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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
WS. NO.1371 OF 2014
BETWEEN
KOMAI HARIWAJA
Plaintiff
AND
PNG POWER LTD
Defendant
Waigani: Kandakasi, J
2016: 19 April
2018: 4 September
DAMAGES – Assessment of damages - Liability resolved by default judgment - Relevant principles – No issue on liability
can be raised except for any new matter raised outside those already pleaded and resolved by judgment on liability – Only items
properly pleaded and evidence adduced can be allowed – No assessment of damages for alleged loss of dependency on grounds of
lack of proper pleadings and lack of credible evidence – Estate claim allowed at K8,000 and reasonable funeral expenses at
K12,000.000 in the absence of any specific evidence for more - Damages for solatium awarded at amounts fixed by statute – Only
Parliament can change it – Ss. 28(2), 29(2), 34(1) Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Chap.297).
Cases cited:
Papua New Guinea Cases
Andale More and Manis Andale v. Henry Tokam and The State (1997) N1645.
Chief Sir Michael Thomas Somare v. Chronox Manek (2011) SC1118
Inabari v. Sapat and The State [1991] PNGLR 427.
Jackson Koko and Elisha Koko v. MVIT [1988] PNGLR 167
Jackson Mari v. Dr Sano Tahong (2015) N6241
MVIT v. John Etape [1995] PNGLR 214
MVIT v. James Pupune [1993] PNGLR 370
Muna Uokare v. The State [1988-89] PNGLR 655
None v. MVIT [1990] PNGLR 561
Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation v. Jeff Tole (2002) SC694
Paul Komba v. Nauli Duwaba, Headmaster, Tabubil High School (2006) N2979
Roy Manduru v. MVIL (2016) N6509
Robert Wandokun v. Manase Leeman & Madang Provincial Government (2015) N5950
Steven Charles Pickthall v. Lae Plumbing Pty Ltd [1994] PNGLR 363
Simin Dingi v. MVIT [1994] PNGLR 385
Tapi v. MVIL [1990] PNGLR 568
Wallbank and Minifie v. The State [1994] PNGLR 78
Overseas cases
Shaw v. Shaw [1954] 2 QB 429
Counsel:
S. Wanis, for the Plaintiff
D. Dusava, for the Defendant
4th September, 2018
1. KANDAKASI J: The Plaintiff is seeking damages from the Defendant, PNG Power Ltd for the loss of his child through electrocution. Default judgment resolved the question of liability. Eventually, the matter came before me on trial for an assessment of the Plaintiff’s damages. Loss of dependency, estate claim, solatium and special damages especially for funeral expenses are the heads of damages claimed. However, the pleadings do not lay any good and enough foundation for each, if not, for all the heads of damages claimed.
2. The issues for this Court to determine are thus straightforward and they are:
(1) Whether the pleadings lay sufficient and good foundation for the various heads of damages claimed?
(2) Subject to an answer to the first issue, has the Plaintiff adduce enough and credible evidence supporting each or all of the damages claim?
(3) Provided questions (1) and (2) are answered in the affirmative, what is the reasonable amount of damages to be assessed for each head of damages claimed?
First Issue – Sufficiency of Pleadings
3. It is settled law that plaintiffs must have the basis for their claims sufficiently pleaded with the relevant and necessary particulars in their statements of claim. The Supreme Court in Grand Chief Sir Michael Thomas Somare v. Chronox Manek[1] succinctly stated the relevant principles in these terms:
“As has been noted in many decisions of the Supreme and National Courts, pleadings lay the foundation for a claim and determine the relevance and kinds of evidence the parties may call and the kinds of relief the Court could grant if proven. Given that, the law requires parties in particular, plaintiffs to properly plead and then establish by appropriate evidence their alleged loss or damages. Where plaintiffs have failed to do that, both this and the National Courts have correctly denied them of their claims. This is the case, because without the necessary foundation in the pleadings, there can be nothing on which the Court can be properly seized of a matter and proceed to properly and legally exercise its jurisdiction.”
4. The Court cited the decisions in Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation v. Jeff Tole[2] and Steven Charles Pickthall v. Lae Plumbing Pty Ltd[3] as cases on point. In the Jeff Tole case, as a member of the Court, I summarised the law on pleadings in the following terms:
“The law on pleadings in our jurisdiction is well settled. The principles governing pleadings can easily be summarized in terms of, unless there is foundation in the pleadings of a party, no evidence and damages or relieves of matters not pleaded can be allowed. This is the effect of the judgements of this Court in Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust v. John Etape [1995] PNGLR 214 at p.221 and Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust v. James Pupune [1993] PNGLR 370 at pp. 373 –374. These judgements re-affirmed what was always the position at common law and consistently applied in a large number of cases in our country. The list of such cases is long, but reference need only be made to cases like that of Repas Waima v. Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust [1992] PNGLR 254 and Carmelita Mary collins v. Motor Vehicles (PNG) Insurance Trust [1990] PNGLR 580 at p. 582 for examples only.
This position follows on from the objects behind the requirements for pleadings. As the judgement in Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust v. James Pupune (supra) at p. 374 said in summary, pleadings and particulars have the object or functions of:
‘1. they furnish a statement of the case sufficiently clear to allow the other party a fair opportunity to meet it;
5. In the present case, the pleadings relevantly plead at paragraph 8 as follows:
“As a direct result of the death of the deceased, the Plaintiff has suffered damages and losses and has incurred expenses associated with the death of the deceased, namely:
i. Medical expenses incurred as a result of the death of the deceased.
ii. Expenses associated with the funeral and cremation of the deceased.
ii. Costs of erecting a headstone over the grave of the deceased person.”
6. This very brief pleading is then immediately followed by the Plaintiff’s prayer for relief which reads:
“AND THE PLAINTIFF therefore claims:
7. Clearly, the pleadings are in want of better pleadings to lay any proper foundation for any of the reliefs sought and set out in the prayer for relief. Notwithstanding this insufficient set of pleadings, liability was resolved in favour of the Plaintiff on 20th June 2016, by the entry of default judgment for the Plaintiff with damages to be assessed.
8. Counsel for the Plaintiff concedes to the lack of proper foundation in the pleadings particularly in respect of a claim for loss of dependency. Nevertheless, he argues for an award in the sum of K100,000.00 for loss of dependency. In so arguing, reliance is placed on the decision of Canning J., in Paul Komba v. Nauli Duwaba, Headmaster, Tabubil High School.[4] There, the plaintiff sued for damages based on the tort of negligence against a school headmaster, the Commissioner of Police and the State following the death of his son, a school student. The defendants did not file a defence and the court entered default judgment against them. A trial for the assessment of damages then followed. In assessing the plaintiff’s damages, his honour decided to depart from the common law position of children being dependant on parents and not parents depending on their children. His honour noted that, the decisions for example in None v. MVIT [5] and Tapi v. MVIL[6] adopted and applied in Papua New Guinea the common law position where children leave their parents and live with their own families upon reaching their age of majority. His honour commenting on the common law position said:
“That in my opinion is not necessarily the case. It might represent the way things are meant to work in a western, nuclear family. But I do not think it is a true reflection of the way that families operate in Papua New Guinea. Extended families are the norm and the wantok system holds sway. Many children continue to live at home after they turn 16 or 18. When they marry they often still live at home. If they get paid job they are expected to contribute to the maintenance of the extended family unit. If they are living a predominantly subsistence lifestyle in the village environment, they are still expected to contribute to the maintenance of the family. The PNG family unit involves a much more complex, intricate set of interdependent relationships than in western societies, from where the principles that have been applied in the cases referred to above seem to have emerged.”
9. His honour then concluded:
“The best approach to take in my view is to consider each case on its own merits, free of the strictures of a western or common law prism, and ascertain whether, in fact, a parent who is a plaintiff was or was likely to be dependent on a child.”
10. His Honour found two earlier decisions of the National Court supported the position he was taking. The first of these decisions was the one in Muna Uokare v. The State[7] by Woods J. The other was by Salika J. (as he then was) in Simin Dingi v. MVIT.[8] In both cases, the persons who were killed due to negligent driving of motor vehicles were respectively a young man and a young woman, both aged 18 years old at the time of their death. In Muna Uokare, liability was admitted and there was a trial on assessment of damages. The deceased was a young man who was in good health. Prior to his death he was a useful member of his family. He cultivated traditional food crops and had a coffee garden and provided support for his parents. The parents were aged about 45 and were expected to have a life expectancy of up to 65 years. On these facts, the Court assessed loss of dependency by allowing K4.00 per week for 10 years and a reduction of 10 percent on account of early payment.
11. In the Simin Dingi matter, the parents sued for bride price they would have received had their deceased daughter lived on and married. The evidence showed the deceased was healthy before her demise and there was no reason to suggest the opposite. The Court found for the plaintiffs and awarded K5,000.00 in damages for lost of possible bride price.
12. Having regard to these cases, Cannings J., found in the case before him that the plaintiff established a case of dependency on the deceased prior to his demise. This was based on proper pleadings which were subsequently supported by evidence called in support of the claim. The evidence established the deceased being a bright student who loved to draw. This saw him early in the workforce where he painted “T” shirts which sold well in the local market. From the proceeds, the father was able to buy a motor vehicle. Prior to his demise, the deceased was healthy and was well liked by his school mates and staff. He was at the relevant time doing grade 7. The deceased death caused the plaintiff and his relatives to incur air travel costs to take the body to his home province, post-mortem and all other related funeral expenses. Based on those facts, his honour decided to award the plaintiff K24,960.00, funeral expenses of K19,700.00 and K3,000.00 for the deceased estate claim. Interests and costs were also ordered against the State.
13. Counsel for the Plaintiff also relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Wallbank and Minifie v. The State[9] to support his submission for the Court to infer loss of dependency notwithstanding the lack of any pleading evidence substantiating such a loss. In the case cited, the Supreme Court said:
“The National Court Rules do not require a plaintiff to characterise his cause of action within a legal framework, although he has, in fact, done that when calling the estate’s claim as one for ‘loss of expectation of life’. The National Court Rules O 8 r 7 merely ask that the plaintiff plead the facts on which he seeks to rely. If established on the evidence at the hearing, the Court may find an award for damages according to any principles of law which have developed, whether by common law, statutory effect or development in Papua New Guinea on a case-by-case basis. There is no need ‘to put a label on his cause of action’.
14. Further, counsel for the Plaintiff relies upon the following passage from Lord Denning’s decision in Shaw v. Shaw:[10]
“It is said that an implied warranty is not alleged in the pleadings, but all the material facts are alleged, and in these days, so long as those facts are alleged, that is sufficient for the court to proceed to judgment without putting any particular legal label upon the cause of action.”
15. I was able to find a few other cases in which Cannings J., had arrived at decisions similar to the one in the Paul Komba case. One such decision is in the matter of Roy Manduru v. MVIL.[11] In that case, the Plaintiff sued for loss of prospective dependency, solatium or deceased estate claim and special damages, especially funeral expenses. There, the deceased, then 17 years old and a grade 10 student got killed by a negligent driver who drove off the road and collided with the deceased, who was then walking on a footpath on the side of the road.
16. It is not clear if the pleadings were an issue before the Court. Unhelpful as they are on the issue of pleadings, these lines of cases cannot override the many decisions of the Supreme Court as in the PNGBC vs. Jeff Tole, MVIT v. John Etape[12] and MVIT v. James Pupune[13] and other cases which make it clear that, there can be no award of damages for any item of damage that fails to meet the requirements for proper pleadings. The decisions in Wallbank and Minifie as well as Lord Denning’s decision in the Shaw case are consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court. These lines of case authorities make the point that the requirements for proper pleadings would be met by a party pleading the relevant facts or essential elements that make up a particular item of loss or damage clear. Indeed, I note that the Supreme Court in the Wallbank and Minifie discussed the decision in the Shaw case and said:
“Having regard to the way in which the pleadings were drawn, with a clear correlation between the dependency of the surviving widow and child and the income and earnings of the deceased (but no intimation in fact that the estate has suffered a loss by virtue of the diminution of income consequent upon the death) limiting the claim to the extent that it had ‘for loss of expectation of life’, we do not permit the plaintiff to put forward this claim at this juncture. The National Court Rules have not been complied with for no particular facts have been pleaded to put the defendant on notice of this supposed head of damage claim.
17. I have long held the view and do agree with these lines of cases because a party is required to plead the facts and not the law which is restated in O.8, r.8(1) of the National Court Rules. This rule reads “pleading of a party shall contain only a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which he relies...” It follows therefore that, unless this requirement is met there can be no departure and award of damages outside that which is pleaded. In other words, there can be no award of damages for any item of alleged loss or damage for which no material facts are pleaded.
18. In the context of the decisions in Paul Komba and Roy Manduru, I consider the provisions of O.8, r.20A (2) and (4) as most relevant. These provisions read:
“(2) Every pleading which does not state whether or not a rule of customary law is applicable shall be deemed to plead that no rule of customary law is applicable.
...
(4) Where a party pleads that the Court should apply:
a. A rule of customary law, that party shall plead:
1. The rule is not inconsistent with the written law;
2. The rule is consistent with the Constitutional rights.”
19. This rule makes it abundantly clear that, if a party wants a customary law or principle to apply, it must be properly pleaded. This is necessary to properly raise the issue as a matter for the Court to consider and apply. Similarly, the rest of the provisions of O.8, r. 20A require appropriate pleadings for any newly formulated principle or any principle of the underlying law or a common law or any part of the underlying law no longer being relevant and applicable to the circumstances of Papua New Guinea.
20. The law on what are the recognised heads of damages for claims arising out of wrongfully cause death of a child is well settled. The established position at common law is has adopted and applied in Papua New Guinea in the case of Jackson Koko and Elisha Koko v. MVIT,[14] Andale More and Manis Andale v. Henry Tokam and The State[15] are examples of cases on point. According to these recognized principles of law, the only recognised heads of damages arising out of a wrongful death of a child are estate claims and solatium only. This is so for very good reason.
21. Usually children are dependent on their parents. Upon attaining their age of majority or upon reaching adulthood, they move on, create and live with their own families. Their own children and husbands or wives become dependant on them. Meanwhile, most parents die sooner in Papua New Guinea than elsewhere in the world. It is therefore highly speculative to assume that parents would live longer and become dependent on their children. Aged old parents if they survive that long, will be dependent on their children only up to a point and from time to time and not consistently. Occasionally would their children support their parents and if they do, it will be very minimal. Unless, the parents are disabled and cannot fend for themselves, most parents in Papua New Guinea work hard to support themselves even in their old ages. Besides, a child would have siblings who would either contribute or substantially support their parents. Only in a few cases, very advanced aged parents would depend entirely on the support of their children. Also, it is highly speculative that every child will live up to adulthood, become a professional and get a decent job or otherwise become industrious enough to look after themselves, their own families and their parents. Presently, there is a trend in which a whole lot of young people if not in any form of employment are loitering and wondering around in cities or towns and the highways and byways. Given these variables, each case is different. That means, a case must be made out before there can be any acceptance of any claim for any loss of dependency by a parent upon the wrongful death of a child. Hence, all claims for any loss of an existing dependency or any prospective dependency must be made out first in one’s pleadings and secondly by the production of credible evidence establishing such a claim. To succeed in a claim for loss of dependency, the pleadings must plead the matters required under O.8, r. 20A as well as the specific factual basis upon which there was dependency, or a prospective dependency claim is based. Such specifics should include the deceased’s:
(a) medical history and status prior to his or her demise;
(b) academic and or intellectual capacity by reference to school or college work and or assessments and results;
(c) employment or industriousness record and evidence of it; and
(d) living environment, whether rural or city with type of accommodation, food, other factors that contribute to better health and longer life expectancy and opportunities or lack therefore of being employed with a certainty of earning or generating a regular income.
22. In the present case, there are two main problems. First there is no foundation in the pleadings for the claim for loss of dependency in that none of the matters listed above is stated or address in the pleadings with any particulars. Secondly, the Plaintiff adduced no evidence establishing, the Plaintiff’s dependence on the deceased or a good prospect of depending on the deceased. Specifically, no evidence of the type that were adduced for example in the Paul Komba case has been adduced in this case. In the present cases, affidavit evidence filed for or by the Plaintiff claims having suffered loss of dependency but fails to provide any evidence substantiating or formating the necessary foundation for his claims. Hence, there is no basis or foundation for an award of damages for loss of dependency. Consequentially, this part of the claim must therefore fail.
Estate Claim
23. The next head of damages the Plaintiff is claim is the estate claim. As already noted, estate claims are well recognized and allowable. The Plaintiff relies upon the decisions in Paul Komba and Wallbank and Minifie cases to argue of an award of K100,000 under this head of damages. I agree with Canning J., with his decision in the Roy Manduru case, that foundation for this head of damages is in s. 34(1) of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. This provision allows for a deceased estate to both sue and be sued as if the person had not died.
24. Again, as his honour notes, the conventional sum for many years for this head of damage has been K3,000.00, going by authorities such as the decision in the Wallbank and Minifie case. However, in his decision in Kembo Tirima v. ANGAU Memorial Hospital Board & The State,[16] Cannings J, had a significant relook at the subject and decided to increase the conventional sum by 100% to K6, 000.00. Almost 10 years later His Honour increased that amount again to K8,000.00 in the case of Robert Wandokun v. Manase Leeman & Madang Provincial Government.[17] The main reason for this increase was the fact that, the past awards were outdated and did not reflect current realities. Living conditions and the way of life had changed from what they were in the years the earlier awards were made. Also, inflation in the country and the value of the Kina were also another factor. The buying power of the Kina had changed significantly to the point of the Kina buying lesser goods and services than before. In other words, one has to spend more for less in the present economic settings.
25. In my decision in Jackson Mari v. Dr Sano Tahong,[18] I effectively decided to adopt the reasonings of Cannings J., and decided to award K8,000.00 for an estate claim in that case. That was only 3 years ago, which is not a significant passage of time to allow for any further increase in the amount of damages for the deceased estate today. No convincing basis or argument other than the factors already considered have been presented to convince me to award the K100,000.00 asked for in damages for the estate claim. I am of the view that K8,000.00 is still a reasonable amount to award for the deceased estate. Accordingly, I make an award in that amount.
Funeral Expenses
26. According to the Plaintiff’s affidavit, the relatives and family members spent an estimated total sum of almost K50,000.00. This was for costs of morgue, food and drinks for the friends and relatives turning up for mourning the death of the deceased for one and half weeks in Port Moresby and air and related transportation of the deceased body to Tari. The latter item included the Plaintiff and his wife and 12 other relatives who accompanied the deceased body. None of these expenses is confirmed by any receipt or other credible evidence in their place. There is no itemisation of each of these expense with an indication of their individual costs. I also note that, it is a common highlands customary practice for friends and relatives of a deceased or his family members to contribute to most of these expenses, either in cash or food or other relevant items of value. Although there is an expectation that the grieving and receiving family would reciprocate when the giver or contributor is in a similar need in future, there is no obligation to repay such assistance to the same value or same item received. If it is not the case here, this had to be pleaded and evidence led establishing the same.
27. Here the Plaintiff had to adduce evidence through himself or through other witnesses which show clearly the total number of persons, if not exactly at least an estimated number that attended the funeral, who and or how many of them contributed to the various expenses and the amounts or value of each person’s contribution. He also had to adduce evidence clearly indicating which of the contributions are loans that must be repaid and which of them have no such obligations attached. Evidence disclosing what was the extend of the Plaintiff’s own contribution and the source of such contributions also had to be adduced. The Plaintiff did not adduce any such evidence. If such evidence were led and adduced into evidence, the Plaintiffs claim would easily be rendered credible. I am not for once suggesting the Plaintiff did not incur some or all these expenses. Instead, he may have incurred such expenses. But in the absence of any evidence substantiating the claims, the Plaintiff is entitled only to an amount the Court considers reasonable for this part of the claim.
28. In the absence of the kind of evidence required, I surveyed the cases on point for assistance to arrive at a reasonable amount in damages. I came to a number of decisions of the National Court that might be of assistance. Included in that line of cases, is my own decision in the Jackson Mari matter. There, I awarded K17,000 for funeral expenses. That was based on evidence of funeral expenses being incurred for food and drinks for mourners, transport of the deceased body to Mendi from Mt. Hagen and the deceased grave.
29. However, a case that might be more directly on point and closer to the present case is the Roy Manduru case. There, although there were claims, the Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to support his claims for transportation costs for transporting the deceased body from Port Moresby to Tufi, Northern Province, costs incurred at the funeral home, airfares and freight charges to Tufi and purchase of food and refreshments for funeral feasts and the like. Despite that lack in the evidence, the Plaintiff claimed K37,556.00 which the Court rejected. But the Court did not consequently refuse to award any damages. Instead, the Court decided to make an award of K9,325 as a reasonable amount because the plaintiff gave evidence which detailed the expenses. His honour also noted the provisions of s. 28(2) of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Wrongs Act) which specifically provides for funeral expenses. Further his Honour had regard to the decision of Salika J. (as he then was) in Inabari v. Sapat and The State[19] which explained how a reasonable figure should be assessed. The Court must have regard to the normal costs and customary obligations that are generated by a death in PNG.
30. In the case before me, there is no evidence substantiating the exact amounts incurred in funeral related expenses. Also, there is no itemisation of each of the items of funeral related expenses. This was not a hard thing to do. Receipts would have been issued for most of the items of expenses claimed. For the air travel component of the expenses, there would be ticket butts in addition to receipts. Where could they be? Were they lost or misplaced or destroyed or what happened to them? The duty was on the Plaintiff to explain. This he failed to do. A production of the receipts and ticket butts could have at least supported the claims for funeral home and related expenses and airfares to Tari from Port Moresby.
31. Whilst noting this serious lack of evidence, I accept that, it is a well-accepted and practised custom throughout the country for funeral related expenses. The amount is dependent on the status of the deceased and his family, the distance to travel from the place where the deceased was last residing and found his unfortunate death to the place where his or her body is finally laid to rest, a feast or so marking the end of mourning and finished with an appropriate grave yard. Unless there is evidence of the actual amounts out laid in funeral related expenses, the Court can allow only for a reasonable amount in funeral expenses. This has been done even in cases where defendants have seriously opposed and contested the awarding of such damages, which is not the case here. The main reason for the Courts making such awards is because these are expected expenditure items following the death of a person as opposed to the claim of loss of dependency on a child which is not normal and or expected in all cases. I will allow myself to be guided by the awards in the Roy Manduru and Jackson Mari in the absence of any credible evidence and lack of proper or sufficient pleadings.
32. As noted in, Roy Manduru’s case, there were no receipts or such other evidence confirming each item of expenses claimed but they were specifically itemised. On the other hand, in Jackson Mari’s case, there were actual evidence supporting each of the claims. In the case before me now, I am prepared to note that the costs of air transport alone from Port Moresby to Tari would have been substantial compared to the air travel costs to Tufi from Port Moresby and road transport from Mt. Hagen to Mendi. In these circumstances, I consider an award of K14,000.00 reasonable. Accordingly, I award that amount in funeral expenses.
Solatium
33. The next head of damages claimed by the Plaintiff is solatium. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff cites the decision in Wallbank and Minifie and asks for an award of K10,000.00 for solatium. He argues that K3,000.00 awarded in that case is outdated and times have changed substantially. Reference is also made to Tari custom regarding compensation payments following wrongful deaths. Unfortunately, this submission is seriously flawed and against clearly expressed statutory and case law. Firstly, there is no evidence supporting the submissions. Secondly, an award of damages as solatium must start with its statutory foundation. The foundation for this head of damages is s. 29 of Wrongs Act. Subsection (2) of this provision expressly stipulates:
“...the court may award such damages, not exceeding K600.00 in the aggregate, as the court thinks just, by way of solatium for the suffering caused to a parent by the death of the child.”(Emphasis supplied)
34. The Courts have therefore consistently awarded only K600 for solatium and no more. Good examples of cases on point are the decisions in the Roy Manduru and Jackson Mari cases. Thirdly, the decision in Wallbank and Minifie makes no mention and does not provide any support for the submissions of counsel. Finally, if there must be an increase, that increase will have to come by way of an amendment to s. 29 (2) of the Wrongs Act by Parliament. Until then, the prescribed maximum limit is K600.00. Accordingly, I award K600.00 for solatium for the parents.
33. In summary, this Court’s decision on the Plaintiffs damages are as follows:
(1) No award for loss of dependency, for lack of foundation in the pleadings and for lack of evidence substantiating the claim;
(2) K8,000.00 is awarded for the deceased’s estate claim;
(3) K14,000.00 is award for special damages, namely funeral and related expenses;
(4) K600.00 is awarded for solatium;
(4) The total award in damages therefore is K22, 600.00.
33. Additionally, I order interest at 8% pursuant to the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 from the date of the issue of the writ until full settlement of the judgment debt. Of course, costs will follow that event against the Defendant. Such costs shall be taxed, if not agreed.
Judgment and orders accordingly.
______________________________________________________
Warner Shand Lawyers: Lawyers for the Plaintiff
In House Lawyers : Lawyers for the Defendant
[1] (2011) SC1118
[2] (2002) SC694.
[3] [1994] PNGLR 363.
[4] (2006) N2979.
[5] [1990] PNGLR 561.
[6] [1990] PNGLR 568.
[7] [1988-89] PNGLR 655.
[8] [1994] PNGLR 385.
[9] [1994] PNGLR 78.
[10] [1954] 2 QB 429 at 441.
[11] (2016) N6509.
[12] [1995] PNGLR 214.
[13] [1993] PNGLR 370.
[14] [1988] PNGLR 167.
[15]
[16] (2006) N3106.
[17] (2015) N5950.
[18] (2015) N6241.
[19] [1991] PNGLR 427.
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