the more general rights of appeal, or to apply for leave to appeal, provided for in the Judicature Ordinance. In the appellant's submission, they are therefore not equal before the law. They are discriminated against because they are deprived of the rights which are conferred on litigants in all other types of proceedings in the Supreme Court. In answer to this submission, counsel for the Returning Officer contended that there was no discrimination and no failure to treat parties to election petitions equally because all parties to election petitions were treated similarly. No party to such a proceeding was entitled to appeal.

The Belgian Linguistic case is again of relevance. The Court there was concerned not only with Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but also with Art. 14. So far as relevant, that article provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground. The language of Art. 14 of the European Convention is not identical with the language of Art. 15 of the Western Samoan Constitution but it is to similar effect.

In the course of its judgment in the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court said (at 284-5) that the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and reasonable justification. Such a justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. Secondly, in addition to pursuing a legitimate aim, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The Court said that the Court cannot put itself in the place of the legislature. Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of the measures with the requirements of the convention. The Court said further (at 293) that Art. 14 does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are founded on an objective assessment of essentially different factual circumstances and which, being based on the public interest, strike a fair balance between the protection of the interests of the Community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention.

In Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648, the Privy Council was concerned with alleged discrimination based upon discrepancies in penalties provided for in Singapore in the case of persons convicted of trafficking in more than 15 grams of heroin and penalties provided for in the case of persons trafficking in lesser quantities. The penalty for those trafficking in more than 15 grams of heroin was death. In the course of its judgment, the Privy Council said (at 673-4):

The discrimination that the defendants challenge in the instant cases is discrimination between class and class: the imposition of a capital penalty upon that class of individuals who traffic in 15 grammes of heroin or more and the imposition of a penalty, severe though it may be, which is not capital upon that class of individuals who traffic in less than 15 grammes of heroin. The dissimilarity in circumstances between the two classes of individuals lies in the quantity of the drug that was involved in the offence. The questions whether this dissimilarity in circumstances justifies any differentiation in the punishments imposed upon individuals who fall within one class and those who fall within the other, and, if so, what are the appropriate punishments for each class, are questions of social policy. Under the Constitution, which is based on the separation of powers, these are questions which it is the function of the legislature to decide, not that of the judiciary. Provided that the factor which the legislature adopts as constituting the dissimilarity in circumstances is not purely arbitrary but bears a reasonable relation to the social object of the law, there is no inconsistency with article 12(1) of the Constitution.

Article 12(1) of the Constitution of Singapore provided that all persons were equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.

The judgment in Ong Ah Chuan was referred to by the Court of Appeal of The Cook Islands in Clarke v Karika (Appeal No. 2/82, unreported). Reference may be made to pp.24-26. After citing the passage from Ong Ah Chuan which has been quoted above, the Court said (at 24) that the Privy Council had stressed that whether the dissimilarity in circumstances justified the differentiation in penalties, and if so whether the penalties were appropriate for each class, were questions of social policy, left under the Constitution to the legislature and not to the judiciary. Later the Court said (at 26) that the question was whether the challenged provisions of the private Act of Parliament in question before it were discriminatory in a way which singled out persons for reasons not consonant with the legitimate and apparent legislative purpose.

The cases to which we have referred show that it is relevant to take into account the legislative policy which underlies s.117. We have mentioned that provisions such as s.117 are not uncommon in electoral statutes. The purpose of them is to achieve finality of litigation in order that parliaments are able to function as they were intended to with a full membership with the least possible delay. There is nothing arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable about such a provision. There is a sound policy reason for it. Furthermore, all parties to election petitions are in exactly the same position. None has any right of appeal. All persons falling into this category or class are treated similarly. Within that class there is no discrimination. It is true that parties to election petitions do not enjoy the general rights of appeal, or the right to apply for leave to appeal, conferred on parties to most cases in the Supreme Court. They are excluded from them. But, as we have said, there is, in our opinion a sound policy reason for the bar which s.117 imposes. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that s.117 is a valid exercise of legislative power and operates to bar the appeal which the appellant wishes to bring.

Before we conclude, there are some further matters to be mentioned.

Firstly, we need to say something about the operation of Arts 80 and 81 of the Constitution. As mentioned, the provisions of Art. 80 are to the same effect as the provisions of s.45 of the Judicature Ordinance. Nevertheless, because the provisions are to be found in the Constitution itself, they must be given an overriding effect. In other words those provisions would prevail over a provision such as s.117 of the Electoral Act. But they will only apply if the Supreme Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation or effect of a provision of the Constitution or, where the Supreme Court has refused to give such a certificate, the Court of Appeal is satisfied that the case involves such a question and decides to grant special leave to appeal from the decision. Here the Supreme Court has not issued any certificate as provided for in Art. 80(1). There was no occasion, therefore, for this Court to consider the matter because there had been no refusal to give a certificate by the Supreme Court as contemplated by Art. 80(2). It would not appear to us that the grounds of appeal which were intended to be relied upon by the appellant in the event that the objection to competency had been dismissed would have raised any such question as is provided for in Art. 80. The two grounds of appeal involve essentially questions of fact concerning as they do the appropriateness of the finding of a corrupt practice and the place of residence of the appellant in the period of 12 months prior to the election. Insofar as an appeal would involve challenging findings of fact, the usual limitations on appellate courts would of course apply and would present the appellant with a difficulty. That may account for the fact that no certificate under Art. 80 was applied for.

If such a certificate had been applied for, it seems almost certain that the application would have been refused and that this Court would have taken the view that the Supreme Court was correct. Be that as it may, no question concerning Art. 80 can arise in this proceeding because the procedural steps provided for in Art. 80 have not been taken. In any event, and perhaps more importantly, the constitutional matters that were relied upon by the appellant were relied upon by him in opposing the submission made by counsel for the Returning Officer that the appeal was incompetent because it was barred by s.117 of the Electoral Act. We have decided that the constitutional provisions in question, Arts. 9 and 15, do not operate to invalidate that section. We have thus decided the only constitutional questions that could have arisen in the present matter.

Article 81 provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the Supreme Court in any proceedings under the provisions of Art. 4. That Article is in Part II of the Constitution in which Arts. 9 and 15 also appear. The Article provides that any person may apply to the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings to enforce the rights conferred under the provisions of Part II. The Article goes on to empower the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary and appropriate to secure to an applicant the enjoyment of any of the rights conferred under the provisions of Part II. Here there is no application as such to enforce the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part II. However, it was quite appropriate to raise in this proceeding arguments based on Arts 9 and 15 of the Constitution. They have been dealt with. In effect the Court's decision covers the matters which might have been raised in an application under Art. 4. Accordingly, there would not appear to be any utility in the taking of any proceeding under Art. 4. It is enough, however, for us to say that there is no such proceeding before us.

There was a subsidiary submission relied upon by the appellant based on the ambit of the operation of s.117 of Electoral Act assuming it to be a valid exercise of legislative power. We have considered this submission but are of opinion that the appeal sought to be brought in this case is plainly barred by s.117.

Finally, we should emphasise that we have not considered the substance of the matter of the appeal which the appellant wished to bring. We have not heard argument on the two matters of which he complains and we have not ourselves formed any view on either of those matters. We have decided that there is no appeal to the Court because of the provisions of s.117 of the Electoral Act. Our decision goes no further than this.

For the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the purported appeal is incompetent because it offends s.117 of the Electoral Act. The appeal is therefore dismissed as incompetent.

No application for costs was made by the respondent. In those circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

Solicitors:
Libra Law Consultancy, Apia, for Appellant
Office of the Attorney-General, Apia, for Second Respondent