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Pacific Helicopters Ltd v Kambanei [2007] PGNC 72; N3242 (29 November 2007)

N3242

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS 793 of 2004

BETWEEN:

PACIFIC HELICOPTERS LIMITED
First Plaintiff

AND:

PACIFIC PROPERTY
& INVESTMENT LIMITED
Second Plaintiff

AND:

SHEPHERD AVIATION LIMITED
Third Plaintiff

AND:

THADDIUS KAMBANEI,
SECRETARY FOR DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
First Defendant

AND:

THE INDEPENDENT STATE
OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Second Defendant

Waigani: Davani .J
2007: 22, 29 November

CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE – Judgments obtained – compliance with Claims By and Against the State Act – Secretary for Department of Finance failure to pay judgments – Declarations and Mandamus – s.13 (1) and s.14 (3) and (5) of the Claims By and Against the State Act considered.

ENFORCEMENT – Outstanding judgments – Order for examination of Secretary for Department of Finance – O. 13 r. 13 of National Court Rules.

Facts
The plaintiff obtained separate judgments against the defendants for amount in excess of K14 million. The defendant paid approximately K8.4 million. There is a sum outstanding on 11 judgments of K8,437,094.44.

These judgments have remained unpaid since 1998.

Held

1. A declaration that

i. The Secretary for Finance has failed to satisfy the outstanding judgment from monies legally available;

ii. The Secretary for Finances actions in not satisfying these judgments is unreasonable in the circumstances;

iii. The Secretary for Finances actions in not satisfying the judgments is a breach of his duties pursuant to s.14 (3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against the State Act;

2. The Secretary for Finance must pay the monies under the judgment debt or answer to the court for his failure to comply with the law. Mandamus is granted;
   
3. The Secretary for Finance must be examined as to budget appropriation and if moneys have been appropriated towards payment of judgment debts and have not been properly applied, to explain why and how the monies were applied.
   

Cases cited

Sealark Shipping Limited and Bismark Maritime Pty Limited v. Secretary of Treasury & the State (1998) PNGLR 333;
Pansat Communications Pty Limited v. Morea Vele & the State (1999) SC 604;
Morris Manum & Benjamin Mana v. Senior Constable Dimuk Dage & the State (2003) N2435.

Counsel:

G. Poole, for the first, second and third plaintiffs
No appearance, for the first and second defendants

DECISION

29 November, 2007

1. DAVANI .J: This is the hearing of the originating summons filed on 15 December, 2004 (‘OS’). The OS seeks several declaratory orders which I will set out below after I provide a summary of the background to this matter.

Preliminaries

2. On 22 November, 2007, the matter came before me as a Judicial Review hearing on the originating summons. Only Mr Poole for the first, second and third plaintiffs (‘the plaintiff’) was in attendance. There was no representation by lawyers for the first and second defendants whom I understand are represented by the office of the Solicitor-General.

3. Mr Poole informed the Court that on 15 November, 2007, both Mr Poole and a lawyer from the office of the Solicitor-General appeared before His Honour Justice Hartshorn who adjourned the hearing of this matter to today, 22 November, 2007. Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ lawyer sent a letter dated 15 November, 2007 to the Secretary, Department of Finance and Treasury informing and advising of the hearing of 22 November, 2007 and also advising that when the matter returns to court on that day, that they propose to proceed. The letter requested that they either attend or are represented by their lawyer. It also advised that they would produce this letter to the court as evidence that the defendants have notice of the hearing.

4. On 19 November, 2007, Mr Poole received a telephone call from a lawyer from the office of the Solicitor-General, who requested a copy of the Review Book. This Review Book was delivered to the Office of the Solicitor-General on the same day, 19 November, 2007, by Brian Agisi of Mr Poole’s firm and which was received by a Mrs Betty Makis, personal secretary to the Acting Solicitor-General. With leave of the court, Mr Poole filed affidavit of service sworn by Graham Agisi, on 22 November, 2007 which affidavit deposes to the above facts relating to service.

5. Mr Poole submits that the hearing should proceed ex parte because his firm had given sufficient notice of today’s hearing to the Office of the Solicitor-General and the defendants, more specifically the first defendant. The court noted this to be correct, in light of the above facts, and ruled that the hearing proceed ex parte.

6. I must also say that half way through the hearing, Mr Nandape of the Office of the Solicitor-General walked into the court room but immediately left. I do not know if he was in court for this matter or for another matter.

Application for judicial review

7. As I stated above, the Originating Summons seeks several declaratory orders which are as follows;

1. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 6 August 2004 in WS No. 1439 of 2003 for K971,560.37 (which Certificate was served shortly after 6 August 2004) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

2. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 7 June 2002 in WS No. 1200 of 1997 for K73,732.82 (which Certificate was served shortly after 7 June 2002) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

3. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 6 October 1999 in WS No. 1209 of 1997 for K81,007.66 (which Certificate was served shortly after 6 October 1999) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

4. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 19 June 2001 in WS No. 316 of2000 for K77,972.19 (which Certificate was served shortly after 19 June 2001) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

5. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 11 November 1999 in WS No. 1210 of 1997 for K18,071.87 (which Certificate was served shortly after 11 November 1999) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

6. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 6 August 1998 in WS No. 347 of 1995 for K18,365.00 (which Certificate was served shortly after 6 August 1998) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

7. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 26 August 1998 in WS No. 346 of 1995 for K696,887.45 (which Certificate was served shortly after 26 August 1998) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

8. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 6 August 1998 in WS No. 345 of 1995 for K445,722.75 (which Certificate was served shortly after 6 August 1998) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

9. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 14 November 2000 in WS No. 1056 of 1999 for KI38,238.22 (which Certificate was served shortly after 14 November 2000) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

10. An order for declaration that the time that has elapsed from service of the Certificate of Judgment dated 13 December 1999 in WS No. 1305 of 1997 for Kll,055.45 (which Certificate was served shortly after 13 December 1999) on the Solicitor General, to the date of filing the Originating Summons in this action is more then a reasonable time to satisfy the judgment out of monies legally available to the Department Head responsible for finance matters in accordance with section 14(3) Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

11. An Order for leave to apply for judicial review against the First Defendant for an order in the nature of mandamus pursuant to Order 16 Rule 3 of the National Court Rules and Sections 8 and 14(5) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 requiring the First Defendant to within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order to satisfy the 11 judgments obtained against the Second Defendant in the proceedings set out in the Schedule attached hereto out of monies legally available in accordance with the First Defendant's duty pursuant to Section 14(3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

12. An Order in the nature of mandamus pursuant to Section 14(5)(a) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 requiring the First Defendant to within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order to satisfy the 11 judgments obtained against the State in the proceedings set out in the Schedule attached hereto out of monies legally available in accordance with the First Defendant's duty pursuant to Section 14(3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

13. An Order be issued against the First Defendant to appear before the National Court and show cause as to why an order in the nature of mandamus should not be made against him to satisfy the 11 Judgments obtained against the Second Defendant in the proceedings set out in the Schedule attached hereto out of monies legally available in accordance with the First Defendant's duty pursuant to Section 14(3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against The State Act 1996.

14. An Order be issued against the First Defendant to attend before the Registrar of the National Court and be orally examined on the question of whether the Department of Finance has monies legally available to satisfy the judgment debt in the sum of K8,437,094.44 and produce a Statement of Account of the monies paid out by the First Defendant to satisfy the various judgments obtained against the Second Defendant for the last six (6) months from the date of this Order pursuant to Order 13, Rule 13 of the National Court Rules.

15. An Order in the nature of Declaration that the action of the First Defendant in failing to satisfy the 11 Judgments obtained against the Second Defendant in the proceedings set out in the Schedule attached hereto out of monies legally available in accordance with the First Defendant's duty pursuant to Section 14(3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996 is unreasonable in the circumstances.

16. An Order in the nature of a Declaration that the actions of the First Defendant in failing to satisfy the 11 Judgments obtained against the Second Defendant in the proceedings set out in the Schedule attached hereto out of monies legally available unlawful and in breach of the First Defendant's duty pursuant to Section 14(3) and (4) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

17. The Defendants pay the costs of this application and the whole proceeding.

18. Time for the entry of these orders be abridged to the date of settlement by the Registrar which shall take place forthwith.

19. Any further orders this Court deems appropriate."

8. &##160;;On 24 Au24 August, ust, 2006, the National Court granted leave to the plaintiffs, to apply for judicial review of the declarations listed above.

9. &#1e plafs are Companies nies locatlocated and operating out of Goroka in the Eastern Highlands Province. Each of the Companies provided variervic the d Deft. The Second Defendant failed to pay the agreed price for thor the sere servicesvices rend rendered. The Plaintiffs sued the Second Defendant in eleven (11) separate Court actions and in each Court action, obtained Judgments against the Second Defendant between 1995 and 2003.

10. The PlafstifrveseCert ficatficates of Judgments in each Court action on the Solicitor General in accordance with Form I of section 13(2) of the Claims By and Against the State Act. This is notuted.
. &#160 The SThe Second cond Defendant made some payment to settle part of the Judgment Debts, however, a sum of K8,94.44ins onding, which is made up of both principal and interest.

12

12.&#16. &The Plaintnow snow seek Juek Judicial Review, for Orders in the nature of Declaration and Mandamus against the First and Second Defendants to settle the outstanJudgmin th of K8,437,094.44.

13.&#16. < &The ;rders in the nature oure of Declarations are to declare that the delay in settling each of the Judgment debts are unreasonable because the Judgments have been outstanding for more than fi) yea/p>

14.&#14. &160; #160;ـThe Orders in t in the nature of Mandamus are to compel the Defendants to settle each of the outstanding Judgments forthwith.

15. Asequential Orders, the Plae Plaintiffs also seek Orders that the First Defendant appear before the National Court and show cause as to why Orders in the nature of Mandamus should not be made ano be y exa on the ques question tion of whof whether the Department of Finance has monies legally available to settle the Judgments.

i. Issues - The issues posed by the declaratory orders sought and as put to the court by the plaintiffs lawyer are the following;

- What is a reasonable time in which the First Defendant should settle in full the eleven Judgment debts?

- Whether reasonable time was given to the First Defendant to fully settle the eleven Judgment debts obtained against the Second Defendant?

- Whether there are monies legally available for the First Defendant to satisfy the outstanding Judgment Debt in the sum of K8,437,094.44?

ii. Evidence – The plaintiffs rely on the following affidavits in support of the application for judicial review. These are;

(a) Affidavit of Phillip William Smith sworn on 14 December 2004;

(b) Affidavit of Service of Notice of Motion deposed by Graham Agisi;

(c) Affidavit of Malcolm Roy Smith-Kela sworn on 18 July 2006;

(d) Affidavit of Malcolm Roy Smith-Kela sworn on 30 July 2006; and

(e) Affidavit of Peter Ando sworn on 14 November 2006.

iii. History of matter - Before I proceed to analyzing the issues, I should first mention that this matter has a long drawn out history. The original judgment debts were in excess of K14 million. Approximately K8.4 million has been paid by periodic payments. There is outstanding balance to be paid. Interest has therefore accrued on the principal amount. The accumulation of interest means that the present outstanding balance remains over K8 million. Ever since, there has been a series of exchanges between the plaintiffs, the Office of the Solicitor-General, the Department of Finance and the National Court Registry in relation to the plaintiffs attempts at securing payment of the outstanding judgment debt, to no avail. This material is before the court in the affidavit of Goodwin Poole sworn on 16 August, 2007 and various letters to the Registry from O’Briens Lawyers, which I take judicial notice of. These are;

16. The history of the matter demonstrates to me a determination by certain factions involved in this matter, to impede the progress of enforcement by the convenient ‘losing’ and ‘misplacing&# of turt f It would dold do no j no justicustice to the parties if I were to just gloss over these incidents in the registry, which to the reader is an acceptance by the Court of these instances of incompetence, inefficiency and the registry staff’s total, blatant disregard for the aggrieved parties desire to seek justice. In my view, those in charge in the Registry, continue to display apathy towards these incidents and developments. This dangerous trend has continued for some time now. In light of such alarming facts, the Courts now must take control, when faced with such a scenario. In light of the many instances when the court file was lost and ‘recreated’, I can safely conclude that it is not a simple case of a file being lost but that its registry staff are being influenced in one way or another to deliberately ‘lose’ these files and are being nonchalant and oblivious to the obvious fact that the aggrieved party, apart from being anxious and distressed is incurring considerable legal costs to locate and replace these ‘lost’ files and to ultimately, bring these matters to a conclusion. The registry is the inner sanctum of the judiciary where the Courts every day work is daily churned out and processed. It is the control room or the engine room. Events such as that now portrayed, and that are occurring in the Registry, must be nipped in the bud before it is allowed to grow to uncontrollable proportions. And the Courts must be seen to be playing an active role in curbing this activity, in whatever way it is able to. I condemn these acts by those involved in the strongest possible terms and trust that those involved, if and when identified, will be appropriately dealt with.

iv. Analysis of evidence & the law - The various legislations under which these applications are made are s.14 (3) and (4) of the CBASA and O. 13 r. 13 of the National Court Rules. For my purposes, I set out respectively, the full text of s. 14 of the CBASA and O. 13 r. 13 of the National Court Rules. They read;

"14. Satisfaction of Judgement against the State.

(1) The certificate referred to in Section 13(2) shall be served on the Solicitor-General by—

(a) personal service; or

(b) leaving the document at the office of the Solicitor-General with the person apparently occupying the position of personal secretary to the Solicitor-General between the hours of 7.45 a.m. and 12 noon p.m. or 1 p.m. and 4.06 p.m., or such other hours as may from time to time be declared by or under the Public Services (Management) Act 1995 to be the normal public service hours of duty, on any day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday declared by or under the Public Holidays Act 1953.

(2) The Solicitor-General shall, within 60 days from the date of service upon him of a certificate under Section 13(2), endorse the certificate in Form 1.

(3) Upon receipt of the certificate of a judgement against the State bearing the Solicitor-General's endorsement that judgement may be satisfied, the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters shall, within a reasonable time, satisfy the judgement out of moneys legally available.

(4) Any payment in satisfaction of judgement may, in the absolute discretion of the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters, be made by instalments, provided the judgement is thereby satisfied within a reasonable time.

(5) No action—

(a) for or in the nature of mandamus; or

(b) for contempt of court,

or otherwise lies against the Solicitor-General or the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters in respect of the satisfaction of a judgement under this Act, other than for failure to observe the requirements of Subsection (2), (3) or (4), as the case may be, or unless other exceptional circumstances can be shown to the satisfaction of the court."

"13. Order for examination or production.

(1) The Court may, on motion by a person entitled to enforce a judgement or order, order a person bound by the judgement or order in Form 57 to—

(a) attend before the Registrar and be orally examined on the material questions; and

(b) produce any document or thing in the possession, custody or power of the person bound relating to the material questions.

(2) For the purposes of Sub-rule (1), the material questions are—

(a) as to so much of a judgement or order as requires the person bound to pay money—

(i) whether any and, if so, what debts are owing to the person bound; and

(ii) whether the person bound has any and, if so, what other property or means of satisfying the judgement or order; and

(b) as to so much of the judgement or order as does not require the person bound to pay money, such questions concerning or in aid of the enforcement or satisfaction of the judgement or order as may be specified in the order for examination or production."

17. Sect4 must be read togetherether with s. 13 of the CBASA. It reads;

"13. No execution against the State.

(1) In any suit, execution or attachment, or procn there ofution or attr attachmeachment, mnt, may not be issued against the property or revenue of the State.

(2) Where a judgement is given against the State, the registrar, clerk or other proper officer of the court by which the judgement is given shall issue a certificate in Form 1 to the party in whose favour the judgement is given."

18. It is nsputed that the Sole Solicitor General received and endorsed the Certificate of Judgment in each action as required under sectio2) ofClBy and Against the State Act 1996. It is also not disputed that thet the Soli Solicitorcitor General forwarded to the Departmental Head responsible for financial matters and that the Departmental Head responsible for financial matters has received the Certificates of Judgment in each of the Court actions pursuant to section 14(3) of the Claims By and Against the State Act 1996.

19. &&#160matters inrs in contecontention are;

(a) the delay by the Departmental Head responsible for financial matters to satisfy the Judgment in each action,

(b) the question of what is a reasonable time within which the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters is required to satisfy the Judgment in each of the Court action;

(c) are there monies legally available for the Departmental Head responsible for finance matters to satisfy the outstanding Judgment in each of the Court action.

20. The Affidavit of Phimip Sswth sworn on 14 December, 2004 and filed on 17 December, 2004 (see pages 19 to 54 of the Review Book) at paragraph 5, deposes that for some timehe han corndingcommunicating with both the Sthe Soliciolicitor Gtor Generaeneral and the Offices of the Department of Finance to have the State settle the Judgments. The First Defendant has paid by way of installment, a sum of K2,902,527.80 to the Plaintiffs but has not made further payments. The amount outstanding is in the sum of K8,437,094.44.

20. ـ Mr Smith deposdeposes further in paragraph 6 of his Affidavit that the Plaintiffs have reconciled the payments made by the State with their records of pt rec. His Affidavit contains a summary of the calculalculations reflecting the payments made byde by the State and what is owing by the State. This evidence is Annexure "N" which shows a sum outstanding of K8,437,094.44.

21. The dants on the other hand hand contend that the total owing is not K8,437,094.44 but a sum of K503,409.74. This is referred to in ure " the avit telai Polume Kiele sworn on 15 June 2006 and filed on 22 June June 2006 2006 on p on page 7age 72 to 89 of the Review Book.

22. Iview, the outstanding in t in the amount of K503,409.74 is not the issue before this Court. The issue is whether the State has settled the Judgments in each of the Court action within a reasonable time. The question of how much is owing is not strictly relevant to the question of time. The question of how much is owing is only relevant when it comes to determining how much the State has yet to settle. This is reflected in the orders being sought. But it is of course correct and proper practice, for the plaintiff to put before the court, for the purposes of payment, an updated schedule which will reflect payments that have already been made. That, I will order.

23. &##160; The evidence ince is that lhe plaintiff has complied with the mandatory requirements of sections 13(2), 14(1) and 14(2) of the Claims By and Against the State Act but the Firfendas failed and/or n/or neglected for a considerable time, as , as demonstrated by the evidence, to comply with section 14(3) of the Claims By and Against the State Act to satisfy the outstanding Judgment Debt. The plaintiffs now bring an action for Mandamus against the first defendant to ensure compliance with section 14(3), and submit that they are entitled to do so, relying on Morris Manum & Benjamin Mana v. Senior Constable Dimuk Dage & the State (2003) N2435 and Pansat Communications Pty Limited v. Morea Vele & the State (1999) SC 604.

24. &#1n thentlais affs apply fply for Mandamus in an application for Judicial Review? In Pansat Communications Pty Limited (supra), the Supreme Court discussedapplin of and s.14 of the CBASA. The SupreSupreme come court surt said at pg. 4 and pg 5;

"The issue raised in this case is essentially one of proper interpretation and application of sections 13 and 14 of the Act. Section 13 (1) is clear in its terms that no suit, execution or attachment or process in the nature of execution or attachment may be brought against the property or revenue of the State. In the normal course, applications to the court for Judicial Review of administrative actions are not automatically proceedings in the nature of attachment or against the revenue of the State. In the present case, the judicial proceedings have not been brought directly against the revenue of the State. Clearly, the proceeding is not in the nature of attachment. The question is; whether, the proceeding is a "suit" or "a process in the nature of execution against the revenue of the State"? We are of the opinion that it is a suit in the nature of execution against the revenue of the State.

However, s 13 has to be read with s 14 of the Act. Section 14 requires the Solicitor-General and the Departmental Head responsible for financial matters to comply with certain requirements in relation to a judgment given against the State. The first is that the Solicitor-General should endorse a Certificate of Judgment within 60 days of service upon him of the Certificate (s 14 (2)). The second is that when such Certificate is served upon the responsible Departmental Head for finance matters, he shall satisfy the judgment out of moneys legally available within a reasonable time (s 14 (3)). Payment in satisfaction of the judgment may be made by way of instalments ( s14(4)).

Subsection 14 (5) specifically prohibits any action for mandamus or contempt of court proceedings against the Solicitor-General or the responsible Departmental Head in respect of the satisfaction of a judgment other than for failure to observe the requirements set out in s 14 (2), (3) and (4) of the Act. This prohibition is no different in effect to the prohibition under s 13 (1) of the Act except that the prohibition here is specifically against an action for mandamus or contempt of court proceedings.

However, there is an express exception to this prohibition in the latter part of s 14 (5). This effectively means that an action for an order for mandamus or contempt of court to enforce the requirements set out in s 14 (2) and (3) of the Act may be brought against the appropriate officer. Where there is a failure by the Solicitor-General or the Departmental Head responsible for financial matters to comply with the requirements under s 14 (2) and (3) of the Act, an action for mandamus or contempt of court may be brought against them to ensure compliance.

In the present case, the Departmental Head failed to satisfy the judgment. That is a failure on the part of the Departmental Head to comply with the requirement to satisfy the judgment. I accept that the judicial review proceedings is a suit or process in the nature of execution against the revenue of State. However, an action for mandamus or contempt of court in respect of satisfaction of a judgment is expressly provided for by s 14 (5) of the Act.

In our opinion, s 14 was enacted with the intention to ensure that judgments against the State are satisfied. The latter part of s 14(5) expressly allows an action for an order in the nature of mandamus and contempt of court to ensure that the two officers comply with the requirements. The practical effect of this view is that if an action for mandamus is not complied with, an action for contempt of court may be taken out against the appropriate officer to effect compliance. If this interpretation is not adopted, the State could refuse to comply with the requirements with impunity. If the State is allowed to do this, judgments obtained against the State would be rendered worthless. We cannot imagine that the Parliament intended such an absurd result.

The satisfaction of a judgment against the State under s 14 is qualified by two matters. The first is that it may satisfy judgments "from moneys legally available". Whether or not there are moneys legally available is a separate question and it has not arisen at this stage of the proceedings. That is a matter which may arise at the substantive trial and can be determined at that time. The second matter is that the State may choose to satisfy the judgment by instalments. It is empowered to do this under s 14 (4) of the Act. Again this is a matter which has not arisen at this stage and it is not necessary to deal with the issue fully.

The interpretation we have adopted of s 14 can be read harmoniously with s 13 of the Act. The protection afforded to the State by s 13 (1) is far reaching. It prohibits all legal processes that may be brought against the property and the revenue of State. The two causes of action which are permitted to be brought under s 14 (5) are confined to the requirements set out under s 14 (2) and (3) of the Act. We find that the two sections can be read harmoniously in this way."

25. I adopt the Supreme sourtsoreasoning raised above and conclude that the plaintiffs can make the application of the type that they now make and are not barred by s. 13 (1) of the CBASA.

26. ҈Taintiffstiffs submisubmit that the time from service of the eleven (11) Certificates of Judgment on the Solicitor-General to the date of filing the OriginaSummo this Application for Judicial Review is more thae than a rn a reasonable time for the Defendants to satisfy the outstanding Judgment Debts out of monies legally available.

27. ҈ In support of t of this, the plaintiffs rely on section 14(3) of the Claims By and Against the State Act and Sealark Shipping Limited and Bismark Maritime Pty Limited v. Sery ofsury & the Sthe State (1998) PNGLR 333 where the Cohe Court held that three (3) months is a reasonable time within which to satisfy a judgment debt for the purposes of section 14(3) of the CBASA.

28. In this case, the time fron when the Certificates of Judgment were served upon the Solicitor-General, vary and range as follows;