![]() |
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Fiji Law Reports |
HIGH COURT OF FIJI ISLANDS
IN THE MATTER of S. (An In.
[HIGH COURT, 1997 (Bryne J) 24 November]
Family Jurisdiction
Family Law- adoptioinfants- whether a regular visitor to Fiji is “resideesident” in Fiji- Adopiton of Infants Act(Cap 58) Section 6 (4).
The Applicants who were former Fiji cis now living in Australia wished to adopt an infant Fiji ciji citizen resident in Fiji. The
Applicants regularly visited Fiji and it was argued that this entitled them to be described as Fiji residents. The High Court, HELD:
the concept of residency involves an element of permanent settlement for a forseeable period of time and not merely some temporary
period or sojourn and accordingly the application failed.
Cases cited:
In thIn the matter of P (an infant) (CA 5/84L)
Keserue serue#160;] 2 All2 All E.R. E.R. 796.
Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928[1928] A.C. 217
p>State v. Attorney-General of Fiji ex-parte Joseph Nainima HBJ0027 of 1995S
&#br>
The Respt-espt- parent in person
Byrne J <160;<160;
This is an application for adoption of a female child who was bornst Au1981. The applicaplication was referred to the High Court furt
from the First Class Magistrate’s Court at Nausori sitting as a Juvenourt, the learned Magistratstrate being of the opinion
that although it was in the interest of the child that she be adopted by the Applicants, who are her uncle and aunt, he considered
the adoption might be prevented because of the provisions of Section 6(4) of theAdoption of Infants Act. That sub-section states
that an Adoption Order shall not be made in favour of any Applicant who is not resident in Fiji or in respect of any infant who is
not so resident.
There isuestion that that the infant is a resident of Fiji but the problem raised by the application is whether the Applicants can
be said to be resident in Fiji. Like the learned Magistrate I should have no hesitation on the merits in acceding to the application
but the question which confronts me in limine, like the learned Magistrate in Nausori, is whether I have the jurisdiction to do so. The evidence before the Court is contained
in various affidavits, by the mother of thant, by her brother, an Army Officer in Fiji, by the male Aale Applicant and lastly by
a Justice of Peace. From these affidavits the following facts emerge:
The father of the infant died on the 29th of May 1992 at the age of 42.
The infant e only childchild left with the mother in Fiji. Her other daughter is married and lives in Australia where she is well
settbr>&#br>The mother is r is unemployed and depends on the Social Welfare Department and donationstions from her close family members.
She receives $43.00 per month from the Social Welfare Department. She does not educate the infant because she has no funds to offer
her any better education and a prosperous life, such as she believes her daughter will have if an Adoption Order is made in favour
of the Applicants.
The Applicnd his wife bife became Australian citizens on the 3rd of September 1981. The male Applicant has assets in Australia valued
at $00 consisting of a residence in a country town in New South Wales on 5 acres of land, farmifarming plant and equipment and a
motor vehicle. The Applicant is a businessman and has 5 children from his marriage all of whom are married.
He is Presidentrakash Rash Ramayan Mandali of Australia and is also an active member of Hindu Religious Association, especially being
a Vice-Prnt of Shiri Sanatan Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha of Australia. The Brahman Purohit Sabha of Aust Australia Inc. recommends the
Applicant as a suitable father for the infant he and his wife wish to adopt.
The Applicant is anaginnaging Director of Cape Bank Pty Ltd which is an import and export business. He and his wife have known the
Applicant and her mother since 1992 and wish tpt the child and take her to Australia where they will educ educate her and support
her until she marries as they have no child living with them now.
Thlicant finally statestates that since 1992 he has been travelling frequently to Fiji and staying with the infant with whom he says,
she has maintained a good father and daughter relationship.
It appears from his passport that since April 1992 the Applicant has come to Fiji numerous times and has been admitted as a visitor
for periods of 4 monbr>
The last affidavit is by a Justice of Peace who says that he has known the mote mother and her late husband since 1987 and has known
the male Applicant since 1977. He too believes that the infant will have a prosperous future in Australia where she will be given
education and a decent life.
In his very ehensive suve submission Mr. Singh has referred me to numerous authorities mainly dealing with the question of residence.
Many of these authorities were referred to by Cullinan J. in his unrep judgment of the 2nd of Novf November 1984 in the matter of P InfanInfant) Civil Appeal Nof 1984. His His Lordship there was considering an appeal from the refusal of the Magistrates’ Court at Sigatoka
to make an Adoption Order on a grouich dot arise in the ithe instant case, namely that the learned rned Magistrate considered the
application before him was not bonabut merely an atan attempt to circumvent the Citizenship Act.
The learned Magistrate held that the Applicant chas on a visitor’s permit and as such not a resident within the meaning of Section
6(4n 6(4) of the Act.
Cullinan Jeld tpeal agal against the Magistrate’s Order but in t in the course of doing so had to consider the case law relating
to the p “resident in Fiji”.
His Lordship pointed out that the word “#8220;resident” is not defined in the Adoption of Infants Act, although the term “reside8221; is defined by implicaplication. His Lordship said, and I respectfully agree, that “residence”
for the purposes of the Immigration Act is not determiy duration. Hon. He also said however, and again I respectfully agree, that for the purpose of that Act a holder of
a visitor’s permit is not deemed to besident in Fiji.
Like mysullinan J. firs first irst looked at Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary 4th Edition Volumt pp.2358/2358/2366, where a formidable if not bewildering body of authority is set out concerning the meaning of
the words20;re#8221;, “residence” and “resideesident”. From this it is clear that that the words have different
meanings in different contexts and in particular in different legislation. Thus for example in fiscal legislation the courts and
legislatures have adopted artificial standards in determining what constitutes “residence”. His Lordship considered many
of the authorities but, like myself considered the case of Retion Application No. 5No. 52/1951 [1952] 1 Ch. 16 the most hllpful in determining the question now before me. That case turned on the provisions of the English Adoption Act 1950 whichbasedarlier
legislatiolation on which our Adoption of Infants Act (Cap. 58) is also based. Section 1(1) of the (1950) Act provided that an application for an Adoption Order could only be by a person
domiciled in E in England or Scotland. Section 2(5) of the 1950 Act however read so far as relevant:
“n adoption oion order shall not be made in England unless the applicant and the infant reside in England, and shall not be
made otland unless the applicant and the infant reside in Scotland.”
T
The fan <160;Re Adoption Application No. 52/1951 were that the Applicants wnts were ordinarily resident in Nigeria where the husband was employed inNigerolonial Service, returning
to England his native tive country for three months leave in even every fifteen months. Usually the couple stayed with his or her
parents on leave, but they had recently purchased a house in England and intended to reside permanently there when his service in
Nigeria terminated in the normal course after seven years. The couple made application for the adoption of an infant but as the husband
was obliged to return to duty in Nigeria the application continued with the wife as sole applicant; she remained behind in England,
her intention being to return to Nigeria taking the infant with her if the application were successful.
Like Culli. I found thed the very learned judgment of Harman J. (as he then was) which was delivered exoreparticularly inly instructive on the question now before me. For example at p.22 he said:
“Throughhe Act of 1950 residence in England or residence in Great Britain and residence abroad are are contrasted as being two things which he
converse one of the other, and that seems to make it difficult to suppose that in this Ahis Act, unlike the fiscal Acts, a person
may be resident in two places. For the purpose of the Income Tax Acts, if a person has two residences available to him and habitually
resorts for more than temporary purposes to two jurisdictions, he may be resident in one place for part of the year and in the second
place for another part; but that does not seem to fit the scheme of the Act of 1950.
The crucial matheretherefore is the construction of section 2(5) which prohibits an adoption order being made except in favour of
an applicantis “resident” in England.”
His Lordshin quoted thed the rema remark of Lord Cave L.C. in Levene v. d Revenue Comm Commissioners [1928] UKHL 1; [1928] A.C. 217 at 222 who cited the Oxford English Dictionary, saying:
I consider thatage sage most apposite to the facts of the instant case.
;
Likewise in anotasr case cited by counsel, Inackenzie [194;[1941] 1 Ch. 6ton J. h J. held that an Australian woman, domiciled in Australia, who came on a to Ed in and shnd shortly afterwards
became of unsound mind mind, continued to live in England unti until her death 54 years later, remaining of unsound mind throughout
that period, was ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for the purposes of the Finance Act.
Again I quote fr. JustiJustice Harman in Adoption Application 52on 52/1951. At p.23 referring to an argume counsel for the Applicantscants
that while the Applicants were on leave in England they were for the time being “resident” there, His Lordship said:
“I should say they were for the time being staying here, and I do not think that is the same as being resident.”
Later and towards nd ofnd of his judgment at p.25 His Lordship said:
 
“The court must bust be able to postulate at the critical date that the applicant is resident, and that is a question of faesidence
denotes some degredegree of permanence. It does not necessarily mean the applicant has a home of his own, but that he has a settled
headquarters in this country. It seems dangerous to try to define what is meant by residence. It is very unfortunate that it is not
possible to do so, but, in my judgment, the question before the court is in every such case whether the applicant is a person who
resides in this country. In the present case I can only answer that question in the case of the wife by holding that she is not resident
in this country; she is merely a sojourner here during a period of leave; she is resident in Nigeria, where her husband’s duties
are, and whither, in pursuance of her wifely duties, she accompanies him. I do not think either of the applicants is resident in
England at present.”
Again it seems to me that this passage is also applicable to the facts of the instant case. I am satisfied that the concept of residency
involves an element of permanent settlement for eseeable period of time and not some temporary period or soor sojourn, to use the
word employed by Mr. Justice Harman. There can be no doubt in my judgment that on the evidence before the court the Applicants have
established their roots in Australia for the foreseeable future and that any visits they may make to Fiji are simply stays for a
particular time.
I regret having me to t to this conclusion but I consider that do otherwise would be to avoid the clear meaning of Section 6(4) of
the Act.
&
I was informed by counsel that Magistrates in the Magistrates’ Court in Suva if n if not else where are regularly making Adoption
Orders in cases whose facts are for practical purposes similar to those in the instant case. If this be so then I consider they are
acting wrongly and the practice should cease immediately. In my unreported judgment in HBJ0027 of 1995 The St. Attorney-Generalneral of Fiji ex-parte: Joseph Nainima deld on 21st October 1997 I997 I remarked that it is the functf the Courts only to interpret the law but not to amend it. It may
well be that Section 6(4n 6(4) of the02/">Adoption of Infants Act shou amended at least to prto provide that any former Fijian national now a naturalised citizen of a country with whom Fiji has always
had a friendly relationship should be allowed to adopt an inff that would be in the inte interests of the welfare of the child, such
as I have no doubt is the case here. This is a matter to which I invite the attention of the authorities just as in England the Adoption of Infants Act was amended to alleviate the hardship caused by the interpretation given to the law for ex by Mr. Justice Harman. His decision was
criticised as R “too narrow” by McClean in “The Meaning of Residence̫ I.C.L.Q. 1153. Like Mr. Mr. Justice
Cullinan, to my knowledge the judgment was never reversed but with due respect to Mr. McClean, I consider Harman J. was correct.
It is possible the Appl Applicants may be able to adopt this child in Australia and I should see no harm being done if they were to
consult the relevant authorities in New South Wales to see whether this is ble. In the circumstances hces however I have no alternative
but to reject their application. Although this application was heard in Chambers because of the important question it raises I have
delivered this judgment in open Court.
(Application dismissed.)
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJLawRp/1997/41.html