Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Fiji Law Reports |
HIGH COURT OF FIJI ISLANDS
DAVENDRA BIJAY
v
THE STATE
[HIGH COURT, 1997 (Tuivaga CJ) 16 July]
Appellate Jurisdiction
Sentence- domestic violence-
st offender pleadedeaded guilty to assaulting his wifethereby causing her actual tual bodily harm. The Magistrates’ Court imposed
an immediate sentence of 4 months imprisonment. On appea High Court HELD: that in a in all the circumstances the offence was eminently
suitable for reconciliation, and that the Magistrate had virtually ignored established principles of sentencing. The sentence of
imprisonment was set aside.
No case was .
#160;
Appeal against seetence imposed in the Magistrates’ Court.
A. Koi> for Appr Appelbr>Ms. L. Laveti for Respondent
 T>Tuivaga CJ:
Appellant was on 2 June June 1997 convicted on hi pleahe Labasa Magistrate’s Court of the offencefence of assault occasioning
actual bodilyodily harm contrary to section 245 of the ef="h/www.paclii.org/forg/forg/fj/legis/consol_act/pc66/">Penal Code and sentenced to 4 months imprisonment. The particularshe offence were that on 22 March, 1997 at Labasa appellant assaulted his wife,
Uttra Wati dati d/o Bas Deo occasioning her actual bodarm.
In passing sentencelear learned Magistratstrate noted appellant’s plea of guilty, that this was his first offence and that he
and his wife had reconciled. The couple have three children, aged 14, 10 and 8. Appellant (37) was employed by Fiji Forest Industries
Ltd. at Malau, Labasa.
Appellant pealing againagainst his sentence on the ground (i) that the sentence failed to take into consideration relevant factors
relating to the case; and (ii) that the sentence was harsh and excessiv wrong in principle having ving regard to all the circumstances
of the case.
On 6 1997 appellantllant’s counsel filed an application for bail pending appeal against sentence. The application for bail was
supported by an affidavit from ppellant and one from his wife. In a 4 page Ruling on the athe application the learned Magistrate
expressed his views on the affidavits in these terms:
0;I am in complete agre agreement with the contents of paragraphs 9 and 10 of Davendra Bijay’s affidavit that the Courts, which
includes this Court, have always promoted reconciliation in domestic matters and that upon reconciliation, proceedings have been
terminated and the accused ordered to pay costs.
I am also in complete agreement with paragraph 12(3), (f) and (h) of the said affidavit that the children are attending school and
that he is the soladwinner in the family and that he stands to lose his job as a result of which his family wily will suffer.
am not only in agrn agreement, but I am most concerned and distressed, I may add, about the contents of paragraphs 7 and 8 of Utati’s affidavit that the family is suffering hardship and the children shattered and and that the sentence could ruin her marriage and that the blame for her husband’s imprisonment is being put solely on her shoulders.”
“However, stro strong voices have been raisedaised recently in some forums that the public is most dissatisfied with the meagre sentences which are being imposed on offenders guilty of domestic violence and that the magistrates pay scant regard to gender sensitivity in such cases. It is being advocated that custom, tradition or culture should not be used as an excuse or reason for promoting reconciliation in matters of domestic violence and that a husband’s assault on his wife should be treated no different from a man assaulting any other woman in the street or outside a night club. In other words if reconciliation is not proper in the latter case then it is equally improper in the former.
The Magist have been toen told that they should listen to the facts and sentence the offending husband in the same manner as in any
other of assault. They have been told that, and I quote, “whether the marriage breaks down down is not your concern and that
we are not social workers.” It has further been said that domestic violence should be treated as any other criminal offence
and that, again I quote “we are not there to protect the family”. It has been said that the general public, women’s
organisations and other NGO’s are unhappy with the lenient sentences, or no sentences passed by the Courts in matters of domestic
violence. As pointed out above the advocates of such a view are not prepared to accept that bearing in mind the social and economic
condition in this country and bearing in mind, maybe to a small extent, the tradition and culture in which the bulk of the rural
population has been brought up, it is unwise to treat a husband and wife assault in the same manner as if the same person had committed
a similar assault outside a night club. They are not prepared to accept that though the latter may be a clear case of no re-reconciliation
and a custodial sentence, considering the social and economic conditions current in our society, such rigorous and indiscriminate
application of the law in a husband and wife situation, particularly where there are children and the parties are prepared to reconcile,
albeit after some coaxing, will undoubtedly bring about disastrous social and economic consequences. We are, for some reason, told
that, that is none of our business.
In the present case, in , in spite of the fact that this Court was fully conscious of the retrograde step it was taking, in the light of the standard set out , it had no choice but to impose a custodial sentence of 4 of 4 months imprisonment because if anyone had subjected a woman to that kind of assault out in the street or outside a night club which resulted in injuries such as those received by Uttra Wati, a 4 month sentence would be somewhat on the lighter side.
The Court was loath to apply the test set out above, that is, that an assault by a husand on his wife must be treated as an assault
on anyone else and reconciliation, marriage breakdo effect on children should not be taken into consideration tion by the Magistrates
because they are not there to protect the family neither are they social workers.”
It is clear in refusingusing bail the learned Magistrate had allowed himself to become overly affected by peripheral sentiments against
his own better judgment for justice based on his understanding of exg law in this country. Judi Judicial officers are sworn to do
justice according to law and to discharge their judicial function without fear or favour, affection or ill will. It seems clear that
the learned Magistrate had let himself down and others concerned in the case by his undue preoccupation with polemical diversions.
The concluding passage from the Ruling which is quoted below is, if I may with respect say so, somewhat lamentable in its lack of
decisiveness and proper exercise of judicial authority:
“I am firmly of the view that custodial sentence, if it threatens a breakdown of the marriage, or if there is a likelihood that such a move may adversely affect the welfare of the family, should be avoided.
Unfortunately, agisMagistrates are advised that it is wrong to adopt such an attitude and what they should do is to regard the offending husbanthe same manner as if the victim of the assault was not his wife but a stranger and sentencntence him accordingly. As already mentioned, if the victim in a case such as this was a stranger, the assailant would have certainly gone to prison.
I am afraid that with a th a great deal of reluctance, I must disallow this application.”
It was no surprise than when the bail application was renewed before me on 9 June7 I had no hesitation in grin granting the application
and ordered the appellant to be released from prison to await his appeal from with his wife and children.dren. Both appellant and
wife were present on the hearing of the application when they confirmed again their reconciliation and promised there would be no
further trouble in the future. Uttra Wati presented a picture of health and appeared none the worse her experience at the hands of
her husband. Appellant was suitably warned that tougher measures would be taken if there should be any further recurrence of the
problem. It was clear the couple were very concerned about their marriage and about their children whose welfare and future came
dangerously close to being shattered. It would have happened if appellant had lost his job through poor judgment on the part of the
court. The learned Magistrate took what appeared clearly to be an unorthodox approach to the sentencing process by virtually ignoring
established principles of sentencing. Gender sensitivity is apt in a suitable case and context but it should not be allowed to unduly
divert judicial officers from properly discharging their judicial function. That function requires them to judge every case according
to its own particular circumstances. Or put another way each case must be assessed and evaluated on its true merits. One should not
generalise and pluck pontifical sentiments from untested and unreferenced sources for sentencing purposes. This is important to safeguard
against the making of artificial and unreal adjudication. Guidelines, as sought by the learned Magistrate are not helpful because
of the widely varying circumstances of each case. The best guidance, as always, is for the courts to grasp the essence of established
general principles of sentencing and apply them based on the fundamental premise that a sentence should not be harsh and excessive
or wrong in principle.
The appeal was heard on 20 June, 1997 and judgment was reserved to be given on notice later. That judgment I now proceed to give.
The main grou appeal isal is that the sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment imposed on appellant was harsh and excessive and wrong
in principle having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Appellant was convicted under section 245 of the Penal Code on his own por assault occa occasioning actual bodily harm. The offence is within the category of cases in which the courts are encouraged
to promote reconciliation betweenaffected parties. The relevant provisions are prescribed uned under section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code which state:
&
&#
‘163. In the case of any charge or chargought under any of the provisions of subsection (1) of sect section 197 or of section
244 or of section 245 or of subsection (1) of sn 324 of the Penal Code, the court may, in such cases which are substantially of a personal or private nature and which are not aggravated in degree, promote
reconciliation and encourage and facilitate the settlement in an amicable way of the proceedings, on terms of payment of compensation
or on other terms approved by the court, and may thereupon order the proceedings to be stayed or terminated.”
The appeal is allowed. Appellant has served several days in prison before he was released on bail, further punitive action is quite
unnecessary. The sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment is set aside and the case terminated.
(Appeal all sentencetence varied).
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJLawRp/1997/26.html