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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR N0. 1438 – 1447 OF 2017
THE STATE
V
JOSHUA SAGALOL
WILIE LOTE
WILFRED LOTE
JUSTIN LOBAU
TADIUS TOLEPUNA
DONLEY SALE
ANDREW AILAS
DAMASIUS KOSALKE
GORDON KANGERI
Palmalmal: Susame, AJ
2018: 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 17th & 23rd April
CRIMINAL LAW – Trial – Crime of wilful murder s 299 criminal code – Defence of self-defence s 269 –Factors to consider for availability of defence – Onus remains with the prosecution to show absence of defence – Alibi defence –Principles applicable – Identification evidence – Guiding principles applicable in assessment of evidence – The need for warning of dangers inherent in eye witness evidence – Wilful murder charge – Element of intention to kill essential element to prove – Onus of prove remains with prosecution – Alternative conviction available if intention not proved- s.539 (1).
Facts
The accused persons are all from Marmar village, Central Pomio, East New Britain Province. The deceased Francis Tangaliurea was suspected of practicing sorcery, committing rape causing deaths including the death of a small boy in the village. At about 4:00am on 17th August 2017 a large group of men and young children converged at the dwelling house where the deceased lived with his family. They shouted insults and threw stones on the roof of the house waking up the family. The deceased opened the door armed with a bush knife to investigate. He then swung the bush knife cutting the hand of one of the accused who knocked on the door. The deceased and his family rushed out of the house when the deceased was pulled away from behind. He however freed himself and was chased by the assailants and caught a short distance from the house. He was assaulted with objects and weapons and left lying on the ground bleeding from the wounds he received. A stretcher was made and he was carried to Pomio Health Centre about a kilometer down the village. He was alive on arrival but died of shock caused by massive loss of blood at 8:00am on the same day.
Held:
Cases cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases
R v Kaiwor Ba [1975] PNGLR 90
The State v Angela Colis Towavik [1981] PNGLR 140
R v Yambiwato [1967-1968] PNGLR 222
R v Paul Maren (1971) N615
John Jaminan v The State (No. 2) [1983] PNGLR 318.
The State v Lucas Soroken & Ors (2006) N3029
The State v. Marety Ame Gaidi (01/08/02)) N2256,
The State v Raphael Kuanande [1994] PNGLR
Goya v The State [1987] PNGLR 51.
Overseas Cases
Raymond Turnbull & Ors [1970] HCA 21; (1970) 126 C.L.R 321, 3 All ER 549
Counsel
Mr. Lukara Ragan, for the State
Mr. Andrew Tunuma, for the accuseds
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
23rd April, 2018
LAW ON WILFUL MURDER
s299. Wilful murder.
(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who unlawfully kills another person, intending to cause his death or that of some other person, is guilty of wilful murder.
(2) A person who commits wilful murder shall be liable to be sentenced to death.
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE
EVIDENCE
| Particulars | Exhibit label |
1. | witness Joyce Maisragun’s statement | 1 |
2. | witness Valentine Tupitarea’s statement | 2 |
3 | Witness Rosensia Valentine’s statement | 3 |
4 | Witness Joycelyn Kerou’s statement | 4 |
5 | Witness Beatrice Patoi’s statement | 5 |
6 | Witness Getrude Otto’s statement & clinical report | 6 |
7 | Witness S/C Robert Tobung statement | 7 |
8 | Sketch plan | 7 a |
9 | 3 pages of photographs taken | 7 b,c.d |
10 | Axe | 7 e |
11 | Crowbar | 7 f |
12 | Piece of 6 x 3 timber | 7 g |
13 | 2 pieces of timber | 7 h, i |
14 | 5 branches of tree | 7 j |
15 | Top part of spear | 7 k |
16 | 17 stones & rocks | 7 l |
17 | R.O.I of accused Joshua Sagalol pidgin & English | 8 (1&2) |
18 | R.O.I of accused Willie Lote pidgin & English | 9 (1&2) |
19 | R.O.I of accused Wilfred Lote Pidgin & English | 10(1&2) |
20 | R.O.I of accused Justin Lobau Pidgin & English | 11(1&2) |
21 | R.O.I of accused Tadius Tolepuna Pidgin & English | 12( 1&2) |
22 | R.O.I of accused Donley Sale Pidgin & English | 13( 1&2) |
23 | R.O. I of accused Andrew Ailas Pidgin & English | 14( 1&2) |
24 | R.O.I of accused Damasius Kosalke Pidgin & English | 15( 1&2) |
25 | R.O.I of accused Bently Kiren Pidgin & English | 16( 1&2) |
26 | R.O.I of accused Gordon Kangeri Pidgin & English | 17( 1&2) |
27 | R.O.I of accused Anzelem Mathias Pidgin & English | 18(1&2) |
28 | S/C Vannessa Niel 4 affidavit statements dated 31/8/17 | 19(a-d) |
19 | S/C Vannessa Niel 3 affidavit statements dated 1/9/17 | 20( a-c) |
30 | S/C Vannessa Niel 2 affidavit statements dated 5/9/17 | 21(a-b) |
31 | Sgt Mary Tobing’s 4 affidavit statements dated 5/9/17 | 22(a-d) |
32 | Sgt Mary Tobing’s 3 affidavit statements dated 7/9/17 | 23(a-b) |
| Sgt Mary Tobing’s 2 affidavit statements dated 8/9/17 | 24(a-b) |
34 | Const. Bruce Enoch’s statement | 25 |
35 | Sgt Pauline Tawii’s statement | 26 |
36 | 11 Antecedent reports for each accused persons | Unmarked. |
DEFENCE RAISED
ISSUES
FACTS ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE
An axe marked exhibit 7e
A crow bar marked exhibit 7f
Piece of 6x3 timber marked exhibit 7g
2 other pieces of timber marked exhibit 7h & i
5 branches of tree marked exhibit 7j
Top part of spear marked exhibit 7k
17 rocks and stones marked exhibit 7l
ARGUMENTS
Section 269. Self –defence against unprovoked assault. Sub section (1) reads:
“When a person is unlawfully assaulted and has not provoked the assault, it is lawful for him to use such force to the assailant
as is reasonably necessary to make an effectual defence against the assault, if the force used is not intended to cause and is not
likely to cause, death or grievous bodily harm.
Subsection (2) If-
(a) the nature of the assault is such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or
Grievous bodily harm; and
(b) the person using force by way of defence believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise preserve the person defended from death or grievous bodily harm,
it is lawful for him to use force to the assailant as is necessary for defence , even if it causes death or grievous bodily harm.
“The person using force in self-defence is entitled to use any force which is reasonably necessary to preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm if (1) the nature of the force is such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and (2) the person using the force by way of self defence believes on reasonable grounds that he cannot otherwise preserve the person defended from death or grievous bodily harm.”
EVIDENCE
Witness Elizabeth Tangaliurea
ALIBI DEFENCE
a. “If an alibi is raised, the burden of proof does not shift from the prosecution. The onus is never on the accused to prove an alibi or prove innocence.
b. However, in practical terms, the accused must lead some evidence of an alibi and it must be sufficiently convincing to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge.
c. How strong or convincing the alibi evidence must be, depends on the strength of the prosecution witnesses. If their evidence is very strong, the alibi evidence needs to be reasonably strong to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge as to the guilt of the accused.
d. Unlike the defences of self-defence and provocation, there is no rule of law that says that once an alibi is raised it is up to the prosecution to disprove it.
e. An alibi is not one of the excusatory defences such as self-defence, provocation or mistake, which concede the presence of the accused and his or her involvement in a series of events that led to the final state of affairs and are like a confession and avoidance. An alibi entails a complete negation and puts every matter in issue.
f. If an alibi is rejected it does not necessarily follow that the court should enter a conviction. The court must still be satisfied that the prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt.
g. An alibi that is determined to be false may, depending on the circumstances, amount to corroboration of the complainant's evidence.
h. The court should consider whether the alibi evidence contains convincing detail or whether it is vague and short on detail.
i. The court should also consider the demeanour of the alibi witnesses and whether there are any inconsistencies in their evidence.”
LAW ON IDENTIFICATION
a. “Whenever the case against an accused person depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence allege to be mistaken, the trial judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on the correctness of the identification. He should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness could be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses could all be mistaken. Provided such a warning is given, no particular form of words need be used.
b. Further, the trial judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made....
c. Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognize someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made. All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. When the quality is good, the jury can be safely left to assess the value of the identifying evidence even though there is no other evidence to support: Provided always, however, that an adequate warning has been given about the special need for caution.
d. When the quality of the identifying evidence is poor — i.e. a fleeting glance or a longer observation made in difficult conditions — the judge should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification.
e. The trial judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of supporting the evidence of identification. If there is any evidence or circumstances which the jury might think was supporting when it did not have this quality, the judge should say so.”
a. "1. It has been long recognized that, there are dangers inherent in eye-witness identification evidence;
b. A trial judge should warn the jury in the case of a jury trial system or himself as in our case, of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on the correctness of the identification because for example:
1. a convincing witness may be mistaken; or
2. a number of witnesses could be mistaken;
c. Provided such a warning is given, no particular form of word need be used;
d. There should be a specific direction to closely examine the circumstances in which the identification was made;
e. Identification by recognition may be reliable but one needs to be cautious because there can be mistakes in trying to identify close relatives and friends;
f. All these go to the quality of evidence – if the quality of evidence is good the identification may be reliable. If however, the quality of evidence is bad, the identification will be bad;
g. The quality of the evidence may be poor if there is a fleeting glance or a longer observation made in poor conditions; and
h. There should be an acquittal if the quality of the evidence is
bad."
59. It is trite law that the onus of proving guilt always rests with the State. The law places no obligation on an accused person
to prove his innocence.
DEFENCE CASE ON THE ALIBI
60. Prior to the assessment and weighing of evidence I am reminded of the principles of law on alibi evidence earlier in the judgment.
61. I adopt and apply them. Firstly, accused does not bear the onus of proving his alibi defence or his innocence. The burden of proof of guilt remains with prosecution all throughout. Secondly, if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is strong then the alibi evidence needs to be reasonably strong to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge as to the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, “if an alibi is rejected it does not necessarily follow that the court should enter a conviction. The court must still be satisfied that the prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt.” (The State v Lucas Soroken & Ors (supra).
EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTION
62. I adopt and apply the principles of law discussed in the judgment. In the assessment of identification evidence, I am mindful and warn myself of dangers inherent in eye-witness identification evidence. This is because there have been experiences over the years sometimes completely honest evidence have shown to be wrong and innocent people convicted.
63. What is the strength of evidence of identification adduced by the prosecution? Elizabeth (1st State witness) stated it was Gordon Kangeri who came and woke up his son Pontian to wake up his dad. She came out of the room and sat at the western side of the kitchen just under the lights. She saw Gordon. She also identified Damasius as the one her husband cut just outside the bedroom door. She also said Donley was the one who threw the stone and hit her husband on the back of his head. While outside at the material time her husband was chased and being assaulted she had her back and did not observe what was happening and who was assaulting her husband. She turned around and saw her husband on the ground bleeding when the attackers had stopped assaulting him and left. She stated her son who watched provided names of the other persons involved.
64. Her son Pontian also gave evidence it was Gordon who woke him up. He recognized his voice. He came out of the room and Gordon was talking to him. Gordon and his brother Mainard broke open the kitchen door and entered. Then they broke open the bed room door. When the father had is back talking to the persons on the western side of the house Pontian said Donley threw a stone hitting him on the back of his head. He stated it was Damasius who cut his dad with the bush knife on his hand by the house.
65. When further questioned during examination in chief Pontian mentioned the names of other persons involved including accuseds Joshua Sagalolo, Willie Lote and Justin Lobau. They were seen at the material time his dad was being assaulted on the spot where the children play. He said many others had gathered around and were also involved in assaulting his dad. He was observing at a very close distance of 6 to 7 metres. He said Joshua Sagalol held his dad’s hand and twisted it (Though it has not been proven by medical evidence of the fracture). Justin Lobau shot his dad’s leg with a crow bar. (Question 96 & answer, at pg.57 of note book).
66. Are the witnesses mistaken in the identification of the five accused persons? To answer the question assessment and weighing of alibi evidence against the evidence of identification adduced by the prosecution is necessary.
67. The law also requires that an accused must lead some evidence of an alibi and it must be sufficiently convincing to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge.
68. All the five accused gave sworn statements in support of the alibi defence. Accused Joshua Sagalol and Donley Sale were the only ones who called a single witness each in support of the alibi. The other three did not. I do not intend to set out the stories each of the accused persons told the court. Their alibi story is simple and easy to follow.
69. Their evidence is that at the material time incident happened they had gone to bed in their respective homes as early as 7:00am or 8:00am. They never woke up and left their homes at any time in the night until they woke up as early as 5.45 am and 7 am or 8am the morning of 17th August 2017.
70. I took note of the discrepancies identified by Mr. Ragan in their oral testimonies and their explanations in their respective records of interview. I noted the particular questions and answers (Q.14 & ans. accused Joshua Lobau R.O.I, Q.8 & ans. Accused Willie Lote R.O.I, Q.13 & ans. Accused Justin Lobau R.O.I and Q.13 & Ans. Accused Donley Sale R.O.I)
71. Indeed the times given in their oral evidence vary from the times given to police in the record of interview. Surprisingly, their evidence is almost the same. Every one of them had gone to bed about the same time and waking up at about the same time the next day.
72. I have watched the demeanor of the accused persons and the two witnesses who gave evidence. Witness Wendy is Joshua Sagalol’s wife and witness Florence is Donley Sale’s mother. The witnesses were very careful not to make mistake when answering questions under cross-examination. They maintained the exact times when they went to bed and woke up given by the accused persons. They even told the court when questioned the two particular accuseds never woke up at any time in the night and gone out of the house.
73. How certain were they? The witnesses would have been fast asleep. How would they possibly know with certainty if the two particular accuseds had left the house even if they responded to nature’s call?
74. For the other three accuseds no other evidence was adduced to support their alibi story. Nonetheless, their story was same as
the other two accused persons.
How convincing is that alibi story? Weighing that story against over all evidence adduced by the prosecution the alibi is not convincing.
Evidence of identification of the involvement of the accuseds is strong, has weight and is far more convincing.
75. The incident started at 4:00am until 6:00am when the place had cleared up. The place would have obviously still be dark between 4:00am and 5:00am but getting clearer. There were many others involved in the assault of late Francis apart from the accused persons. The places immediately around the house was illuminated by the two solar light bulbs fixed on the rafter on the western side of the house and with another fixed right at the doorway into the bedroom. Elizabeth and Pontian clearly saw Donley threw a stone and hit the deceased on the back of his head.
76. The Spot where late Francis was assaulted and he fell down on the ground and continued to be assaulted (distance measuring 10 metres from the house) was within the illuminated area. The deceased was being assaulted under the watchful eyes of not only his son Pontian but many other parishioners and members of the community some of whom were never involved but merely onlookers. They knew who was involved and refrained from providing names to police for whatever reasons but talk amongst themselves and do nothing about the serious crime that was committed right under their nose.
77. This is not a case where Elizabeth and Pontian had a “fleeting glance” of the identity of the persons involved. The attack of the deceased took almost two hours at the single location in the village. The witnesses live in the community and accused persons are known to them. Gordon and Damasius are close family relatives of Elizabeth and Pontian who also hail from Marmar village.
78. The two witnesses saw all five accused persons including the other four who raised the defence of self-defence involved in the assault of the late Francis Tangaliurea. They were never mistaken to identify them including others who they mentioned in their respective testimonies.
ELEMENT OF INTENTION TO KILL
79. Court has found that the accused persons were involved in the death of the deceased. The other most important element requires proving is the mental element of intention. Hence, the question. Did the accused persons have the pre-requisite intention of killing the deceased? Did they plan to kill the deceased at the gathering at the haus krai? Thereafter, set out on the course to his house to execute their intention.
80. In The State v Raphael Kuanande [1994] PNGLR 512 at page 514, Injia AJ (as he then was) said:
“ Intention is a matter which goes to the state of mind of the accused at the time he acted. It may be proven by direct evidence of the accused’s expression of intention followed by the act itself or by circumstantial evidence. In either situation, it is necessary to examine the course of conduct of the accused prior, at the time and subsequent to the act constituting the offence.”
81. I must again remind myself prosecution maintains the onus of proving beyond all reasonable doubt by evidence either direct or circumstantial there was intention to kill. If it fails accuseds are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
82. Examination of evidence in particular evidence of accuseds, Wilfred Lote, Tadius Tolepuna, Andrew Alias and Damasius Kosalke and Records of interview of accuseds reveals this. Marmar community had all along suspected late Francis Tangaliurea for practicing sorcery. They claimed he was a convicted rapist, a murderer and committed other wrongs in the community. Few occasions he had evaded meetings he was asked to attend to resolve the allegations.
83. Whilst these unresolved allegations were hanging over his head a small boy died and was buried. Late Francis Tangaliurea was believed to have caused his death through sorcery. At the gathering at the haus krai on the evening between 16th August and 17th August 2017 discussions were held concerning the death. Two boys told the gathering they had seen the deceased and the boy prior to their deaths at some spot in the bush. The boy was sweating and looked abnormal. The deceased was held as the prime suspect. That was the reason the group of persons numbering over 20 to 30 people converged at his house at 4:00am on 17th August 2017.
84. Examination of evidence at the scene of the crime. Other five witnesses for the prosecution whose statements were tendered into evidence stated there was a large group around the house. The group were armed with weapons. They were throwing stones at Francis’ house and calling out for Francis to exit from the house.
85. Witness Elizabeth told court Gordon called Pontian to wake up his dad. When his dad woke up and came out from the bed room to the kitchen area Gordon told him he has been accused by the people for killing the small boy and asked if it was true. Witness was not able to tell court any other statements she heard from the crowd or the accused persons.
86. Pontian said he heard words kai kai kan uttered and Gordon came and called him to wake up his dad. Gordon told him his dad was suspected of killing a small boy. Witness stated (page 46 of notebook) as his dad was being assaulted he heard Wilfred saying they will clean the place up and Carl saying to kill him. Carl said that many times (Q 25 & answer pg. 18 of note book). At the time stones were thrown on the roof he never heard anyone else calling out to kill his dad. (Question 40 & answer pg. 48 of notebook). He also heard Gordon say his father was the one who kill the boy. He swore saying “yu kaikai kan blo mama blo yu.”(Question 64 & answer, pg. 52 of notebook.)
87. Strictly speaking Carl would be an accomplice if he was allegedly involved. Though, he was never arrested and charged. The alleged
statement of him saying ‘kill him’ has not been verified, no other witness had testified of hearing such words had been uttered. Hence, I place less weighed
on that statement.
88. Court’s finding on the issue. When Francis cut Damasius with a bush knife in self-defence, when confronted with immediate
danger of being attacked the accused persons responded and attacked him. They assaulted him with offensive weapons. He was left lying
on the ground with pain and bleeding from the wounds/cuts he received. He was still alive then and carried on foot on a stretcher
that was made that morning to Pomio Health Centre which was about a kilometer down on the coast. On arrival he was still alive. But
due to lack of qualified medical officers and equipment for urgent medical intervention to save his life Francis was pronounced death
at 8:00am. He died of shock due to massive loss of blood.
89. Evidence is lacking from the prosecution as proof all the nine accused persons including the two whose case had been dismissed were at the haus krai and involved in the discussions, except for the four who said they were there. Evidence is also lacking to establish what was actually said or expressly stated by any interested individual or any of the accused persons.
90. What is derived from the defence evidence and which court accepts is that the group had not only gone to confirm if Francis had killed the boy. They had gone to actually attack and paralyze him to stop him from walking around committing any more wrong in the community.
91. At the crime scene there is no direct evidence that accused persons had gone to the house with the pre-requisite intention to kill Francis. Even from the evidence examined which is not convincing in my assessment it cannot be safely inferred with certain degree of confidence that accused persons had gone to the house with an intention to kill Francis. Hence, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
92. I consider s 539 (1) of the Code. The provision reads:
“On an indictment charging a person with the crime of wilful murder, he may be convicted of the crime of murder or of the crime of manslaughter but not, except as expressly provided in this Code, of any other offence other than that with which he is charged.”
93. I quote a passage on page 144 of Criminal Law and Practice Papua New Guinea, 3rd Edition, in the discussion of s. 8 of the Code which is relevant, “to justify a conviction of wilful murder pursuant to s 8, there must be proof beyond doubt that the intention to kill was the common purpose which was shared by all, or that it was a probable consequence of their common purpose. Where the common purpose is to attack a person with the intention merely of causing grievous bodily harm, but death results, the proper conviction is murder, even though one of the assailants may form the intention to actually kill.” The learned authors re-stated what was held in The Supreme Court in Goya v The State [1987] PNGLR 51. I adopt and apply the principle to this case.
SUMMARY OF DECISION
94. Alternatively, Court enters conviction of murder and according returns a guilty verdict against the accused persons.
95. Judgment on sentence is reserved. These orders are issued:
__________________________________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Public Solicitor: Lawyer for the Accuseds
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