SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
Police v Tevaga [2015] WSSC 184
Case name: 	Police v Tevaga	
		
Citation: 	[2015] WSSC 184
	
Conclusions:	16 November 2015
	
Decision date: 	16 November 2015	
		
Parties: 	POLICE v ATONIO PINETUAOI TEVAGA male of Samalaeulu and Lano in Savaii.	
		
Hearing date(s): 	27 October 2015 	
		
File number(s): 	S1544/15	
		
Jurisdiction: 	CRIMINAL	
		
Place of delivery: 	Supreme Court of Samoa, Mulinuu	
		
Judge(s): 	Chief Justice Sapolu	
		
On appeal from:		
		
Order:	-	In respect of the charge of ordinary theft under s.161 of the Crimes Act 2013, I am satisfied in terms of s.161 (1) (b) that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft of one fuel pump valued at $465.00, two parking lights valued at $300.00 each, two sliding door rollers valued at $95.00 each, and two body kits valued at $300.00 each.  However, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused stole the floor cover of the van valued $150.00.  This charge is therefore proved in part.
-	The charge of theft by a person in a special relationship under to s.162 of the Crimes Act 2013 is not in order.  It is therefore dismissed. 

Representation: 	F Lagaaia for prosecution
Accused in person 	
		
Catchwords: 	ordinary theft- theft by a person in a special relationship, or theft in a special relationship - gratuitous bailment – breach of the contractual obligation – 	
		
Words and phrases:		
		
Legislation cited:	Crimes Act 2013, s.161 and s.162, .s.161 (1) (b), s.172
Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s.219 (1) (b)

Cases cited:

Law Text Books	Hansen v R [2013] NZHC 731; 
Harris v R [2013] NZCA 611; 
Herbert v R [2015] NZCA 483; 
McGuirk v R [2015] NZCA 148; 
Mead v R [1972] NZLR 255, 261.
Nisbet v The Queen [2011] NZCA 285
Norris v R [2013] NZCA 526; 
Police v Tapuolo [2015] WSSC 6
R v Douglas [2012] NZHC 1748
R v Dunbar [1963] NZLR 253
R v Farley (1918) 43 VLR 505
R v Hamilton [2014] NZHC 1579; 
R v Kirk (1901) 20 NZLR 463
R v Martini [1941] NZLR 361
R v Smith [2013] NZHC 1341; 
R v Sullivan [2014] NZHC 2501; 
S Tallentire v R [2012] NZCA 610; 
R (SFO) v Robinson [2015] NZHC 1673
R v Whale [2013] NZHC 731; 
Wilton v Police [2015]NZHC 427; 

Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1	
	Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (1998) 6th ed 	
	Garrow and Turkington’s Criminal Law in New Zealand	
Summary of decision:		

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU

FILE NO:  S1544/15

BETWEEN

P  O  L  I  C  E
Prosecution

A  N  D

ATONIO PINETUAOI TEVAGA a male of Samalaeulu and Lano in Savaii.
Accused

Counsel:	
F Lagaaia for prosecution
Accused in person

Hearing:	27 October 2015

Judgment:	16 November 2015

JUDGMENT OF SAPOLU CJ
The charges
1. 	The accused Atonio Pinetuaoi Tevaga of Lano and Samalaeulu in Savaii is a motor mechanic.  He stood trial on two charges, namely, one of ordinary theft pursuant to s.161 of the Crimes Act 2013 and one of theft by a person in a special relationship, or theft in a special relationship as it is sometimes called, pursuant to s.162 of the Act.
2. 	Under the charge of ordinary theft, the accused is charged that between 1 April 2014 and 30 November 2014 he stole one fuel pump valued at $465, two parking lights valued at $300 each, two sliding door rollers valued at $95 each, one floor cover valued at $150, and two body kits valued at $300 each which were the properties of the complainant Sua Tafili Tuimanua of Samalaeulu.  All of these properties were parts of a Mazda van owned by the complainant and was given to the accused to repair.  It is, however, not clear whether for this charge the prosecution is relying on s.161 (1) (a) or on s.161 (1) (b).
3. 	Under the charge of theft in a special relationship, it is alleged that the accused received property, namely, a van from the complainant on terms or in circumstances that required him to account to the complainant but failed to do so by not returning the van in a repaired condition or the unrepaired van at all.  It is also not clear whether for this charge the prosecution is relying on s.162 (1) (a) or on s.162 (1) (b).
Background 
4. 	The complainant who is a male of Samalaeulu is the owner of a van.  It appears from the prosecution’s evidence that on a Saturday night in April 2014, a son of the complainant and other boys of the village of Samalaeulu went for a ride in the complainant’s van.  On the following morning, the van was found with its rear boot stuck on a pile of rocks near the boundary between Samalaeulu and the village of Mauga.  The police were contacted and a team of police officers went to the scene of the accident the same day.
5. 	According to the evidence of constable Ikenasio Falaniko, when the police arrived at the scene of the accident, he saw the van with its rear boot stuck on a pile of rocks.  The police found large empty bottles of beer inside the van.  One of the big lights of the van was hanging out and the door of the boot was badly dented and the rear windscreen was shattered.  There were pieces of glass inside the boot.  Constable Ikenasio further said that he did not see any damage to the front or the sides of the van or any other part of the van.  All the lights of the van were also in good condition except for the big light that was hanging out.
6. 	The van was later brought to the complainant’s house at Samalaeulu where it was parked for two to three weeks.  An arrangement was then made between the complainant’s son and the accused for the accused to repair the damage to the complainant’s van and the accused came to the complainant’s house and drove the van to his place at the village of Lano.  This is quite a long distance from Samalaeulu.
7. 	The complainant testified that after about three months he went to the accused’s place to see whether the repairs to the boot of his van had been completed.  He was shocked to see that the doors and other parts of his van as well as the boot had been removed even though only the boot was damaged.  He then gave $200 to the accused to do the repairs to his van.
8. 	Two months later, the complainant again visited the accused and found no repairs had yet been done to his van.  He then told the accused that he wanted to use his van for White Sunday in October and he paid $1,500 to the accused in order to expedite the repairs to his van.  After White Sunday, the van had still not been repaired.
9. 	Then about a month after White Sunday, the complainant went back to the accused’s place.  He found his van had still not been repaired.  He then had his van towed away.  The doors were put back inside the van but still missing from the van were the stereo, the fuel pump, lights, two sliding door rollers and the floor cover. Other evidence adduced by the prosecution showed that the two body kits of the van were also missing.  It was only after the accused was arrested and questioned by the police that he told the police that the missing parts of the complainant’s van were at his house at Lano.  The police went to the accused’s house at Lano and recovered the stereo, one body kit, the floor cover, one parking light, and two sliding door rollers.
10. 	The complainant’s wife testified that one day (not clear when) she went to the accused to return the missing parts of her husband’s van but the accused told her that he had thrown away those parts except for the floor cover.  He then told the complainant’s wife to tell her husband to come and get the floor cover.  In his evidence, the accused said that he told the complainant’s wife to tell her husband to come and get the missing parts of his van.  I have decided to accept the evidence of the complainant’s wife and reject the accused’s evidence as untrue.
Bailment 
11. 	For the purposes of this case, it is important to be clear in mind that the relationship between a car owner who takes his car to a motor mechanic, or allow his car to be taken to a motor mechanic, to be repaired for reward is a bailment.  It is a bailment of a chattel for something to be done to it for reward.  Such a bailment would be founded on contract.  It is not a gratuitous bailment which is non-contractual in nature.   A bailment for reward is often contrasted with a gratuitous bailment. The car owner will be the bailor and the motor mechanic will be the bailee. 
12. 	In Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (1998) 6th ed, the learned authors stated at 5.026:
	“A bailment of chattels for something to be done to or with them may be gratuitous or for reward.  The gratuitous bailment of this class is called a mandate.  Bailments for reward for something to be done are very numerous and vary according to the terms of the contract and the context in which they have arisen.  The nature of the function to be performed varies according to the circumstances:  one very common example is the bailment for repair (for example, A delivers his car to a garage for mechanical work to be performed).”
13. 	 The non-contractual nature of a gratuitous bailment, as opposed to a bailment for reward, is explained in the leading text Bailment (1991) 2nd ed by Professor N E Palmer where the learned author said at pp 26-27:
	“The most obvious example of a non-contractual bailment is a bailment which is gratuitous: i.e, from which only one party benefits.  A gratuitous bailment may take one of two forms.  The benefit may rest exclusively with the bailor, as in the cases of deposition or mandatum, which involve the unrewarded custody of goods or the unrewarded performance of work upon them.  Conversely, the benefit may rest entirely with the bailee; a bailment of this kind is known as commodatum or gratuitous loan.  At one time it was thought that gratuitous bailments could be accommodated within the contractual theory of bailment by means of some invented or hypothetical consideration.  As Professor Stoljar has remarked, those attempts were amusing and highly technical:  (1995) 7 Res Judicature 160 at 167” 
Relevant statutory provisions 
14. 	The charges of ordinary theft and theft in a special relationship are brought under s.161 and s.162 of the Crimes Act 2013 respectively.   Section 161 provides: 
	“(1)   Theft or stealing is the act of:
(a)	dishonestly taking any property with intent to deprive any owner permanently of that property or of any interest in that property; or
(b)	dishonestly using or dealing with any property with intent to deprive any owner permanently of that property or of any interest in that property after obtaining possession of, or control over, the property in whatever manner.
		“(2)	An intent to deprive any owner permanently of property includes an intent to deal with property in such a manner that:
(a)	the property cannot be returned to any owner in the same condition; or
(b)	any owner is likely to be permanently deprived of the property or of any interest in the property.
	“(3)	For tangible property, theft is committed by a taking when the offender moves the property or causes it to be moved. 
15. 	Section 162 provides:  
“(1)	This section applies to any person who has received or is in possession of, or has control over, any property on terms or in circumstances that require the person: 
(a)	to account to any other person for the property, or for any proceeds arising from the property; or 
(b)	to deal with the property, or any proceeds arising from the property, in accordance with the requirements of any other person.
	“(2)	A person to whom subsection (1) applies commits theft who fails to account to the other person as so required or deals with the property, or any proceeds of the property, otherwise than in accordance with those requirements.
	“(3)	This section applies whether or not the person was required to deliver over the identical property received or in the person’s possession or control.
	“(4)	For the purposes of subsection (1), it is a question of law whether the circumstances required any person to account or to act in accordance with any requirements.
Discussion 
(a)	Section 161 of the Crimes Act 2013
16. 	Even though the charge of ordinary theft does not specify whether it is s.161 (1) (a) or s.161 (1) (b) that is relied upon, it seems that the appropriate provision would be s.161 (1) (b) and not s.161 (1) (a).  Section 161 (1) (a), insofar as relevant, provides that theft is the dishonest ‘taking’ of any property with intent to deprive the owner permanently of that property.  The evidence of the complainant’s wife shows that her son agreed with the accused to let the accused drive the van away for repairs to the boot of the van while she was present.  There was therefore no ‘taking’ of property by the accused in terms of s.161 (1) (a) as it will appear from the commentary in Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 219.02, because the accused obtained possession of the van with the consent of the complainant’s son in the presence of the complainant’s wife.  Section 161 (1) (a) therefore does not apply.
17. 	In the commentary in Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 219.02, on s.219 (1) (a) of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), which is in similar terms to s.161 (1) (a) of our Crimes Act 2013, the learned authors in discussing the meaning of the term “taking” for the purposes of the offence of theft said:
	“The common law required that the thing should be ‘taken and carried away’.  The ‘taking’ consisted in the physical act of seizing the thing.  The ‘carrying away’ (or ‘asportation’) consisted of moving the thing taken.  Section 219 now merely requires that the thing be moved: subs (4)...
	“There is no ‘taking’ if ownership, possession or control of the property is acquired with the consent of the person from whom such title, possession or control is obtained (subs (3))... If the consent was obtained by deception, there may be an offence under s.240”.
18. 	The offence provided in s.240 of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) is obtaining by deception or causing loss by deception which corresponds with the offence of obtaining by deception or causing loss by deception provided in s.172 of our Crimes Act 2013.
19. 	After the accused had obtained possession of and control over the van, he removed several undamaged parts of the van without the knowledge or authority of the complainant as owner.  This seems to me to come within s.161 (1) (b) which relevantly provides that it is theft to dishonestly use or deal with any property with intent to deprive the owner thereof permanently after obtaining possession of, or control over, the property in whatever manner.  This is because after the accused had obtained possession and control of the van with the consent of the complainant’s son in the presence of the complainant’s wife, he removed several undamaged parts of the van without the knowledge or authority of the complainant as owner.  This must have been done by the accused at some time within three months after he obtained possession of the van because when the complainant went to the accused’s place at about the end of three months, the damage to the boot of his van had still not been repaired but several undamaged parts of the van including its doors had been removed.  When the complainant went again to the accused’s place at the end of the next two months, his van had still not been repaired and several undamaged parts were still missing.  Then one month later when the complainant had waited long enough he went to the accused’s place to tow away his van.  Only the doors which had been removed were put back inside the van.  It was only after the accused was arrested and questioned by the police that he told the police about the other parts of the complainant’s van at his house.  The police went to the house of the accused and recovered the other parts except for the fuel pump and one body kit which up to now could not be recovered.
20. 	The complainant’s wife also testified that when she went to the accused and asked for the return of the parts of her husband’s van he had removed, he told her he had thrown those parts away but to tell her husband to come and get the floor cover.  This further shows an intention on the part of the accused to deprive the complainant permanently of several parts of his van except for the floor cover.  
21. 	It should also be re-mentioned that only the boot and the door of the boot of the complainant’s van were damaged at the accident in which it was involved.  There was no good reason for the accused to remove the undamaged parts of the van and kept them for several months without the authority of the complainant as owner.  Up to now, the fuel pump and one of the body kits of the van have not been recovered from the accused.
22. 	In terms of s.161 (1) (b), I am satisfied on the evidence that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) the accused had obtained possession and control of the complainant’s van from the complainant’s son, (b) after obtaining possession and control of the complainant’s van the accused had dishonestly dealt with the undamaged parts of the van without the knowledge and authority of the complainant, and (c) the accused had an intention to deprive the complainant as owner permanently of those parts (except for the floor cover).  The charge of ordinary theft has therefore been proved in part.
(b)	Section 162 of the Crimes Act 2013
23. 	As earlier pointed out, the charge of theft in a special relationship preferred by the prosecution under s.162 alleges that the accused received property, namely, a van from the complainant on terms or in circumstances that required him to account to the complainant but failed to do so by not returning the van in a repaired condition or the unrepaired van at all.
24. 	I have a few initial comments to make about this charge.  Firstly, the charge does not specify whether the prosecution is relying on s.162 (1) (a) or on s.162 (1) (b).  It would have been helpful if the prosecution had specified whether it was relying on s.162 (1) (a) or s.162 (1) (b).  However, it would appear from the wording of the charge that the prosecution is relying on s.162 (1) (a) because it is alleged that the accused received the complainant’s van on terms or in circumstances that required him to account to the complainant for the van but he failed to return the van in a repaired condition.  Secondly, it is further alleged in the charge that the accused failed to account to the complainant for the van by not returning the van in ‘a repaired condition or the unrepaired van at all’.  This is partly incorrect.  The unrepaired van was actually returned to the complainant because the accused allowed the complainant to tow away his unrepaired van.  Thirdly, in the commentary by Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 220.04, on the meaning of the expression ‘account for’ as used in s.220 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), the learned authors said:
	“The key element in ‘accounting for’ property, or the proceeds of property, is that there is either a reckoning or calculation of any sum of money or quantum of property due and a rendering of that amount of quantum:  R v Farley (1918) 43 VLR 505.  Thus more than a simple entry in an accounting document may be needed”
25. 	Looking at the above passage from Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 220.04, my initial impression is that the present charge of theft in a special relationships laid by the prosecution under s.162 does not fall within that provision.
26. 	In Police v Tapuolo [2015] WSSC 6, this Court dealt for the first time with a charge of theft in a special relationship under s.162 Crimes Act 2013.  I referred in that case to the elements of theft in a special relationship as follows:
(a)	the accused had possession of or control over property;
	(b)	the accused was subject to an obligation to deal with the property, or proceeds from the property, in accordance with the requirements of any other person;
(c)	the accused knew of that obligation; and
(d)	the accused intentionally dealt with the property in a manner that he knew and intended to be a breach of that obligation.
27. 	The case of Police v Tapuolo [2015] WSSC 6 was not concerned with the question of what type of situation would give rise to an offence of theft in a special relationship in terms of s.162.  That was because the question was not raised whether as a matter of law in terms of s.162 (4), s.162 (1) applied to the circumstances of that case which related to a game of ‘ponesi’.  However, it has occurred to me that I should now deal with that issue because of the circumstances of this case.
28. 	In Nisbet v The Queen [2011] NZCA 285 which is one of the leading New Zealand authorities on the offence of theft in a special relationship under s.220 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), Lang J, in delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal said at [8], [13], [14], [25] – [28], [33]:
	“[8] Section 220, which was enacted by the Crimes Amendment Act 2003, replaced the original s.222 of the Crimes Act 1961, which had created the offence of theft by failing to account.  Section 220 also replaced the old s.223 (theft by a person holding a power of attorney) and the old s.224 (theft by misappropriating proceeds held under directions).
	...
	[13] Liability cannot arise under s.220 unless the circumstances required the accused to deal with property in accordance with the requirements of another person.  Section 220 (4) provides that it is a question of law whether the circumstances give rise to that obligation on the part of the accused.  Questions of law are the province of the trial Judge and not of the jury.
	[14] Section 220 (4) requires the trial Judge to identify specific factual circumstances that, if proved, give rise to a legal requirement obliging the accused to deal with property in a particular way.  The identification of those circumstances is properly a matter for the Judge, because it may require the interpretation of contractual documents or a determination as to whether legal obligations flow from the particular relationship or conduct of the parties.
	...
	[25] Section 220 replaced s.222 in 2003.  The issue of what will constitute circumstances requiring a person to act in accordance with the requirements of another person under s.220 (4) has not been the subject of any authority to date.  However, the authors of Garrow and Turkington’s Criminal Law in New Zealand note that there is nothing in the Report of the Law and Order Select Committee on the Crimes Amendment Bill or the 1991 Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee to suggest that the replacement of s.222 with s.220 was intended to change the substance of the law.  The explanatory note to the Crimes Amendment Bill says that s.220 is a ‘simplified version’ of s.222.  Accordingly, cases under the former s.222 are still relevant to determining what falls within s.220.
	“[27]  Case law on the former s.222 made it clear that the section applied if a person agreed to take money on terms requiring it to be paid to a third person and then failed to do so.  The terms could be merely contractual.  Therefore, an arrangement whereby a canvasser for drapery orders collected money under an agreement that the canvasser was to pay over all money received at least once a week fell within the section:  R v Kirk (1901) 20 NZLR 463.  Similarly, an insurance broker who received deposits for life insurance under a contract to pay them over to the insurance company fell within the section:  R v Martini [1941] NZLR 361.  An auctioneer who received money from a sale on behalf of his principal and retained some of it for himself could likewise be convicted: Shields v Jefferies [1953] NZLR 666.
	[28] However, this Court has held that in order for the offence to be established the obligation must be more than a mere debt:  Mead v R [1972] NZLR 255, 261.
	...
	[33] We conclude that a requirement will be established under s.220 (4) if the facts relied upon by the Crown establish a contractual obligation on the part of the accused to deal with property in a particular way.  Whether or not it will arise from a fiduciary relationship will depend upon the circumstances.  We leave open, because it does not arise in the present case, the possibility that the requirement might otherwise be imposed by law”.
29. 	It is further to be noted that s.162 (1) states that the offence of theft in a special relationship only arises where a person is in possession or control of property “on terms or in circumstances” that require him (a) to account to any other person for the property or its proceeds, or (b) to deal with the property, or its proceeds, in accordance with the requirements of any other person.  Section 162 (4) then states that for the purposes of subsection (1), it is a question of law, which is to be determined by the Judge, whether the circumstances required any person to account or to act in accordance with the requirements of any other person.
30. 	In the commentary by Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 220.03, on the meaning of the expression “on terms or in circumstances” used in s.220 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), the learned authors state:
	“In general, the existence of a contractual obligation to deal with property in a particular manner will give rise to few legal difficulties.  The essential distinction to be drawn is between terms or circumstances which require an accounting or payment for property or proceeds, and terms or circumstances which create only a personal liability which may be enforced by civil action.  Where the issue relates to dealing with property or proceeds, there is again a distinction to be drawn between terms or circumstances where a person may be required to act in a particular manner, and those where a failure to act only gives rise to a civil liability in damages”.
The charge of theft in a special relationship by failing to account
31. 	The present charge of failing to account against the accused is for failing to return the complainant’s van in a repaired condition  and falls under s.162 (1) (a).  Under the terms of the bailment, which was one for reward founded on contract, the accused was required to repair the damaged boot of the complainant’s van.  He failed to do so.  When the complainant towed his van away after waiting for several months, the van was still unrepaired.  The accused was therefore in breach of his contractual obligation under the bailment which was to repair the complainant’s van.  The question which arises is whether this breach of a contractual obligation to repair by the accused engaged the criminal law in terms of s.162 (1) (a).  In my opinion, the criminal law was not so engaged.
32. 	In terms of the passage cited from Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 220.03, the “terms or circumstances” under which the accused obtained the complainant’s van for repair and his failure to carry out repairs even though the complainant had paid him for the repairs gives rise only to a civil liability in damages.  To attach criminal liability to the accused would mean that numerous contracts for repairs to a chattel where a bailment for reward is involved will attract criminal liability if there is a breach of the contractual obligation to carry out the repairs.  This could not have been the intention of the legislature when enacting s.162 (1) (a).  It would not be appropriate that such a breach of a contractual obligation to repair should be criminalised in the absence of clear words to that effect.  In other words, as a question of law in terms of s.162 (4), I am of the view that in the circumstances of this case the accused was not required to account or to act in accordance with the requirements of the complainant for the purpose of s.162 (1).
33. 	I have also taken the trouble to read a number of New Zealand cases on theft in a special relationship to see whether there has been a New Zealand case which involved the kind of relationship that existed between the accused and the complainant in this case.  There is none.  The New Zealand cases on theft in a special relationship I have consulted are:  Nisbet v The Queen [2011] NZCA 285; Tallentire v R [2012] NZCA 610; R v Douglas [2012] NZHC 1748; Hansen v R [2013] NZHC 731; Norris v R [2013] NZCA 526; Harris v R [2013] NZCA 611; R v Whale [2013] NZHC 731; R v Smith [2013] NZHC 1341; R v Hamilton [2014] NZHC 1579; R v Sullivan [2014] NZHC 2501; McGuirk v R [2015] NZCA 148; Wilton v Police [2015]NZHC 427; Herbert v R [2015] NZCA 483; R (SFO) v Robinson [2015] NZHC 1673.
34. 	The only reported New Zealand case on bailment which involved a charge of theft  that I have been able to find is R v Dunbar [1963] NZLR 253.  In that case the owner of a boat lent his boat to the accused as bailee for the accused’s use.  The accused as bailee fraudulently executed an instrument of chattels security over the boat to secure a loan from a finance company.  The accused was charged with theft by conversion of the boat under s.240 (1) of the Crime Act 1908 (NZ).  What is of relevance about R v Dunbar is that it is discussed in Adams on Criminal Law (1992) vol 1, CA 219.03, in relation to s.219 (1) (b) Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) which provides for theft by dishonestly using or dealing with property with the intent to deprive the owner thereof permanently.   As already pointed out, s. 219 (1) (b) is in similar terms to s.161 (1) (b) of our Crimes Act 2013.
35. 	From the above discussion, I have come to the view that the present charge of theft in a special relationship under s.162 is not in order and therefore should be dismissed. 
Conclusions 
36. 	(a)	In respect of the charge of ordinary theft under s.161 of the Crimes Act 2013, I am satisfied in terms of s.161 (1) (b) that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft of one fuel pump valued at $465.00, two parking lights valued at $300.00 each, two sliding door rollers valued at $95.00 each, and two body kits valued at $300.00 each.  However, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused stole the floor cover of the van valued $150.00.  This charge is therefore proved in part.
(b)	The charge of theft by a person in a special relationship under to s.162 of the Crimes Act 2013 is not in order.  It is therefore dismissed. 
37. 	This case is adjourned to Monday 14 December 2015 at 12:30pm for a pre-sentence report and sentencing.  Bail to continue.
CHIEF JUSTICE