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Federated States of Micronesia v Engichy [1989] FMSC 23; 4 FSM Intrm. 177 (Truk 1989) (15 November 1989)

[1989] FMSC 23; 4 FSM Intrm. 177 (Truk 1989)

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION

FSM CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1981-1512

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Plaintiff

V

CASIMIRO ENGICHY

Defendant

BEFORE: Richard H. Benson, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
November 15, 1989

APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff: Steven P. Pixley, Chief, Litigation Attorney Generals Office; For the Defendant: Dan Maloney, Public Defender

HEADNOTE

Prisons and Prisoners
The serious illness of a prisoner's child does not constitute an emergency necessitating the defendant's release from prison, where the child will receive the treatment she requires whether the prisoner is released or not. FSM v. Engichy, [1989] FMSC 23; 4 FSM Intrm. 177, 180 (Truk 1989).

COURT'S OPINION

RICHARD H. BENSON, Associate Justice:

This matter came before the court on the motion of the defendant filed November 10, 1989 for an order permitting his release so that he can travel to Phoenix, Arizona "to give support to wife and his daughter Rebecca Keleb, who must undergo extensive medical treatment."

The motion is supported with extensive documentation, the truth of which is not disputed by the government, that the 10 month old child suffers from Apert syndrome, a very serious condition which requires an extensive course of treatment.

The government's position is limited to a question of what assurance exists that the defendant would return to Truk.

The defendant relies upon Soares v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 79 (App. 1989) to support his request. I agree that that case offers the only authority. Counsel have not furnished and the court has not been able to find any United States authority concerning releases for emergencies.

In context however, Soares is referring to emergencies in which the release of the prisoner is the proper act to meet the emergency. For instance, Soares uses the example of a jailer releasing prisoners in the event of a fire in the prison. Id. at 81-82.

In this case the emergency does not apply to the defendant himself; it is the child's. She is receiving the care and treatment that the emergency requires. She will receive that treatment whether the prisoner is released or not. The release of the defendant is sought so that the defendant can be present to render emotional support while that treatment is given.

I find that the facts do not bring this case within the meaning of "emergency" referred to in Soares. The letters and reports awake deep sympathy for the child and her present suffering and for her parents and family. However, I am compelled to deny the motion.

So ordered this 15th day of November, 1989.