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State v Romba [1981] PGNC 53; N365 (9 December 1981)

N365

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

THE STATE

V

ROBERT ROMBA

Lae: Pratt J
9 December 1981

PRATT J: The State has brought Robert Romba before the Court on a charge that he has breached a good behaviour bond entered into by him before the Honourable the Deputy Chief Justice in Mt. Hagen on the 13th September 1978. On that date the respondent in this matter pleaded guilty to a charge of dangerous driving causing death and was sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labour, but part of that sentence, namely six months, was suspended on his entering into a good behaviour bond or recognisance under the provisions of s.19(f) of the Criminal Code. On my calculations the respondent was therefore released from custody round about April 1980. The State has produced the following documentation to me: a copy of the warrant of commitment and recognisance signed by the Deputy Chief Justice, a certificate of conviction from the Registrar of the National Court setting out the conviction at Mt. Hagen on the 13th September 1978 together with a certification in respect of the photostat copies of the recognisance and warrant and also a certificate of conviction from the District Court in Lae showing that the respondent was convicted on the 22nd day of September 1980 of driving upon a public street under the influence of intoxicating liquor in contravention of s.9(1)(a) of the Motor Traffic Act and further on the same date a conviction of driving a motor vehicle upon a public street without being licensed for the purpose contrary to s.10(1)(a) which I think may possibly be a typing error. Anyhow, it is clear that he was convicted of two offences under the Motor Traffic Act. As I say, all that documentation is essential and is all before me.

Whether or not subsequent conduct should be treated as a breach of bond is a matter for the court’s discretion. Obviously this must be so for a minor breach of the Motor Traffic Act, for example, is technically a breach of the good behaviour bond but would hardly be sufficient to warrant imposition of the suspended sentence. Now the respondent in this matter has committed far more than a technical breach of the Motor Traffic Act. The Court however is faced with a number of difficulties which I propose to set out in the hope that it may assist the presentation of future cases:

(1) I have no details at all of the facts which came before the Deputy Chief Justice. The absence of such detail creates special problems where the original charge is dangerous driving causing death and the subsequent charge also concerns the use of a motor vehicle. With our present antiquated court recording system, the solution is not easy. If the trial judge has recorded his remarks on sentence, be it following a trial or a plea, a copy of these notes would undoubtedly fill the gap. I think that the use of committal depositions would be dangerous even if the matter had been dealt with by way of plea, unless the Court could be sure that no major aspect contained in the depositions was the subject of dispute. It may be that the trial judge’s comments on sentence cover this aspect. Another less satisfactory solution is for counsel to obtain from their own files their notes of the judge’s reasons for sentence and see if a composite set can be agreed to for submission to the Court. In the absence of agreement, the only remaining solution appears to be for the notes by defence counsel and prosecuting counsel taken at the time of the original hearing to be submitted separately in the hope that some common ground can be thrashed out.

(2) The material which formed the basis of the second conviction, which is said to constitute the breach of bond, should also be supplied. In the case where such conviction was recorded in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, perhaps the statement of facts would suffice provided it does not contain any material which was seriously contested by the defendant.

(3) It is obvious that a considerable amount of work will be involved in dealing with such cases. However, the availability of the good behaviour bond is a very valuable tool for any court and it would be a great pity to see its effectiveness made nugatory through lack of adequate follow-up and presentation. It is most commendable that the present case has been brought before the court and I hope that my comments will not be treated as any form of criticism. The occasion when breaches of bond are coming to the attention of the authorities is becoming more frequent and the follow-up is to be encouraged. Nevertheless it is obvious that the court cannot work in a vacuum.

(4) One particular problem emerges from the instant case. The respondent was released in April 1980 after having served eighteen months in prison. The offence before the Magistrates Court was committed in August and was dealt with by the magistrate on the 22nd September 1980. He received in respect of the driving under the influence charge a period of one months imprisonment and in respect of the driving without a licence charge a fine of K50.00 which was apparently paid. It is now the 9th December 1981, almost fifteen months after he was dealt with by the learned magistrate. It is true that the good behaviour bond is for a period of four years. But I cannot overcome the feeling that the respondent and members of the community would harbour some sense of injustice at the long delay in bringing the matter to a head. Each case will have to be dealt with on its merits but any substantial delay depreciates the effectiveness of the system and places the courts in a difficult position. In my view the present respondent could understandably be puzzled and confused by a procedure which contains elements of unfairness because of the long period of time between his second brush with the law and the result of that brush coming before me some fifteen months later on. In all the circumstances of this particular case I do not propose to exercise my discretion in favour of the State application. I will not on this occasion impose the suspended sentence but I do warn Robert Romba that he is still under the four year bond and that if he gets into any further trouble he may well find that the six months suspended sentence will be imposed on him. That completes all I have to say on the general aspects of the matter.

The one further aspect which has had some bearing on my decision in this case is the fact that the respondent was taken into custody three days ago and it is clear that before the necessary material covering the original hearing in 1978 could be produced before me or some other National Court judge, we would be well into January or probably February of 1982. I’m not sure when the Deputy Chief Justice is coming back from leave, indeed I’m not even sure if he’s going on leave at the moment but it could well be January or February before that material became available. Any further delay is to be avoided.

Solicitor for the State: L. Gavara-Nanu, Public Prosecutor
Counsel: V. Noka
Solicitor for the Defence: A. Amet, Public Solicitor
Counsel: S. Lupulrea