Kunai v Papua New Guinea Forest Authority [2018] PGNC 439; N7570 (4 September 2018)

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BETWEEN
FRANCIS KUNAI for himself and on behalf of all 8 Jimi Timber Rights Purchase Agreement Holders as who are landowners and beneficiaries stated in the Schedule herewith and marked “A”
First Plaintiffs

AND
KELLY KALIT for himself and on behalf of all Waripi Timber Rights Purchase landowners and beneficiaries
Third Plaintiff

AND
JULIUS POLOLI – The Public Curator of the Independent State of PNG
Second Defendant

AND
SIMON TOSALI – The Secretary for Department of Treasury
Third Defendant

AND
STEVEN GIBSON – The Secretary for Department of Finance
Fourth Defendant

AND
MARK STEWARD – As administrator and agents of the Palgei Timber Rights Purchases Landowners
Sixth Defendant

Waigani: Kandakasi, J.
2017: 21^st August
2018: 08^th March
04^th July
15^th and 17^th August
4^th September

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) – Med-arb – Defined – A combination of the process of mediation and arbitration by the same neutral third party as mediator and arbiter or adjudicator – Benefits and disadvantages of considered – Provided the neutral third party has the consent of all parties and can stay clear of the risks of using confidential information gathered in the mediation process and avoid coercing the parties it is a useful process to use given its benefits.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE - Notice under s. 5 of the Claim by and Against the State Act – Specific defence – State obliged to take a clear position on compliance or noncompliance - State has duty to specifically plead the defence and the basis for the defence – Failure to so plead – State precluded from raising the issue and succeeding – Section 5 of Claims by and Against the State Act – Order 8, r.14 National Court Rules.

CONTRACT – Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) agreements – Treasury Investment of proceeds for landowners - Effect of – Loan to the extent that the principle plus all interest accrued on it will be paid to the investors – Principle and accrued interest not paid out at end of agreed period – No expressed agreement to continue or discontinue investment – Effect of – Relevant industry practice – Roll over of the investments on the same terms but on current prevailing interest rates – Ascertaining relevant exchange rate – Accepting and apply relevant rate established by Court judgments - Total amount due and payable should consist of principle with interests from the initial period of investment and further periods up to date of judgment.

COMMON LAW – Doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation – Relevant elements or principles of – Essential element of acting on representation and suffering detriment not proven – Effect of allowing doctrine to applying would result in unjust outcome – Doctrine inapplicable.

EVIDENCE – Party in a position to adduce relevant evidence fails to do so – Evidence of relevant foreign exchange rate for a number of years and prevailing commercial interest rate - Effect of – Court at liberty to use whatever evidence adduce by the opposing side or other information available to the Court – Commercial interest rate found in judgments – Court can use rates found and established by judgments.

EVIDENCE – Matter in dispute in writing – Document speaks for itself – no extrinsic evidence permissible to contradict – Claim of privilege – No case as a matter of law or fact made out by party claiming privilege – Effect of – Document properly in evidence before the Court.

FINANCE & INVESTMENT – Investments by colonial government in foreign currency - Investments not paid out as and when due – Effect of – Roll over of – Terms and conditions of - Interest rates – Simple or compound interest rates – Parties agreement was for compound interests to apply – Current and prevailing commercial interest rates – Conversion of foreign currency - Currently prevailing conversion rates applied to convert from Australian Dollars to PNG Kina.

GOVERNMENT – National Executive Council (NEC) – NEC highest executive decision making body in the country – Has power to make all decisions for the good order and administration of the country in accordance with the law - Decisions of – Whether NEC has duty to seek and act only in accordance with the Attorney Generals (AG) Advice – Lack of any advice from the AG – Effect of – NEC decision is binding unless the NEC itself revokes or a court of competent jurisdiction sets it aside – All public organisations and public servants to give effect to NEC decision to allow for orderly running of the affairs of the country - Sections 8 (1) and (4) of the Attorney General Act 1989 (the AG’s Act.

INTERESTS – Types – Interest on damages and interest as damages – Two different matters – Interest as damages could attract interest on damages - Interest on damages entails an order that interest be paid upon award of damages – Interest as damages entails an actual award of damages – Interest as damages represents compensation for a wrongfully created loss of the use of money - Such interest is assessed wholly or partly by reference to the interest which would have been earned by safe investment of the money or which was in fact paid upon borrowings which otherwise would have been unnecessary or retired – Interest as damages awarded.

LOANS – Loans with the State – Applicable law – Loans and Securities Act – Requirements of – Unless the requirements of the Act are met no loan with the State can be created – Section 35 of Loans and Securities Act.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Duty to proof – He who alleges must proof – Failure to – Allegation fails.

PUBLIC CURATOR – Powers and functions of – Whether subject to control or direction from any State department? – Duty owed to clients – Duty is to act in the client’s best interest – Clients interest not same as that of the State – Public Curators Act Chp.81.

SLIP RULE – Jurisdiction in the National Court – Principles governing – Purpose is to correct clear misapprehensions and consequential obvious errors or omission by the Court – Numerous calculations – Room for slip – Parties invited, and they assist in identification of slips – Corrections effected – Order 8 Rule 59 (1) of the National Court Rules.

Papua New Guinea Cases

Peter Mangope vs. Rolence Maprik Haba (2015) SC1459
The State v. Moki Lepi (No 2) (2002) N2278
Curtain Bros (Qld) Pty Ltd v. The State [1993] PNGLR 285
Shell Papua New Guinea Ltd v. Speko Investment Ltd (2004) SC76
Koitaki Plantations Ltd v. Charlton Ltd (2014) N5656
Abel Constructions Ltd v. W.R. Carpenter (PNG) Ltd (2014) N5636
Hargy Oil Palm Ltd v. Ewasse Landowners Association Inc (2013) N5441
PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v. Canopus No 71 Ltd (2010) N4288
Toale Hongiri Incorporated Land Group & Ors v. Wolotou Incorporated Land Group & Ors (2014) SC1358
Polem Enterprises Ltd v. Attorney General of Papua New Guinea (2006) N2968
The State v. Zachary Gelu and Anor (2003) SC716
PNG v. Keboki Business Group Inc. [1985] PNGLR 369
Paul Kumba v. Motor Vehicle (PNG) Trust (2001) N2132
Fly River Provincial Government v. Pioneer Health Services Ltd (2001) SC705
Wahgi Savings and Loan Society Ltd v. Bank of South Pacific Ltd (1980) SC185
Joe Kerowa v MVIL (2010) SC1100
Rundle v. MVIT [1988] PNGLR 20
MVIL v. Sanage Kuri (2006) SC825
Andrew Posai v. Bevan Saile (2008) N3260
Sao Gabi & State v. Kasup Nate & Ors (2006) N4020
Tau Gumu v. Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation (2001) N2288
Jerry Kusa v. Steven Raphael (2008) N3304
Pija Grannies Ltd v. Rural Development Bank Ltd (2011) SC1327
Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) Ltd v. Ine Ibi & Ors (2017) SC1605
Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation Limited v. Jeff Tole (2002) SC694
David Raim v. Simon Korua (2010) SC1062
John Wasis v. Margaret Elias (2016) SC1485
The State v. Downer Construction (PNG) Ltd (2009) SC979
Ruth Kaurigova v. Dr. Russo Perone and Ors SC 964
PNG v. Keboki Business Group Inc. [1985] PNGLR 369
Mathew Petrus Himsas & Another vs. The State & Another (2002) N2307
Cosmas Gawi v. RD Tuna Canners Ltd (2013) N5336
Clark Piokole v. Rei Logona (2017) N6713
PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri, Acting Deputy Secretary Department of Civil Aviation & Others (2009) SC1002
CBIP (PNG) Ltd v. Landex Ltd (2016) N6861
KL Engineering & Constructions (PNG) Ltd v. Damansar Forestry Products (PNG) Ltd (2002) N2250
Alotau Enterprises Ltd v. Zuric Pacific Insurance Pty Ltd (1999) N1969
Lawrence Sausau v. PNG Harbours Board (2007) N3255
POSF Board v. Sailas Imanakuan (2001) SC 677
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority v. Concord Pacific Ltd (No 2) (2003) N2465
Eddie Tarsie v. Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd (2010) N4142
PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v. Canopus No 71 Ltd (2010) N4288
Stephen John Rose v. The State (2007) N3241
Waim No 85 Ltd v. The State (2015) SC1470
Andrew Trawen v. Steven Kama & Michael Laimo v. Steven Kama (2010) SC1063

Overseas Cases Cited:

Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757
Geoffrey Wayne Clarkson & Another vs. Whangamata Metal Supplies Limited & Another [2007] AZCA 590
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341;156 ER

Legislation cited:

Loans Securities Act (Chp. 134)
National Court (Amendment) Act 2008 (No. 4 of 2008).
District Courts (Amendment) Act 2000 (No. 8 of 2000).
Forestry Act 1991.
Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, (Chp. 295).
Companies Act.
Frauds and Limitations Act 1988.
Public Finances (Management) Act 1995.
Public Curator Act (Chp.81).
Attorney General Act 1989.
Claims By & Against the State Act 1996.
Employment Act (Chp 37).

Other Sources and Material

Bartel, Barry C. “Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and Potential,” Willamette L. Rev. 27 (1991): 661-92.
Blankenship, John T. “Developing your ADR Attitude: Med-Arb, a Template for Adaptive ADR.” Tennessee Bar Journal Nov. (2006): 28-41.
Brewer, Thomas J., and Lawrence R. Mills. “Combining Mediation and Arbitration.” Disp. Resol. J. 54:4 (1999): 32-39.
Galanter, Marc. “‘A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:’ Judicial Mediation in the United States” Brit J L & Soc’y, 12:1 (1985): 1-18;
Hoffman, David. “Colliding Worlds in Dispute Resolution: Towards a Unified Field Theory of ADR.” J. Disp. Resol. 2008 (2008): 11-44;
Hoellering, Michael F. “Arbitration and Mediation: A Growing Interaction.” Disp. Resol. J. 52 (1997): 23-25;
Peter, James T. “Note and Comment: Med-Arb in International Arbitration.” Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 8 (1997): 83-116.
Welsh, Nancy. “Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?” Wash. U. L. Q. 79 (2002): 787-861.
Papua New Guinea Forestry Studies 1, What Can be learnt from the past? A history of the forestry sector in PNG, Overseas Development Institute, January 2007 copy also found at https://www.odi.org/ resources/docs.
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition, Vol.16.

J. Ambone, for all the Plaintiffs except for those represented by other lawyers

O. Dekas, for parts of the First Plaintiffs
T. Tape, for parts of Third Plaintiffs.
T. Yamarai, for parts of Third Plaintiffs
T.Wera, for parts of Third Plaintiffs

K. Makeu, for three Interested Parties as Plaintiffs
J.Sione, for the First to Fifth Defendants
No Appearance for the Sixth Defendants

1. KANDAKASI J: This judgment has two parts. The first part contains the main judgment of the Court, while the second part contains the Courts ruling under Order 8 Rule 59 of the National Court Rules (Slip Rule). The second part of the judgment follows invitations from the Court for the parties to carefully go through the various calculations and assist the Court by confirming accuracy or corrections to those calculations given the numerous calculations the Court had to deal with and the high possibility of the Court misapprehending the facts and accidentally making a slip or error or omission. The parties appropriately responded by helping the Court to identify the clear and accidental slips or omissions, the Court made and help make the necessary corrections.

2. This is an interesting and peculiar case, which warrants a specific and separate treatment. It is no usual contract or tort case against the State. Instead, this was a case in which the State through the then colonial administration received certain sums of money from certain simple and illiterate villagers who were owners of large portions of forest resources (Landowners).

3. The then colonial administration retained and was supposed to invest monies so received from the Landowners in the form of treasury bonds in 1967 and 1968 respectively for the benefit of certain landowners out of logging operations in Australian Dollars. This was under several Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) areas under several Timber Rights Purchase Agreements (TRPAs). These TRP areas covered what is now the Enga, Western Highlands and Jiwaka Provinces. The investments were to mature in 10 years. When they matured however, the State did not properly ascertain the total proceeds of the investments and the original amounts invested for each of the beneficiaries and pay them to the investors with their respective agreed accrued interests. Having defaulted in that way, the State also failed to undertake an open and fair process to ascertain the correct beneficiaries of the investments in cases where the investors passed away. Meanwhile, the State either allowed the investments to roll over each year or used them for its own purposes until the Plaintiffs in this proceeding were able to make enquiries and confirm that the investments were made and were not paid out upon their maturity. If the Plaintiffs did not take such action, the State would have failed to account for the investments, dishonesty applied them for its own purposes to the detriment of the Landowners. I wonder if there are other similar cases since, there has been many logging operations throughout the country during the colonial times.

4. On ascertaining the investments, the Plaintiffs demanded their repayment with all interests accrued and added on. Certain other similar claimants represented by the Sixth Defendant had their claims processed and approved at a total sum of K10 million. Of that, the State paid K7 million to the Sixth Defendants and the balance of K3 million was paid to a law firm despite Court orders restraining such payment.

5. The three named Plaintiffs (the lead Plaintiffs) are raising the principle of estoppel by conduct against the State and are asking for what is due to them to be calculated on the same formula or basis used to calculate and pay the other claims. The State consisting of the First to the Fifth Defendants (the Defendants) on the other hand are arguing for a different formula or basis to calculate what is due to the Plaintiffs. In so arguing, the State claims the formula or basis upon which the other claims were settled was illegal, null and void and not binding on the State. Other persons who were later joined or are parts of the landowning groups represented by the lawyers other than Mr. Ambone (the other Plaintiffs) argue for a different formula or basis to the one the State has earlier used and the ones the State is now arguing for.

6. The parties have also gone into some detailed submission on the question of the nature of the investments under the various TRPAs. The Original Plaintiffs plead the various investments as loans under the Loans Securities Act (Chp. 134). This has drawn serious opposing arguments from the Defendants.

(3) What is the total amount of funds now standing to the credit of the landowner beneficiaries?

(5) Is the State at any liberty to seek to use a formula or basis other than what it used to resolve other similar claims or is it estopped by the application of the principle of estoppel by conduct or representation?

8. By consent of the parties, the second and fourth issues were referred for resolution by mediation conducted at various locations in the Enga, Western Highlands and Jiwaka Provinces by accredited mediators, His Worship Mark Pupaka, Craig Jones and myself, all appointed with the consent of the parties. That process resolved the second and fourth issues leaving the first, third and fifth issues to be resolved by adjudication. These issues have arisen and remain to be resolved due mainly to the parties not being able to agree on how the amounts due and owing to the plaintiffs and the other beneficiaries should be arrived at. These issues in turn present several sub-issues as set out below:

(a) Having regard to the terms of the TRPAs and relevant exchange rates between the PNG Kina and the Australian Dollar:

(ii) what was the total amount accrued upon the initial agreed period of 10 years; and

(b) Did the investments roll-over by way of reinvestment on the State failing to pay them out on their due dates?

9. Before considering and determining the issues present, I need to deal with one preliminary point first. This has to do with my being one of the mediators who assisted in a resolution of two of the main issues presented. I expressed reluctance in assuming jurisdiction to deal with the remaining main issues with their sub-issues. I took that position in the light of the Supreme Court’s remarks in its decision in the matter of Peter Mangope vs. Rolence Maprik Haba^[1] (the Tari Airport case). The parties however, unanimously consented to my presiding and determining the remaining issues for them. They submitted that, my having conducted the mediations and the various directions hearing both before and after the mediations, I was in a better position to appreciate the background, the parties’ respective positions, understand the issues and come to a more informed decision. In making that submission, all learned counsel pointed out that, it would take more time and effort for another judge to come to the position I am at in this proceeding and would result in further costs and delay to their respective clients. Further, they expressly agreed not to take any issue on my presiding and determining the remaining issues. Accordingly, I decided in favour of presiding and dealing with the issues presented.

10. The position the parties took may be new to PNG. This is because, formal mediation and ADR processes and their development and use for the effective resolution of many disputes previously delayed or backlogged or locked up in litigation is a recent development. It is however, a well-known and used process under the label or name “med-arb” internationally. Med-arb is common place in most jurisdictions where mediation and arbitration and other forms of ADR are well developed, understood and readily used given the advantages of expedited, long lasting and less costly resolution of disputes. By way of definition, as its name suggests, med-arb is a process that combines both mediation and arbitration, where the same neutral third party is the mediator and arbitrator or in our case the adjudicator on any issue not resolved by mediation.^[2] The development and advancement to the employment of med-arb reflects and parallels the larger societal trend that has increasingly linked judicial processes and procedures with various forms of ADR which are less formal, more expedient and less costly processes for effective and lasting resolution of conflicts. Med-arb is a natural outgrowth of this trend.

11. In a dispute resolution environment as is the case in PNG, where mediation and judicial adjudication (the equivalent of arbitration) often occurs in sequential order, it makes sense to have the same neutral perform both functions, if feasible. This is particularly so in a law centered model of mediation like ours where the parties already expect the mediator to be adept at formulating optimal settlement strategies based on legal and technical norms and industry practice. In this context, the mediator already has tremendous power of persuasion based on his “expert” authority to evaluate the likely outcome of the case if it went to trial, and his knowledge of how other cases in the same commercial or other sectors have settled. While the neutral in adjudication has the ultimate degree of decision making power by his authority to create a final and binding settlement, the evaluative mediator’s power to influence the settlement process may differ only as a matter of degree. This has led some to characterize the differences between mediation and arbitration as an “artificial”^[3] one.

12. In traditional PNG, well before the arrival of the white man and his ways, conflicts or disputes were resolved by leaders at the various levels in society. They were respected and accepted just like the judges of today. The model or process used was a combination of mediation and arbitration or adjudication. Using this process, the conflict resolver would endeavor to get the parties to arrive at an amicable resolution of the dispute themselves. Failing any such resolution, the facilitator would proceed to consider and determine the matters in dispute for the parties which would be accepted. Before the commencement of the process, the parties know about the process and what would happen in the process. Accordingly, they know and accept the fact that their process facilitator would be wearing two hats, one as mediator and the other as arbiter or adjudicator. Clearly therefore, PNG from time immemorial had a system of conflict resolution which in modern terminology could be described as “med-arb”. It is this system that kept societies, communities and families together and ensured there was law and order for centuries before the arrival of the White men and his ways.

13. On independence, our founding fathers made a deliberate decision to build our country upon the good Christian principles and customs and traditions and provided for it, although only in the preamble.^[4] In the substantive provisions of our Constitution^[5] however, our founding fathers provided for the National Judicial System and vested it with the people’s judicial power. Through the various enabling legislation, rules and judicial pronouncements, the focus has been more on the adjudicative role of the Courts following the formal common law courts of mother England. There has been little or no focus on the facilitative mediation or similar roles with the aim of enabling the disputing parties to have their disputes resolved by their own considered agreement. The good news is, eventually Parliament being informed by the developments worldwide^[6] and in the Courts in PNG, decided to have mediation and ADR introduced by an enactment of the amendments to the National Court Act (Chp. 38) and introduced Part IIA, sections 7A – 7E in 2008 by the National Court (Amendment) Act 2008 (No. 4 of 2008) and earlier by amending the District Court Act and introducing s. 22B -22C by the District Courts (Amendment) Act 2000 (No. 8 of 2000). In my humble view, this makes much more sense for the PNG Judiciary in its further development and use of mediation and ADR to also develop and encourage more use of med-arb. Indeed, s. 22C of the District Court allows for the same mediator magistrate to be the adjudicator with the consent of the parties if mediation fails. The National Court Act does not make a similar provision.

14. The main advantages of med-arb are the certainty of an outcome at the end of the process, greater efficiency in terms of time and money, and greater flexibility concerning process and timelines.^[7] Efficiency in med-arb is in the saving of time and money over separate sequential phases of mediation and arbitration in two important respects. First, if the mediation phase does not reach settlement, the parties and their lawyers do not have to hire another neutral unfamiliar with the case and then prepare for a full-blown adjudication. Second, the issues in dispute are frequently narrowed down during a mediation phase and unresolved issues proceed directly into the arbitration or adjudication process.^[8] The flexibility inherent in med-arb allows the process to be fashioned to fit a particular dispute. Blankenship argues that while med-arb may not be suitable for every dispute, ... it is a leading example of “adaptive ADR” where “[the different ADR] forms become adaptable, combinable, reversible, and even discardable for the sake of the parties and their dispute”.^[9] There is also the most important attribute of med-arb which is, bringing about a final decision or an outcome. The med-arbiter has complete authority to create a final and binding settlement, a power that is not available to a mediator.^[10] In addition, “whether the final product of a med-arb results entirely from mediation or both mediation and arbitration, it becomes the entire [arbitral] settlement, which is binding and enforceable at law”.^[11]

15. A good example of how this flexibility to blend mediation and arbitration may sometimes serve the parties’ best interests is provided by Hoffman. He speaks of a case in which the parties and counsel had intended to resolve their dispute, a breach of contract claim between two taxi companies, by mediation. However, after more than a day of mediation, both sides became convinced that a definitive interpretation of their contract was needed, and they asked the mediator to switch hats and arbitrate the dispute. Strongly held views on both sides, as well as intense anger between the principals of the two companies, made it difficult for either party to consider settlement, but they did see the value, from a business standpoint, of having the dispute resolved quickly and privately.^[12] Finally, the same facilitator made a decision which both sides accepted and carried on in their business.

16. As the above example indicates, parties to an ongoing business relationship have a mutual interest in being able to resolve inevitable disputes expeditiously, privately, and in a manner, that is fair and even-handed, so they can move forward. Med-arb is an especially appealing option for disputes that the parties view as “irritants” to a valuable commercial relationship such as a manufacturer and a distributer, a joint venture, or marketing relationship, which both sides see as “more important than the stakes involved in such disputes”.^[13]

17. However, on the downside, whilst med-arbs are good for the reasons given above, they come with two important concerns. These are in the areas of a possible inherent potential for “coercion” and the risk of confidential information gained during mediation tainting the med-arbiter or judge’s final decision. These are concerns the parties and the third party neutral need to fully understand when considering med-arb as a process choice for resolving a specific dispute. The best possible safeguard suggested and available to prevent these concerns from materializing is to allow each party the right after the mediation phase to “opt out” of having the same neutral continue into the arbitration phase.^[14] The potential loss in efficiency, in terms of the extra time and money required in shifting to a separate arbitrator or judge is justified by the important protection it provides to each party, and the incentive it provides for the med-arbiter to maintain impartiality.

18. In detail, turning firstly to the issue of “coercion”, I note the available material appear to suggest that, when the power to decide the dispute is vested in the med-arb facilitator, it gives him or her the power to pressure the parties into settlement. It is suggested that, unlike an “ordinary” mediator, when the med-arbiter evaluates a case, it is highly suggestive of how the legal and factual issues of the case will be decided. When the med-arbiter or adjudicator “makes a settlement suggestion based on his or her legal evaluation of the case and issues presented, it is effectively a pre-decision”^[15] on the case. For some commentators, the concern this gives rise to is that “what appears to be a negotiated resolution may be perceived by the parties as an imposed one, thus diminishing the degree of satisfaction and commitment”.^[16] However, this concern with a “coerced” decision loses force when the parties have made a free and informed choice for med-arb, a process that explicitly authorizes the third party neutral to impose a final binding decision^[17] if they fail to reach agreement at mediation. Med-arbs are sometimes referred to as “mediation with muscle” as the facilitator has a built-in tool available to him or her, and the parties relinquish some power of self-determination when they give up their ability to “walk away” and agree to a med-arb process. Moreover, as Blankenship writes, “any competent, ethical neutral must be sensitive to the line between appropriate pressure to settle and inappropriate coercion”.^[18] It is in the med-arbiter’s or adjudicators professional interest to gain the parties’ trust during the mediation, as they observe firstly, his skill in using the mediator toolbox to support each party’s participation and secondly, his even-handedness as they witness his reactions to the legal and factual issues.^[19] Strong-arm tactics by the med-arbiter or adjudicator would likely cause a party to feel unheard, disrespected, or unfairly treated, thereby impinging on that party’s sense that “justice is being done”.^[20] This potential for abuse is not restricted to med-arbs. The potential exists in mediation as well and even in the formal courts “if the neutral, due to incompetence or overzealousness, allows it to happen”.^[21] At the same time, it should be understood that, the possible need for a neutral to render a decision in a med-arb process does not of itself mean that the process during mediation is inherently coercive or that the party will feel “pressured” by how the med-arbiter or adjudicator facilitates the parties’ negotiation during mediation. The opposite might be the case. The parties might be comforted by the fact that their facilitator will help determine the issues they themselves cannot resolve by their direct negotiations.

19. Turning next to the second concern of breaching confidentiality duties, I note the concern is in the risk of confidential information gained during the mediation process being allowed to inappropriately influence or being used by the neutral in the exercise of his or her arbitration or adjudication role to arrive at a decision. “The real premise of this criticism is that the med-arbiter [or adjudicator] cannot be completely neutral in the decision-making phase, having gained some information, perhaps unfavorable to one or more of the parties, in confidence in the mediation phase”.^[22] The decision of the Supreme Court in the Tari Airport case, discussed this risk in these terms:

“30. If a Judge is appointed a mediator and the mediation is incomplete he or she should refrain from resuming the role of Judge unless the issue to be raised in Court is uncontentious and the resumption by the Judge mediator of a judicial role is with the express consent of all parties to the mediation. As Injia CJ explained in Rimua v Ekanda (2011) SC1094 it is necessary to maintain a clear demarcation at all times between a Judge mediator’s adjudicative, judicial functions and that Judge’s mediation functions. It will be almost impossible to avoid a blurring of these quite distinct functions if the Judge returns to the courtroom during the course of mediation. It will almost inevitably put the Judge in breach of the duty of confidentiality regarding all matters coming to the Judge’s knowledge in the course of the mediation, which is imposed on the Judge upon appointment as a mediator.”

20. The Court then referred to and cited the provisions of Rule 11 of the ADR Rules and went on to say:

“31. A mediator, whether a Judge or not, is, by virtue of the definition in Rule 3(2) of the ADR Rules, a “participant” in the mediation and therefore subject to the duty of confidentiality. When a Judge mediator resumes a judicial role in the proceedings, the Judge will, unless the court proceedings are conducted in chambers or in camera or with the consent of all parties in public, be at great risk of disclosing to non-parties the nature and effect of discussions that have taken place during the mediation.

32. The resumption by a Judge mediator of a judicial role during the course of mediation should be assiduously avoided except in exceptional or urgent circumstances where the risk of a breach of the mediator’s duty of confidentiality can be said to be totally excluded. Those circumstances did not exist here.”

21. It is not clear if the appellants in the case then before the Supreme Court made out a clear case of actual breach of the confidentiality duty incorporated in the provisions of relevant ADR Rules. Instead, it is clear the Supreme Court in what is obviously an obiter dictum made a general remark.

22. Writers like Welsh suggests the abstract discussion in the literature as to whether the neutral as mediator can or cannot successfully “disregard” confidential information gained in mediation is of far less consequence than the parties’ perception of a med-arbiter’s or adjudicator’s fairness and even-handedness in specific cases on a case by case basis.^[23] A competent and ethical conflict resolution professional can protect parties considering med-arb by fully informing them of the confidentiality issue and explaining to them the “specific procedures and safeguards” available to address it, such as the ability of either party to opt-out after the mediation phase. It is important to note also that, whether confidentiality will be significant depends more on the particular circumstances, including the issues to be resolved by the arbitrator or adjudicator, other challenges, and the parties involved in a specific dispute. For example, if both parties are willing to commit at the outset that they will always remain in joint session in mediation and all issues will be out on the table, or the matter for resolution by adjudication is one which the parties either by deliberate choice or during mediation decide to keep it out of mediation, that would diminish the risk that confidential information will inappropriately influence the med-arbiter or adjudicator in reaching an adjudicated outcome. Further, the parties might also come to a deliberate decision that the med-arbiter might be the most appropriate neutral to decide on the matters requiring an adjudicator to adjudicate based on the information disclosed and available during the mediation process. It should also be remembered that, at the end of the day, the parties own the dispute and they should be at liberty to decide who should help determine issues they are not able to resolve through mediation. Once that choice is made, all third parties including the formal courts, should respect the parties’ choices and allow for disputes to be resolved in the way they prefer. Forcing them to go to a process in which they do not have a choice of their facilitator and forced to go through the facilitation of a person other than their mediator comes with the risk of undoing gains and resolutions arrived at mediation and cause the parties to get into uncertainties, unnecessary delays, arguments and increased costs. This risk is real as an adjudicator ill-informed of what transpired at mediation could assume many things or fail to appreciate gains made at mediation as was demonstrated in the Tari Airport case and Toale Hongiri Incorporated Land Group & Ors v. Wolotou Incorporated Land Group & Ors^[24] (the Gobe Land case).

23. In the Tari Airport case, none of the parties sought to disqualify the adjudicator from adjudicating in the matter. The substantive issues concerned a proper identification of the owners of the Tari Airport land which had become State Land and how compensations paid for the land should be distributed. Those issues were addressed and resolved openly in the presence and witness of all the landowning clan’s representatives and endorsed by the whole of their respective clan members. The mediation process also enabled the true and correct former landowners of the land to form their respective ILGs which they did, and their respective certificates were issued as oppose to only one man incorporating 22 ILGs from within his own clan and family to the exclusion of the other true and correct landowners, purposely to access and unjustly enrich himself. Further the mediation process clearly established some of the persons who went to court did so without the consent and approval of all the landowning clans. Hence, no substantive issue in the proceeding remained unresolved. Section 7D (4) of the National Court Act provides for “trial” before a different Judge if a matter in which the mediator was a judge and did not result in a resolution of the proceedings. In the case under consideration, all the substantive issues were resolved. The only outstanding issue was certain lawyers’ fees which were not in the substantive issues for resolution by mediation but was addresses as a related issue to finally resolve the matter. No confidential information was given to adjudicator at mediation and later used in Court. The lawyers who wanted their fees included in the mediated outcome did not fully and meaningfully participate in the discussions on the specifics of their costs with their respective clients. Rather than having their costs properly itemized and proven and thereby enable the landowners to appreciate and agree to their bill of costs, they chose to take issue with the mediation process and the agreements reached by the landowners which allowed certain amounts for their costs and left them with the option to have their costs taxed if they did not accept the amounts allowed by the landowners. Furthermore, it appears that the Supreme Court was not with respect informed and it therefore did not acknowledge the failures of the lawyers to attend mediation in good faith and failed to also return up in Court without good reason when the matter returned to the Court, which entitled the parties appearing and the Court to proceed. Similarly, it seems clear that the Supreme Court was not informed of the absent and uncooperative lawyers knew of the date and time when the matter was returning to the Court. They thus had the duty amongst others to either, press for their motions or settled with their clients and the rest of the parties and their lawyers, neither of which they did. Finally, it appears clear that the Supreme Court was again not with respect informed and therefore was not able to appropriately acknowledge and protect the agreements that were reach at mediation. Those gains or agreement reached at mediation thus stood the risk of all being undone.

24. In the Gobe Land case, the Supreme Court as in the earlier Tari Airport case, was not informed and therefore it was with respect not able to note what was achieved at mediation and what remained to be resolved. Again, as was in the Tari Airport case, the matter was in Court mainly on the question of who was entitled to a share and how the benefits derived from their land should be shared amongst the beneficiaries. There was no ownership dispute as such as most of the landowning clans acknowledge each other and the issues got down to identifying and confirming the landowning clans and their respective memberships and the question of how best to share the benefits. Again, as in the Tari Airport case, the mediation resulted in the landowning groups or clans identifying and confirming the correct landowners and resolved the question of benefit sharing for most of the landowning groups. Only two or three landowning groups’ identification of the beneficiaries and how they would share their benefits remained to be resolved by the concerned landowners. Failing such agreement, it was agreed that the concerned landowning groups should take only their matters to a hearing and determination by the Land Titles Commission, which had been on standby to pick up from there and resolve the issues. Further it appears the Supreme Court was not informed and therefore was not able to note that the purported consent order appeared to resolve the remaining issues. Hence, upon finding that the consent order was not by the consent of all the parties, the Court should have with respect, allowed for the matter to revert to the position the matter was before the purported consent orders came about. This would have resulted in a protection of the agreements that were already reached at mediation. The orders the Court ultimately made with respect, appear not to appreciate and accommodate this fact.

25. The decisions of the Supreme Court in both cases, have not in any way decided to protect the gains made at mediation. Instead, the Court as ill-informed as it was either knowingly or unknowingly, undid the agreements of the landowners who resolved their main issues and were prepared to get to the next stage of accessing the benefits due to them. Effectively, those you failed to make use of the mediation process have with the approval of the Supreme Court, with respect, put everyone back to square one instead of only those who failed to reach agreements. These proceedings have caused much delay, pain and anguish for the landowners unnecessarily. The problems cause by the decision in the Gobe Land case being an LNG related matter is more pronounced. Delays in the landowners accessing their benefits is an issue that is the subject of many media coverages which are almost daily if not weekly. Sadly, it is a case of a few difficult parties with effectively, the approval of the Supreme Court, with respect, is causing these unnecessary delays and associated pain, anguish and sufferings.

26. It should be apparent from the foregoing discussions that, the process of med-arb is a known and accepted process which if properly and appropriately used can help expedite the resolution of disputes at less costs to the parties and all involved and in less time. It is a process well known to past traditional and present PNG. As noted, the process has its advantages and disadvantages. Much care and cautions are required especially if the process is to be used. It is important to note that, it will not be known until after the mediation process, which of the information a mediator obtains in the mediation process is confidential and which are not and are in the public or in the common knowledge domain. Also, after the completion of the mediation process, the parties would know what issues they have resolved and what issues remain to be resolved. They would also be in a better position to know whether they can trust the mediator and he or she is well positioned to be a suitable adjudicator for them on the issues yet to be resolved rather than going through the expensive process of a full-blown trial on all matters. They would also be in a better position to dictate as to what information the mediator come arbiter can or cannot use to arrive at a determination of the issues to be determined. No doubt, each case would turn on its own settings. In landowner related cases, as in the present case, in the context of issues of proper landowner identification and benefit share, most of the information concerning these issues would be common or public knowledge both within and outside a clan. All, if not most members of a clan and its neighbouring, or surrounding clans and or communities would already have information about each clan’s genealogy and all related information. Hence, strictly speaking, not much information would come under the banner of confidential information.

27. In this case, as already noted, all the parties consented to my presiding, receive the submissions on the matters requiring this Court’s determination and come to a decision. I also noted that, the issues for me to determine did not form part of the issues for resolution at any of the mediations that were already conducted. The main issues in those mediations as already noted, were the questions of who are the beneficiaries of the various investment proceeds and how should the proceeds be distributed amongst the beneficiaries. The issues for the Court to decide here were not the subject of any discussion or any information disclosed at the various mediations concluded in the various locations. The only exception there was the documents evidencing each of the investments giving the names of the investors and the amounts invested with the terms of the investments. This information formed the basis without much of an argument for the parties to reach agreement on the beneficiaries and their decision on how to distribute the proceeds of the various investments. That information is part of the evidence adduced in Court through various affidavits filed for the plaintiffs which are not the subject of any contest. Further, the mediations were amongst persons claiming to be the beneficiaries under each of the respective investments. This did not involve the state. The issues for me to determine involves the owners of the land on which the State was permitted and it allowed for or enabled logging out of which the investments came on the one hand and the State parties on the other hand on the issues presented for this Court to determine as outlined earlier.

28. Turning then to the main issues before me, it is necessary to note and appreciate the relevant factual background, which I go into now. On 25^th October 1967, several TRPAs were entered into between traditional landowners in the then Dei and Jimi Districts of the Western Highlands Province, with the then colonial administration. Similar agreements were also entered into between the traditional landowners in the Waripa area of the now Enga Province in December 1968. These Agreements were in identical terms except only for the names of the traditional landowners and their respective land areas. They were each to run for forty (40) years expiring respectively on 25^th October 2007 and December 2008. The TRPAs allowed for extraction and logging of timber on the Landowner’s land. In return, the Landowners were paid certain negligible sums of money. These payments were governed by an agreement contained in Schedule 2 to the agreements. The respective agreements were for a payment of only a small amount about one third (1/3) of the total due to each of the Landowners in cash and the balance by way of Treasury Investment. The investments were to be at a fixed interest rate of AUD$5.57 per annum payable on the first day of January and July each year during a total investment period of ten years respectively from 26^th January 1967 to 26^th January 1977 and 26^th January 1968 to January 1978. There is no dispute that, in accordance with the terms of these agreements, certain landowners of Waripa TRPA area and the Jimi areas invested certain specific amounts of money then in Australian Dollars per individual investment agreements which also contained other information about each of the investors and other useful information. Similarly, there is no dispute that, the State did not pay any of the investors when their respective investments matured. Further, there is no dispute that most of the original investors were illiterates at the relevant time and they did not know how to follow up on the payments as and when they each fell due until a Mara Wek of Moiwa approached the First and Third Defendants and was paid a sum of K1.2 million for his clans in 2002.

29. Prior to the issuance of this proceeding, there were numerous communications between some of the Plaintiffs and some officers of the State until in June 2012 when the First Defendant released a sum of K7 million out of an appropriated K10 million. The Public Curator claimed the K10 million was for the landowners represented by the Sixth Defendant. That led to the Plaintiffs obtaining on 29^th November 2012 an ex parte injunctive order restraining the Defendants from distributing or using the money in question on the basis that, the Plaintiffs might also be entitled to those funds in the absence of any evidence clearly establishing the funds in question belonging to the Sixth Defendants only.

30. During the interim injunction application hearings, the following issues were raised:

31. The payment and appropriation of the K10 million came about in this way. By letter dated 27^th October 2009, the then Acting Public Curator, Mr. Vuatha Leva sought the Governor of the Central Bank’s comments on the method to calculate interest payable on the investments. The Governor by letter dated 24^th November 2009, refused to comment on the method, reasoning the Central Bank had no records to form the basis for any such comment. On 04^th December 2009, the State Solicitor provided a legal advice to Mr. Leva. Thereafter, on 21^st December 2009, Mr. Leva wrote to the Minister for Treasury and Finance and informed him of his calculations to that date. His calculations were 5.57% interest for the first 10 years and then 17% (8% +9% =17%) to 01^st January 2009 giving a total of K48,881,410.43.

32. After some delay, on 20^th October 2010, the then First Secretary to the Minister for Treasury and Finance, Mr. John Matau gave a brief to the Minister. That brief set out the calculations of the amount owing and pointed out that, the calculations should be based on the inscribed stock rate of 9% from 1977 and the 5.5% rate from 1966 to 1977. Based on his calculations, Mr. Matau stated that the total amount owing as at the date of his letter was K33,299,614.75. Two years later in 2012, in the National Budget, the National Executive Council (NEC) made an appropriation for timber royalty payments. By letter dated 29^th June 2012, the then Secretary for the Department of Treasury, Mr. Simon Tosali, confirmed K10 million was appropriated for the redemption of outstanding TRP treasury investments. Of that amount, Mr. Tosali released K7 million to the then Managing Director of the Forestry Authority Mr. Goodwill Tony Amos to assist with the treasury investment payments. At the same time however, he noted with concern that, there were other TRPAs around the country who were in a similar situation and withheld K3 million. He also directed that the K7 million should be paid by cheque to the Public Curator’s office. This was to ensure that the Public Curator properly identifies the correct beneficiaries and pay them.

33. By July 2012, a new Public Curator in the Second Defendant was appointed. By letter dated 04^th July 2012, the new Public Curator wrote to Mr. Amos of the first Defendant. By letter dated 07^th August 2012, Mr. Amos expressed the view that, the K7 million should not be paid only to the Sixth Defendants but to all the other Jimi TRPA areas as well. On 14^th August 2012, Mr. Tosali wrote to Acting Public Curator and directed him to make payment of the K7 million to 10 TRPAs. Despite these correspondences, the Acting Public Curator went ahead to distribute the funds as part of the deceased estate of the Six Defendants only. This was also despite the Court orders injuncting such payments and the issues raised.

34. Bearing the relevant facts as outlined above in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the main issues presented. I start with the first main issue of what is the nature of the investments. As noted, the Plaintiffs pleaded in their statement of claim that the TRPAs were in fact loan agreements within the meaning of the Loans Securities Act.^[25]

35. The relevant provision in the TRPAs is in the Second Schedule to the TRPAs, clause C, item 2. This provision reads:

“It is hereby agreed that the term “Treasury Investment” where used in this agreement means that part of the price of the Timber Rights, which with the consent of and by the direction of the vendors, has been invested [in the names of and in the proportions due to Vendor] in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea Loan for a period of 10 years computed from the Twenty sixth day of January 1967 [or 1968] to bear interest at the rate of five dollars seventy five cents (5.75) per centum per annum. Each Vendor has received an acknowledgement of his investment from the Treasurer of the said Territory and interest will be due to each vendor on the first day of the months of January and July in each and every year during the said period of 10 years.”

36. It should be enough to look at the language used in the TRPAs and determine their nature. For it is settled law that, where an agreement or anything is reduced into writing, the document should speak for itself to the exclusion of any extrinsic evidence. There are numerous authorities such as the decision of the Supreme Court in Curtain Bros (Qld) Pty Ltd v. The State^[26] and Shell Papua New Guinea Ltd v. Speko Investment Ltd^[27], which support this proposition.

37. At the same time, I accept the Defendants’ submission that, to properly understand the true nature of the investments we need to know and appreciate the history of how TRPAs came into existence. The Court is greatly assisted by the affidavit of Mr. Desmond Kipa sworn and filed on 18^th May 2016, which annexes an excerpt from Papua New Guinea Forestry Studies 1, What Can be learnt from the past? A history of the forestry sector in PNG, Overseas Development Institute, January 2007.^[28]

38. Based on the source referred to above, it is clear that, during the early colonial times, two separate legislation governed the exploitation of forest resources in the country. The two legislation were the Timber Ordinance 1909 Papua and the Timber Ordinance, 1922 of the Territory of New Guinea. In the 1930s these legislation were merged to come up with the Forestry Ordinance 1936-37. The main provisions of the Ordinance provided for:

39. The Forestry Ordinance was widely used in both the former territories of Papua and New Guinea until its repeal and replacement in 1991 by the Forestry Act 1991. The Act and its predecessors defined the various rights. Under this legislation the concept of timber rights came into existence. The Administration could purchase timber rights under TRPAs from customary landowners, and then control and supervise the issuance of timber permits and timber licenses over such areas. It also had provisions on conservation of forest areas which were to be dedicated as Territory Forests or Timber Reserves. Unfortunately, nothing significant was and has been done about such reserves to my knowledge.

40. The TRPAs were the avenue through which the State gained access to timber resources located within customary land. The guidelines to secure a TRPA from as early as 1951 were:

(a) An application would be made for a Timber Permit on a prescribed form, under Regulation 4 of the Forestry Ordinance 1936-37, Territory of New Guinea, and applicable in the Territory of Papua under the Forestry (Papua) Ordinance 1950;

(b) A local Forest Officer would then make a resource survey of the area to be acquired, though not necessarily limited to the area applied for as a Timber Permit.;

(c) On consideration of the report received under (b), a recommendation would be made by the Director of Forests to the Administrator as to any purchase or otherwise of Land and/or Timber Rights;

(d) On approval of a recommendation under (c), funds would be obtained from the Department of Treasury under procedures laid down for the control of departmental expenditures;

(e) The Department of District Services and Native Affairs would then proceed with the “purchase”;

(f) If the Land Rights were acquired, the transaction would be finalized by the Department of Lands, Surveys and Mines and became a matter of Timber Rights, falling within the jurisdiction of the Department of Forests; and

(g) Finally, on the recommendation of the Director of Forests, a timber sale would then proceed, subject to the Administrator’s approval of such sales and conditions to be applied.

41. TRPAs were and are not created and governed by the provisions of the Loans Securities Act. Instead, as already noted, they are governed by the Forestry Act 1991 and its predecessors. The TRPAs in the present case are headed “Timber Rights Purchase” and have the emblem of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea as it was then and followed by the heading Department of Forests. There is nothing in the TRPAs that labels these agreements as Loan Investment Agreements in any manner or form for the parties to make any reasonable inference from. An example of a loan agreement entered into between the then Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea is annexed and marked “JS-3” to the affidavit of Jerome Sioni sworn and filed 16 May 2016. Comparing this to the TRPAs do not make them comparable or render them capable of being readily reconcilable and treated as similar or resembling each other. Further, the Department of Forests is not the department that is responsible and has the power to enter into any loan agreements for and on behalf of the State. There is no evidence of any specific delegation or authorization for the Department of Forests to borrow from the Landowners on behalf of the State. The TRPAs were instead clearly between the customary landowners with forest resources from whom timber rights were purchased in consideration of various agreed cash payments and investments that were to be made for the Landowners. Reading the whole of the TRPAs inclusive of the relevant part cited in the submissions of the parties and recited in the foregoing, makes this very clear. In the light of these, I find that, the Plaintiffs pleadings at paragraphs 11 -14 that the normal banking practice under the Loans Securities Act, Chap. 134 (LSA), the Constitution and other unspecified law is misconceived and do not and could not apply either by expressed or any implied provision under that Act.

42. The use of the word “loan” in the phrase “loan for a period of 10 years computed from the twenty sixth day of January 1967 [or 1968] to bear interest at the rate of five dollars seventy-five cents (5.75) per centum per annum” may give the wrong impression. However, if we carefully consider the TRPAs in the context of the prevailing arrangements and more so, the true nature of the TRPAs as discussed above, the use of the term “loan” merely gives a description of the effect of the investment and not necessarily connoting the creation of a loan under the LSA. The LSA provides for the issuance of stocks, bonds debentures and other securities by the State to the public to raise much needed funds to help fund the State’s budget. A provision that comes close to a borrowing by agreement between the State and third parties is s.35 of that Act. This provision reads:

(1) The Head of State, acting on advice, may, by order, authorize the Minister to borrow, by agreement, on behalf of the State, any money the authority to borrow which is granted by an Act.

(2) An order made under Subsection (1) shall specify the amount that may be borrowed and the terms and conditions on which it may be borrowed.”

43. Obviously, for a valid borrowing and hence a loan under the Act, it requires an involvement of the Head of State acting on advice of the NEC. The Head of State would authorize the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act to borrow. The borrowing would have to be by agreement on behalf of the State. Most importantly however, before any authorization under this provision can take place, there must first be a grant by another Act of Parliament an authority to borrow. These requirements must first be met before there can be a claim of a loan being created and existing under the LSA.

44. In the present case, there is no evidence of any authorization by the Head of State acting on the advice of the NEC. Similarly, there is no evidence of any loan agreement being executed by the Minister responsible on behalf of the State and the Landowners lending the money. Further, there is no evidence or indeed any submission from the Plaintiffs as to another Act authorizing the borrowing. Furthermore, the LSA was in existence in 1960, which was well before the TRPAs were executed. It should follow therefore that, if indeed the intention was a borrowing under the LSA, these and the other requirements of the Act had to be met. There is neither any pleading in the Plaintiffs’ statement of claim nor is there any evidence of these requirements being met. I am not surprised because, the fact of the matter was this, in the case of the various investments in the present case, parts of the Landowners’ monies from the proceeds of the sale of their forest products were authorized by agreement of the parties to be retained and invested for their benefit by way of investments on specific terms. This was likened to customers of commercial or the Bank of Papua New Guinea placing certain sums of money by way of term deposits normally called, “term deposits” on certain terms including an agreed interest rate payable by a certain time and at a certain rate. Though effectively they were loans from the customers or the depositors to the banks, they cannot strictly speaking be treated as loans under the LSA.

45. Having regard to all the above, I accept the Defendants submissions that to construe the TRPA investments as loans is against the true nature of the TRPAs and against the express language used in the TRPA’s. In the consequence, I reject the Plaintiffs claim for a treatment of the TRPA investments as loans under the LSA.

46. The next issue, I turn to is the issue of estoppel by conduct. If that argument is upheld it will resolve all the remaining issues.

47. As noted, the lead Plaintiffs argue that the State has already accepted a formula and or the basis to calculate what is due to the beneficiary landowners culminating in the payout of the K10 million to the Sixth Defendants. Hence, they argue that, by operation of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct, the State is precluded from arguing for any other formula or basis to calculate and pay out what is due to them. In response, the First to the Fifth Defendants argue that:

(a) The Acting Public Curator acted in breach of the advice of the State Solicitor by not seeking the advice of the Department of Treasury and acted on his own, adopted a formula or basis and calculated what was due to the landowner beneficiaries;

(b) Mr. Matau who revised the calculations by the Acting Public Curator, was not a public servant and an officer vested with the appropriate power to make the submissions he made;

(c) There is no evidence of the Secretary for the Department of Treasury or a staff of the Department having verified and approved the submissions despite the relevant Minister requiring such be done;

(e) If however, the NEC made a decision, it was flawed as there was no advice from the Attorney General endorsing or approving neither of the submissions of the Acting Public Curator or Mr. Matau;

(f) NEC decisions are subject to the laws of this land and any NEC policy decision and any budget appropriation is not a law unto itself; and

(g) No responsible authority of the State had settled the question in regard to the calculations and computations of the amounts the landowners could redeem from the State for their investments.

48. Before dealing with the arguments presented, it is necessary for me to remind myself of the relevant principles governing the common law doctrine of estoppel by conduct. On this point, Mr. Abone of counsel for the lead Plaintiffs has gone into some detail submission. However, only the submissions on the definition of the word “estoppel” and estoppel by conduct or representation are relevant. The rest of the submissions covering issue estoppel and res judicata are irrelevant. The submissions for the First to the Fifth Defendants cite the decision of Gabi J., in Polem Enterprises Ltd v. Attorney General of Papua New Guinea^[29] as well as the decision on appeal from that decision in The State v. Zachary Gelu and Anor^[30]; PNG v. Keboki Business Group Inc.^[31], per Pratt J., and Davani J., in Paul Kumba v. Motor Vehicle (PNG) Trust^[32] and finally the Supreme Court’s decision in Fly River Provincial Government v. Pioneer Health Services Ltd^[33] to argue against an application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct against these defendants. These decisions were in the context of illegal contracts which were entered into and in some cases, part performed contrary to or without meeting specific statutory requirements to make them legal, by reason of which they became unenforceable.

49. The relevant principles or essential elements of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or as is otherwise known as “estoppel by representation” comes from its definition. The following quote from Blacks Law Dictionary as cited in Mr. Ambone’s submissions for the original Plaintiffs might be relevant. This dictionary defines the doctrine of estoppel generally as a doctrine that serves as a:

“bar or impediment raised by the law, which precludes a man from alleging or from denying a certain fact or state of facts, in consequence of his previous allegation or denial or conduct or admission, or in consequence of a final adjudication of the matter in a court of law.” Estoppel, Black’s Law Dictionary”.

50. In my view a more clearer definition is from Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition, Vol.16, paragraph 995. The phrase “equitable estoppel” is defined in these terms:

“Where a person has by words or conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of fact, either with knowledge of its falsehood or with the intention that it should be acted upon, or has so conducted himself, that another would, as a reasonable person, understand that a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted upon and the other person has acted upon such representation and thereby altered his position to his prejudice, an estoppel arises against the party who made the representation, and he is not allowed to aver that the fact is otherwise than he represented it to be”.

51. This doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation has been effectively considered in our jurisdiction by numerous National and Supreme Court decisions. An example is the decision of the Supreme Court in Wahgi Savings and Loan Society Ltd v. Bank of South Pacific Ltd.^[34] There, the Supreme Court closely examined a document alleged to be evidence of the relevant conduct in question in that case and said:

“In relation to Exhibit ‘L’ there is absolutely no evidence of the conduct or inaction of the appellant from which it could reasonably be inferred that the letter was from the appellant. On the facts of this case it is irrelevant what the appellant could have done after 14th June 1977 because the respondent had already acted to its detriment. There is no evidence of the conduct of the appellant up to 14th June 1977 from which the trial judge could consider the issue of estoppel by representation.”

52. Later, Davani J., in her judgment in the matter of Paul Kumba v. Motor Vehicle (PNG) Trust (supra) cited the above passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England. Thereafter, she held that the doctrine did not apply because its application went contrary to a clear statutory requirement, namely the requirement under s. 54 (6) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, (Chp. 295). In its recent decision, the Supreme Court in Joe Kerowa v. MVIL^[35], endorse the position taken by her honour. This was consistent with position earlier taken by the Supreme Court in its decision in Rundle v. MVIT^[36] and affirmed in its subsequent decisions as in MVIL v. Sanage Kuri.^[37]

53. Similarly, in Andrew Posai v. Bevan Saile^[38], Lay J., refused to allow the doctrine to apply against the clear provisions of s. 425(1)(b) of the Companies Act. This provision prohibits persons convicted of criminal offences especially offences involving dishonesty from being appointed directors. His Honour, rejected an argument that the Defendants knew about the Plaintiffs conviction and took no proceedings to disqualify him by reason of which the Plaintiffs approved of his appointment. Therefore, he argued that the Plaintiff should be precluded by the doctrine of estoppel by conduct from taking up the issue. His Honour said:

“I consider that it must also follow that equity cannot set at naught a statutory prohibition. If Parliament has said that certain persons cannot act as directors, shareholders or directors or other officers of a company cannot by specific agreement or by their conduct set aside the prohibition.”

54. But there are other decisions like the ones in Lomot Chauka v. Elthy Biang,^[39] per Cannings J. There, his Honour was of the view that, if the State fails to apply to have proceedings dismissed despite obvious grounds for doing so and allows a matter to be progressed to trial, it is by its conduct and as a matter of equity and justice estopped from relying on alleged breaches of the Claims By and Against the State Act or other procedural irregularities as a defence at trial.

55. Earlier, in Sao Gabi & State v. Kasup Nate & Ors,^[40] Injia DCJ (as he then was) arrived at a similar decision. There, the State settled some claims for compensation as determined by the Lands Titles Commission. Then sought others claims to be dismissed by raising issues it should have earlier raised but did not. That resulted in the settlement of the other claims. In view of that, his honour said:

“The Respondents submit the State had settled similar awards made in this period. It had also failed to appeal the decision. By its conduct, the State had waived its right to contest the awards and in fact settled some of the awards. By such conduct, the State is estopped from contesting the awards. It is grossly unfair to the Respondents for the State not to settle the awards in respect of the other matters....”

56. I had opportunity to look at the doctrine in Tau Gumu v. Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation.^[41] There, Tau Gumu sued the bank for the bank’s failure to properly lodge his claim for workers compensation by giving the required notice under the relevant legislation. That failure resulted in Mr. Gumu missing out on workers compensation for a medical condition he developed and eventually suffered whilst in the cause of his employment. The bank raised the issue of statutory time bar under s.16(1) of the Frauds and Limitations Act 1988. I resolved the issue against the bank and reasoned:

“... the bank’s failure to give the required notice under the WCA [Workers Compensation Act] and notify the plaintiff of that failure, led the plaintiff to believe that the necessary requirements were being taken care of and that he need not do anything in relation to his right to compensation. As such, he did not know that he had a cause of action against the defendant until he became aware of the defendant’s failure to lodge the required notice under section 42 (1) of the WCA in 1998. Knowledge of the Bank’s failure is the most important, if not the material fact in this action. It is the failure of the Bank that is the basis of the action. Without it, there would not be an action. Time must be computed from 1998 onwards”.

57. I then went on to say, equity and justice dictated that, the bank should not be allowed to benefit from its own failure. For it was the bank which created the false impressions and as such, it would be unconscionable to permit it to gain from its own failure. I found the case analogous to cases in which it has been held that, if there is fraud by the employer, time did not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud. “Fraud” in that context, was not confined to deceit or dishonesty but it covered actions of the defendant such as concealing its failure to take steps it should have for the benefit of the plaintiff until the discovery by the plaintiff of the defendant’s failure.

58. Subsequently, in Jerry Kusa v. Steven Raphael,^[42] the doctrine of estoppel was considered in this way:

“The question is, did the State say or do anything that could form the foundation to enable the plaintiffs to maintain these proceedings in equity? There is no evidence or indication in the pleadings as to when the plaintiffs first approached the State for these allowances and the legal basis for their claims. Similarly, there is nothing in the pleadings or any evidence as to what the State said or did in relation to their claims apart from denying their claims which prevented them from issuing proceedings within the six years limit. This is necessary and critical in view of the State saying the plaintiffs were not entitled to the kinds of allowances they claim they were entitled to and that the decision to include this particular head of allowances came in 1996. In the circumstances, I find that the plaintiffs have not established any foundation for the Court to allow these proceedings to stand even outside the six years limitation.”

59. Further, it is also settled law in our jurisdiction that, the principles of equity and common law which includes the doctrine of estoppel, cannot apply to save contracts that fail to meet specific requirements under the Public Finances (Management) Act 1995. The Supreme Court in its decision in Fly River Provincial Government (supra) made a clear statement on that in these terms:

“...it is trite law that an illegal contract cannot be enforced. Clearly, a guilty party to an illegal contract cannot enforce it (Cowan v. Mibourn (1867) [1848] EngR 492; L.R. 2 Ex 230). A person would be a guilty party to a contract for the purposes of not enforcing an illegal contract, where it fails to take steps it should have taken to protect its interest. This consequence follows even as against an innocent party. There is therefore, no such a thing as estoppel by conduct as against the need to put an end to an illegal contract.”

60. From the foregoing brief discussion, it is clear to me that, in order that the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation to apply, its application must not go against any specific legislative requirement or provision as discussed and applied in the Andrew Posai v Bevan Saile (supra) case. Then provided it is not against any specific statutory provision on point, certain essential elements or factors must exist to allow for an application of the doctrine. These are:

(e) understood that the representation of fact was intended to be acted upon and;

61. In the present case, as already noted, the then Acting Public Curator lodged a claim with the Minister for the Third Defendant and Fourth Defendants on behalf of the Landowners. The claim calculated what was considered due and owing in the following terms:

62. However, as already noted also, an officer of the then Minster for the Second and Third Defendants at that time, Honourable Peter O’ Neill, submitted through his office a brief dated 29^th October 2010, and a submission to the National Executive Council.^[43] This brief and NEC submission effectively reviewed the Public Curator’s position and sought approval for a reduced amount of K33, 299,614.75. The brief stated that, a calculation of the amount owing should be based on the inscribed stock rate of 9% from 1977 to 2010 and prior to that, the agreed rate of 5.5% rate from 1966 to 1977.

63. As noted at paragraph 45 above, the Defendants raised several points in support of their arguments against the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct. As can be noted from that list, the only relevant point being raised in the context of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct, is the authority of the persons who made the representations to the Plaintiffs. The first person or authority in line is the Public Curator. The argument against him is that, he acted in breach of an advice from the State Solicitor by not seeking the advice of the Department of Treasury and acted on his own, adopted a formula and calculated what was due to the landowner beneficiaries. The Defendants cite the following passage from the State Solicitor’s letter to support their argument:

“our role is not to investigate and determine who the beneficiaries would be nor in computing the investment redeemable pursuant to the Agreement.”

64. There is nothing in the words relied on or indeed elsewhere in the letter that specifically directs or suggests to the Public Curator that he should seek the advice of the Department of Treasury. The Defendants’ arguments go outside the established principle of law that a document should speak for itself. Given that, no extrinsic evidence can be allowed to either add or subtract from what is written.^[44] Further, the Public Curator was acting for the beneficiaries he was representing at the time. He owed a duty to them. Counsel has not referred me to any specific requirement in the Public Curator Act^[45] or any other Act that specifically requires the Public Curator to act with and only in accordance with the advice of the Department of Treasury when discharging his powers and functions. This argument must therefore fail.

65. The second point raised by the Defendants is that, Mr. Matau who revised the calculations made by the Acting Public Curator, was not a public servant and an officer vested with the appropriate powers to make the submissions he made. This requires evidence of this person’s lack of authority. If indeed Mr. Matau lacked the requisite authority, the duty was on the Defendants to adduce appropriate evidence to lay the necessary foundation for this argument. No such evidence has been adduced for or by the Defendants. For these reasons, I dismiss this point in the Defendants’ arguments.

66. The next two points in the Defendants’ arguments can be dealt with together. One of them concerns their allegations of a lack of evidence of the Secretary for the Department of Treasury or a staff of the Department verifying and approving the submissions despite the relevant Minister requiring such be done. The other concerns an allegation that the NEC did not consider the submissions and arrive at a decision. It is well settled law that, he who alleges must prove it to succeed in any allegation. In this case, the Defendants had the burden to establish what they were alleging by appropriate evidence. This was not hard to do. The defendants had easy access to the relevant departments’ and authorities’ records from which they could easily gather the relevant evidence and produce them in Court. This they failed to do. What the Supreme Court recently said in Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) Ltd v. Ine Ibi & Ors^[46] is relevant and on point. There the Court in the context of a logging company illegally trespassing upon, occupying and carrying on its business for a commercial purpose said:

“...we observe that a landowner would be hard placed to access any evidence on the specifics and more so the full nature and extent of a trespasser’s gain or benefits from the use of the land. Naturally, a trespasser would be in possession of such information. The onus should be on the trespasser therefore to fully disclose all the relevant information or evidence. Such disclosure should be made upon the landowners making a claim against a trespasser to enable an expedited settlement through direct negotiations, mediations or a form of ADR and only failing that, resolution by trial. Any failure to disclose or produce the kind of evidence in question, should result in any secondary or tertiary evidence being allowed to overcome the lack of any direct evidence as a practical application of the best evidence rule principle.”

67. There, the appellant being in a position to and being able to adduce the relevant evidence, failed to adduce evidence of its income as a result of entering illegally, occupying and using the Respondent’s land. The Respondents were hard placed to access and adduce into evidence, such evidence. The best they could do was to adduce secondary evidence from newspapers cuttings and other sources. In the case before me, the Defendants were in a better position to access their records and produce the relevant evidence to provide the foundation for their arguments. They failed to do so without good reason. Besides, the available evidence suggests and is not seriously contested but agreed to that, the NEC did make a decision. That decision saw to the release ultimately of K10 million. Accordingly, the two points under consideration must also fail.

68. The next point I turn to is the Defendants argument that, if the NEC did make a decision, it was flawed as there was no advice from the Attorney General endorsing or approving neither of the submissions of the Acting Public Curator or Mr. Matau. The defendants rely upon s. 8 (1) and (4) of the Attorney General Act 1989 (the AG’s Act) and ss. 2 and 5 of the Claims By & Against the State Act 1996 (CBASA). Section 8 (1) and (4) of the first Act read as follows:

“(1) The Attorney-General, as the principal legal adviser, shall tender legal advice and opinion to the National Executive following a request to do so and shall of his own initiative give such advice where it appears to him necessary or appropriate for legal advice to be given on a matter.”

“(4) On matters affecting the conduct of the business of the State where legal issues arise or might arise, legal advice shall be provided by the Attorney-General, either in his capacity as principal legal adviser to the National Executive or under Subsection (2) or (3) to the exclusion of all other lawyers unless the Attorney-General, in his absolute discretion, authorizes the giving of legal advice by any other person.”

69. The Defendants point out and I accept that, the above power is in addition to the other powers, functions and duties bestowed upon the Attorney General by the AG’s Act. I also accept that the AG’s Act has been amended in 2013, with the effect that the State Solicitor is now authorized to provide legal advice to the NEC. That amendment was not made retrospective. That means the relevant officer at the relevant time for our purposes was still the AG.

70. The Defendants have not pointed to any provision in the AG’s Act or elsewhere that obligates the NEC to act only with and in accordance with the advice of the AG. What is clear though from the wording in s. 8 (1) and (4) is that, the AG is duty bound to provide legal advice to the NEC on his own volition or on the NEC’s request. That is all there is to what is provided for in the provisions cited. It should follow therefore, without much of a contest that, there is nothing preventing the NEC from making a decisions without any legal advice from the AG or now the State Solicitor. This is understandable. The highest executive government’s decision-making body should be at liberty to make all decisions it considers it has to make from time to time for the good order and administration of the country as and when required. Through this, it is recognized that the highest executive decision-making authority should not be subjected to any other authority that is lower in status to the NEC itself. Should there be any legal implications in any proposed decision, it would be considered most appropriate for the NEC to seek and for the AG or the State Solicitor to provide an appropriate legal advice. Once such advice is provided, the NEC would be expected to make a decision to either act in accordance with the legal advice provided or not. Hence, there is no obligation in the NEC to make a decision only in accordance with the legal advice provided. Instead, the NEC would still be at liberty to arrive at a decision it considers appropriate. Such a decision may well be with and in accordance with any legal advice provided or may be contrary to any legal advice. Sometimes, the legal advice provided might be unsound. In such a case, it would be most unwise to require the NEC to act only with and in accordance with such legal advice.

71. Of course, I accept that the NEC must make decisions that are sound and in accordance with the law for the good order and administration of the country. Also, I accept that a person who is aggrieved by a decision of the NEC always has the right to avoid its application to him or her through the correct process of judicial review in the normal way. Unless a decision is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, all decisions of the NEC must be respected and given effect to. A failure to do so, comes with the serious risk of chaos in public order and sound administration and the orderly running of the affairs of the country through the constitutionally mandated NEC.

72. In the present case, as already noted, the evidence suggests the NEC has come to a decision on the question of the basis to work out what is due and owing to the landowner beneficiaries. A clearest evidence of the NEC having made a decision is in the fact of the K10 million appropriation and a pay out of the same to the Sixth Defendants.

73. Proceeding on that basis, I reject the Defendants submissions for an exclusion of the draft NEC submission based on privilege. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, apart from claiming it is a privileged document, the Defendants have not provided any other basis for a rejection of the evidence before the Court. In any case, no case has been made out by reference to any relevant statutory or other legal foundation for the privileged argument. This is in addition to no foundation being laid in the Defendants’ defence for this argument. That precludes the Defendants from raising the issue and succeed on that point. It is settled law that, a party’s argument or claims for a relief must have its foundation in the pleadings without which no argument can be permitted and allowed to succeed, or any relief granted.^[47]

74. Secondly, there is no evidence of a submission other than the one in the terms of the draft in evidence that had gone to the NEC. If the draft submission in evidence did not form the basis for the NEC decision resulting in the K10 million appropriation, which submission formed the basis for that decision? If a submission in terms other than the draft in evidence formed the basis, the duty was on the Defendants to adduce the appropriate evidence. This they failed to do. It should follow therefore that, the NEC had before it a submission in terms of the draft in evidence and it arrived at a decision reflecting that submission. Consequently, unless and until that decision is revisited by the NEC and is set aside or varied by the NEC itself or a court of competent jurisdiction, all government departments, officers and other persons are required to give effect to it. This includes an obligation on all persons concerned, led by the relevant government departments, authorities and officers to act in accordance with the decision of the NEC and not to act in any manner or form that is contrary to any of the NEC’s decision either directly or indirectly. It follows therefore that, the Defendants are precluded from taking a position and acting contrary to that which has already been decided by the NEC.

75. This leaves me to turn to a consideration of the reliance on the provisions of s.2 and 5 of the CBASA by the Defendants. I have some difficulty following the arguments here for a few reasons. First, no submission is made in respect of the application of the provisions of s.2 of the CBASA. Relevantly, this provision reads:

“(1) A person making a claim against the State in contract or in tort may bring a suit against the State, in respect of the claim, in any court in which such a suit may be brought as between other persons.”

76. The Supreme Court in Downer Construction (PNG) Ltd v. The State,^[48] fully considered the provisions of s. 2 as well as s. 5 of the CBASA. The majority in that case took the view that, the word “claim” as used in s. 2 should be given a restricted meaning and ultimately came to the decision that arbitration proceedings do not constitute an action to enforce a claim by reason of which there was no requirement to give the required notice. In my minority decision however, I took the view that:

“Turning firstly to s.2 (1), I am of the view that, this provision does no more than simply provide a road map as to where a person having any “claim” (as we have defined) against the State that is founded in contract or in tort could go to enforce his or her claim if need be. Such a person could go to a court in much the same way any person having a claim in contract or tort as against any other person could. One could only go to a court if the State does not accept responsibility and is contesting the claim. This is why in my view, Parliament did not make it mandatory for every person having a claim against the State based in contract or in tort to issue proceedings against the State. For the same reason, I am of the view that, Parliament did not see it necessary and did not provide for any demarcation between, cases in which court proceedings are or likely to be issued and those in which there are and will be no court action. All that Parliament did is, provided (sic) an avenue for a person having a claim against the State in contract or in tort to take his or her claim to court, if need be, as any other person could do for his or her claim against any other person failing any out of court resolution.”

77. The Defendants here have not entered into any serious contest or argument on this provision and the views expressed. They then appear to argue that the requirement for notice under s. 5 of the CBASA has not been met in this case. In their own words, the Defendants submit:

“In this instance, we cannot note from the evidence so far adduced, if Section 5 of the CBASA has been complied with before the filing of this proceeding. It is trite law that such Notice is a prerequisite to filing a court proceeding.”

78. There are no further submissions on the application of s.2 and 5 of the CBASA. I accept the suggestion that, all claims against the State must be preceded with by a notice of intention to make a claim against the State. In the present case, there is no serious and specific submission or argument from the Defendants that the requirements of s. 5 of the CBASA has not been met. The Defendants are required to take a clear position on this requirement. They are duty bound to say either s. 5 notice has not been given or that such notice has been given but the purported notice failed to meet the purpose of the notice requirement as elaborated by many decisions of the National and Supreme Courts.^[49] Order 8 r. 14, requires a defendant to specifically plead any matter, for example,

“performance, release, any statute of limitation, fraud, or any fact showing illegality ... which he alleges makes any claim, defence or other case of the opposite party not maintainable; or which, if not pleaded specifically, may take the opposite party by surprise; or which raises matters of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings.”

79. A failure to meet the requirements of s. 5 need to be specifically pleaded if the Defendants wish to avoid meeting the Plaintiffs’ claim. At best, the Defendants’ submission is that, they are not too sure if the Plaintiffs have given their notices of intention to make a claim against the State. By this, I take it that the Defendants are not seriously raising the issue of lack of s. 5 notice. Accordingly, nothing should turn on this point in favour of the Defendants for their failure to make a case for it, if the relevant requirement has not been met. Instead, the Defendants are precluded by their failures from raising and succeeding on this issue.

80. The other authorities the Defendants refer to and rely upon are the decisions in Mali v. State (supra) case, the national Court decision in The State v. Zachary Gelu and Anor (supra) and the Supreme Court Court’s decision in the matter of Polem Enterprises Ltd v. Attorney General of Papua New Guinea Mr. Francis Damen (supra). These decisions stand for the proposition that the Solicitor General has no power or authority to bind the State. Instead, it can only be done by the AG for matters falling within his limit and beyond that the NEC. Any decisions by the Solicitor General without the required approval from the AG or the NEC are at nullity and cannot be enforced.

81. In the present case, the Defendants argue that, legal issues arise as to whether there was an agreement between the Landowners and the State. If so, what were the terms of the agreement and if the State had defaulted what would be the damages. Also, the amounts claimed by the Landowners in their submissions where significant amounts and it did affect the business of the State in that, if the State was to be liable, huge sums of money would have to be removed or allocated from the National Budget. Given that, the AG was the only legal body at the time responsible to provide a legal advice to the NEC or other government entities. In this case, so submits the Defendants, there was no evidence of the AG exercising its powers under the AG’s Act or his appointed delegate. Hence, they go on to argue that, this Court cannot rely on the advice of the State Solicitor, the Public Curator or any other public servant or private entity for that matter, to bind the State by accepting liability and the damages as calculated by these persons and the Plaintiffs. Further, the Defendants’ argue that, even if the Court finds that the State Solicitor’s advice of 04^th December 2009 was within authority and lawful, it required the Public Curator to seek and secure the advice of the Department of Treasury on the method of calculation and the computation of the amounts owing to the Landowners from the treasury investments. But since no such advice was sought and obtained, the pay out to the Six Defendants remain to be verified and confirmed as legal.

82. As already noted, this argument fails to give due weight and consideration to the fact that the NEC had come to a decision. The NEC as the ultimate executive decision-making authority had the ultimate power to consider all the issues raised by the Defendants or all other relevant issues raised by the subject matter. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I take it that, the NEC considered all the relevant issues and came to a decision. Also, as already noted, all NEC decisions must be honoured, respected and given effect to unless the NEC itself has revisited its own decision and arrived at a different decision or a successful judicial review application results in a quashing or set aside of the decisions of by a court of competent jurisdiction. Here, there is no evidence of the NEC reversing or varying its decision or there has been a successful judicial review against the decision. Consequently, the NEC decision stands. Accordingly, the Defendants are duty bound to lead in compliance and or giving effect to the decision instead of arguing against it. Further, it is hard to imagine that the State’s own servants and agents could have any right or authority to question any decision of the NEC and refuse to give effect to it, unless it is clearly illegal and not in the best interest of the country as may be affirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, I dismissed this part of the Defendants arguments as having no merit.

83. The final argument of the Defendants is the arguments based on s. 47 and 61 of the Public Finances (Management) Act 1995. The Defendants argument is that the Head of State is the only authority authorized to commit the State to any amount exceeding K5 million. They also argue that the provisions of this Act clearly stipulate who is responsible for committing the State. Applying that to the present case, they argue that, the State Solicitor, the Public Curator and even Mr. Matau did not at the relevant time have the capacity to commit the State to any amount in favour of the Plaintiffs. They go on to argue that, if the Court is to recognize the actions of these officers as binding on the State, it would amount to a breach of the said Act. Reliance is placed on the decision in Polem Enterprises Ltd v. Attorney General of Papua New Guinea (supra) and the decisions in PNG v. Keboki Business Group Inc.^[50] and Paul Kumba v. Motor Vehicle (PNG) Trust (supra).

84. I already discussed the effect of these decisions in the earlier part of this judgment, which I need not repeat here save only to refer to them. Additionally, an important point to note about these cases is that, the plaintiffs in each of the cases sought to enforce their claims and or contracts against the State or the MVIL. Seriously in issue in each of the cases were what each of the Plaintiffs did or should have done to have a valid claim against the State and the MVIL. In the case of the claims against the State, the Plaintiffs sought to enforce contracts for services with the State. In each of those case, the requirements of the Public Finances (Management) Act were not met. This prevented the contracts from being recognized and enforced. In the MVIL case, it concerned the mandatory requirement for notice of intention to make a claim before any cause of action could accrued against the MVIL.

85. In this case, strictly speaking, the Public Finances (Management) Act does not apply because the State was not entering into any contract with the Landowner beneficiaries. Instead, there is no dispute that, there were certain investments the State through the then colonial administration decided to make for the benefit of the Landowners from funds due and payable to them by the State. There is also no dispute that, when the investments matured, they were not paid. But the only issues raised in the present case, is the question of how much is due and owing to the Landowner beneficiaries. A few State departments or authorities and or officers have arrived at how what is due to the Landowner beneficiaries should be calculated and paid over to them. The initial one came from the Public Curator. That was revised by Mr. Matau of the Department of Treasury. NEC ultimately arrived at a decision and appropriated K10 million which eventually got paid over to the Sixth Defendants despite injunctive orders. As noted, the duty to make decisions and manage the daily affairs of the country at the highest level is vested in the NEC. Also, as already noted, for the good order and administration of the affairs of the country, the NEC decisions are to be respected and given effect to unless the NEC itself or a court of competent jurisdiction in matters properly before it causes such decisions to be revoke, quashed, set aside or varied. The relevant NEC decision in the present case as noted, has not been quashed, set aside or varied by the NEC or a court of competent jurisdiction. The decision thus remains to be enforced and or given effect to and is binding on all State departments, authorities and or officers. Accordingly, the Defendants are at no liberty to argue against the relevant NEC decision. They are effectively estopped from arguing or taking steps against the relevant decisions. They are instead duty bound to take all the steps necessary to give effect to the relevant decision.

86. I also find the present case is almost on all fours with the decision of the current Chief Justice, Injia DCJ (as he then was) in the case of Sao Gabi & State v. Kasup Nate & Ors (supra). There, as earlier noted, the State settled some claims brought by certain claimants like the ones brought by the Plaintiffs in that case. After having settled the earlier claims, the State declined to also settle the subsequent Plaintiffs’ claims raising certain legal points it failed to raise before settling the earlier claims. The Court held that, the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation applied to prevent the State from taking issues with the Plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, the Court decided in favour of the Plaintiffs. The decision by Cannings J., in the matter of Lomot Chauka v. Elthy Biang (supra) supports the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation where the State has failed to take issue on matters it should have earlier taken.

87. In the present case, like the plaintiffs in the Sao Gabi & State v. Kasup Nate & Ors (supra) case, the Plaintiffs here are correctly raising the fact that the State has already settled the Sixth Defendants’ claims. Those person’s claims arose out of the same set of facts as the Plaintiffs in the present case. The only difference was in the area where the TRPAs were located and the amount of funds that may have been invested. I might also add that, certain servants and or agents of the State have had the settlement proceeds paid to the Sixth Defendants despite Court orders preventing them from making the payments. Those orders were sought and obtained by the Plaintiffs to enable the issues raised in this proceeding resolved first. But the State firmly opposed those applications and the grant of those orders. Having made the payments contrary to the orders secured by the Plaintiffs, it is extremely odd in the circumstances of this case that, the Defendants could now seek to prevent the Plaintiffs claim and ask for settlement in amounts way below what was paid to the Sixth Defendants whose investors invested sums of money much lesser in value compared to all the Plaintiffs in this case’s claims combined. The Defendants have failed to offer any valid or good reason to have the Plaintiffs’ claims treated differently to the kind of favorable treatment the Sixth Defendants received resulting in those defendants receiving substantial payments from the State. No doubt, this is grossly unfair to the Plaintiffs. The only just and fair way to resolve the Plaintiffs claims is for them to be treated in the same way as the Six Defendants were treated with their claims settled in full. After all, all things considered equal in most respects, the people expect their government to treat them in the same way the government has treat other persons who were precisely in the same position as them, unless there is very good reason offered to treat them differently. Again, as already noted, the State has offered no good reason for the Plaintiffs to be treated differently from how the Six Defendants were treated.

88. Having rejected all the Defendants, arguments it could easily be possible to uphold the Plaintiffs submissions for an application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation. There are however two problems. The first problem is, there is neither any evidence nor is there any submission of the Plaintiffs demonstrating how and in what ways each of them acted upon the Defendants conduct or representation. Similarly, they have neither adduced any evidence nor have they demonstrated in their submissions how and in what ways they have altered their respective positions based on the State paying the Sixth Defendants K10 million. Further, there is neither any evidence, nor is there any submissions for or by the Plaintiffs demonstrating what prejudice or detriment if any, each of them suffered because of their acting upon the Defendants’ conduct or representation. Given these, the arguments for an application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation cannot be sustained. I therefore, dismiss the submissions based on the common law doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation.

89. The second problem is in the application of the formula or basis for a calculation of what is considered due to the Plaintiffs applying the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation. This is the subject of the remaining issue of the total amounts due and owing to the Plaintiffs. What matters most for the purposes of determining this issue is the formula or basis to calculate what is due to the Plaintiffs. As noted, the lead Plaintiffs base their submissions on the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation applying. Proceeding on that basis, they are making submissions that is somewhat confusing to me. On the one hand, they argue for a formula which allows for a ratio of AUD$6,900 is to K10 million. In other words, they are arguing for an allowance of K10 million for every AUD$6,900 invested. This is based on the pay out to the Six Defendants who received the payment of K10 million for a total investment of AUD$6,900, notwithstanding objections raised and restraining orders. At the same time, their submissions ask for a calculation of the principles and interest in accordance with the terms of each of the investments in the first part for the 10 years using a formula expressed in terms of P/100 x I + P = NP, where P = Principal, I = Interest, and NP = New Principal. Then in the second part, the lead Plaintiffs are asking for an application of a further interest at 9% in inscribed stocks as used by the BPNG and a penalty rate of .0937% to be applied for the period the Plaintiffs have been kept out of their money while the State was without their permission and authority using their funds. Although the submissions are not clear, it appears to me that the ultimate effect of applying these formulas will come down to the ratio of AUD$6,900 is to K10 million.

90. If we go by the lead Plaintiffs submission based on the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation, we could calculate the amounts now due and owing to the Plaintiffs in this way. The total amount invested in Australian Dollars would be divided by $6,900. The result would then be multiplied by K10 million to arrive at the total amounts due and owing to the Plaintiffs up to 2012 when the State made the payments to the Sixth Defendant. However, since the State has made no payments to the Plaintiffs, it would be fair and reasonable to allow for interests. The interests thus calculated would then be divided by 365 days in a year to ascertain the daily rate and have that multiplied by the total number of days that have lapsed since the end of 2012 to the date of this judgement which comes to 2,008 days to arrive at the total interests due and payable. The table below does this. This table has allowed for either rounding up or down of the figures to the nearest whole number in cases where more than two figures are produced after the decimal points.

Mage $6,350.00	$6,350 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K9,202,898.55	K736,231.88÷365 =K2,017.07x 2,008 =K4,050,276.56	K9,202,898.55 +K4,050,276.56 =K13,253,175.11
Tsendiap $5,900.00	$5,900 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K8,550,724.64	K684,057.97÷365 =K1,874.13x 2,008 = K3,763,255.91	K8,550,724.64 +K3,763,255.91 =K12,313,980.55
Milma $2,660.00	$2,660 ÷ $6, 900 x K10 million = K3,855,072.46	K308,405.80÷ 365 = K844.95 x 2,008 = K1,696,659.60	K3,855,072.46 +K1,696,659.60 =K5,551,732.06
Gindji $9,200.00	$9,200 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K13, 333, 333.33	K1,066,666.67÷365 =K2,922.37x 2,008 = K5,868,118.96	K13,333,333.33 +K5,868,118.96 =K19,201,452.29
Kinint $2,510.00	$2,510.00 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K3,637, 681.16	K291,014.49÷365 = K797.30 x 2,008 = K1,600,978.40	K3,637,681.16 +K1,600,978.40 =K5,238,659.56
Kitingnambuga $5,120.00	$5,120.00 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K7,420,289.86	K593,623.19 ÷ 365 =K1,626.36x 2,008 =K3,265,740.72	K7,420,289.86 +K3,265,740.72 =K10,686,030.58
Ambusaki $800.00	$800.00 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K1,159,420.29	K92,753.62 ÷ 365 = K254.12 x 2,008 = K510,272.96	K1,159,420.29 K510,272.96 =K1,669,693.25
Kumun $880.00	$880.00 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K1,275,362.32	K102,028.99 ÷ 365 = K279.53 x 2,008 = K561,296.24	K1,275,362.32 +K561,296.24 =K1,836,658.56

91. However, calculating how much is due to the Plaintiffs in this way is not possible because I rejected the Plaintiffs submission for an application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation for the reasons I have earlier given. Also calculating in this way cannot be permitted because it goes outside the terms of what was agreed to per the TRPAs and any reasonably acceptable rates such as the prevailing commercial rates or rates fixed by any authority authorized by law. Awarding of damages is usually compensation for a plaintiff being kept out of his or her money. Given the small amount of each of the initial investments, any award of damages in these terms would amount to absurdity, out of touch with anything reasonable but more so of a windfall, which cannot be permitted. This being the case, the question then is, what is the alternative?

92. The other Plaintiffs argue for an assessment of what is due to the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the investment for the agreed period of 10 years. Then for the period after the 10 years, they are asking for an imposition of a 22.38% interest, consisting of 13.38% being the prevailing commercial interest rates based on case authorities and a further 9% in penalty rates.

93. Learned counsel for the Defendants argue for a one-off interest at 5.75 % to be calculated and added onto the principle amounts invested after having converted the principle into PNG Kina. Using this approach, the Defendants argue for a total award of K359, 365.79. I find these arguments and the Defendants ultimate position clearly erroneous. The terms of the TRPAs make it clear that the interests are due to the Plaintiffs and are to be calculated and added twice each year. Also, the submissions of the Defendants in effect amounts to a rewriting of the parties’ agreement to allow for one round of interest upon maturity or simple interests. The relevant law on contracts as discussed earlier speaks against this submission. It is settled law that the contract should be allowed to speak for itself. The courts can only uphold the free agreement of the parties. They do not have any power to rewrite the parties’ contracts. Further, these submissions do not adequately accommodate the fact that, the State without the permission and authority of the original investors or the Plaintiffs used the principle amounts and interests accrued thereupon for its own purpose and failed to take any meaningful step to have those investments paid out in full together with each of their respective accrued interests. For these reasons, I am not persuaded by the Defendants submissions and I reject them. This leaves us to assess what is due to the Plaintiffs using the formula argued for by the other Plaintiffs that are represented by Mr. Tape and the lawyers other than Mr. Ambone for some of the Plaintiffs or such other formula the Court finds appropriate.

94. Going then by the submissions of the other Plaintiffs, I allow myself to be guided by the precise wording in the TRPAs. The relevant provisions of the TRPAs read:

“...to bear interest at the rate of five dollars seventy-five cents (5.75) per centum per annum. ... interest will be due to each vendor on the first day of the months of December [or January] and July in each and every year during the said period of 10 years.”

95. This wording in my view suggests an application of the compound interest principle which applies to loans or investments. This is standard in the world of finance and economics and is often used. It allows for the addition of interest s to whatever the principal sum is of a loan or deposit, which effectively allows for interests on interests to apply. It is the result of reinvesting interests, rather than paying it out, so that interests in the next period is then earned on the principal sum plus previously accumulated interests. This is to be contrasted with simple interests, where interests are added to the principal only once and does not compound each year.

96. Under the expressed terms of the TRPAs, it is obvious that interests are payable twice. The first is in December or January and the second one in July “in each and every year” for each of the investments during the period of investment, namely 10 years. However, given that the investments were toward the end of the year, the due date for the first interest payments would be in July with the second one in December or January from the first year following the making of the investments respectively in the years 1967 for Waripa TRPAs and 1968 for the Jimi TRPAs. The interests are payable “at the rate of five dollars seventy-five cents (5.75) per centum per annum”, which I take to mean interest at 5.75% per annum on each of the Australian dollar amounts invested. Since interests are calculated and agreed to be paid in December or January and July as noted, I am of the view that the annual interest rate of 5.75 % should be divided by two as opposed to that interest rate applying once each year. The result is a half yearly interest rate of 2.875%. Hence, the agreed interest gets calculated and added to the principle twice each year at the rate of 2.87% every six months. The interests thus calculated and added become part of the principle for the purposes of working out the principle to calculate and add the following year’s interests. Interests calculated and added in this way increases by a few dollars to the amounts due to the investors upon maturity of their funds.^[51] This is then repeated each year up until their maturity. The following table calculates the interest rates at the relevant frequency and added to the principle up to the end of the period of investment which gives the final figures. In the process, some of the figures have been rounded up or down to the nearest whole number in cases where more than two figures are produced after the decimal points. The final amounts payable is in the last column at the end of each table in bold:

97. As can be seen from the above, assessing the Plaintiffs’ damages for the first 10 years from the date of each of the investments is straight forward. The difficulty is in determining whether the investments continued and if so, whether that was on the same terms and conditions when the State failed to pay them out with all accrued interests on their respective maturity dates. One view is that, the investments continued on the same terms. The other view is that, they came to a stop and attracted penalty and different interest rates to compensate for the State using the invested funds and accrued interests without the investors or their beneficiaries’ approval or authorisation, which meant a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their money. If the monies were paid out as and when they matured and fell due, some of them could have been further invested with better interests or returns on them, while some could have been wasted. There is no submission from the Defendants on this point. The lead Plaintiffs have argued for the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation, which I have already dealt with. The other Plaintiffs however argue for the investments coming to a stop on their respective maturity dates. They also argue that, after the maturity date, the investments attracted an application of interest rates at the prevailing commercial rates in line with case authorities on point as well as penalty interests for the State’s unauthorized use and gaining from the funds.

98. Reliance is placed on my decision in Mathew Petrus Himsas & Another vs. The State & Another.^[52] In that case, I dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims who amongst others, sought to remain employed with the State after their respective contracts had expired without any expressed renewal. In arriving at that decision, I reasoned:

“...there is no provision at all either in the contract or in the CSA [Correction Services Act] as to the terms and conditions under which the applicants were to continue to remain in the employ of the DCS [Department of Correction Service] after the expiry of their contracts. There is no evidence at all of what were the terms and conditions on which the applicants were to remain in the employ of the DCS. Also, there is no evidence showing what position the applicants would hold, their salary and other terms and conditions of employment and how they could be terminated under the CSA once their contract expired. There is a complete failure or a lack of certainty of agreement in these important areas. Given that, I find that the parties were not at any consensus ad idem on these important aspects.”

99 This position can be contrasted with the position in other cases where the law or the relevant contract provides for the continued operation of an expired contract. One such provision is s. 17 of the Employment Act (Chp 37) which Cannings J., had the opportunity to deal with in a few of his decisions. One of those decisions was his decision in Cosmas Gawi v. RD Tuna Canners Ltd.^[53] The provision stipulates relevantly:

“Each party to an oral contract of service that expires under Section 16 shall, immediately on the expiration of the contract, be deemed to have entered into a new oral contract of service for a further period of the same duration and subject to the same terms and conditions as the expired contract unless—

(a) notice to terminate the employment under Section 34 has previously been given and—

(b) the contract has been summarily terminated by either party for lawful cause.”

100. Another case on point is my decision in Clark Piokole v. Rei Logona.^[54] In that case, again in a contract of employment situation I found the terms of the contract continued to apply given the wording in the relevant contract. Amongst others, a provision that catered for the contract period, its amendment and or replacement had the following:

“..the provisions of this agreement will remain in force until such time as a new agreement is reached”

101. These cases highlight the point that, unless a contract or a statutory provision specifically allows for the terms of an expired contract to continue to remain in force, the contract ceases upon its expiration. This is of course, subject to the parties’ rights of enforcement of any breach of the terms of the contract. Here, there is no evidence of any provision being made in the TRPAs or any relevant and application legislation allowing for the investments to continue after their maturity dates. Accordingly, I find that the investments and the terms of the contract under which the investments were made came to an end on each of the investments reaching their respective maturity dates. They were due in 1977 for the Waripa TRP areas and 1978 for the Jimi TRP areas.

102. There is no contest that, upon the maturity of the investments, the State was obliged to have each of the investments with their respective accrued interests paid over to the investors or their respective beneficiaries. Also, there is no evidence rebutting the Plaintiffs’ claim that the State did not make any payments upon their maturity. Instead, the State made use of the funds without first seeking and securing the approval or agreement of the investors and or their beneficiaries. In the absence of any meaningful step being taken by the State on its own initiative or volition to have the investments with their accrued interests paid over to the investors or their beneficiaries, I find that the State would not have at all accounted for and paid the monies over to the investors or their beneficiaries. Consequently, the State would have unjustly enriched itself. Belatedly however, the State did make some payments to the Sixth Defendants and some others only upon the Plaintiffs and the other persons making their respective claims decades after each of the investments had matured and were due for payment to the investors or their beneficiaries.

103. In what I believe is an appreciation of its failures and unlawful and unauthorized keeping away and using of the Plaintiffs’ monies, the State has accepted by its conduct as earlier noted that there should be a payment of two types of interests. These are namely, a penalty interest at the rate of 0.937 % and a further 9% which is what is payable on inscribed stocks invested with the BPNG. These interests were included and or reflected in the payments made to the Six Defendants. Despite that, and as also already noted, the State is now arguing against any such interest being charged and added onto the amounts due and owing as at the time of each of the investments maturity until their full payout.

104. The Plaintiffs represented by Mr. Tape and the other counsel appearing, argue for the compound interests’ principle or approach to apply for the period that has lapsed since each of the investments matured. In support of that submission, they refer to a New Zealand Court of Appeal case in the matter of Geoffrey Wayne Clarkson & Another vs. Whangamata Metal Supplies Limited & Another.^[55] That case applied the leading English case of Hadley v. Baxendale.^[56] In the earlier case, the Appellant claimed suffering losses due to delay in settlement of a sale of a business. One ground of appeal was whether the compound interests applied. The Court held that the compound interests did apply. In arriving at that decision, the Court discussed the relevant case law on point and clearly stated the distinction between an award of interest as damages and interest on damages awarded by a court in these terms:

“Interest on damages entails an order that interest be paid upon an award of damages. However interest as damages is, as Brennan and Deane JJ explained in Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125 at 152:

[A]n actual award of damages which represents compensation for a wrongfully created loss of the use of money and which is assessed wholly or partly by reference to the interest which would have been earned by safe investment of the money or which was in fact paid upon borrowings which otherwise would have been unnecessary or retired.

Therefore the phrase ‘interest as damages’, although commonplace, is somewhat misleading. What is being claimed is compensation for the deprivation of the use of money. That value of that deprivation is quantified by the interest that could have been earned by investing the money, or avoided by retiring debt. The loss is interest-related, but this is only a factual matter rather than a legal classification of the claim. As Oliver J stated in Bushwall Properties Ltd v Vortex Properties Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1649 at 1660 (HC):

[T]he sum so claimed is not in any relevant sense interest itself; it is the sum payable by way of damages for breach of contract.”

105. These principles have been accepted into PNG by the Supreme Court. An example of a Supreme Court decision on point is the decision in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri & Or.,^[57] which Mr. Tape cites in support of his submissions. There, the Court after duly considering the cases on point said generally of the Courts awarding of interests at paragraph 75 of its judgment:

“An award of interest is plainly compensatory and reflects the loss which a successful plaintiff suffers from not having and being able to make use of the money to which the court finds the plaintiff to be entitled. Interest cannot be said to be punitive so far as a defendant is concerned because the defendant has the use of the money until it is paid to the plaintiff.”

106. These are sound principles which equally apply in this case for the reasons given by these authorities. In the present case, I find additionally that, this case is special and or unique in that, the State has taken money from its people to invest on their behalf and to have them paid out on their maturity date with all interests accrued. As noted, instead of paying out the investments in full with all of their respective accrued interests in accordance with the terms of the investment as and when they fell due, the State kept the monies. Then in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I found that the State applied them to its own use. The investors or the Plaintiffs have been kept out of their funds and their benefits or use of them. Again, as already noted, had it not been for the actions of the Plaintiffs, the State could have failed to account for and pay to the Plaintiffs what is theirs. This obviously amounts to dishonesty and breach of a sacred trust the people have in their State and government that their State and government will protect them. Hence, this is not a case of ordinary assessment of damages as in the case of personal injuries based on the tort of negligence, or for breach of contract, where damages have to be assessed and then interest added. Instead, this is a case of the Plaintiffs being kept out of their money for a long period since each of the investments matured which is continuing to this day. Meanwhile, some of the original investors have since passed on without benefiting from their respective investments. The Plaintiffs who are the children or the descendants of some of the investors have being pursuing this claim for a long time at much costs, pain, trouble and anguish to them. On the other hand, the State has taken no meaningful step to have the matured investments and interests accrued on them paid promptly. As I have already found, in the absence of any evidence from the State that the monies have been put to better use for and on behalf of the investors and their dependents with better returns on them, the State has used the funds for its own purposes without any prior informed agreement or approval or consent of the investors. Indeed, the State for example, through the affidavit of John Uware sworn on 17^th and filed on 18^th February 2015, claims there is nothing standing to the credit of the investors. At the same time, no evidence has been produced by the State confirming that the funds were paid to each of the respective investors as and when they were due for payment with the relevant details such as, the dates when the payments were made, whom to, where, in cash or cheque and the amounts paid?

107. In the particular circumstances of this case, as noted above, warrants an award of interest on the prevailing commercial interest rates as damages and not as interest on assessed damages until what is due and owing to the plaintiffs are fully paid. For the actual amounts invested are clear. There is no dispute on that. The arguments have been only around interest rates and conversion of the investment in Australian Dollars into PNG Kina. I find this case is akin to a case of a commercial bank customer continuing to pay interests at the applicable interest rate until all amounts lent with all accrued interests are paid. I consider it fair and reasonable that compound interests at the prevailing commercial interest rates should be award by way of damages.

108. I also consider it fair and reasonable that penalty interests should be calculated and added onto the damages due and payable to the plaintiffs. This will be consistent with what the State has already accepted and included in the payment to the Sixth Defendants and others. It will also be consistent with the practice employed by all commercial banks and even the BPNG against a customer who defaults in paying his or her loan or breaking his or her term deposit prior to its maturity date. A failure to award such additional interests will be allowing an already unfair playing field to continue where only the Banks and the State through the BPNG will continue to gain from any breaches of their contractual terms by their customers while their own breaches go unchecked and uncompensated. The same would apply to anyone who deprives others of their funds. Allowing compound interests with an additional penalty interest will ensure discipline and allow for the same rules to apply to everyone across the board without any discrimination or some sectors having unfair advantage against or over others. In that way, fairness will apply across the board as is intended and provided for under the Fairness of Transactions Act 1993.

109. The question then is, what rates of interests are fair and reasonable. The decision of the Supreme Court in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri, & Ors, cited by Mr. Tape in his submissions is relevant and is on point. There, the Court reviewed the cases on point and said at paragraph 74 of its judgment:

“The claim for a higher interest rate to be used in the award of interest is not novel. Such claims have been made and granted in such cases as Blackwood Hodge Hire (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Sandaun Provincial Government and Jacob Talus, Pratt J, 6 March 1985, where a commercial interest rate of 12.5% per annum was awarded, and Cybula v. Nings Agencies Pty Ltd [1981] PNGLR 120, where a then commercial rate of 8% was applied. In addition to those decisions, which pre-dated the judgment on damages in this case, this court was referred to Alotau Enterprises Pty Limited and Allen Enterprises Pty Limited v. Zurich Pacific Insurance Pty Limited, (1999) N1969 where the average Westpac indicator lending rate of 13.50% was awarded for pre-judgment interest.”

110. The Court then took the view as earlier noted that, “[a]n award of interest is plainly compensatory”. This reflects the loss suffered by successful plaintiffs due to the defendants keeping from them their funds and depriving them of an opportunity to “make use of the money to which the court finds the plaintiff to be entitled”. Given that, “[i]nterest cannot be said to be punitive ... because the defendant has [had] the use of the money until it is paid to the plaintiff.”

111. The case then before the Supreme Court was a breach of tenancy agreement. The National Court found for the appellant and awarded both damages and interest at 8% and not at the prevailing commercial interest rate. The Supreme Court allowed for fresh evidence on the prevailing commercial interest rates to be adduced. Based on evidence thus produced, the appellant argued for an award of interest at the prevailing commercial interest rate in terms of the then prevailing indicator lending rate of 15.38%. The respondents argued against that by saying “the appellant would not have been a borrower but a depositor and, for that reason, a lower rate should be applied.” The Court noted that “... if the appellant’s bank account was in overdraft then it would have been paying the indicator lending rate plus the risk premium.” The Court further noted that “the indicator lending rate is higher than the rate paid to depositors.”

112. Ultimately, the Court decided to allow for interest at the average indicator lending rate of 13.38%. In arriving at that decision, the Court reasoned in addition to what it earlier noted that:

“For the reasons given by the trial judge, namely that an interest rate of 8% per annum is out of touch with commercial interest rates, and in conformity with the decision in Alotau Enterprises Pty Limited and Allen Enterprises Pty Limited v Zurich Pacific Insurance Pty Limited, interest is awarded at the average indicator lending rate of 13.38% for the period from the date when the cause of action arose, 10 August 1995, to the date of judgment, 27 November 2009, which is a period of 14 years and 109 days.”

113. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have cited with approval the decision in the PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri & Ors and applied it. An example of a case on point is Polem Enterprise Ltd v. The State and Others. A recent example of the National Court applying the position taken by the Supreme Court is the decision of Injia DCJ (as he then was) in CBIP (PNG) Ltd v. Landex Ltd.^[58] The decision in that case was delivered on 21^st March 2016. There the plaintiff sought interest at the commercial rate at 12.5%. On the basis of the decisions in KL Engineering & Constructions (PNG) Ltd v. Damansar Forestry Products (PNG) Ltd^[59] and Alotau Enterprises Ltd v. Zuric Pacific Insurance Pty Ltd,^[60] his honour decided to award interest at 12.5% notwithstanding arguments from the defendants that the breach of contract came about as a result of an act of God. The Court reasoned:

“Interest at a commercial rate is appropriate where the loss suffered is commercial in nature and the defendant is totally at fault in breaching the contract: KL Engineering & Constructions (PNG) Ltd v. Damansar Forestry Products (PNG) Ltd, (supra). Cash advance for a substantial amount in a commercial transaction of the sort in this case is one in which interest at the commercial rate will apply. The reasons given by the defendant are immaterial to the issue at hand.”

114. Based on the foregoing authorities, I accept the submissions of Mr. Tape of counsel for the Plaintiffs he represents with the support of the other lawyers appearing in this matter for some more of the Plaintiffs for this Court to accept the prevailing commercial interest rate. Per the decision in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri, (supra), the average prevailing commercial interest rate in 2009 was 13.38%. The Supreme Court allowed that rate to apply for a period of 14 years and 109 days from the date when the course of action accrued until judgment in case then before it. In the present case, the interests will have to be calculated from the date when each of the investments matured and the State failed to pay them over with all accrued interests. Again as already note, the State had the benefit of using the funds while the investors or the Plaintiffs were kept out of their funds. This continued even after the Plaintiffs made their respective claims. It was incumbent on the State to minimize the loss, pain and suffering and increased costs by acting promptly to pay what was due and owing to the Plaintiffs. Instead, it has taken too long with little or lack of appropriate action taken to make the payments promptly. Instead of allowing itself to be guided by the terms of each of the TRPAs and allowing for appropriate levels of interests and promptly make the payments, the State has failed to take any meaningful step to have these claims settled promptly. This is the case despite the encouragement these days for more expedite resolution of disputes through direct negotiations except only for cases in which an issue warranting resolution only by a judicial determination is presented.^[61] In the process, the State has allowed a period of 40 years to pass to date with the possibility of paying nothing to the investors or the plaintiffs but for the actions of the plaintiffs.

115. As for the interest rates for each of the years that have lapsed after the investments had matured, I am of the view that the same interest rate of 13.38% per the Supreme Court decision in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri prevailed, especially in the absence of any evidence to the contrary from the State. This was for the period from 1978 and 1979 respectively for each of the TRP Areas until the decision in CBIP (PNG) Ltd v. Landex Ltd came along. As noted, that decision held that, the prevailing commercial interest rate was 12.5 % in 2016. Hence, the relevant prevailing commercial interest rates in 2016 to 2018 should and will be allowed at 12.5% in the absence again of any evidence to the contrary. As already noted, the decision in Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) Ltd v. Ina Enei (supra), supports this approach. There, as noted, the appellant failed to tender into evidence, its income and expenditure records although it was in a better position to do so.

116. In the present case, of all the parties, the State was in a much better position to produce the relevant evidence. The State’s organ or instrumentality, the BPNG regulates and controls all banking and finance related businesses in the country. Given that, the State was in a better position to access and produce through the relevant officers of the BPNG evidence of each of the years from 1978 to 2015’s and from 2016 to 2018’s prevailing average commercial interest rates. Unfortunately, for reasons only known to the State, they failed to adduce any such evidence. It was in the State’s interest to produce such relevant evidence if there has been a change or there were different prevailing average commercial interest rates for each of the period that has passed before and after the decision in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri, & Ors and the later one in CBIP (PNG) Ltd v. Landex Ltd. But the State failed to do that. The failure was despite the Court issuing specific directions or orders for such evidence to be sourced and adduced in Court. The Plaintiffs had difficulties getting any cooperation from the State or the BPNG. In the circumstances, the interest as damages with the relevant interest rates as represented by the authoritative decisions of the Supreme and National Court applies here.

117. This leaves me to determine the correct penalty rate. Before getting to the rate itself, I noted fundamentally that, the legal foundation for interest in addition to commercial interest was again noted by the Supreme Court in PNG Aviation Services Pty Limited v. Geob Karri & Ors in these terms:

“Of course, if the appellant’s bank account was in overdraft then it would have been paying the indicator lending rate plus the risk premium.”

118. A rate that has been mentioned in the parties’ submissions and obviously accepted by the State in its calculation and meeting of the Sixth Defendants’ claims was .937%. As already noted, the lead Plaintiffs argued for the same rate to apply by way of penalty interest. Mr. Tape and the other lawyers for the other Plaintiffs argue for a 9% penalty interest. This interest rate comes from the State’s calculations that went into the amounts calculated and paid over to the Sixth Defendants. But this submission ignores the fact that, the BPNG approved that interest rate for inscribed stocks and the State used it in addition to a different penalty interest rate of .937%. The State effectively by its conduct accepted 9% as the rate that replaced the original 5.57% after the maturity of each of the investments, when it calculated and paid over the K10 million to the Sixth Defendants. The material before the Court, suggest .937% in penalty interests which the BPNG often charges against investors who break their investments before their maturity was applied. Accordingly, I accept .937% as the correct rate for penalty interests to apply.

119. It should follow therefore that, the final amounts payable to each of the investors or their beneficiaries becomes clearer. In my layman’s view, (as opposed to a professional accountant or an economist’s view) the formula becomes:

PM = Principle accrued on maturity per the calculations under the table appearing immediately under paragraph 96 above;

Note: The average commercial interests and the penalty interests on the principle at maturity are calculated separately and then added to arrive at the new principle at the end of each year up to the date of judgment.

120. The table below applies the above formula to work out and arrive at what is ultimately due and owing to the Plaintiffs in damages. For the purposes of this calculation, each of the years respectively from 1978 and 1979 to 2017 as been taken as whole years. Since 2018 has seen 183 days pass to the date of this judgment, an allowance is made only for those days. This is done by applying the two different interest rates to the new principle from 2017 by first ascertaining the annual interest amounts and then dividing them by the number of days in a year, namely 365 days followed by a multiplication of each of the results by 183 days that have past. Where appropriate, the calculations also allow for either a round up or down to the nearest whole number where there are more than two figures past the decimal points. Finally, the total accumulated amount is the final figure in bold in the last column. That figure is then converted into PNG Kina from the Australian Dollar to arrive at the amounts due and payable to the Plaintiffs in damages.

121. I have given some thought to converting the investment in Australian Dollars from the date of PNG gaining independence when the currency became PNG Kina. However, since the investments were not paid out on their respective maturity dates and the State has applied them to its own use without any consent or approval of the investors well past the date of independence, I consider it more fairer, appropriate and simpler to treat the investments in Australian Dollars with their respective accrued interests continuing until the date of this judgment when the State is expected to fully pay them. This is also necessary from a more practical problem. That problem is neither the State with access to all the relevant information nor the other parties have provided the relevant exchange rates for each of the years up to this day. The parties have in their submission allowed for different exchange rates, a .4323 by Mr. Abone, .4672 by Mr. Tape and a .44 by the Defendants. The correct approach is to convert the Australian Dollar into PNG Kina using the current exchange rate as the banks would. As at the time of writing this judgment, this comes to 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK. I used this approach to arrive at the final figures payable to the Plaintiffs by way of damages.

122. The table below applies the formula set out in paragraph 119 using the applicable interest rates for the relevant periods and at the end, the relevant conversion rate to arrive at the final damages due to the Plaintiffs:

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1978	$60,798.13	$60,798.13 x 13.38% = $8,134.79	$60,798.13 x .937% = $569.68	$60,798.13 + $8,134.79 + $569.68 = $69,502.60
1979	$69,502.60	$69,502.60 x 13.38% = $9,299.45	$69,502.60 x .937% = $651.24	$69,502.60 + $9,299.44 + $651.24 = $79,453.29
1980	$79,453.29	$79,453.29 x 13.385 = $10,630.85	$79,453.29 x .937% = $744.48	$79,453.29 + $10,630.85 + 744.48 = $90,828.62
1981	$90,828.61	$90,828.61 x 13.38% = $12,152.87	$90,828.61 x .937% = $851.06	$90,828.61 + $12,152.87 + $851.06 = $103,832.54
1982	$103,832.54	$103,832.54 x 13.38% = $13,892.79	$103,832.54 x .937% = $972.91	$103,832.54 + $ 13,892.79 + $ 972.91 = $118,698.24
1983	$118,698.24	$118,698.24 x 13.38% = $15,881.82	$118,698.24 x .937% =$1,112.20	$118,698.24 +$15,881.82 + $ 1,112.20 = $135,692.27
1984	$135,692.27	$135,692.27 x 13.38% = $18,155.63	$135,692.27 x .937% = $1,271.44	$135,692.27 + $18,155.63 + $ 1,271.44 = $155,119.33
1985	$155,119.33	$155,119.33 x 13.38% = $20,754.97	$155,119.33 x .937% = $1,453.47	$155,119.33 +$ 20,754.97 + $ 1,453.47 =$177,327.76
1986	$177,327.76	$177,327.76 x 13.38% = $23,726.45	$177,327.76 x .937% = $1,661.56	$177,327.76 +$ 23,726.45 +$ 1,661.56 =$202,715.78
1987	$202,715.78	$202,715.78 x 13.38% = $27,123.37	$202,715.78 x .937% = $1,899.45	$202,715.78 + $ 27,123.37 + $ 1,899.45 =$231,738.60
1988	$231,738.60	$231,738.60 x 13.38% = $31,006.62	$231,738.60 x .937% = $2,171.39	$231,738.60 + $ 31,006.62 + $ 2,171.39 = $264,916.62
1989	$264,916.62	$264,916.62 x 13.38% = $35,445.84	$264,916.62 x .937% = $2,482.27	$264,916.62 + $ 35,445.84 + $ 2,482.27 = $302,844.73
1990	$302,844.73	$302,844.73 x 13.38% = $40,520.62	$302,844.73 x .937% = $2,837.66	$302,844.73 +$ 40,520.62 +$ 2,837.66 = $346,203.01
1991	$346,203.01	$346,203.01 x 13.38% = $46,321.96	$346,203.01 x .937% = $3,243.92	$346,203.01 + 46,321.96 + 3,243.92 =$395,768.89
1992	$395,768.89	$395,768.89 x 13.38% = $52,953.88	$395,768.89 x .937% = $3,708.35	$395,768.89 + 52,953.88 + 3,708.35 = $452,431.12
1993	$452,431.12	$452,431.12 x 13.38% = $60,535.28	$452,431.12 x .937% = $4,239.28	$452,431.12 + 60,535.28 + 4,239.28 = $517,205.68
1994	$517,205.68	$517,205.68 x 13.38% = $69,202.12	$517,205.68 x .937% = $4,846.22	$517,205.68 + 69,202.12 + 4,846.22 =$591,254.02
1995	$591,254.02	$591,254.02 x 13.38% = $79,109.79	$591,254.02 x .937% = $5,540.05	$591,254.02 + 79,109.80 + 5,540.05 =$675,903.86
1996	$675,903.86	$675,903.86 x 13.38% = $90,435.94	$675,903.86 x .937% = $6,333.22	$675,903.86 + 90,435.94 + 6,333.22 =$772,673.02
1997	$772,673.02	$772,673.02 x 13.38% = $103,383.65	$772,673.02 x .937% = $7,239.95	$772,673.02 +103,383.65 + 7,239.95 =$883,296.62
1998	$883,296.62	$883,296.62 x 13.38% = $118,185.09	$883,296.62 x .937% = $8,276.49	$883,296.62 +118,185.09 + 8,276.49 =$1,009,758.20
1999	$1,009,758.20	$1,009,758.20 x 13.38% = $135,105.65	$1,009,758.20 x .937% = $9,461.43	$1,009,758.20 + 135,105.65 + 9,461.43 =$1,154,325.28
2000	$1,154,325.28	$1,154,325.28 x 13.38% = $154,448.72	$1,154,325.28 x .937% = $10,816.03	$1,154,325.28 + 154,448.72 + 10,816.03 =$1,319,590.03
2001	$1,319,590.03	$1,319,590.03 x 13.38% = $176,651.15	$1,319,590.03 x .937% = $12,364.56	$1,319,590.03 + 176,651.15 + 12,364.56 =$1,508,515.73
2002	$1,508,515.73	$1,508,515.73 x 13.38% = $201,839.40	$1,508,515.73 x .937% = $14,134.79	$1,508,515.73 + 201,839.40 + 14,134.79 =$1,724,489.93
2003	$1,724,489.93	$1,724,489.93 x 13.38% = $230,736.75	$1,724,489.93 x .937% = $16,158.47	$1,724,489.93 + 230,736.75 + 16,158.47 =$1,971,385.15
2004	$1,971,385.15	$1,971,385.15 x 13.38% = $263,771.33	$1,971,385.15 x .937% = $18,471.88	$1,971,385.15 + 263,771.33 + 18,471.88 =$2,253,628.36
2005	$2,253,628.36	$2,253,628.36 x 13.38% = $301,535.47	$2,253,628.36 x .937% = $21,116.50	$2,253,628.36 +$301,535.47 +$21,116.50 =$2,576,280.33
2006	$2,576,280.33	$2,576,280.33 x 13.38% = $344,706.31	$2,576,280.33 x .937% = $24,139.75	$2,576,280.33 +$344,706.31 +$24,139.75 =$2,945,126.38
2007	$2,945,126.38	$2,945,126.38 x 13.38% = $395,057.91	$2,945,126.38 x .937% = $27,595.83	$2,945,126.38 +$395,057.91 +$27,595.83 =$3,366,780.12
2008	$3,366,780.12	$3,366,780.12 x 13.38% = $450,475.18	$3,366,780.12 x .937% = $31,546.73	$3,366,780.12 +$450,475.18 +$31,546.73 =$3,848,802.03
2009	$3,848,802.03	$3,848,802.03 x 13.38% = $514,969.71	$3,848,802.03 x .937% = $36,063.28	$3,848,802.03 +$514,969.71 +$36,063.28 =$4,399,835.02
2010	$4,399,835.02	$4,399,835.02 x 13.38% = $588,697.93	$4,399,835.02 x .937% = $41,226.45	$4,399,835.02 +$588,697.93 +$41,226.45 =$5,029,759.40
2011	$5,029,759.40	$5,029,759.40 x 13.38% = $672,981.81	$5,029,759.40 x .937% = $47,128.85	$5,029,759.40 +$672,981.81 +$47,128.85 =$5,749,870.05
2012	$5,749,870.05	$5,749,870.05 x 13.38% = $769,332.61	$5,749,870.05 x .937% = $53,876.28	$5,749,870.05 +$769,332.61 +$53,876.28 =$6,573,078.95
2013	$6,573,078.95	$6,573,078.95 x 13.38% = $879,477.96	$6,573,078.95 x .937% = $61,589.75	$6,573,078.95 +$879,477.96 +$61,589.75 =$7,514,146.66
2014	$7,514,146.66	$7,514,146.66 x 13.38% = $1,005,392.82	$7,514,146.66 x .937% = $70,407.55	$7,514,146.66 +$1,005,392.82 +$70,407.55 =$8,589,947.04
2015	$8,589,947.32	$8,589,947.32 x 13.38% = $1,149,334.91	$8,589,947.32 x .937% = $80,487.80	$8,589,947.32 +$1,149,334.91 +$80,487.80 =$9,819,769.76
2016	$9,819,769.76	$9,819,769.76 x 12.5% = $1,227,471.22	$9,819,769.76 x .937% = $92,011.24	$9,819,769.76 + $1,225,471.22 +$92,011.24 =$11,139,252.22
2017	$11,139,252.22	$11,139,252.22 x 12.5% = $1,392,406.53	$11,139,252.22 x .937% = $104,374.79	$11,139,252.22 +$1,392,406.53 +$104,374.79 =$12,636,033.54
2018	$12,636,033.54	$12,636,033.54 x 12.5% = $1,579,504.19 365 (days) = $4,327.41 x 185 (days 2018) = $800,570.85	$12,636,033.54 x .937% =$118,399.63 365 (days) = $324.38 x 185 (days 2018) = $60,010.30	$12,636,033.54 +$800,570.85 +$60,010.30 =$13,496,614.69 converted to PNGKina using current exchange rate 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K32,691,500.10

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$24,449.69	$24,449.69 x 13.38% = $3,271.37	$24,449.69 x .937% = $229.09	$24,449.69 + $3,271.37 + $229.09 = $27,950.15
1980	$27,950.15	$27,950.15 x 13.38% = $3,739.73	$27,950.15 x .937% = $261.89	$27,950.15 + $3,739.73 + $261.89 = $31,951.77
1981	$31,951.77	$31,951.77 x 13.385 % = $4,275.15	$31,951.77 x .937% = $299.39	$31,951.77 + $4,275.15 + $299.39 = $36,526.30
1982	$36,526.30	$36,526.30 x 13.38% = $4,887.22	$36,526.30 x .937% = $342.25	$36,526.30 + $4,887.22 + $342.25 = $41,755.77
1983	$41,755.77	$41,755.77 x 13.38% = $5,586.92	$41,755.77 x .937% = $391.25	$41,755.77 + $5,586.92 + $391.25 = $47,733.94
1984	$47,733.94	$47,733.94 x 13.38% = $6,386.80	$47,733.94 x .937% =$447.27	$47,733.94 +$6,386.80 + $447.27 = $54,568.01
1985	$54,568.01	$54,568.01 x 13.38% = $7,301.20	$54,568.01 x .937% = $511.30	$54,568.01 + $7,301.20 + $ 511.30 = $62,380.51
1986	$62,380.51	$62,380.51 x 13.38% = $8,346.51	$62,380.51 x .937% = $584.51	$62,380.51 +$ 8,346.51 + $ 584.51 =$71,311.53
1987	$71,311.53	$71,311.53 x 13.38% = $9,541.48	$71,311.53 x .937% = $668.19	$71,311.53 + 9,541.48 + 688.19 =$81,521.20
1988	$81,521.20	$81,521.20 x 13.38% = $10,907.54	$81,521.20 x .937% = $763.85	$81,521.20 + $10,907.54 + $ 763.85 = $93,192.59
1989	$93,192.59	$93,192.59 x 13.38% = $12,469.17	$93,192.59 x .937% = $873.21	$ 93,192.59 + 12,469.17 + 873.21 = $106,534.97
1990	$106,534.97	$106,534.97 x 13.38% = $14,254.38	$106,534.97 x .937% = $998.23	$106,534.97 + 14,254.38 + 998.23 = $121,787.58
1991	$121,787.58	$121,787.58 x 13.38% = $16,295.18	$121,787.58 x .937% = $1,141.15	$121,787.58 +$ 16,295.18 +$ 1,141.15 =$139,223.91
1992	$139,223.91	$139,223.91 x 13.38% = $18,628.16	$139,223.91 x .937% = $1,304.53	$139,223.91 + 18,628.16 + 1,304.53 =$159,156.60
1993	$159,156.60	$159,156.60 x 13.38% = $21,295.15	$159,156.60 x .937% = $1,491.30	$159,156.60 + 21,295.15 + 1,491.30 = $181,943.05
1994	$181,943.05	$181,943.05 x 13.38% = $24,343.98	$181,943.05 x .937% = $1,704.81	$181,943.05 + $24,343.98 + 1,704.81 =$207,991.84
1995	$207,991.84	$207,991.84 x 13.38% = $27,829.31	$207,991.84 x .937% = $1,948.88	$207,991.84 +$27,829.31 +$1,948.88 =$237,770.03
1996	$237,770.03	$237,770.03 x 13.38% = $31,813.63	$237,770.03 x .937% = $2,227.91	$237,770.03 + 31,813.63 + 2,227.91 = $271,811.57
1997	$271,811.57	$271,811.57 x 13.38% =$36,368.39	$271,811.57 x .937% = $2,546.87	$271,811.57 + $36,368.39 +$2,546.87 =$310,726.83
1998	$310,726.83	$310,726.83 x 13.38% = $41,575.25	$310,726.83 x .937% = $2,911.51	$310,726.83 +$41,575.25 +$2,911.51 =$355,213.59
1999	$355,213.59	$355,213.59 x 13.38% = $47,527.58	$355,213.59 x .937% = $3,328.35	$355,213.59 +$47,527.58 +$3,328.35 =$406,069.52
2000	$406,069.52	$406,069.52 x 13.38% = $54,332.10	$406,069.52 x .937% = $3,804.87	$ 406,069.52 + 54,332.10 + 3,804.87 =$ 464,206.49
2001	$ 464,206.49	$ 464,206.49 x 13.38% = $62,110.83	$ 464,206.49 x .937% = $4,349.61	$ 464,206.49 +$62,110.83 +$4,349.61 =$530,666.93
2002	$530,666.93	$530,666.93 x 13.38% = $71,003.24	$530,666.93 x .937% =$4,972.35	$530,666.93 +$71,003.25 +$4,972.35 =$606,642.51
2003	$606,642.51	$606,642.51 x 13.38% = $81,168.77	$606,642.51 x .937% = $5,684.24	$606,642.51 +$81,168.77 +$5,684.24 =$693,495.52
2004	$693,495.52	$693,495.52 x 13.38% = $92,789.70	$693,495.52 x .937% = $6,498.05	$693,495.52 +$92,789.70 +$6,498.05 =$792,783.27
2005	$792,783.27	$792,783.27 x 13.38% = $106,074.40	$792,783.27 x .937% = $7,428.38	$792,783.27 +$106,074.40 +$7,428.38 =$906,286.05
2006	$906,286.05	$906,286.05 x 13.38% = $121,261.07	$906,286.05 x .937% = $8,491.90	$906,286.05 +$121,261.07 +$ 8,491.90 =$1,036,039.02
2007	$1,036,039.02	$1,036,039.02 x 13.38% = $138,622.02	$1,036,039.02 x .937% = $9,707.69	$1,036,039.02 + 138,622.02 + 9,707.69 =$ 1,184,368.73
2008	$ 1,184,368.73	$ 1,184,368.73 x 13.38% = $158,468.54	$ 1,184,368.73 x .937% = $11,097.54	$ 1,184,368.73 + 158,468.54 + 11,097.54 =$1,353,934.80
2009	$1,353,934.80	$1,353,934.80 x 13.38% = $181,156.48	$1,353,934.80 x .937% = $12,686.37	$1,353,934.80 +$181,156.48 +$12,686.37 =$1,547,777.65
2010	$1,547,777.65	$1,547,777.65 x 13.38% = $207,092.65	$1,547,777.65 x .937% = $14,502.68	$1,547,777.65 +$207,092.65 +$14,502.68 =$1,769,372.98
2011	$1,769,372.98	$1,769,372.98 x 13.38% = $236,741.10	$1,769,372.98 x .937% = $16,579.02	$1,769,372.98 +$236,741.10 +$16,579.02 =$2,022,694.11
2012	$2,022,694.11	$2,022,694.11 x 13.38% = $270,636.47	$2,022,694.11 x .937% =$ 18,952.64	$2,022,694.11 +$270,636.47 +$18,952.64 =$2,312,283.23
2013	$2,312,283.23	$2,312,283.23 x 13.38% = $309,383.50	$2,312,283.23 x .937% = $21,666.09	$2,312,283.23 +$309,383.50 +$21,666.09 =$2,643,332.82
2014	$2,643,332.82	$2,643,332.82 x 13.38% = $353,677.93	$2,643,332.82 x .937% = $24,768.03	$2,643,332.82 +$353,677.93 +$24,768.03 =$3,021,778.78
2015	$3,021,778.78	$3,021,778.78 x 13.38% = $404,314.00	$3,021,778.78 x .937% = $28,314.07	$3,021,778.78 + 404,314.00 + 28,314.07 = $3,545,406.85
2016	$3,545,406.85	$3,545,406.85 x 12.5% =$443,175.86	$3,545,406.85 x .937% = $33,220.46	$3,545,406.85 +$443,175.86 +$33,220.46 =$4,021,803.17
2017	$4,021,803.17	$4,021,803.17 x 12.5% = $502,725.40	$4,021,803.17 x .937% = $37,684.30	$4,021,803.17 + $502,725.40 +$37,684.30 =$4,562,212.86
2018	$4,562,212.86	$4,562,212.86 x 12.5% = $570,276.61 ÷ 365 (days) = $1,562.40 x 185 (days 2018) = $289,044.31	$4,562,212.86 x .937% = $ 42,747.93 ÷ 365 (days) = $117.12 x 185 (days 2018) = $21,666.76	$4,562,212.86 + $ 289,044.31 + $ 21,666.76 =$4,872,923.93 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K11,803,196.34

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$11,193.26	$11,193.26 x 13.38% = $1,497.66	$11,193.26 x .937% = $104.88	$11,193.26 + 1,497.66 + 104.88 = $12,795.80
1980	$12,795.80	$12,795.80 x 13.38% = $1,712.08	$12,795.80 x .937% = $119.90	$ 12,795.80 + $1,712.08 + 119.90 = $14,627.77
1981	$14,627.77	$14,627.77 x 13.385 = $1,957.20	$14,627.77 x .937% = $137.06	$14,627.77 + $1,957.20 + $137.06 = $16,722.03
1982	$16,722.03	$16,722.03 x 13.38% = $2,237.41	$16,722.03 x .937% = $156.69	$16,722.03 + 2,237.41 + 156.69 = $19,116.12
1983	$19,116.12	$19,116.12 x 13.38% = $2,557.74	$19,116.12 x .937% = $179.12	$19,116.12 + 2,557.74 + 179.12 = $21,852.97
1984	$21,852.97	$21,852.97 x 13.38% = $2,923.93	$21,852.97 x .937% =$204.76	$21,852.97 + 2,923.93 + 204.76 = $ 24,981.66
1985	$ 24,981.66	$ 24,981.66 x 13.38% = $3,342.55	$ 24,981.66 x .937% = $234.08	$ 24,981.66 + 3,342.55 + 234.08 = $28,558.28
1986	$28,558.28	$28,558.28 x 13.38% = $3,821.10	$28,558.28 x .937% = $267.59	$28,558.28 + 3,821.10 + 267.59 =$32,646.97
1987	$32,647.01	$32,647.01 x 13.38% = $4,368.16	$32,647.01 x .937% = $305.90	$32,647.01 + 4,368.16 + 305.90 =$37,321.04
1988	$37,321.04	$37,321.04 x 13.38% = $4,993.56	$37,321.04x .937% = $349.70	$ 37,321.04 + 4,993.56 + 349.70 = $42,664.29
1989	$42,664.29	$42,664.29 x 13.38% = $5,708.48	$42,664.29 x .937% = $399.76	$42,664.29 + 5,708.48 + 399,76 = $48,772.54
1990	$48,772.54	$48,772.54 x 13.38% = $6,525.77	$48,772.54 x .937% = $457.00	$48,772.54 + 6,525.77 + 457.00 = $55,755.30
1991	$55,755.30	$55,755.30 x 13.38% = $7,460.06	$55,755.30 x .937% = $522.43	$55,755.30 + 7,460.06 + 522.43 = $63,737.79
1992	$63,737.79	$63,737.79 x 13.38% = $8,528.12	$63,737.79 x .937% = $597.22	$63,737.79 + 8,528.12 + 597.22 = $72,863.13
1993	$72,863.13	$72,863.13 x 13.38% = $9,749.09	$72,863.13 x .937% = $682.73	$72,863.13 + 9,749.09 + 682.73 = $83,294.94
1994	$83,294.94	$83,294.94 x 13.38% = $11,144.86	$83,294.94 x .937% = $780.47	$83,294.94 +11,144.86 + 780.47 = $95,220.28
1995	$95,220.28	$95,220.28 x 13.38% = $12,740.47	$95,220.28 x .937% = $892.21	$95,220.28 + 12,740.47 + 892.21 =$108,852.97
1996	$108,852.97	$108,852.97 x 13.38% = $14,564.53	$108,852.97 x .937% = $1,019.95	$108,852.97 + 14,564.53 + 1,019.95 = $124,437.45
1997	$124,437.45	$124,437.45 x 13.38% =$16,649.73	$124,437.45 x .937% = $1,165.98	$124,437.45 + 16,649.73 + 1,165.98 =$142,253.16
1998	$142,253.16	$142,253.16 x 13.38% = $19,033.47	$142,253.16 x .937% = $1,332.91	$142,253.16 + 19,033.47 + 1,332.91 =$162,619.54
1999	$162,619.54	$162,619.54 x 13.38% = $21,758.49	$162,619.54 x .937% = $1,523.75	$162,619.54 + 21,758.52 + 1,523.75 =$185,901.78
2000	$185,901.78	$185,901.78 x 13.38% = $24,873.66	$185,901.78 x .937% = $1,741.90	$185,901.78 + 24,873.66 + 1,741.90 =$212,517.34
2001	$212,517.34	$212,517.34 x 13.38% = $28,434.82	$212,517.34 x .937% = $1,991.29	$212,517.34 + 28,434.82 + 1,991.29 =$242,943.45
2002	$242,943.45	$242,943.45 x 13.38% = $32,505.83	$242,943.45 x .937% =$2,276.38	$242,943.45 + 32,505.83 + 2,276.38 =$277,725.66
2003	$277,725.66	$277,725.66 x 13.38% = $37,159.69	$277,725.66 x .937% = $2,602.29	$277,725.66 + 37,159.69 + 2,602.29 =$317,487.64
2004	$317,487.64	$317,487.64 x 13.38% = 42,479.85	$317,487.64 x .937% = $2,974.86	$317,487.64 + 42,479.85 + 2,974.86 =$362,942.35
2005	$362,942.35	$362,942.35 x 13.38% = $48,561.69	$362,942.35 x .937% = $3,400.77	$ 362,942.35 + 48,561.69 + 3,400.77 =$414,904.81
2006	$414,904.81	$414,904.81 x 13.38% = $55,514.26	$414,904.81 x .937% = $3,887.66	$414,904.81 +55,514.26 + 3,887.66 =$474,306.73
2007	$474,306.73	$474,306.73 x 13.38% = $63,462.24	$474,306.73 x .937% = $4,444.25	$474,306.73 + 63,462.24 + 4,444.25 = $ 542,213.22
2008	$ 542,213.22	$ 542,213.22 x 13.38% = 72,548.13	$ 542,213.22 x .937% = $5,080.54	$ 542,213.22 + 72,548.13 + 5,080.54 =$619,841.89
2009	$619,841.89	$619,841.89 x 13.38% = $82,934.84	$619,841.89 x .937% = $5,807.92	$619,841.89 + 82,934.84 + 5,807.92 = $708,584.65
2010	$708,584.65	$708,584.65 x 13.38% = $94,808.63	$708,584.65 x .937% = $6,639.44	$708,584.65 + 94,808.63 + 6,639.44 = $810,032.71
2011	$810,032.71	$810,032.71 x 13.38% = $108,382.38	$810,032.71 x .937% = $7,590.01	$810,032.71 +108,382.38 + 7,590.01 =$926,005.09
2012	$926,005.09	$926,005.09 x 13.38% = $123,899.48	$926,005.09 x .937% =$8,676.67	$926,005.09 +123,899.48 + 8,676.67 = $1,058,581.24
2013	$1,058,581.24	$1,058,581.24 x 13.38% = $141,638.17	$1,058,581.24 x .937% = $9,918.91	$1,058,581.24 + 141,638.17 + 9,918.91 =$1,210,138.32
2014	$1,210,138.32	$1,210,138.32 x 13.38% = $161,916.51	$1,210,138.32 x .937% = $11,339.00	$1,210,138.32 + 161,916.51 + 11,339.00 =$1,383,393.82
2015	$1,383,393.82	$1,383,393.82 x 13.38% = $185,098.09	$1,383,393.82 x .937% = $12,962.40	$1,383,393.82 + 185,098.09 + 12,962.40 = $1,581,454.31
2016	$1,581,454.31	$1,581,454.31 x 12.5% =$197,681.79	$1,581,454.31 x .937% = $14,818.23	$1,581,454.31 + 197,682.79 + 14,818.23 = $1,793,954.33
2017	$1,793,954.33	$1,793,954.33 x 12.5% = $224,244.29	$1,793,954.33 x .937% = $16,809.35	$1,793,954.33 + 224,244.29 + 16,809.35 = $2,035,007.97
2018	$2,035,007.97	$2,035,007.97 x 12.5% = $254,376.00 ÷ 365 (days) = $696.92 x 185 (days 2018) = $128,930.30	$2,035,007.97 x .937% = $ 19,068.02 ÷ 365 (days) = $52.24 x 185 (days 2018) = $9,664.62	$2,035,007.97 + 128,930.30 + 9,664.62 =$2,173,602.89 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K5,264,900.92

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$10,400.37	$10,400.37 x 13.38% = $1,391.57	$10,400.37 x .937% = $97.45	$10,400.37 + 1,391.57 + 97.45 = $11,889.39
1980	$11,889.39	$11,889.39 x 13.38% = $1,590.80	$11,889.39 x .937% = $111.40	$ 11,889.39 + 1,590.80 + 111.40 = $13,591.59
1981	$13,591.59	$13,591.59 x 13.38% = $1,818.55	$13,591.59 x .937% = $127.35	$13,591.59 + $1,818.55 + $127.35 = $15,537.49
1982	$15,537.49	$15,537.49 x 13.38% = $2,078.92	$15,537.49 x .937% = $145.59	$15,537.49 + 2,078.92 + 145.59 = $17,762.00
1983	$17,762.00	$17,762.00 x 13.38% = $2,376.56	$17,762.00 x .937% = $166.43	$17,762.00 + 2,376.56 + 166.43 = $20,304.99
1984	$20,304.99	$20,304.99 x 13.38% = $2,716.81	$20,304.99 x .937% =$190.26	$20,304.99 + 2,716.81 + 190.26 = $ 23,212.06
1985	$ 23,212.06	$ 23,212.06 x 13.38% = $3,105.77	$ 23,212.06 x .937% = 217.50	$ 23,212.06 + 3,105.77 + 217.50 = $26,535.33
1986	$26,535.33	$26,535.33 x 13.38% = $3,550.43	$26,535.33 x .937% = 248.64	$26,535.33 + 3,550.43 + 248.64 =$30,334.40
1987	$30,334.40	$30,334.40 x 13.38% = $4,058.74	$30,334.40 x .937% = $284.23	$30,334.40 + 4,058.74 + 284.23 =$34,677.37
1988	$34,677.37	$34,677.37 x 13.38% = $4,639.83	$34,677.37 x .937% = $324.93	$ 34,677.37 + $4,639.83 + 324.93 = $39,642.13
1989	$39,642.13	$39,642.13 x 13.38% = $5,304.12	$39,642.13 x .937% = $371.45	$39,642.13 + 5,304.12 + 371.45 = $45,317.69
1990	$45,317.69	$45,317.69 x 13.38% = $6,063.51	$45,317.69 x .937% = $424.63	$45,317.69 + 6,063.51 +. 424.63 = $51,805.82
1991	$51,805.82	$51,805.82 x 13.38% = $6,931.62	$51,805.82 x .937% = $485.42	$51,805.82 +6,931.62 +485.42 = $59,222.86
1992	$59,222.86	$59,222.86 x 13.38% = $7,924.02	$59,222.86 x .937% = $554.92	$59,222.86 +7,924.02 + 554.92 = $67,701.80
1993	$67,701.80	$67,701.80 x 13.38% = $9,058.50	$67,701.80 x .937% = $634.37	$67,701.80 + 9,058.50 + 634.37 = $77,394.67
1994	$77,394.67	$77,394.67 x 13.38% = $10,355.41	$77,394.67 x .937% = $725.19	$77,394.67 +10,355.41 + 725.19 = $88,475.26
1995	$88,475.26	$88,475.26 x 13.38% = $11,838.12	$88,475.26 x .937% = $829.01	$88,475.26 + 11,838.12 + 829.01 =$101,143.40
1996	$101,143.40	$101,143.40 x 13.38% = $13,532.99	$101,143.40 x .937% = $947.71	$101,143.40 + 13,532.99 + 947.71 = $115,624.10
1997	$ 115,624.10	$ 115,624.10 x 13.38% =$15,470.50	$ 115,624.10 x .937% = $1,083.40	$ 115,624.10 + 15,470.50 + 1,083.40 = $132,178.00
1998	$132,178.00	$132,178.00 x 13.38% = $17,685.42	$132,178.00 x .937% = $1,238.51	$132,178.00 + 17,685.42 + 1,238.51 =$151,101.92
1999	$151,101.92	$151,101.92 x 13.38% = $20,217.44	$151,101.92 x .937% = $1,415.82	$151,101.92 + 20,217.44 + 1,415.82 =$172,735.18
2000	$172,735.18	$172,735.18 x 13.38% = $23,111.97	$172,735.18 x .937% = $1,618.53	$172,735.18 + 23,111.97 + 1,618.53 =$197,465.68
2001	$197,465.68	$197,465.68 x 13.38% = $26,420.91	$197,465.68 x .937% = $1,850.25	$197,465.68 + 26,420.91 + 1,850.25 =$225,736.84
2002	$225,736.84	$225,736.84 x 13.38% = $30,203.59	$225,736.84 x .937% =$2,115.15	$225,736.84 + 30,203.59 + 2,115.15 =$258,055.58
2003	$258,055.58	$258,055.58 x 13.38% = $34,527.84	$258,055.58 x .937% = $2,417.98	$258,055.58 + 34,527.84 + 2,417.98 =$295,001.40
2004	$295,001.40	$295,001.40 x 13.38% = 39,471.19	$295,001.40 x .937% = $2,764.16	$295,001.40 + 39,471.19 + 2,764.16 =$337,236.75
2005	$337,236.75	$337,236.75 x 13.38% = $45,122.28	$337,236.75 x .937% = $3,159.91	$337,236.75 + 45,122.28 + 3,159.91 =$385,518.94
2006	$385,518.94	$385,518.94 x 13.38% = $51,582.43	$385,518.94 x .937% = $3,612.31	$385,518.94 + 51,582.43 + 3,612.31 =$440,713.69
2007	$440,713.69	$440,713.69 x 13.38% = $58,967.49	$440,713.69 x .937% = $4,129.49	$ 440,713.69 + 58,967.49 + 4,129.49 = $ 503,810.67
2008	$ 503,810.67	$ 503,810.67 x 13.38% = $67,409.87	$503,810.67 x .937% = $4,720.71	$ 503,810.67 + 67,409.87 + 4,720.71 =$ 575,941.24
2009	$575,941.24	$575,941.24 x 13.38% = $77,060.94	$575,941.24 x .937% = $5,396.57	$575,941.24 + 77,060.94 + 5,396.57 = $658,398.75
2010	$658,398.75	$658,398.75 x 13.38% = $88,093.75	$658,398.75 x .937% = $6,169.20	$658,398.75 + 88,093.75 + 6,169.20 = $752,661.70
2011	$752,661.70	$752,661.70 x 13.38% = $100,706.14	$752,661.70 x .937% = $7,052.44	$752,661.70 +100,706.14 + 7,052.44 =$860,420.28
2012	$860,420.28	$860,420.28 x 13.38% = $115,124.23	$860,420.28 x .937% =$8,062.14	$860,420.28 + 115,124.23 + 8,062.14 = $983,606.65
2013	$983,606.65	$983,606.65 x 13.38% = $ 131,606.57	$983,606.65 x .937% =$ 9,216.39	$983,606.65 + 131,606.57 + 9,216.39 =$1,124,429.61
2014	$ 1,124,429.61	$ 1,124,429.61 x 13.38% = $150,448.68	$ 1,124,429.61 x .937% = $10,535.91	$ 1,124,429.61 + 150,448.68 + 10,535.91 =$1,285,414.20
2015	$1,285,414.20	$1,285,414.20 x 13.38% = $171,988.42	$1,285,414.20 x .937% = $12,044.33	$1,285,414.20 + 171,988.42 + 12,044.33 = $1,469,446.95
2016	$1,469,446.95	$1,469,446.95 x 12.5% =$183,680.87	$1,469,446.95 x .937% = $13,768.72	$1,469,446.95 + 183,680.87 + 13,768.72 =$1,666,896.54
2017	$1,666,896.54	$1,666,896.54 x 12.5% = $208,362.07	$1,666,896.54 x .937% = $15,618.82	$1,666,896.54 + 208,362.07 + 15,618.82 = $1,890,877.43
2018	$1,890,877.43	$1,890,877.43 x 12.5% = $236,359.68 ÷ 365 (days) = $647.56 x 185 (days 2018) = $119,798.74	$1,890,877.43 x .937% = $17,717.52 ÷ 365 (days) = $48.54 x 185 (days 2018) = $8,980.11	$ 1,890,877.43 + 119,798.74 + 8,980.11 =$2,019,656.28 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K4,892,011.44

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$4,688.99	$4,688.99 x 13.38% = $627.39	$4,688.99 x .937% = $43.94	$4,688.99 + $627.39 + 43.94 = $5,360.31
1980	$5,360.31	$5,360.31 x 13.38% = $717.21	$5,360.31 x .937% = $50.23	$5,360.31 + 717.21 + 50.23 = $6,127.75
1981	$6,127.75	$6,127.75 x 13.38% = 819.89	$6,127.75 x .937% = $57.42	$6,127.75 + $819.89 + $57.42 = $7,005.06
1982	$7,005.06	$7,005.06 x 13.38% = $937.28	$7,005.06 x .937% = $65.64	$7,005.06 + 937.28 + 65.64 = $ 8,007.97
1983	$8,007.97	$8,007.97 x 13.38% = $1,071.47	$8,007.97 x .937% = $75.03	$ 8,007.97 + 1,071.47 + 75.03 = $9,154.47
1984	$9,154.47	$9,154.47 x 13.38% = $1,224.87	$9,154.47 x .937% =$85.78	$9,154.47 + 1,224.87 + 85.78 = $10,465.12
1985	$10,465.12	$10,465.12 x 13.38% = $1,400.23	$10,465.12 x .937% = $98.06	$10,465.12 + 1,400.23 + 98.06 = $11,963.41
1986	$11,963.41	$11,963.41 x 13.38% = $1,600.70	$11,963.41 x .937% = $112.10	$11,963.41 + 1,600.70 + 112.10 =$13,676.21
1987	$13,676.21	$13,676.21 x 13.38% = $1,829.88	$13,676.21 x .937% = $128.15	$13,676.21 + 1,829.88 + 128.15 =$15,634.23
1988	$15,634.23	$15,634.23 x 13.38% = $2,091.86	$15,634.23 x .937% = $146.49	$15,634.23 +$2,091.86 + $146.49 =$17,872.58
1989	$17,872.58	$17,872.58 x 13.38% = $2,391.35	$17,872.58 x .937% = $167.47	$17,872.58 + 2,391.35 + 167.47 = $20,431.40
1990	$20,431.40	$20,431.40 x 13.38% = $2,733.72	$20,431.40 x .937% = $191.44	$20,431.40 + 2,733.72 + 191.44 = $23,356.56
1991	$23,356.56	$23,356.56 x 13.38% = $3,125.11	$23,356.56 x .937% = $218.85	$23,356.56 + 3,125.11 + 218.85 = $26,700.52
1992	$26,700.52	$26,700.52 x 13.38% = $3,572.53	$26,700.52 x .937% = $250.18	$26,700.52 +3,572.53 + 250.18 = $30,523.23
1993	$30,523.23	$30,523.23 x 13.38% = $4,084.01	$30,523.23 x .937% = $286.00	$30,523.23 + 4,084.01 + 286.00 = $34,893.24
1994	$34,893.24	$34,893.24 x 13.38% = $4,668.72	$34,893.24 x .937% = $326.95	$34,893.24 + 4,668.72 + 326.95 = $39,888.91
1995	$39,888.91	$39,888.91 x 13.38% = $5,337.14	$39,888.91 x .937% = $373.76	$39,888.91 + 5,337.14 + 373.76 =$45,599.81
1996	$45,599.81	$45,599.81 x 13.38% = $6,101.25	$45,599.81 x .937% = $427.27	$45,599.81 + 6,101.25 + 427.27 = $52,128.33
1997	$52,128.33	$52,128.33 x 13.38% =$6,974.77	$52,128.33 x .937% = $488.44	$52,128.33 + 6,974.77 + 488.44 =$59,591.54
1998	$59,591.54	$59,591.54 x 13.38% = $7,973.35	$59,591.54 x .937% = $558.37	$59,591.54 + 7,973.35 + 558.37 =$68,123.26
1999	$68,123.26	$68,123.26 x 13.38% = $9,114.89	$68,123.26 x .937% = $638.31	$68,123.26 + 9,114.89 + 638.31 = $77,876.47
2000	$77,876.47	$77,876.47 x 13.38% = $10,419.87	$77,876.47 x .937% = $729.70	$77,876.47 + 10,419.87 + 729.70 =$89,026.04
2001	$89,026.04	$89,026.04 x 13.38% = $11,911.68	$89,026.04 x .937% = $834.17	$89,026.04 + 11,911.68 + 834.17 =$101,771.90
2002	$101,771.90	$101,771.90 x 13.38% = $13,617.08	$101,771.90 x .937% =$953.60	$101,771.90 + 13,617.08 + 953.60 =$116,342.58
2003	$116,342.58	$116,342.58 x 13.38% = $15,566.64	$116,342.58 x .937% = $1,090.13	$116,342.58 + 15,566.64 + 1,090.13 =$132,999.35
2004	$132,999.35	$132,999.35 x 13.38% = $17,795.31	$132,999.35 x .937% = $1,246.20	$132,999.35 + 17,795.31 + 1,246.20 =$152,040.87
2005	$152,040.87	$152,040.87 x 13.38% = $20,343.07	$152,040.87 x .937% = $1,424.62	$ 152,040.87 + 20,343.07 1,424.62 =$173,808.56
2006	$173,808.56	$173,808.56 x 13.38% = $23,255.59	$173,808.56 x .937% = $1,628.59	$173,808.56 +$23,255.59 +$ 1,628.59 =$198,692.73
2007	$198,692.73	$198,692.73 x 13.38% = $26,585.09	$198,692.73 x .937% = $1,861.75	$198,692.73 + 26,585.09 + 1,861.75 = $227,139.57
2008	$227,139.57	$227,139.57 x 13.38% = $30,391.27	$227,139.57 x .937% = $2,128.30	$227,139.57 + 30,391.27 + 2,128.30 =$259,659.14
2009	$259,659.14	$259,659.14 x 13.38% = $34,742.39	$259,659.14 x .937% = $2,433.01	$259,659.14 + 34,742.39 + 2,433.01 = $296,834.54
2010	$296,834.54	$296,834.54 x 13.38% = $39,716.46	$296,834.54 x .937% = $2,781.34	$296,834.54 + 39,716.46 + 2,781.34 = $339,332.34
2011	$339,332.34	$339,332.34 x 13.38% = $45,402.67	$339,332.34 x .937% = $3,179.54	$339,332.34 +$45,402.67 + 3,179.54 =$387,914.55
2012	$387,914.55	$387,914.55 x 13.38% = $51,902.97	$387,914.55 x .937% =$3,634.76	$387,914.55 + 51,902.97 + 3,634.76 = $443,452.28
2013	$443,452.28	$443,452.28 x 13.38% = $59,333.92	$ 443,452.28 x .937% = $4,155.15	$ 443,452.28 + 59,333.92 + 4,155.15 =$ 506,941.34
2014	$506,941.34	$ 506,941.34 x 13.38% = $67,828.75	$ 506,941.34 x .937% = $4,750.04	$ 506,941.34 + $ 67,828.75 + 4,750.04 = $579,520.13
2015	$579,520.13	$579,520.13 x 13.38% = $77,539.79	$579,520.13 x .937% = $5,430.10	$ 579,520.13 + 77,539.79 + 5,430.10 = $662,490.03
2016	$662,490.03	$662,490.03 x 12.5% =$82,811.25	$662,490.03 x .937% = $6,207.53	$662,490.03 + 82,811.25 + 6,207.53 = $751,508.81
2017	$751,508.81	$751,508.81 x 12.5% = $93,938.60	$751,508.81 x .937% = $7,041.64	$ 751,508.81 + 93,938.60 + 7,041.64 = $852,489.05
2018	$852,489.05	$852,489.05 x 12.5% = $106,561.13 ÷ 365 (days) = $291.95 x 185 (days 2018) = $54,010.44	$852,489.05 x .937% = $7,987.82 ÷ 365 (days) = $21.88 x 185 (days 2018) = $4,048.62	$852,489.05 + 54,010.44 + 4,048.62 =$910,548.11 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K2,205,529.63

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$16,217.54	$16,217.54 x 13.38% = $2,169.91	$16,217.54 x .937% = $151.96	$16,217.54 + 2,169.91 + 151.96 = $18,539.41
1980	$18,539.41	$18,539.41 x 13.38% = $2,480.57	$18,539.41 x .937% = $173.71	$18,539.41 + 2,480.57 + 173.71 = $21,193.70
1981	$21,193.70	$21,193.70 x 13.38% = $2,835.72	$21,193.70 x .937% = $198.58	$21,193.70 + 2,835.72 + 198.58 = $24,228.00
1982	$24,228.00	$24,228.00 x 13.38% = $3,241.71	$24,228.00x .937% = $227.02	$24,228.00 + $3,241.71 + 227.02 = $27,696.72
1983	$27,696.72	$27,696.72 x 13.38% = $3,705.82	$27,696.72 x .937% = $259.52	$27,696.72 +$3,705.82 + 259.52 = $31,662.06
1984	$31,662.06	$31,662.06 x 13.38% = $4,236.38	$31,662.06 x .937% = $ 296.67	$31,662.06 + 4,236.38 + 296.67 = $36,195.12
1985	$36,195.12	$36,195.12 x 13.38% = $4,842.91	$36,195.12 x .937% = $339.15	$36,195.12 +4,842.91 + 339.15 = $41,377.18
1986	$41,377.18	$41,377.18 x 13.38% = $5,536.27	$41,377.18 x .937% = $387.70	$41,377.18 + 5,536.27 + 387.70 =$47,301.15
1987	$47,301.15	$47,301.15 x 13.38% = $5,536.27	$47,301.15 x .937% = $387.70	$47,301.15 + 5,536.27 + 387.70 =$54,073.26
1988	$54,073.26	$54,073.26 x 13.38% = $7,235.00	$54,073.26 x .937% = $506.67	$54,073.26 + 7,235.00 + 506.67 =$61,814.93
1989	$61,814.93	$61,814.93 x 13.38% = $8,270.84	$61,814.93 x .937% = $579.21	$61,814.93 +8,270.84 + 579.21 = $70,664.97
1990	$70,664.97	$70,664.97 x 13.38% = $9,454.97	$70,664.97 x .937% = $662.13	$70,664.97 + 9,454.97 + 662.13 = $80,782.07
1991	$80,782.07	$80,782.07 x 13.38% = $10,808.64	$80,782.07 x .937% = $756.93	$80,782.07 +10,808.64 + 756.93 = $92,347.64
1992	$92,347.64	$92,347.64 x 13.38% = $12,356.11	$92,347.64 x .937% = $865.30	$92,347.64 + 12,356.11 + 865.30 =$105,569.05
1993	$105,569.05	$105,569.05 x 13.38% = $14,125.14	$105,569.05 x .937% = $865.30	$105,569.05 + 14,125.14 + 989.18 = $120,683.37
1994	$120,683.37	$120,683.37 x 13.38% = $16,147.43	$120,683.37 x .937% = $1,130.80	$120,683.37 + 16,147.43 + 1,130.80 = $137,961.61
1995	$137,961.61	$137,961.61 7x 13.38% = $18,459.26	$137,961.61 x .937% = $1,292.70	$137,961.61 + 18,459.26 + 1,292.70 =$157,713.57
1996	$157,713.57	$157,713.57 x 13.38% = $21,102.08	$157,713.57 x .937% = $1,477.78	$157,713.57 + 18,459.26 + 1,292.70 = $180,293.42
1997	$180,293.42	$180,293.42 x 13.38% =$21,102.08	$180,293.42 x .937% = $1,477.78	$180,293.42 + 21,102.08 + 1,477.78 =$206,106.03
1998	$206,106.03	$206,106.03 x 13.38% = $27,576.99	$206,106.03 x .937% = $1,931.21	$206,106.03 + 27,576.99 + 1,931.21 = $235,614.23
1999	$235,614.23	$235,614.23 x 13.38% = $31,525.18	$235,614.23 x .937% = $2,207.71	$235,614.23 + 31,525.18 + 2,207.71 =$269,347.12
2000	$269,347.12	$269,347.12 x 13.38% = $36,038.64	$269,347.12 x .937% = $2,523.78	$269,347.12 + 36,038.64 + 2,523.78 =$307,909.55
2001	$307,909.55	$307,909.55 x 13.38% = $41,198.30	$307,909.55 x .937% =$2,885.11	$307,909.55 + 41,198.30 + 2,885.11 =$351,992.96
2002	$351,992.96	$351,992.96 x 13.38% = $47,096.66	$351,992.96 x .937% = $3,298.17	$351,992.96 + 47,096.66 + 3,298.17 =$402,387.79
2003	$402,387.79	$402,387.79 x 13.38% = $53,839.49	$402,387.79 x .937% = $3,770.37	$402,387.79 + 53,839.49 + 3,770.37 =$459,997.65
2004	$459,997.65	$459,997.65 x 13.38% = $61,547.69	$459,997.65 x .937% = $4,310.18	$ 459,997.65 + 61,547.69 4,310.18 =$525,855.51
2005	$525,855.51	$525,855.51 x 13.38% =$70,359.47	$525,855.51 x .937% = $4,927.27	$525,855.51 +70,359.47 + 4,927.27 =$601,142.24
2006	$601,142.24	$601,142.24 x 13.38% = $80,432.83	$601,142.24 x .937% = $5,632.70	$601,142.24 + 80,432.83 + 5,632.70 = $687,207.77
2007	$687,207.77	$687,207.77 x 13.38% = $91,948.40	$687,207.77 x .937% = 6,439.14	$687,207.77 + 91,948.40 + 6,439.14 =$785,595.31
2008	$785,595.31	$785,595.31 x 13.38% = $105,112.65	$785,595.31 x .937% = $7,361.03	$785,595.31 + 105,112.65 + 7,361.03 = $898,068.99
2009	$898,068.99	$898,068.99 x 13.38% = $120,161.63	$898,068.99 x .937% = $8,414.91	$898,068.99 + 120,161.63 + 8,414.91 = $1,026,645.53
2010	$1,026,645.53	$1,026,645.53 x 13.38% = $137,365.17	$1,026,645.53 x .937% = $9,619.67	$1,026,645.53 +137,365.17 + 9,619.67 =$1,173,630.37
2011	$1,173,630.37	$1,173,630.37 x 13.38% = $157,031.74	$1,173,630.37 x .937% =$10,996.92	$1,173,630.37 + 157,031.74 + 10,996.92 = $1,341,659.03
2012	$1,341,659.03	$1,341,659.03 x 13.38% = $179,513.98	$1,341,659.03 x .937% = $12,571.35	$1,341,659.03 + 179,513.98 + 12,571.35 =$1,533,744.35
2013	$1,533,744.35	$1,533,744.35 x 13.38% = $205,214.99	$1,533,744.35 x .937% = $14,371.18	$1,533,744.35 + 205,214.99 + 14,371.18 = $1,753,330.53
2014	$1,753,330.53	$1,753,330.53 x 13.38% = $234,595.62	$1,753,330.53 x .937% = $16,428.71	$1,753,330.53 + 234,595.62 + 16,428.71 = $2,004,354.86
2015	$2,004,354.86	$2,004,354.86 x 12.5% =$250,544.36	$2,004,354.86 x .937% = $18,780.81	$2,004,354.86 + 250,544.36 + 18,780.81 = $2,273,680.02
2016	$2,273,680.02	$2,273,680.02 x 12.5% = $284,210.00	$2,273,680.02 x .937% = $21,304.38	$2,273,680.02 + 284,210.00 + 21,304.38 = $2,579,194.40
2017	$2,579,194.40	$2,579,194.40 x 12.5% = $322,399.30	$2,579,194.40 x .937% = $24,167.05	$2,579,194.40 + 322,399.30 + 24,167.05 = $2,925,760.75
2018	$2,925,760.75	$2,925,760.75 x 12.5% = $365,720.09 ÷ 365 (days) = $1,001.97 x 185 (days 2018) = $185,364.98	$2,925,760.75 x .937% = $27,414.38 ÷ 365 (days) = $75.11 x 185 (days 2018) = $13,894.96	$2,925,760.75 + 185,364.98 + 13,894.96 =$3,125,020.69 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K7,569,425.12

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$4,424.57	$4,424.57 x 13.38% = $592.01	$4,424.57 x .937% = $41.46	$ 4,424.57 + 592.01 + 41.46 =$ 5,058.04
1980	$5,058.04	$5,058.04 x 13.38% = $676.77	$5,058.04 x .937% = $47.39	$ 5,058.04 + 676.77 + 47.39 = $5,782.20
1981	$5,782.20	$5,782.20 x 13.38% = $773.66	$5,782.20 x .937% = $54.18	$5,782.20 + 773.66 + 54.18 = $6,610.04
1982	$6,610.04	$6,610.04 x 13.38% = $884.42	$6,610.04 x .937% = $61.94	$6,610.04 + $884.42 + $61.94 = $7,556.40
1983	$7,556.40	$7,556.40 x 13.38% = $1,011.05	$7,556.40 x .937% = $70.80	$7,556.40 +$1,011.05 + 70.80 = $8,638.25
1984	$8,638.25	$8,638.25 x 13.38% = $1,155.80	$8,638.25 x .937% = $ 80.94	$8,638.25 +1,155.80 + 80.94 = $9,874.99
1985	$9,874.99	$9,874.99 x 13.38% = $1,321.27	$9,874.99 x .937% = $92.53	$9,874.99 +1,321.27 + 92.53 = $11,288.79
1986	$11,288.79	$11,288.79 x 13.38% = $1,510.44	$11,288.79 x .937% = $105.78	$11,288.79 + 1,510.44 + 105.78 =$12,905.01
1987	$12,905.01	$12,905.01 x 13.38% = $1,726.69	$12,905.01 x .937% = $120.92	$12,905.01 + 1,726.69 + 120.92 =$14,752.62
1988	$14,752.62	$14,752.62 x 13.38% = $1,973.90	$14,752.62 x .937% = $138.23	$14,752.62 + 1,973.90 + 138.23 =$16,864.75
1989	$16,864.75	$16,864.75 x 13.38% = $2,256.50	$16,864.75 x .937% = $158.02	$16,864.75 + 2,256.50 + 158.02 = $19,279.28
1990	$19,279.28	$19,279.28 x 13.38% = $2,579.57	$19,279.28 x .937% = $180.65	$19,279.28 + 2,579.57 + 180.65 = $22,039.49
1991	$22,039.49	$22,039.49 x 13.38% = $2,948.88	$22,039.49 x .937% = $206.51	$ 22,039.49 + 2,948.88 + 206.51 =$ 25,194.88
1992	$25,194.88	$25,194.88 x 13.38% = $3,371.07	$25,194.88 x .937% = 236.08	$25,194.88 + 3,371.07 + 236.08 =$28,802.03
1993	$28,802.03	$28,802.03 x 13.38% = $3,853.71	$28,802.03 x .937% = $269.88	$28,802.03 + 3,853.71 + 269.88 = $32,925.62
1994	$32,925.62	$32,925.62 x 13.38% = $4,405.45	$32,925.62 x .937% = $308.51	$32,925.62 + 4,405.45 + 308.51 = $37,639.58
1995	$37,639.58	$37,639.58 x 13.38% = $5,036.18	$37,639.58 x .937% = $352.68	$37,639.58 + 5,036.18 + 352.68 = $ 43,028.44
1996	$ 43,028.44	$ 43,028.44 x 13.38% = $5,757.21	$43,028.44 x .937% = $403.18	$ 43,028.44 + 5,757.21 + 403.18 = $49,188.82
1997	$49,188.82	$49,188.82 x 13.38% =$6,581.46	$49,188.82 x .937% = $460.90	$49,188.82 + 6,581.46 + 460.90 =$56,231.18
1998	$56,231.18	$56,231.18 x 13.38% = $7,523.73	$56,231.18 x .937% = $526.89	$56,231.18 + 7,523.73 + 526.89 =$64,281.80
1999	$64,281.80	$64,281.80 x 13.38% = $8,600.90	$64,281.80 x .937% = $602.32	$64,281.80 + 8,600.90 + 602.32 = $73,485.03
2000	$73,485.03	$73,485.03 x 13.38% = $9,832.30	$73,485.03 x .937% = $688.55	$73,485.03 + 9,832.30 + 688.55 = $84,005.88
2001	$84,005.88	$84,005.88 x 13.38% = $11,239.99	$84,005.88 x .937% = $787.14	$84,005.88 + 11,239.99 + 787.14 =$96,033.00
2002	$96,033.00	$96,033.00 x 13.38% = $12,849.22	$96,033.00 x .937% =$899.83	$96,033.00 + 12,849.22 + 899.83 =$109,782.04
2003	$109,782.04	$109,782.04 x 13.38% = $14,688.84	$109,782.04 x .937% = $1,028.66	$109,782.04 + 14,688.84 + 1,028.66 =$125,499.53
2004	$125,499.53	$125,499.53 x 13.38% = $16,791.84	$125,499.53 x .937% = $1,175.93	$125,499.53 + 16,791.84 + 1,175.93 =$143,467.30
2005	$143,467.30	$143,467.30 x 13.38% = $19,195.92	$143,467.30 x .937% = $1,344.29	$143,467.30 + 19,175.92 + 1,344.29 = $164,007.51
2006	$164,007.51	$164,007.51 x 13.38% = $21,944.20	$164,007.51 x .937% = $1,536.75	$ 164,007.51 +$ 21,944.20 +$ 1,536.75 =$187,488.47
2007	$187,488.47	$187,488.47 x 13.38% = $25,085.96	$187,488.47 x .937% = $1,756.77	$187,488.47 + 25,085.96 + 1,756.77 = $214,331.19
2008	$214,331.19	$214,331.19 x 13.38% = $28,677.51	$214,331.19 x .937% = $2,008.28	$214,331.19 + 28,677.51 + 2,008.28 =$245,016.99
2009	$245,016.99	$245,016.99 x 13.38% = $32,783.27	$245,016.99 x .937% = $2,295.81	$245,016.99 + 32,783.27 + 2,295.81 = $ 280,096.07
2010	$280,096.07	$280,096.07 x 13.38% = $37,476.85	$280,096.07 x .937% = $2,624.50	$280,096.07 + 37,476.85 + 2,624.50 = $320,197.42
2011	$320,197.42	$320,197.42 x 13.38% = $42,842.41	$320,197.42 x .937% = $3,000.25	$320,197.42 + 42,798.43 + 3,000.25 =$366,040.08
2012	$366,040.08	$366,040.08 x 13.38% = $48,976.16	$366,040.08 x .937% =$3,429.80	$366,040.08 + 48,976.16 + 3,429.80 = $418,446.04
2013	$418,446.04	$418,446.04 x 13.38% = $55,988.08	$418,446.04 x .937% = $3,920.84	$418,446.04 + 55,988.80 + 3,920.84 = $478,354.96
2014	$478,354.96	$478,354.96 x 13.38% = $64,003.89	$478,354.96 x .937% = $4,482.19	$478,354.96 + 64,003.89 + 4,482.19 = $546,841.04
2015	$546,841.04	$546,841.04 x 13.38% = $73,167.33	$546,841.04 x .937% = $5,123.90	$ 546,841.04 + 73,167.33 + 5,123.90 = $625,132.27
2016	$625,132.27	$625,132.27 x 12.5% =$78,141.53	$625,132.27 x .937% = $5,857.49	$ 625,132.27 + 78,141.53 + 5,857.49 = $709,131.29
2017	$709,131.29	$709,131.29 x 12.5% = $88,641.41	$709,131.29 x .937% = $6,644.56	$709,131.29 + 88,641.41 + 6,644.56 = $804,417.26
2018	$804,417.26	$804,417.26 x 12.5% = $100,552.16 ÷ 365 (days) = $275.49 x 185 (days 2018) = $50,964.79	$804,417.26 x .937% = $7,537.39 ÷ 365 (days) =$20.65 x 185(days 2018) = $3,820.32	$804,417.26 + $50,964.79 + $3,820.32 =$859,202.37 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K2,081,159.98

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$9,025.42	$9,025.42 x 13.38% = $1,207.60	$9,025.42 x .937% = $84.57	$9,025.42 + 1,207.60 + 84.57 = $10,317.59
1980	$10,317.59	$10,317.59 x 13.38% = $1,380.49	$10,317.59 x .937% = $96.68	$10,317.59 + 1,380.49 + 96.68 = $11,794.76
1981	$11,794.76	$11,794.76 x 13.38% = $1,578.14	$11,794.76 x .937% = $110.52	$11,794.76 + 1,578.14 + 110.52 = $13,483.42
1982	$13,483.42	$13,483.42 x 13.38% = $1,804.08	$13,483.42 x .937% = $126.34	$13,483.42 + 1,804.08 + 126.34 = $15,413.84
1983	$15,413.84	$15,413.84 x 13.38% = $2,062.37	$15,413.84 x .937% = $144.43	$15,413.84 +$2,062.37 + 144.43 = $17,620.64
1984	$17,620.64	$17,620.64 x 13.38% = $2,357.64	$17,620.64 x .937% = $165.11	$17,620.64 + 2,357.64 + 165.11 = $20,143.39
1985	$20,143.39	$20,143.39 x 13.38% = $2,695.19	$20,143.39 x .937% = $188.74	$20,143.39 + 2,695.19 + 188.74 = $23,027.32
1986	$23,027.32	$23,027.32 x 13.38% = $3,081.06	$23,027.32 x .937% = $215.77	$23,027.32 + 3,081.06 + 215.77 =$26,324.14
1987	$26,324.14	$26,324.14 x 13.38% = $3,522.17	$26,324.14 x .937% = $246.66	$26,324.14 + 3,522.17 + 246.66 =$30,092.97
1988	$30,092.97	$30,092.97 x 13.38% = $4,026.44	$30,092.97 x .937% = $281.97	$30,092.97 + 4,026.44 + 281.97 =$34,401.38
1989	$34,401.38	$34,401.38 x 13.38% = $4,602.90	$34,401.38 x .937% = $322.34	$34,401.38 + 4,602.90 + 322.34 = $39,326.63
1990	$39,326.63	$39,326.63 x 13.38% = $5,261.90	$39,326.63 x .937% = $368.49	$39,326.63 + 5,261.90 + 368.49 = $44,957.02
1991	$44,957.02	$44,957.02 x 13.38% = $6,015.25	$44,957.02 x .937% = $421.25	$44,957.02 + 6,015.25 + 421.25 = $51,393.52
1992	$51,393.52	$51,393.52 x 13.38% = $6,876.45	$51,393.52 x .937% = $481.56	$51,393.52 + 6,876.45 + 481.56 =$58,751.53
1993	$58,751.53	$58,751.53 x 13.38% = $7,860.95	$58,751.53x .937% = $550.50	$58,751.53 + 7,860.95 + 550.50 = $67,162.99
1994	$67,162.99	$67,162.99 x 13.38% = $8,986.41	$67,162.99 x .937% = $629.32	$67,162.99 + 8,986.41 + 629.32 = $76,778.72
1995	$76,778.72	$76,778.72 x 13.38% = $10,272.99	$76,778.72 x .937% = $719.42	$76,778.72 + 10,272.99 + 719.42 =$87,771.13
1996	$87,771.13	$87,771.13 x 13.38% = $11,743.78	$87,771.13 x .937% = $822.42	$87,771.13 +11,743.78 + 822.42 = $100,337.32
1997	$100,337.32	$100,337.32 x 13.38% =$13,425.13	$100,337.32 x .937% = $940.16	$100,337.32 + 13,425.13 + 940.16 =$114,702.61
1998	$114,702.61	$114,702.61 x 13.38% = $15,347.21	$114,702.61 x .937% = $1,074.76	$114,702.61 + 15,347.21 + 1,074.76 =$131,124.58
1999	$131,124.58	$131,124.58 x 13.38% = $17,544.47	$131,124.58 x .937% = $1,228.64	$131,124.58 +17,544.47 + 1,228.64 = $149,897.69
2000	$149,897.69	$149,897.69 x 13.38% = $20,056.31	$149,897.69 x .937% = $1,404.54	$149,897.69 + 20,056.31 + 1,404.54 =$171,358.54
2001	$171,358.54	$171,358.54 x 13.38% = $22,927.77	$171,358.54 x .937% = $1,605.63	$171,358.54 + 22,927.77 + 1,605.63 =$195,891.94
2002	$195,891.94	$195,891.94 x 13.38% = $26,210.34	$195,891.94 x .937% =$1,835.51	$195,891.94 + 26,210.34 + 1,835.51 =$223,937.79
2003	$223,937.79	$223,937.79 x 13.38% = $29,962.88	$223,937.79 x .937% = $2,098.30	$223,937.79 + 29,962.88 + 2,098.30 =$255,998.96
2004	$255,998.96	$255,998.96 x 13.38% = $34,252.66	$255,998.96 x .937% = $2,398.71	$255,998.96 + 34,252.66 + 2,398.71 =$292,650.33
2005	$292,650.33	$292,650.33 x 13.38% = $39,156.61	$292,650.33 x .937% = $2,742.13	$292,650.33 + 39,156.61 + 2,742.13 =$334,549.08
2006	$334,549.08	$334,549.08 x 13.38% = $44,762.67	$334,549.08 x .937% = $3,134.72	$334,549.08 + 44,762.67 + 3,134.72 =$382,446.47
2007	$382,446.47	$382,446.47 x 13.38% = $51,171.34	$382,446.47 x .937% = $3,583.52	$382,446.47 + 51,171.34 + 3,583.52 = $437,201.33
2008	$437,201.33	$437,201.33 x 13.38% = $58,497.54	$437,201.33 x .937% = $4,096.58	$437,201.33 + 58,497.54 + 4,096.58 = $499,795.44
2009	$499,795.44	$499,795.44 x 13.38% = $66,872.63	$499,795.44 x .937% = $4,683.08	$499,795.44 + 66,872.63 + 4,683.08 = $571,351.15
2010	$571,351.15	$571,351.15 x 13.38% = $76,446.78	$571,351.15 x .937% = $5,353.56	$571,351.15 + 76,446.78 + 5,353.56 = $653,151.49
2011	$653,151.49	$653,151.49 x 13.38% = $87,391.67	$653,151.49 x .937% = $6,120.03	$653,151.49 + 87,391.67 + 6,120.03 =$746,663.19
2012	$746,663.19	$746,663.19 x 13.38% = $99,903.53	$746,663.19 x .937% =$6,996.23	$746,663.19 + 99,903.53 + 6,996.23 = $853,562.96
2013	$853,562.96	$853,562.96 x 13.38% = 114,206.72	$853,562.96 x .937% = $7,997.88	$853,562.96 + 114,206.72 + 7,997.88 =$975,767.57
2014	$975,767.57	$975,767.57 x 13.38% = $130,557.70	$975,767.57 x .937% = $9,142.94	$975,767.57 + 130,557.70 + 9,142.94 = $1,115,468.21
2015	$1,115,468.21	$1,115,468.21 x 13.38% = $149,249.65	$1,115,468.21 x .937% = $10,451.94	$1,115,468.21 + 149,249.65 + 10,451.94 = $1,275,169.79
2016	$1,275,170.22	$1,275,170.22 x 12.5% =$159,396.22	$1,275,170.22 x .937% = $11,948.34	$1,275,170.22 + 159,396.22 + 11,948.34 = $1,446,514.35
2017	$1,446,514.35	$1,446,514.35 x 12.5% = $180,814.29	$1,446,514.35 x .937% = $13,553.84	$1,446,514.35 + 180,814.29 + 13,553.84 = $1,640,882.48
2018	$1,640,882.48	$1,640,882.48 x 12.5% = $205,110.31 ÷ 365 (days) = $561.95 x 185 (days 2018) = $103,960.02	$1,640,882.48 x .937% = $15,375.07 ÷ 365 (days) = $42.12 x 185 (days 2018) = $7,792.84	$1,640,882.48 + 103,960.02 + 7,792.84 =$1,752,635.34 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K4,245,233.32

Year	Principle at Maturity	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$1,492.48	$1,492.48 x 13.38% = $199.69	$1,492.48 x .937% = $13.98	$1,492.48 + 199.69 + 13.98 = $1,706.16
1980	$1,706.16	$1,706.16 x 13.38% = $228.28	$1,706.16 x .937% = $15.99	$1,706.16 + 228.28 + 15.99 = $1,950.43
1981	$1,950.43	$1,950.43 x 13.38% = $260.97	$1,950.43 x .937% = $18.28	$1,950.43 + 260.97 + 18.28 = $2,229.67
1982	$2,229.67	$2,229.67 x 13.38% = $298.33	$2,229.67 x .937% = $20.89	$2,229.67 + 298.33 + 20.89 = $2,548.89
1983	$2,548.89	$2,548.89 x 13.38% = $341.04	$2,548.89 x .937% = $23.88	$2,548.89 +$ 341.04 + 23.88 = $ 2,913.81
1984	$2,913.81	$2,913.81 x 13.38% = $389.87	$2,913.81 x .937% = $27.30	$2,913.81 + 389.87 + 27.30 = $ 3,330.98
1985	$ 3,330.98	$ 3,330.98 x 13.38% = $445.69	$ 3,330.98 x .937% = $31.21	$3,330.98 + 445.69 + 31.21 = $3,807.88
1986	$3,807.88	$3,807.88 x 13.38% = $509.49	$3,807.88 x .937% = $35.68	$3,807.88 + 509.49 + 35.68 =$4,353.05
1987	$4,353.05	$4,353.05 x 13.38% = $582.44	$4,353.05 x .937% = $40.79	$4,353.05 + 582.44 + 40.79 =$4,976.28
1988	$4,976.28	$4,976.28 x 13.38% = $665.83	$4,976.28 x .937% = $46.63	$4,976.28 + 665.83 + 46.63 =$5,688.73
1989	$5,688.73	$5,688.73 x 13.38% = $761.15	$5,688.73 x .937% = $53.30	$5,688.73 + 761.15 + 53.30 = $6,503.19
1990	$6,503.19	$6,503.19 x 13.38% = $870.13	$6,503.19 x .937% = $60.94	$6,503.19 + 870.13 + 60.94 = $7,434.25
1991	$7,434.25	$7,434.25 x 13.38% = $994.70	$7,434.25 x .937% = $69.66	$7,434.25 + 994.70 + 69.66 = $8,498.61
1992	$8,498.61	$8,498.61 x 13.38% = $1,137.11	$8,498.61 x .937% = $79.63	$8,498.61 + 1,137.12 + 79.63 =$9,715.36
1993	$9,715.36	$9,715.36 x 13.38% = $1,299.92	$9,715.36 x .937% = $91.03	$9,715.36 +1,299.92 + 91.03 = $11,106.31
1994	$11,106.31	$11,106.31 x 13.38% = $1,486.02	$11,106.31 x .937% = $104.07	$11,106.31 + 1,486.02 + 104.07 = $12,696.40
1995	$12,696.40	$12,696.40 x 13.38% = $1,698.78	$12,696.40 x .937% = $118.97	$12,696.40 + 1,698.78 + 118.97 =$14,514.14
1996	$14,514.14	$14,514.14 x 13.38% = $1,941.99	$14,514.14 x .937% = $136.00	$14,514.14 + 1,941.99 + 136.00 = $16,592.13
1997	$16,592.13	$16,592.13 x 13.38% =$2,220.03	$16,592.13 x .937% = $155.47	$16,592.13 + 2,220.03 + 155.47 =$18,967.63
1998	$18,967.63	$18,967.63 x 13.38% = $2,537.87	$18,967.63 x .937% = $177.73	$18,967.63 + 2,537.87 + 177.73 =$21,683.23
1999	$21,683.23	$21,683.23 x 13.38% = $2,901.22	$21,683.23 x .937% = $203.17	$21,683.23 +2,901.22 + 203.17 = $24,787.62
2000	$24,787.62	$24,787.62 x 13.38% = $3,316.58	$24,787.62 x .937% = $232.26	$24,787.62 + 3,316.58 + 232.26 =$28,336.46
2001	$28,336.46	$28,336.46 x 13.38% = $3,791.42	$28,336.46 x .937% = $265.51	$28,336.46 + 3,791.42 + 265.51 =$32,393.39
2002	$32,393.39	$32,393.39 x 13.38% = $4,334.24	$32,393.39 x .937% =$303.53	$32,393.39 + 4,334.24 + 303.53 =$37,031.15
2003	$37,031.15	$37,031.15 x 13.38% = $4,954.77	$37,031.15 x .937% = $346.98	$37,031.15 + 4,954.77 + 346.98 =$42,332.90
2004	$42,332.90	$42,332.90 x 13.38% = $5,664.14	$42,332.90 x .937% = $396.66	$ 42,332.90 + 5,664.14 + 396.66 =$48,393.70
2005	$48,393.70	$48,393.70 x 13.38% = $6,475.08	$48,393.70 x .937% = $453.45	$48,393.70 + 6,475.08 + 453.45 =$55,322.23
2006	$55,322.23	$55,322.23 x 13.38% = $7,402.11	$55,322.23 x .937% = $518.37	$55,322.23 + 7,402.11 + 518.37 =$63,242.71
2007	$63,242.71	$63,242.71 x 13.38% = $8,461.87	$63,242.71 x .937% = $592.58	$63,242.71 + 8,461.87 + 592.58 = $72,297.17
2008	$72,297.17	$72,297.17 x 13.38% = $9,673.36	$72,297.17 x .937% = $677.42	$72,297.17 +9,673.36 + 677.42 = $82,647.96
2009	$82,647.96	$82,647.96 x 13.38% = $11,058.30	$82,647.96 x .937% = $774.41	$82,647.96 +11,058.30 + 774.41 = $94,480.67
2010	$94,480.67	$94,480.67 x 13.38% = $12,641.51	$94,480.67 x .937% = $885.28	$94,480.67 + 12,641.51 + 885.28 = $108,007.47
2011	$108,007.47	$108,007.47 x 13.38% = $14,451.40	$108,007.47 x .937% = $1,012.03	$108,007.47 + 14,451.40 + 1,012.03 =$123,470.90
2012	$123,470.90	$123,470.90 x 13.38% = $16,520.41	$123,470.90 x .937% =$1,156.92	$123,470.90 + 16,520.41 + 1,156.92 = $141,148.23
2013	$141,148.23	$141,148.23 x 13.38% = $18,885.63	$141,148.23 x .937% = $1,322.56	$141,148.23 + 18,885.63 + 1,322.56 =$161,356.42
2014	$161,356.42	$161,356.42 x 13.38% = $21,589.49	$161,356.42 x .937% = $1,511.91	$161,356.42 + 21,589.49 + 1,511.91 = $184,457.82
2015	$184,457.82	$184,457.82 x 13.38% = $24,680.46	$184,457.82 x .937% = $1,728.37	$ 184,457.82 + 24,680.46 + 1,728.37 = $210,866.65
2016	$210,866.65	$210,866.65 x 12.5% = $26,358.33	$210,866.65 x .937% = $1,975.82	$210,866.65 + 26,358.33 1,975.82 = $239,200.80
2017	$239,200.80	$239,200.80 x 12.5% = $29,900.10	$239,200.80 x .937% = 2,241.31	$239,200.80 + 29,900.10 + 2,241.31 = $271,342.21
2018	$271,342.21	$271,342.21 x 12.5% = $33,917.78 ÷ 365 (days) = $92.93 x 185 (days 2018) = $17,191.20	$271,342.21 x .937% = $2,542.48 ÷ 365 (days) = $6.97 x 185 (days 2018) = $1,288.65	$271,342.21 + 17,191.20 + 1,288.65 =$289,822.06 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K702,006.99

Year	Principle @ Maturity & later years	Commercial Interest added	Penalty Interest added	New Principle (PM +CI + PI)
1979	$1,551.24	$1,551.24 x 13.38% = $207.56	$1,551.24 x .937% = $14.54	$1,551.24 + 207.56 + 14.54 = $1,773.33
1980	$1,773.33	$1,773.33 x 13.38% = $237.27	$1,773.33 x .937% = $16.62	$1,773.33 + 237.27 + 16.62 = $2,027.22
1981	$2,027.22	$2,027.22 x 13.38% = $271.24	$2,027.22 x .937% = $19.00	$2,027.22 + 271.24 + 19.00 = $2,317.46
1982	$2,317.46	$2,317.46 x 13.38% = 310.08	$2,317.46 x .937% = $21.71	$2,317.46 + 310.08 + 21.71 = $2,649.25
1983	$2,649.25	$2,649.25 x 13.38% = 354.47	$2,649.25 x .937% = $24.82	$2,649.25 + 354.47 + 24.82 = $ 3,028.54
1984	$ 3,028.54	$ 3,028.54 x 13.38% = $405.22	$ 3,028.54 x .937% = $28.38	$ 3,028.54 + 405.22 + 28.38 = $ 3,462.14
1985	$ 3,462.14	$ 3,462.14 x 13.38% = $463.23	$ 3,462.14 x .937% = $32.44	$3,462.14 + 463.23 + 32.44 = $3,957.81
1986	$3,957.81	$3,957.81 x 13.38% = $529.55	$3,957.81 x .937% = $37.08	$3,957.81 + 529.55 + 37.08 =$4,524.45
1987	$4,524.45	$4,524.45 x 13.38% = $605.37	$4,524.45 x .937% = $42.39	$4,524.45 + 605.38 + 42.39 =$5,172.22
1988	$5,172.22	$5,172.22 x 13.38% = $692.04	$5,172.22 x .937% = $48.46	$5,172.22 + 692.04 + 48.46 =$5,912.73
1989	$5,912.73	$5,912.73 x 13.38% = $791.12	$5,912.73 x .937% = $55.40	$ 5,912.73 + 791.12 + 55.40 = $6,759.26
1990	$6,759.26	$6,759.26 x 13.38% = $904.39	$6,759.26 x .937% = $63.33	$6,759.26 + 904.39 + 63.33 = $7,726.98
1991	$7,726.98	$7,726.98 x 13.38% = $1,033.87	$7,726.98 x .937% = $72.40	$7,726.98 +1,033.87 + 72.40 = $8,833.25
1992	$8,833.25	$8,833.25 x 13.38% = $1,181.89	$8,833.25 x .937% = $82.77	$8,833.25 + 1,181.89 + 82.77 =$10,097.91
1993	$10,097.91	$10,097.91 x 13.38% = $1,351.10	$10,097.91 x .937% = $94.62	$10,097.91 +1,351.10 + 94.62 = $11,543.63
1994	$11,543.63	$11,543.63 x 13.38% = $1,544.54	$11,543.63 x .937% = $108.16	$11,543.63 + 1,544.54 + 108.16 = $13,196.33
1995	$13,196.33	$13,196.33 x 13.38% = $1,765.67	$13,196.33 x .937% = $123.65	$13,196.33 + 1,765.67 + 123.65 =$15,085.65
1996	$15,085.65	$15,085.65 x 13.38% = $2,018.46	$15,085.65 x .937% = $141.35	$15,085.65 + 2,018.46 + 141.35 = $17,245.46
1997	$17,245.46	$17,245.46 x 13.38% =$2,307.44	$17,245.46 x .937% = $161.59	$17,245.46 + 2,307.44 + 161.59 =$19,714.49
1998	$19,714.49	$19,714.49 x 13.38% = $2,637.80	$19,714.49 x .937% = $184.72	$19,714.49 + 2,637.80 + 184.72 =$22,537.01
1999	$22,537.01	$22,537.01 x 13.38% = $3,015.45	$22,537.01 x .937% = $211.17	$22,537.01 + 3,015.45 + 211.17 = $25,763.63
2000	$25,763.63	$25,763.63 x 13.38% = $3,447.17	$25,763.63 x .937% = $241.41	$25,763.63 + 3,447.17 + 241.41 = $29,452.21
2001	$29,452.21	$29,452.21 x 13.38% = $3,940.71	$29,452.21 x .937% = $275.97	$29,452.21 + 3,940.71 + 275.97 =$33,668.88
2002	$33,668.88	$33,668.88 x 13.38% = $4,504.90	$33,668.88 x .937% =$315.48	$33,668.88 + 4,504.90 + 315.48 =$38,489.25
2003	$38,489.25	$38,489.25 x 13.38% = $5,149.86	$38,489.25 x .937% = 360.64	$38,489.25 + 5,149.86 + 360.64 =$43,999.76
2004	$43,999.76	$43,999.76 x 13.38% = $5,887.17	$43,999.76 x .937% = $412.28	$43,999.76 + 5,887.17 + 412.28 =$50,299.21
2005	$50,299.21	$50,299.21 x 13.38% = $6,730.03	$50,299.21 x .937% = $471.30	$50,299.21 + 6,730.03 471.30 =$57,500.55
2006	$57,500.55	$57,500.55 x 13.38% = $7,693.57	$57,500.55 x .937% = $538.78	$57,500.55 + 7,693.57 + 538.78 =$65,732.90
2007	$65,732.90	$65,732.90 x 13.38% = $8,795.06	$65,732.90 x .937% = $615.92	$65,732.90 + 8,795.06 + 615.92 = $75,143.88
2008	$75,143.88	$75,143.88 x 13.38% = $10,054.25	$75,143.88 x .937% = $704.10	$75,143.88 +10,054.25 + 704.10 = $85,902.23
2009	$85,902.23	$85,902.23 x 13.38% = $11,493.72	$85,902.23 x .937% = $804.90	$85,902.23 +11,493.72 + 804.90 = $98,200.85
2010	$98,200.85	$98,200.85 x 13.38% = $13,139.27	$98,200.85 x .937% = $920.14	$98,200.85 + 13,139.27 + 920.14 = $112,260.27
2011	$112,260.27	$112,260.27 x 13.38% = $15,020.42	$112,260.27 x .937% = $1,051.88	$112,260.27 + 15,020.42 + 1,051.88 =$128,332.57
2012	$128,332.57	$128,332.57 x 13.38% = $17,170.90	$128,332.57 x .937% =$1,202.48	$128,332.57 + 17,170.90 + 1,202.48 = $146,705.94
2013	$146,705.94	$146,705.94 x 13.38% = $19,629.25	$146,705.94 x .937% = $1,374.63	$146,705.94 + 19,629.25 + 1,374.63 = $167,709.83
2014	$167,709.83	$167,709.83 x 13.38% = $22,439.58	$167,709.83 x .937% = $1,570.44	$167,709.83 + 22,439.58 + 1,570.44 = $191,720.85
2015	$191,720.85	$191,720.85 x 13.38% = $25,652.25	$191,720.85 x .937% = $1,796.42	$191,720.85 + 25,652.25 + 1,796.42 = $219,169.52
2016	$219,169.52	$219,169.52 x 12.5% = $27,396.19	$219,169.52 x .937% = $2,053.62	$219,169.52 + 27,396.19 + 2,053.62 = $248,619.33
2017	$248,619.33	$248,619.33 x 12.5% = $31,077.42	$248,619.33 x .937% = 2,329.56	$248,619.33 + 31,077.42 + 2,329.56 = $282,026.31
2018	$282,026.31	$282,026.31 x 12.5% = $35,253.29 ÷ 365 (days) = $96.58 x 183 (days 2018) = $17,868.11	$282,026.31 x .937% = $2,642.59 ÷ 365 (days) = $7.24 x 183 (days 2018) = $1,339.39	$282,026.31 + 17,868.11 + 1,339.39 =$301,233.81 Convert this into PNGKina using current exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK = K729,648.53

123. Based on the above calculations and the basis for the calculations, I find the total amounts ultimately due and owing to the Plaintiffs in damages is the sum of K72,184,612.37. Accordingly, I order judgment for the Plaintiffs in that sum.

124. Additionally, in their prayer for relief, the Plaintiffs seek, and the Defendants concede to interest at 8% being added to the total judgment sum. Hence, I order interest at 8% to be calculated and added onto the judgement sum from the date of the issue of the writ to the date of judgment. In addition to the Defendants conceding, I consider such interest is due given the peculiar nature of this case as variously described in the body of this judgment. Costs are also ordered to follow the event in favour of the Plaintiffs to be agreed if not taxed. The total award with interests and costs as added shall be apportioned between each of the TRPAs in accordance with the assessment and figures set out in the judgment. Once the monies reach each of the TRPAs, they will be apportioned or distributed in accordance with their respective mediated agreements on sharing the proceeds. Judgment and orders accordingly.

125. As noted earlier, at the time of delivering the main judgment, the Court invited the parts to carefully go through the various calculations and assist the Court by confirming accuracy or identify any accidental slips or omissions that might be obvious and suggest corrections. This was dictated by the number of calculations the Court had to deal with and the high possibility of accidental slips or omissions on the part of the Court. The parties ably responded with the identification of clear accidental slips or omissions which require correction by the Court before the judgment is formally entered.

126. No serious issue has been taken on the Court having the power to correct its own decision or judgment under what is now well known and accepted as the slip rule principle. Order 8 Rule 59 (1) of the National Court Rules is relevant. This provision stipulates:

(1) Where there is a clerical mistake in a minute of a judgement or order, or an error in a minute of a judgement or order arising from an accidental slip or omission, the Court, on application by a party or of its own motion, may, at any time, correct the mistake or error.”

127. This provision has been considered and applied in a number of National Court decisions. One such decision is the one in Stephen John Rose v. The State.^[62] In that case, Gavara-Nanu J., was confronted with the question of whether he could correct errors which arose from the orders made by another judge (Sakora J). His Honour was correctly, of the view that, the question before him was a question of law and relevantly said of the principle:

“In my opinion, the question turns on the application of the established principles on slip rule. It is sufficient to start with the case of Wallbank and Mimifie v. The State (supra), a case relied upon by Mr. Kua. In that case, the Supreme Court adopted the principle enunciated in Autodesk Inc. v. Dyson (No. 2) (supra). The principle applies to a slip made by a court in an earlier judgment, which the same court would be required to rectify. Thus, the point to note here is that, such slip would be by the Court; which may arise as a result of a court proceeding on a misapprehension as to the facts or the law. ...

The inherent jurisdiction of the Court under O 8 r 59(1) to correct such errors is wide and an all embracing ...”

128. I also consider the views expressed by the Supreme Court on slip rule are relevant and applicable to any slip rule application in the National Court. In respect of that, I note the decision in Waim No 85 Ltd v. The State,^[63] succinctly summarised the relevant principles in this way:

“...it is worth recalling what the Supreme Court has on a number of occasions said about the purpose of slip rule applications. In Marabe v. Tomiape (2007) SC856 the Court held that seven general principles govern determination of a slip rule application:

(f) the purpose is not to allow new arguments that could have been put to the court before;

(g) the court must, before setting aside its previous decision, be satisfied, that it made a clear and manifest, not an arguable, error of law or fact on a critical issue.”^[64]

129. These principles were subsequently settled by the Supreme Court by its five-member bench decision in Andrew Trawen v. Steven Kama & Michael Laimo v. Steven Kama.^[65]

130. Applying these principles to the case before me, counsel were asked to carefully go through the Court’s main judgment and feel free to point out any obvious misapprehension, errors or omissions of the Court. This led to a notice of motion filed and moved by the Plaintiffs seeking the following corrections to the judgment:

“(i) Kuman TRP of Jimi’s investment are $8,800 but ... $800 is used in the judgment so correction need to be made on that figure with the changes to the calculation and projection;

(ii) All the First Plaintiffs and Second Plaintiffs TRP investment agreements were ... signed in 1967 with computation to commence in December of the year ...1967... like Waripa TRP. Correction need to be made on the principle computation table 1 to start at 1968 and end in 1977 and the “after 10 years calculation” in table 2 to commence all their calculation and projection in 1978 instead of 1979. These corrections had been made and need to be adopted as presented in the spreadsheet as the new judgment figures.

(iii) Because of the use of the spreadsheet the error identified in the body of the earlier judgment were corrected by the system and need to be adopted.”

131. The Court heard the motion for correction initially filed on 13^th July 2018 which was heard and orders made on 25^th July 2018. At that time, the parties and the Court focused on the Courts misapprehension of the facts especially correct year of investment for each of the TRPAs namely 1967 and the clear and obvious errors in the calculation of the various damages due to the Plaintiffs. Most of the facts remain unchanged. The only changes were to be centered on where the Court misapprehended the facts and the resultant obvious errors and omission and noted in the notice of motion which require correction. I decided in favour of accepting the suggested changes to correct the apparent misapprehension and the resultant errors and omissions. Consequently, this required a revisit of the relevant calculations and arrive at figures that are correct without changing any of the fundamentals forming the foundation for the judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, I asked the parties to provide a revised calculation for the first 10 years investment. I also asked the parties to provide revised calculations for the subsequent years at the end of the first 10 years investment period at the commercial interest rate of 13.38% until 2016 when that changed to 12.5%. This was necessitated by the fact that the corrections referred to in the notice of motion contained errors.

132. Orders following the initial hearing of the slip rule application were made. Unfortunately, the formal orders issued after the initial hearing were inconsistent with what had to be corrected. The Defendants argue for the errors in the formal orders to be maintained and the revision of the calculations to be guided by those orders. This cannot be permitted for the simple reason that the whole purpose of the application of the slip rule is to correct errors in the main judgment. The formal orders of 25^th July 2018 fail to correct the apparent and accepted slips on the part of the Court in the main judgment. Hence, those orders should not impede the correction of the obvious slips in the main judgment on the part of the Court as noted and accepted. For clarity, the following are the misapprehensions and errors or omissions in the main judgment and the orders issued on 25^th July 2018 that must be corrected forthwith:

(a) All the investments were made in 1967 as confirm by the pleadings and each of the investment instruments adduced in evidence. This means, the 10 years investment commenced in 1968 and ended in 1977 for all of the TRPAs;

(b) Given (a) above, commercial interest rate at 13.38 % should commence in the year 1978 for all of the TRPAs until 2016 when their commercial interest rates changes to 12.5% up to date of the main judgement;

134. Proceeding on this basis, I decided to revise the first 10 years of investment to allow for that period to be from 1968 to 1977 and thereafter allow for the application of the commercial interest rates and penalties commencing in the year 1978. There would thus be not much of a difference in the initial 10 years of investment. The only significant change necessitated by the correction of the main judgment is the amount of damages assessed for the Kuman TRPA starting at $8,800 instead of $880 and an additional one year added to the period the Plaintiffs have been kept out of their money commencing in 1978 from the misapprehended and wrong starting point of 1979 to the date of the main judgment. The relevant tables have thus been revised as set out in the following:

Periods passed the initial investment period commencing 1978 to 4^th July 2018

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$60,798.12	$60,798.12 x13.38% =$8,134.79	$60,798.12 x0.937% =$569.68	$60,798.12 +$8,134.79 +$569.68 =$69,502.59
1979	$69,502.59	$69,502.59 x13.38% =$9,299.45	$69,502.59 x0.937% =$651.24	$69,502.59 +$9,299.45 +$651.24 =$79,453.27
1980	$79,453.27	$79,453.27 x13.38% =$10,630.85	$79,453.27 x0.937% =$744.48	$79,453.27 +$10,630.85 +$744.48 =$90,828.60
1981	$90,828.60	$90,828.60 x13.38% =$12,152.87	$90,828.60 x0.937% =$851.06	$90,828.60 +$12,152.87 +$851.06 =$103,832.53
1982	$103,832.53	$103,832.53 x13.38% =$13,892.79	$103,832.53 x0.937% =$972.91	$103,832.53 +$13,892.79 +$972.91 =$118,698.23
1983	$118,698.23	$118,698.23 x13.38% =$15,881.82	$118,698.23 x0.937% =$1,112.20	$118,698.23 +$15,881.82 +$1,112.20 =$135,692.26
1984	$135,692.26	$135,692.26 x13.38% =$18,155.62	$135,692.26 x0.937% =$1,271.44	$135,692.26 +$18,155.62 +$1,271.44 =$155,119.32
1985	$155,119.32	$155,119.32 x13.38% =$20,754.96	$155,119.32 x0.937% =$1,453.47	$155,119.32 +$20,754.96 +$1,453.47 =$177,327.75
1986	$177,327.75	$177,327.75 x13.38% =$23,726.45	$177,327.75 x0.937% =$1,661.56	$177,327.75 +$23,726.45 +$1,661.56 =$202,715.77
1987	$202,715.77	$202,715.77 x13.38% =$27,123.37	$202,715.77 x0.937% =$1,899.45	$202,715.77 +$27,123.37 +$1,899.45 =$231,738.58
1988	$231,738.58	$231,738.58 x13.38% =$31,006.62	$231,738.58 x0.937% =$2,171.39	$231,738.58 +$31,006.62 +$2,171.39 =$264,916.60
1989	$264,916.60	$264,916.60 x13.38% =$35,445.84	$264,916.60 x0.937% =$2,482.27	$264,916.60 +$35,445.84 +$2,482.27 =$302,844.70
1990	$302,844.70	$302,844.70 x13.38% =$40,520.62	$302,844.70 x0.937% =$2,837.65	$302,844.70 +$40,520.62 +$2,837.65 =$346,202.98
1991	$346,202.98	$346,202.98 x13.38% =$46,321.96	$346,202.98 x0.937% =$3,243.92	$346,202.98 +$46,321.96 +$3,243.92 =$395,768.86
1992	$395,768.86	$395,768.86 x13.38% =$52,953.87	$395,768.86 x0.937% =$3,708.35	$395,768.86 +$52,963.87 +$3,708.35 =$452,431.09
1993	$452,431.09	$452,431.09 x13.38% =$60,535.28	$452,431.09 x0.937% =$4,239.28	$452,431.09 +$60,535.28 +$4,239.28 =$517,205.65
1994	$517,205.65	$517,205.65 x13.38% =$69,202.12	$517,205.65 x0.937% =$4,846.22	$517,205.65 +$69,202.12 +$4,846.22 =$591,253.98
1995	$591,253.98	$591,253.98 x13.38% =$79,109.78	$591,253.98 x0.937% =$5,540.05	$591,253.98 +$79,109.78 +$5,540.05 =$675,903.81
1996	$675,903.81	$675,903.81 x13.38% =$90,435.93	$675,903.81 x0.937% =$6,333.22	$675,903.81 +$90,435.93 +$6,333.22 =$772,672.96
1997	$772,672.96	$772,672.96 x13.38% =$103,383.64	$772,672.69 x0.937% =$7,239.95	$772,672.69 +$103,383.64 +$7,239.95 =$883,296.55
1998	$883,296.55	$883,296.55 x13.38% =$118,185.08	$883,296.55 x0.937% =$8,276.49	$883,296.55 +$118,185.08 +$8,276.49 =$1,009,758.12
1999	$1,009,758.12	$1,009,758.12 x13.38% =$135,105.64	$1,009,758.12 x0.937% =$9,461.43	$1,009,758.12 +$135,105.64 +$9,461.43 =$1,154,325.19
2000	$1,154,325.19	$1,154,325.19 x13.38% =$154,448.71	$1,154,325.19 x0.937% =$10,816.03	$1,154.325.19 +$154,448.71 +$10,816.03 =$1,319,589.93
2001	$1,319,589.93	$1,319,589.93 x13.38% =$176,561.13	$1,319,589.93 x0.937% =$12,364.56	$1,319,589.93 +$176,561.13 +$12,364.56 =$1,508,515.62
200-2	$1,508,515.62	$1,508,515.62 x13.38% =$201,839.39	$1,508,515.62 x0.937% =$14,134.79	$1,508,515.62 +$201,839.39 +$14,134.79 =$1,724,498.80
2003	$1,724,489.80	$1,724,489.80 x13.38% =$230,736.73	$1,724,489.80 x0.937% =$16,158.47	$1,724,489.80 +$230,736.73 +$16,158.47 =$1,971,385.00
2004	$1,971,385.00	$1,971.385.00 x13.38% =$263,771.31	$1,971,385.00 x0.937% =$18,471.88	$1,971,385.00 +$263,771.31 +$18,471.88 =$2,253,628.19
2005	$2,253,628.19	$2,253,628.19 x13.38% =$301,535.45	$2,253,628.19 x0.937% =$21,116.50	$2,253,628.19 +$301,535.45 +$21,116.50 =$2,576,280.14
2006	$2,576,280.14	$2,576,280.14 x13.38% =$344,706.28	$2,576,280.14 x0.937% =$24,139.74	$2,576,280.14 +$344,706.28 +$24,139.74 =$2,945,126.17
2007	$2,945,126.17	$2,945,126.17 x13.38% =$394,057.88	$2,945,126.17 x0.937% =$27,595.83	$2,945,126.17 +$394,057.88 +$27,595.83 =$3,366,779.88
2008	$3,366,779.88	$3,366,779.88 x13.38% =$450,475.15	$3,366,779.88 x0.937% =$31,546.73	$3,366,779.88 +$450,475.15 +$31,546.73 = $3,848,801.76
2009	$3,848,801.76	$3,848,801.76 x13.38% =$514,969.68	$3,848,801.76 x0.937% =$36,063.27	$3,848,801.76 +$514,969.68 +$36,063.27 =$4,399,834.71
2010	$4,399,834.71	$4,399,834.71 x13.38% =$588,697.88	$4,399,834.71 x0.937% =$41,226.45	$4,399,834.71 +$588,697.88 +$41,226.45 =$5,029,759.04
2011	$5,029,759.04	$5,029,759.04 x13.38% =$672,981.76	$5,029,759.04 x0.937% =$47,128.84	$5,029,759.04 +$672,981.76 +$47,128.84 =$5,749,869.64
2012	$5,749,869.64	$5,749,869.64 x13.38% =$769,332.56	$5,749,869.64 x0.937% =$53,876.28	$5,749,869.64 +$769,332.56 +$53,876.28 =$6,573,078.48
2013	$6,573,078.48	$6,573,078.48 x13.38% =$879,477.90	$6,573,078.48 x0.937% =$61,589.75	$6,573,078.48 +$879,477.90 +$61,589.75 =$7,514,146.12
2014	$7,514,146.12	$7,514,146.12 x13.38% =$1,005,392.75	$7,514,146.12 x0.937% =$70,407.55	$7,514,146.12 +$1,005,392.75 +$70,407.55 =$8,589,946.43
2015	$8,589,946.43	$8,589,946.43 x13.38% =$1,149,334.83	$8,589,946.43 x0.937% =$80,487.80	$8,589,946.43 +$1,149,334.83 +$80,487.80 =$9,819,769.06
2016	$9,819,769.06	$9,819,769.06 x12.50% =$1,227,471.13	$9,819,769.06 x0.937% =$92,011.24	$9,819,769.06 +$1,227,471,13 +$92,011.24 =$11,139,251.42
2017	$11,139,251.42	$11,139,251.42 x12.50% =$1,392,406.43	$11,139,251.42 X0.937% =$104,374.79	$11,139,251.42 +$1,392,406.43 +$104,374.79 =$12,636,032.64
2018	$12,636,032.64	$12,636,032.64 x12.5% =$1,579,504.08 $1,579,504.08 /365 days =$4,327.41 $4,327.41 x185 days =$800,570.56	$12,636,032.64 x0.937% =$118,399.63 $118,399,63 /365 days =$324.38 $324.38 x185 days =$60,010.77	$12,636,032.64 +$800,570.56 +$60,010.77 =$13,496,613.97 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K32,691,498.35

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$24,449.69	$24,449.69 x13.38% =$3,271.37	$24,449.69 x0.937% =$229.09	$24,449.69 +$3,271.37 +$229.09 =$27,950.15
1979	$27,950.15	$27,950.15 x13.38% =$3,739.73	$27,950.15 x0.937% =$261,89	$27,950.15 +$3,739.73 +$261.89 =$31,951.78
1980	$31,951.78	$31,951.78 x13.38% =$4,275.15	$31,951.78 x0.937% =$299.39	$31,951.78 +$4,275.15 +$299.39 =$36,526.31
1981	$36,526.31	$36,526.31 x13.38% =$4,887.22	$36,526.31 x0.937% =$342.25	$36,526.31 +$4,887.22 +$342.25 =$41,755.78
1982	$41,755.78	$41,755.78 x13.38% =$5,586.92	$41,755.78 x0.937% =$391.25	$41,755.78 +$5,586.92 +$391.25 =$47,733.96
1983	$47,733.96	$47,733.96 x13.38% =$6,386.80	$47,733.96 x0.937% =$447.27	$47,733.96 +$6,386.80 +$477.27 =$54,568.03
1984	$54,568.03	$54,568.03 x13.38% =$7,301.20	$54,568.03 x0.937% =$511.30	$54,568.03 +$7,301.20 +$511.30 =$62,380.53
1985	$62,380.53	$62,380.53 x13.38% =$8,346.52	$62,380.53 x0.937% =$584.51	$62,380.53 +$8,346.52 +$584.51 =$71,311.56
1986	$71,311.56	$71,311.56 x13.38% =$9,541.49	$71,311.56 x0.937% =$668.19	$71,311.56 +$9,541.49 +$668.19 =$81,521.23
1987	$81,521.23	$81,521.23 x13.38% =$10,907.54	$81,521.23 x0.937% =$763.85	$81,521.23 +$10,907.54 +$668.19 =$93,192.63
1988	$93,192.63	$93,192.63 x13.38% =$12,469.17	$93,192.63 x0.937% =$873.21	$93,192.63 +$12,469.17 +$873.21 =$106,535.01
1989	$106,535.01	$106,535.01 x13.38% =$14,254.38	$106,535.01 x0.937% =$998.23	$106,535.01 +$14,254.38 +$998.23 =$121,787.63
1990	$121,787.63	$121,787.63 x13.38% =$16,295.19	$121,787.63 x0.937% =$1,141.15	$121,787.63 +$16,295.19 +$1,141.15 =$139,223.97
1991	$139,223.97	$139,223.97 x13.38% =$18,628.17	$139,223.97 x0.937% =$1,304.53	$139,223.97 +$18,628.17 +$1,304.53 =$159,156.66
1992	$159,156.66	$159,156.66 x13.38% =$21,295.16	$159,156.66 x0.937% =$1,491.30	$159,156.66 +$21,295.16 +$1,491.30 =$181,943.12
1993	$181,943.12	$181,943.12 x13.38% =$24,343.99	$181,943.12 x0.937% =$1,704.81	$181,943.12 +$24,343.99 +$1,704.81 =$207,991.92
1994	$207,991.92	$207,991.92 x13.38% =$27,829.32	$207,991.92 x0.937% =$1,948.88	$207,991.92 +$27,829.32 +$1,948.88 =$237,770.12
1995	$237,770.12	$237,770.12 x13.38% =$31,813.64	$237,770.12 x0.937% =$2,227.91	$237,770.12 +$31,813.64 +$2,227.91 =$271,811.67
1996	$271,811.67	$271,811.67 x13.38% =$36,368.40	$271,811.67 x0.937% =$2,546.88	$271,811.67 +$36,368.40 +$2,546.88 =$310,726.94
1997	$310,726.94	$310,726.94 x13.38% =$41,575.27	$310,726.94 x0.937% =$2,911.51	$310,726.94 +$41,575.27 +$2,911.51 =$355,213.72
1998	$355,213.72	$355,213.72 x13.38% =$47,527.60	$355,213.72 x0.937% =$3,328.35	$355,213.72 +$47,527.60 +$3,328.35 =$406,069.67
1999	$406,069.67	$406,069.67 x13.38% =$54,332.12	$406,069.67 x0.937% =$3,804.87	$406,069.67 +$54,332.12 +$3,804.87 =$464,206.66
2000	$464,206.66	$464,206.66 x13.38% =$62,110.85	$464,206.66 x0.937% =$4,349.62	$464,206.66 +$62,110.85 +$4,349.62 =$530,667.13
2001	$530,667.13	$530,667.13 x13.38% =$71,003.26	$530,667.13 x0.937% =$4,972.35	$530,667.13 +$71,003.26 +$4,972.35 =$606,642.75
200-2	$606,642.75	$606,642.75 x13.38% =$81,168.80	$606,642.75 x0.937% =$5,684.24	$606,642.75 +$81,168.80 +$5,684.24 =$693,495.79
2003	$693,495.79	$693,495.79 x13.38% =$92,789.74	$693,495.79 x0.937% =$6,498.06	$693,495.79 +$92,789.74 +$6,498.06 =$792,783.58
2004	$792,783.58	$792,783.58 x13.38% =$106,074.44	$792,783.58 x0.937% =$7,428.38	$792,783.58 +$106,074.44 +$7,428.38 =$906,286.40
2005	$906,286.40	$906,286.40 x13.38% =$121,261.12	$906,286.40 x0.937% =$8,491.90	$906,286.40 +$121,261.12 +$8,491.90 =$1,036,039.43
2006	$1,036,039.43	$1,036,039.43 x13.38% =$138,622.08	$1,036,039.43 x0.937% =$9,707.69	$1,036,039.43 +$138,622.08 +$9,707.69 =$1,184,369.19
2007	$1,184,369.19	$1,184,369.19 x13.38% =$158,468.60	$1,184,369.19 x0.937% =$11,097.54	$1,184,369.19 +$158,468.60 +$11,097.54 =$1,353,935.33
2008	$1,353,935.33	$1,353,935.33 x13.38% =$181,156.55	$1,353,935.33 x0.937% =$12,686.37	$1,353,935.33 +$181,156.55 +$12,686.37 = $1,547,778.25
2009	$1,547,778.25	$1,547,778.25 x13.38% =$207,092.73	$1,547,778.25 x0.937% =$14,502.68	$1,547,778.25 +$207,092.73 +$14,502.68 =$1,769,373.67
2010	$1,769,373.67	$1,769,373.67 x13.38% =$236,742.20	$1,769,373.67 x0.937% =$16,579.03	$1,769,373.67 +$236,742.20 +$16,579.03 =$2,022,694.89
2011	$2,022,694.89	$2,022,694.89 x13.38% =$270,636.58	$2,022,694.89 x0.937% =$18,952.65	$2,022,694.89 +$270,636.58 +$18,952.65 =$2,312,284.12
2012	$2,312,284.12	$2,312,284.12 x13.38% =$309,383.62	$2,312,284.12 x0.937% =$21,666.10	$2,312,284.12 +$309,383.62 +$21,666.10 =$2,643,333.84
2013	$2,643,333.84	$2,643,333.84 x13.38% =$353,678.07	$2,643,333.84 x0.937% =$24,768.04	$2,643,333.84 +$353,678.07 +$24,768.04 =$3,021,779.95
2014	$3,021,779.95	$3,021,779.95 x13.38% =$404,314.16	$3,021,779.95 x0.937% =$28,314.08	$3,021,779.95 +$404,314.16 +$28,314.08 =$3.454,408.18
2015	$3,454,408.18	$3,454,408.18 x13.38% =$462,199.81	$3,454,408.18 x0.937% =$32,367.80	$3,454,408.18 +$462,199.81 +$32,367.80 =$3,948,975.80
2016	$3,948,975.80	$3,948,975.80 x12.50% =$493,621.97	$3,948,975.80 x0.937% =$37,001.90	$3,948,975.80 +$493,621.97 +$37,001.90 =$4,479,599.68
2017	$4,479,599.68	$4,479,599.68 x12.50% =$559,949.96	$4,479,599.68 x0.937% =$41,973.85	$4,479,599.68 +$559,949.96 +$41,973.85 =$5,081,523.49
2018	$5,081,523.49	$5,081,523.49 x12.5% =$635,190.44 $635,190.44 /365 days =$1,740.25 $1,740.25 x185 days =$321,945.84	$5,081,523.49 x0.937% =$47,613.88 $47,613.88 /365 days =$130.45 $130.45 x185 days =$24,133.06	$5,081,523.49 +$321,945.84 +$24,133.06 =$5,427,602.38 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K13,146,738.49

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$11,193.62	$11,193.62 x13.38% =$1,497.71	$11,193.62 x0.937% =$104.88	$11,193.62 +$1,497.71 +$104.88 =$12,796.21
1979	$12,796.21	$12,796.21 x13.38% =$1,712.13	$12,796.21 x0.937% =$119.90	$12,796.21 +$1,712.13 +$119.90 =$14,628.24
1980	$14,628.24	$14,628.24 x13.38% =$1,957.26	$14,628.24 x0.937% =$137.07	$14,628.24 +$1,957.26 +$137.07 =$16,722.57
1981	$16,722.57	$16,722.57 x13.38% =$2,237.48	$16,722.57 x0.937% =$156.69	$16,722.57 +$2,237.48 +$156.69 =$19,116.74
1982	$19,116.74	$19,116.74 x13.38% =$2,557.82	$19,116.74 x0.937% =$179.12	$19,116.74 +$2,557.82 +$179.12 =$21,853.68
1983	$21,853.68	$21,853.68 x13.38% =$2,924.02	$21,853.68 x0.937% =$204.77	$21,853.68 +$2,924.02 +$204.77 =$24,982.48
1984	$24,982.48	$24,982.48 x13.38% =$3,342.66	$24,982.48 x0.937% =$234.09	$24,982.48 +$3,342.66 +$234.09 =$28,559.22
1985	$28,559.22	$28,559.22 x13.38% =$3,821.22	$28,559.22 x0.937% =$267.60	$28,559.22 +$3,821.22 +$267.60 =$32,648.04
1986	$32,648.04	$32,648.04 x13.38% =$4,368.31	$32,648.04 x0.937% =$305.91	$32,648.04 +$4,368.31 +$305.91 =$37,322.26
1987	$37,322.26	$37,322.26 x13.38% =$4,993.72	$37,322.26 x0.937% =$349.71	$37,322.26 +$4,993.72 +$349.71 =$42,665.69
1988	$42,665.69	$42,665.69 x13.38% =$5,708.67	$42,665.69 x0.937% =$399.78	$42,665.69 +$5,708.67 +$399.78 =$48,774.13
1989	$48,774.13	$48,774.13 x13.38% =$6,525.98	$48,774.13 x0.937% =$457.01	$48,774.13 +$6,525.98 +$457.01 =$55,757.13
1990	$55,757.13	$55,757.13 x13.38% =$7,460.30	$55,757.13 x0.937% =$522.44	$55,757.13 +$7,460.30 +$522.44 =$63,739.87
1991	$63,739.87	$63,739.87 x13.38% =$8,528.40	$63,739.87 x0.937% =$597.24	$63,739.87 +$8,528.40 +$597.24 =$72,865.51
1992	$72,865.51	$72,865.51 x13.38% =$9,749.41	$72,865.51 x0.937% =$682.75	$$72,865.51 +$9,749.41 +$682.75 =$83,297.67
1993	$83,297.67	$83,297.67 x13.38% =$11,145.23	$83,297.67 x0.937% =$780.50	$83,297.67 +$11,145.23 +$780.50 =$95,223.39
1994	$95,223.39	$95,223.39 x13.38% =$12,740.89	$95,223.39 x0.937% =$892.24	$95,223.39 +$12,740.89 +$892.24 =$108,856.53
1995	$108,856.53	$108,856.53 x13.38% =$14,565.00	$108,856.53 x0.937% =$1,019.99	$108,856.53 +$14,565.00 +$1,019.99 =$124,441.52
1996	$124,441.52	$124,441.52 x13.38% =$16,650.28	$124,441.52 x0.937% =$1,166.02	$124,441.52 +$16,650.28 +$1,166.02 =$142,257.81
1997	$142,257.81	$142,257.81 x13.38% =$19,034.09	$142,257.81 x0.937% =$1,332.96	$142,257.81 +$19,034.09 +$1,332.96 =$162,624.86
1998	$162,624.86	$162,624.86 x13.38% =$21,759.21	$162,624.86 x0.937% =$1,523.79	$162,624.86 +$21,759.21 +$1,523.79 =$185,907.86
1999	$185,907.86	$185,907.86 x13.38% =$24,874.47	$185,907.86 x0.937% =$1,741.96	$185,907.86 +$24,874.47 +$1,741.96 =$212,524.29
2000	$212,524.29	$212,524.29 x13.38% =$28,435.75	$212,524.29 x0.937% =$1,991.35	$212,524.29 +$28,435.75 +$1,991.35 =$242,951.39
2001	$242,951.39	$242,951.39 x13.38% =$32,506.90	$242,951.39 x0.937% =$2,276.45	$242,951.39 +$32,506.90 +$2,276.45 =$277,734.74
200-2	$277,734.74	$277,734.74 x13.38% =$37,160.91	$277,734.74 x0.937% =$2,602.37	$277,734.74 +$37,160.91 +$2,602.37 =$317,498.03
2003	$317,498.03	$317,498.03 x13.38% =$42,481.24	$317,498.03 x0.937% =$2,974.96	$317,498.03 +$42,481.24 +$2,974.96 =$362,954.22
2004	$362,954.22	$362,954.22 x13.38% =$48,563.27	$362,954.22 x0.937% =$3,400.88	$362,954.22 +$48,563.27 +$3,400.88 $414,918.37
2005	$414,918.37	$414,918.37 x13.38% =$55,516.08	$414,918.37 x0.937% =$3,887.79	$414,918.37 +$55,516.08 +$3,887.79 =$474,322.24
2006	$474,322.24	$474,322.24 x13.38% =$63,464.32	$474,322.24 x0.937% =$4,444.40	$474,322.24 +$63,464.32 +$4,444.40 =$542,230.95
2007	$542,230.95	$542,230.95 x13.38% =$72,550.50	$542,230.95 x0.937% =$5,080.70	$542,230.95 +$72,550.50 +$5,080.70 =$619,862.16
2008	$619,862.16	$619,862.16 x13.38% =$82,937.56	$619,862.16 x0.937% =$5,808.11	$619,862.16 +$82,937.56 +$5,808.11 =$708,607.82
2009	$708,607.82	$708,607.82 x13.38% =$94,811.73	$708,607.82 x0.937% =$6,639.66	$708,607.82 +$94,811.73 +$6,639.66 =$810,059.21
2010	$810,059.21	$810,059.21 x13.38% =$108,385.92	$810,059.21 x0.937% =$7,590.25	$810,059.21 +$108,385.92 +$7,590.25 =$926,035.38
2011	$926,035.38	$926,035.38 x13.38% =$123,903.53	$926,035.38 x0.937% =$8,676.95	$926,035.38 +$123,903.53 +$8,676.95 =$1,058,615.87
2012	$1,058,615.87	$1,058,615.87 x13.38% =$141,642.80	$1,058,615.87 x0.937% =$9,919.23	$1,058,615.87 +$141,642.80 +$9,919.23 =$1,210,177.90
2013	$1,210,177.90	$1,210,177.90 x13.38% =$161,921.80	$1,210,177.90 x0.937% =$11,339.37	$1,210,177.90 +$161,921.80 +$11,339.37 =$1,383,439.07
2014	$1,383,439.07	$1,383,439.07 x13.38% =$185,104.15	$1,383,439.07 x0.937% =$12,962.82	$1,383,439.07 +$185,104.15 +$12,962.82 =$1,581,506.04
2015	$1,581,506.04	$1,581,506.04 x13.38% =$211,605.51	$1,581,506.04 x0.937% =$14,818.71	$1,581,506.04 +$211,605.51 +$14,818.71 =$1,807,930.26
2016	$1,807,930.26	$1,807,930.26 x12.50% =$225,991.28	$1,807,930.26 x0.937% =$16,940.31	$1,807,930.26 +$225,991.28 +$16,940.31 =$2,050,861.85
2017	$2,050,861.85	$2,050,861.85 x12.50% =$256,357.73	$2,050,861.85 x0.937% =$19,216.58	$2,050,861.85 +$256,357.73 +$19,216.58 =$2,326,436.16
2018	$2,326,436.16	$2,326,436.16 x12.5% =$290,804.52 $290,804.52 /365 days =$796.72 $796.72 x185 days =$147,394.07	$2,326,436.16 x0.937% =$21,798.71 $21,798.71 /365 days =$59.72 $59.72 x185 days =$11,048.66	$2,326,436.16 +$147,394.07 +$11,048.66 =$2,484,878.89 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K6,018,873.65

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$10,400.37	$10,400.37 x13.38% =$1,391.57	$10,400.37 x0.937% =$97.45	$10,400.37 +$1,391.57 +$97.45 =$11,889.39
1979	$11,889.39	$11,889.39 x13.38% =$1,590.80	$11,889.39 x0.937% =$111.40	$11,889.39 +$1,590.80 +$111.40 =$13,591.60
1980	$13,591.60	$13,591.60 x13.38% =$1,818.56	$13,591.60 x0.937% =$127.35	$13,591.60 +$1,818.56 +$127.35 =$15,537.50
1981	$15,537.50	$15,537.50 x13.38% =$2,078.92	$15,537.50 x0.937% =$145.59	$15,537.50 +$2,078.92 $145.59 =$17,762.01
1982	$17,762.01	$17,762.01 x13.38% =$2,376.56	$17,762.01 x0.937% =$166.43	$17,762.01 +$2,376.56 +$166.43 =$20,304.99
1983	$20,304.99	$20,304.99 x13.38% =$2,716.81	$20,304.99 x0.937% =$190.26	$20,304.99 +$2,716.81 +$190.26 =$23,212.06
1984	$23,212.06	$23,212.06 x13.38% =$3,105.77	$23,212.06 x0.937% =$217.50	$23,212.06 +$3,105.77 +$217.50 =$26,535.33
1985	$26,535.33	$26,535.33 x13.38% =$3,550.43	$26,535.33 x0.937% =$248.64	$26,535.33 +$3,550.43 +$248.64 =$30,334.40
1986	$30,334.40	$30,334.40 x13.38% =$4,058.74	$30,334.40 x0.937% =$284.23	$30,334.40 +$4,058.74 +$284.23 =$34,677.37
1987	$34,677.37	$34,677.37 x13.38% =$4,639.83	$34,677.37 x0.937% =$324.93	$34,677.37 +$4,639.83 +$324.93 =$39,642.13
1988	$39,642.13	$39,642.13 x13.38% =$5,304.12	$39,642.13 x0.937% =$371.45	$39,642.13 +$5,304.12 +$371.45 =$45,317.69
1989	$45,317.69	$45,317.69 x13.38% =$6,063.51	$45,317.69 x0.937% =$424.63	$45,317.69 +$6,063.51 +$424.63 =$51,805.83
1990	$51,805.83	$51,805.83 x13.38% =$6,931.62	$51,805.83 x0.937% =$554.92	$51,805.83 +$6,931.62 +$554.92 =$67,701.81
1991	$59,222.87	$59,222.87 x13.38% =$7,924.02	$59,222.87 x0.937% =$554.92	$59,222.87 +$7,924.02 +$554.92 =$67,701.81
1992	$67,701.81	$67,701.81 x13.38% =$9,058.50	$67,701.81 x0.937% =$634.37	$67,701.81 +$9,058.50 +$634.37 =$77,394.67
1993	$77,394.67	$77,394.67 x13.38% =$10,355.41	$77,394.67 x0.937% =$725.19	$77,394.67 +$10,355.41 +$725.19 =$88,475.27
1994	$88,475.27	$88,475.27 x13.38% =$11,837.99	$88,475.27 x0.937% =$829.01	$88,475.27 +$11,837.99 +$829.01 =$101,142.27
1995	$101,142.27	$101,142.27 x13.38% =$13,532.84	$101,142.27 x0.937% =$947.70	$101,142.27 +$13,532.84 +$947.70 =$115,622.81
1996	$115,622.81	$115,622.81 x13.38% =$15,470.33	$115,622.81 x0.937% =$1,083.39	$115,622.81 +$15,470.33 +$1,083.39 =$132,176.53
1997	$132,176.53	$132,176.53 x13.38% =$17,685.22	$132,176.53 x0.937% =$1,238.49	$132,176.53 +$17,685.22 +$1,238.49 =$151,100.24
1998	$151,100.24	$151,100.24 x13.38% =$20,217.21	$151,100.24 x0.937% =$1,415.81	$151,100.24 +$20,217.21 +$1,415.81 =$172,733.27
1999	$172,733.27	$172,733.27 x13.38% =$23,111.71	$172,733.27 x0.937% =$1,618.51	$172,733.27 +$23,111.71 +$1,618.51 =$197,463.49
2000	$197,463.49	$197,463.49 x13.38% =$26,420.61	$197,463.49 x0.937% =$1,850.23	$197,463.49 +$26,420.61 +$1,850.23 =$225,734.34
2001	$225,734.34	$225,734.34 x13.38% =$30,203.25	$225,734.34 x0.937% =$2,115.13	$225,734.34 +$30,203.25 +$2,115.13 =$258,052.72
2002	$258,052.72	$258,052.72 x13.38% =$34,527.45	$258,052.72 x0.937% =$2,417.95	$258,052.72 +$34,527.45 +$2,417.95 =$294,998.13
2003	$294,998.13	$294,998.13 x13.38% =$39,470.75	$294,998.13 x0.937% =$2,764.13	$294,998.13 +$39,470.75 +$2,764.13 =$337,233.01
2004	$337,233.01	$337,233.01 x13.38% =$45,121.78	$337,233.01 x0.937% =$3,159.87	$337,233.01 +$45,121.78 +$3,159.87 =$385,514.66
2005	$385,514.66	$385,514.66 x13.38% =$51,581.86	$385,514.66 x0.937% =$3,612.27	$385,514.66 +$51,581.86 +$3,612.27 =$440,708.79
2006	$440,708.79	$440,708.79 x13.38% =$58,966.84	$440,708.79 x0.937% =$4,129.44	$440,708.79 +$58,966.84 +$4,129.44 =$503,805.07
2007	$503,805.07	$503,805.07 x13.38% =$67,409.12	$503,805.07 x0.937% =$4,720.65	$503,805.07 +$67,409.12 +$4,720.65 =$575,934.84
2008	$575,934.84	$575,934.84 x13.38% =$77,060.08	$575,934.84 x0.937% =$5,396.51	$575,934.84 +$77,060.08 +$5,396.51 =$658,391.44
2009	$658,391.44	$658,391.44 x13.38% =$88,092.77	$658,391.44 x0.937% =$6,169.13	$658,391.44 +$88,092.77 +$6,169.13 =$752,653.34
2010	$752,653.34	$752,653.34 x13.38% =$100,705.02	$752,653.34 x0.937% =$7,052.36	$752,653.34 +$100,705.02 +$7,052.36 =$860,410.72
2011	$860,410.72	$860,410.72 x13.38% =$115,122.95	$860,410.72 x0.937% =$8,062.05	$860,410.72 +$115,122.95 +$8,062.05 =$983,595.72
2012	$983,595.72	$983,595.72 x13.38% =$131,605.11	$983,595.72 x0.937% =$9,216.29	$983,595.72 +$131,605.11 +$9,216.29 =$1,124,417.12
2013	$1,124,417.12	$1,124,417.12 x13.38% =$150,447.01	$1,124,417.12 x0.937% =$10,535.79	$1,124,417.12 +$150,447.01 +$10,535.79 =$1,285,399.92
2014	$1,285,399.92	$1,285,399.92 x13.38% =$171,986.51	$1,285,399.92 x0.937% =$12,044.20	$1,285,399.92 +$171,986.51 +$12,044.20 =$1,469,430.62
2015	$1,469,430.62	$1,469,430.62 x13.38% =$196,609.82	$1,469,430.62 x0.937% =$13,768.56	$1,469,430.62 +$196,609.82 +$13,768.56 =$1,679,809.01
2016	$1,679,809.01	$1,679,809.01 x12.50% =$209,976.13	$1,679,809.01 x0.937% =$15,739.81	$1,679,809.01 +$209,976.13 +$15,739.81 =$1,905,524.94
2017	$1,905,524.94	$1,905,524.94 x12.50% =$238,190.62	$1,905,524.94 x0.937% =$17,854.77	$1,905,524.94 +$238,190.62 +$17,854.77 =$2,161,570.33
2018	$2,161,570.33	$2,161,570.33 x12.5% =$270,196.29 $270,196.29 /365 days =$740.26 $740.26 x185 days =$136,948.81	$2,161,570.33 x0.937% =$20,253.91 $20,253.91 /365 days =$55.49 $55.49 x185 days =$10,265.68	$2,161,570.33 +$136,948.81 +$10,265.68 =$2,308,784.82 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K5,592,338.58

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$4,688.98	$4,688.98 x13.38% =$627.39	$4,688.98 x0.937% =$43.94	$4,688.98 +$627.39 +$43.94 =$5,360.30
1979	$5,360.30	$5,360.30 x13.38% =$717.21	$5,360.30 x0.937% =$50.23	$5,360.30 +$717.21 +$50.23 =$6,127.74
1980	$6,127.74	$6,127.74 x13.38% =$819.89	$6,127.74 x0.937% =$57.42	$6,127.74 +$819.89 +$57.42 =$7,005.04
1981	$7,005.04	$7,005.04 x13.38% =$937.27	$7,005.04 x0.937% =$65.64	$7,005.04 +$937.27 +$65.64 =$8,007.96
1982	$8,007.96	$8,007.96 x13.38% =$1,071.46	$8,007.96 x0.937% =$75.03	$8,007.96 +$1,071.46 +$75.03 =$9,154.45
1983	$9,154.45	$9,154.45 x13.38% =$1,224.87	$9,154.45 x0.937% =$85.78	$9,154.45 +$1,224.87 +$85.78 =$10,465.10
1984	$10,465.10	$10,465.10 x13.38% =$1,400.23	$10,465.10 x0.937% =$98.06	$10,465.10 +$1,400.23 +$98.06 =$11,963.39
1985	$11,963.39	$11,963.39 x13.38% =$1,600.70	$11,963.39 x0.937% =$112.10	$11,963.39 +$1,600.70 +$112.10 =$13,676.18
1986	$13,676.18	$13,676.18 x13.38% =$1,829.87	$13,676.18 x0.937% =$128.15	$13,676.18 +$1,829.87 +$128.15 =$15,634.20
1987	$15,634.20	$15,634.20 x13.38% =$2,091.86	$15,634.20 x0.937% =$146.49	$15,634.20 +$2,091.86 +$146.49 =$17,872.55
1988	$17,872.55	$17,872.55 x13.38% =$2,391.35	$17,872.55 x0.937% =$167.47	$17,872.55 +$2,391.35 +$167.47 =$20,431.37
1989	$20,431.37	$20,431.37 x13.38% =$2,733.72	$20,431.37 x0.937% =$191.44	$20,431.37 +$2,733.72 +$191.44 =$23,356.52
1990	$23,356.52	$23,356.52 x13.38% =$3,125.10	$23,356.52 x0.937% =$218.85	$23,356.52 +$3,125.10 +$218.85 =$26,700.48
1991	$26,700.48	$26,700.48 x13.38% =$3,572.52	$26,700.48 x0.937% =$250.18	$26,700.48 +$3,572.52 +$250.18 =$30,523.18
1992	$30,523.18	$30,523.18 x13.38% =$4,084.00	$30,523.18 x0.937% =$286.00	$30,523.18 +$4,084.00 +$286.00 =$34,893.19
1993	$34,893.19	$34,893.19 x13.38% =$4,668.71	$34,893.19 x0.937% =$326.95	$34,893.19 +$4,668.71 +$326.95 =$39,888.85
1994	$39,888.85	$39,888.85 x13.38% =$5,337.13	$39,888.85 x0.937% =$373.76	$39,888.85 +$5,337.13 +$373.76 =$45,599.73
1995	$45,599.73	$45,599.73 x13.38% =$6,101.24	$45,599.73 x0.937% =$427.27	$45,599.73 +$6,101.24 +$427.27 =$52,128.25
1996	$52,128.25	$52,128.25 x13.38% =$6,974.76	$52,128.25 x0.937% =$488.44	$52,128.25 +$6,974.76 +$488.44 =$59,591.45
1997	$59,591.45	$59,591.45 x13.38% =$7,973.34	$59,591.45 x0.937% =$558.37	$59,591.45 +$7,973.34 +$558.37 =$68,123.16
1998	$68,123.16	$68,123.16 x13.38% =$9,114.88	$68,123.16 x0.937% =$638.31	$68,123.16 +$9,114.88 +$638.31 =$77,876.35
1999	$77,876.35	$77,876.35 x13.38% =$10,419.86	$77,876.35 x0.937% =$729.70	$77,876.35 +$10,419.86 +$729.70 =$89,025.90
2000	$89,025.90	$89,025.90 x13.38% =$11,911.67	$89,025.90 x0.937% =$834.17	$89,025.90 +$11,911.67 +$834.17 =$101,771.74
2001	$101,771.74	$101,771.74 x13.38% =$13,617.06	$101,771.74 x0.937% =$953.60	$101,771.74 +$13,617.06 +$953.60 =$116,342.40
2002	$116,342.40	$116,342.40 x13.38% =$15,566.61	$116,342.40 x0.937% =$1,090.13	$116,342.40 +$15,566.61 +$1,090.13 =$132,999.15
2003	$132,999.15	$132,999.15 x13.38% =$17,795.29	$132,999.15 x0.937% =$1,246.20	$132,999.15 +$17,795.29 +$1,246.20 =$152,040.63
2004	$152,040.63	$152,040.63 x13.38% =$20,343.04	$152,040.63 x0.937% =$1,424.62	$152,040.63 +$20,343.04 +$1,424.62 =$173,808.29
2005	$173,808.29	$173,808.29 x13.38% =$23,255.55	$173,808.29 x0.937% =$1,628.58	$173,808.29 +$23,255.55 +$1,628.58 =$198,692.42
2006	$198,692.42	$198,692.42 x13.38% =$26,585.05	$198,692.42 x0.937% =$1,861.75	$198,692.42 +$26,585.05 +$1,861.75 =$227,139.22
2007	$227,139.22	$227,139.22 x13.38% =$30,391.23	$227,139.22 x0.937% =$2,128.29	$227,139.22 +$30,391.23 +$2,128.29 =$259,658.74
2008	$259,658.74	$259,658.74 x13.38% =$34,742.34	$259,658.74 x0.937% =$2,433.00	$259,658.74 +$34,742.34 +$2,433.00 =$296,834.08
2009	$296,834.08	$296,834.08 x13.38% =$39,716.40	$296,834.08 x0.937% =$2,781.34	$296,834.08 +$39,716.40 +$2,781.34 =$339,331.82
2010	$339,331.82	$339,331.82 x13.38% =$45,402.60	$339,331.82 x0.937% =$3,179.54	$339,331.82 +$45,402.60 +$3,179.54 =$387,913.95
2011	$387,913.95	$387,913.95 x13.38% =$51,902.89	$387,913.95 x0.937% =$3,634.75	$387,913.95 +$51,902.89 +$3,634.75 =$443,451.59
2012	$443,451.59	$443,451.59 x13.38% =$59,333.82	$443,451.59 x0.937% =$4,155.14	$443,451.59 +$59,333.82 +$4,155.14 =$506,940.56
2013	$506,940.56	$506,940.56 x13.38% =$67,828.65	$506,940.56 x0.937% =$4,750.03	$506,940.56 +$67,828.65 +$4,750.03 =$579,519.24
2014	$579,519.24	$579,519.24 x13.38% =$77,539.67	$579,519.24 x0.937% =$5,430.10	$579,519.24 +$77,539.67 +$5,430.10 =$662,489.01
2015	$662,489.01	$662,489.01 x13.38% =$88,641.03	$662,489.01 x0.937% =$6,207.52	$662,489.01 +$88,641.03 +$6,207.52 =$757,337.56
2016	$757,337.56	$757,337.56 x12.50% =$94,667.19	$757,337.56 x0.937% =$7,096.25	$757,337.56 +$94,667.19 +$7,096.25 =$859,101.01
2017	$859,101.01	$859,101.01 x12.50% =$107,387.63	$859,101.01 x0.937% =$8,049.78	$859,101.01 +$107,387.63 +$8,049.78 =$974,538.41
2018	$974,538.41	$974,538.41 x12.5% =$121,817.30 $121,817.30 /365 days =$333.75 $333.75 x185 days =$61,743.02	$974,538.41 x0.937% =$9,131.42 $9,131.42 /365 days =$25.02 $25.02 x185 days =$4,628.26	$974,538.41 +$61,743.02 +$4,628.26 =$1,040,909.68 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K2,521,291.43

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$16,217.53	$16,217.53 x13.38% =$2,169.91	$16,217.53 x0.937% =$151.96	$16,217.53 +$2,169.91 +$151.96 =$18,539.39
1979	$18,539.39	$18,539.39 x13.38% =$2,480.57	$18,539.39 x0.937% =$173.71	$18,539.39 +$2,480.57 +$173.71 =$21,193.68
1980	$21,193.68	$21,193.68 x13.38% =$2,835.71	$21,193.68 x0.937% =$198.58	$21,193.68 +$2,835.71 +$198.58 =$24,227.98
1981	$24,227.98	$24,227.98 x13.38% =$3,241.70	$24,227.98 x0.937% =$227.02	$24,227.98 +$3,241.70 +$227.02 =$27,696.70
1982	$27,696.70	$27,696.70 x13.38% =$3,705.82	$27,696.70 x0.937% =$259.52	$27,696.70 +$3,705.82 +$259.52 =$31,662.03
1983	$31,662.03	$31,662.03 x13.38% =$4,236.38	$31,662.03 x0.937% =$296.67	$31,662.03 +$4,236.38 +$296.67 =$36,195.09
1984	$36,195.09	$36,195.09 x13.38% =$4,842.90	$36,195.09 x0.937% =$339.15	$36,195.09 +$4,842.90 +$339.15 =$41,377.14
1985	$41,377.14	$41,377.14 x13.38% =$5,536.26	$41,377.14 x0.937% =$387.70	$41,377.14 +$5,536.26 +$387.70 =$47,301.10
1986	$47,301.10	$47,301.10 x13.38% =$6,328.89	$47,301.10 x0.937% =$443.21	$47,301.10 +$6,328.89 +$443.21 =$54,073.20
1987	$54,073.20	$54,073.20 x13.38% =$7,234.99	$54,073.20 x0.937% =$506.67	$54,073.20 +$7,234.99 +$506.67 =$61,814.86
1988	$61,814.86	$61,814.86 x13.38% =$8,270.83	$61,814.86 x0.937% =$579.21	$61,814.86 +$8,270.83 +$579.21 =$70,664.89
1989	$70,664.89	$70,664.89 x13.38% =$9,454.96	$70,664.89 x0.937% =$662.13	$70,664.89 +$9,454.96 +$662.13 =$80,781.99
1990	$80,781.99	$80,781.99 x13.38% =$10,808.63	$80,781.99 x0.937% =$756.93	$80,781.99 +$10,808.63 +$756.93 =$92,347.55
1991	$92,347.55	$92,347.55 x13.38% =$12,356.10	$92,347.55 x0.937% =$865.30	$92,347.55 +$12,356.10 +$865.30 =$105,568.94
1992	$105,568.94	$105,568.94 x13.38% =$16,147.42	$105,568.94 x0.937% =$1,130.80	$105,568.94 +$16,147.42 +$1,130.80 =$120,683.25
1993	$120,683.25	$120,683.25 x13.38% =$16,147.42	$120,683.25 x0.937% =$1,130.80	$120,683.25 +$16,147.42 +$1,130.80 =$137,961.47
1994	$137,961.47	$137,961.47 x13.38% =$18,459.24	$137,961.47 x0.937% =$1,292.70	$137,961.47 +$18,459.24 +$1,292.70 =$157,713.41
1995	$157,713.41	$157,713.41 x13.38% =$21,102.05	$157,713.41 x0.937% =$1,477.77	$157,713.41 +$21,102.05 +$1,477.77 =$180,293.24
1996	$180,293.24	$180,293.24 x13.38% =$24,123.24	$180,293.24 x0.937% =$1,689.35	$180,293.24 +$24,123.24 +$1,689.35 =$206,105.83
1997	$206,105.83	$206,105.83 x13.38% =$27,576.96	$206,105.83 x0.937% =$1,931.21	$206,105.83 +$27,576.96 +$1,931.21 =$235,614.00
1998	$235,614.00	$235,614.00 x13.38% =$31,525.15	$235,614.00 x0.937% =$2,207.70	$235,614.00 +$31,525.15 +$2,207.70 =$269,346.85
1999	$269,346.85	$269,346.85 x13.38% =$36,038.61	$269,346.85 x0.937% =$2,523.78	$269,346.85 +$36,038.61 +$2,523.78 =$307,909.24
2000	$307,909.24	$307,909.24 x13.38% =$41,198.26	$307,909.24 x0.937% =$2,885.11	$307,909.24 +$41,198.26 +$2,885.11 =$351,992.61
2001	$351,992.61	$351,992.61 x13.38% =$47,096.61	$351,992.61 x0.937% =$3,298.17	$351,992.61 +$47,096.61 +$3,298.17 =$402,387.39
2002	$402,387.39	$402,387.39 x13.38% =$53,839.43	$402,387.39 x0.937% =$3,770.37	$402,387.39 +$53,839.43 +$3,770.37 =$459,997.19
2003	$459,997.19	$459,997.19 x13.38% =$61,547.62	$459,997.19 x0.937% =$4,310.17	$459,997.19 +$61,547.62 +$4,310.17 =$525,854.99
2004	$525,854.99	$525,854.99 x13.38% =$70,359.40	$525,854.99 x0.937% =$4,927.26	$525,854.99 +$70,359.40 +$4,927.26 =$601,141.65
2005	$601,141.65	$601,141.65 x13.38% =$80,432.75	$601,141.65 x0.937% =$5,632.70	$601,141.65 +$80,432.75 +$5,632.70 =$687,207.10
2006	$687,207.10	$687,207.10 x13.38% =$91,948.31	$687,207.10 x0.937% =$6,439.13	$687,207.10 +$91,948.31 +$6,439.13 =$785,594.54
2007	$785,594.54	$785,594.54 x13.38% =$105,112.55	$785,594.54 x0.937% =$7,361.02	$785,594.54 +$105,112.55 +$7,361.02 =$898,068.11
2008	$898,068.11	$898,068.11 x13.38% =$120,161.51	$898,068.11 x0.937% =$8,414.90	$898,068.11 +$120,161.51 +$8,414.90 =$1,026,644.52
2009	$1,026,644.52	$1,026,644.52 x13.38% =$137,365.04	$1,026,644.52 x0.937% =$9,619.66	$1,026,644.52 +$137,365.04 +$9,619.66 =$1,173,629.22
2010	$1,173,629.22	$1,173,629.22 x13.38% =$157,031.59	$1,173,629.22 x0.937% =$10,996.91	$1,173,629.22 +$157,031.59 +$10,996.91 =$1,341,657.71
2011	$1,341,657.71	$1,341,657.71 x13.38% =$179,513.80	$1,341,657.71 x0.937% =$12,571.33	$1,341,657.71 +$179,513.80 +$12,571.33 =$1,533,742.85
2012	$1,533,742.85	$1,533,742.85 x13.38% =$205,214.79	$1,533,742.85 x0.937% =$14,371.17	$1,533,742.85 +$205,214.79 +$14,371.17 =$1,753,328.81
2013	$1,753,328.81	$1,753,328.81 x13.38% =$234,595.39	$1,753,328.81 x0.937% =$16,428.69	$1,753,328.81 +$234,595.39 +$16,428.69 =$2,004,352.89
2014	$2,004,352.89	$2,004,352.89 x13.38% =$268,182.42	$2,004,352.89 x0.937% =$18,780.79	$2,004,352.89 +$268,182.42 +$18,780.79 =$2,291,316.10
2015	$2,291,316.10	$2,291,316.10 x13.38% =$306,578.09	$2,291,316.10 x0.937% =$21,469.63	$2,291,316.10 +$306,578.09 +$21,469.63 =$2,619,363.82
2016	$2,619,363.82	$2,619,363.82 x12.5% =$327,420.48	$2,619,363.82 x0.937% =$24,543.44	$2,619,363.82 +$327,420.48 +$24,543.44 =$2,971,327.74
2017	$2,971,327.74	$2,971,327.74 x12.5% =$371,415.97	$2,971,327.74 x0.937% =$27,841.34	$2,971,327.74 +$371,415.97 +$27,841.34 =$3,370,585.05
2018	$3,370,585.05	$3,370,585.05 x12.5% =$421,323.13 $421,323.13 /365 days =$1,154.31 $1,154.31 x185 days =$213,547.34	$3,370,585.05 x0.937% =$31,582.38 $9,131.42 /365 days =$86.53 $86.53 x185 days =$16,007.51	$3,370,585.05 +$213,547.34 +$16,007.51 =$3,600,139.90 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K8,720,258.86

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$4,424.57	$4,424.57 x13.38% =$592.01	$4,424.57 x0.937% =$41.46	$4,424.57 +$592.01 +$41.46 =$5,058.04
1979	$5,058.04	$5,058.04 x13.38% =$676.77	$5,058.04 x0.937% =$47.39	$5,058.04 +$676.77 +$47.39 =$5,782.19
1980	$5,782.19	$5,782.19 x13.38% =$773.66	$5,782.19 x0.937% =$54.18	$5,782.19 +$773.66 +$54.18 =$6,610.03
1981	$6,610.03	$6,610.03 x13.38% =$884.42	$6,610.03 x0.937% =$61.94	$6,610.03 +$884.42 +$61.94 =$7,556.39
1982	$7,556.39	$7,556.39 x13.38% =$1,011.04	$7,556.39 x0.937% =$70.80	$7,556.39 +$1,011.04 +$70.80 =$8,638.24
1983	$8,638.24	$8,638.24 x13.38% =$1,155.80	$8,638.24 x0.937% =$80.94	$8,638.24 +$1,155.80 +$80.94 =$9,874.97
1984	$9,874.97	$9,874.97 x13.38% =$1,321.27	$9,874.97 x0.937% =$92.53	$9,874.97 +$1,321.27 +$92.53 =$11,288.77
1985	$11,288.77	$11,288.77 x13.38% =$1,510.44	$11,288.77 x0.937% =$105.78	$11,288.77 +$1,510.44 +$105.78 =$12,904.99
1986	$12,904.99	$12,904.99 x13.38% =$1,726.69	$12,904.99 x0.937% =$120.92	$12,904.99 +$1,726.69 +$120.92 =$14,752.60
1987	$14,752.60	$14,752.60 x13.38% =$1,973.90	$12,904.99 x0.937% =$138.23	$12,904.99 +$1,973.90 +$138.23 =$16,864.72
1988	$16,864.72	$16,864.72 x13.38% =$2,256.50	$16,864.72 x0.937% =$158.02	$16,864.72 +$$2,256.50 +$158.02 =$19,279.25
1989	$19,279.25	$19,279.25 x13.38% =$2,579.56	$19,279.25 x0.937% =$180.65	$19,279.25 +$2,579.56 +$180.65 =$22,039.46
1990	$22,039.46	$22,039.46 x13.38% =$2,948.88	$22,039.46 x0.937% =$206.51	$22,039.46 +$2,948.88 +$206.51 =$25,194.85
1991	$25,194.85	$25,194.85 x13.38% =$3,371.07	$25,194.85 x0.937% =$236.08	$25,194.85 +$3,371.07 +$236.08 =$28,801.99
1992	$28,801.99	$28,801.99 x13.38% =$3,853.71	$28,801.99 x0.937% =$269.87	$28,801.99 +$3,853.71 +$269.87 =$32,925.57
1993	$32,925.57	$32,925.57 x13.38% =$4,405.44	$32,925.57 x0.937% =$308.51	$32,925.57 +$4,405.44 +$308.51 =$37,639.53
1994	$37,639.53	$37,639.53 x13.38% =$5,036.17	$37,639.53 x0.937% =$352.68	$37,639.53 +$5,036.17 +$352.68 =$43,028.38
1995	$43,028.38	$43,028.38 x13.38% =$21,102.05	$43,028.38 x0.937% =$1,477.77	$43,028.38 +$21,102.05 +$1,477.77 =$180,293.24
1996	$49,188.75	$49,188.75 x13.38% =$6,581.46	$49,188.75 x0.937% =$460.90	$49,188.75 +$6,581.46 +$460.90 =$56,231.11
1997	$56,231.11	$56,231.11 x13.38% =$7,523.72	$56,231.11 x0.937% =$526.89	$56,231.11 +$7,523.72 +$526.89 =$64,281.71
1998	$64,281.71	$64,281.71 x13.38% =$8,600.89	$64,281.71 x0.937% =$602.32	$64,281.71 +$8,600.89 +$602.32 =$73,484.93
1999	$73,484.93	$73,484.93 x13.38% =$41,198.26	$73,484.93 x0.937% =$2,885.11	$73,484.93 +$41,198.26 +$2,885.11 =$351,992.61
2000	$84,005.76	$84,005.76 x13.38% =$11,239.97	$84,005.76 x0.937% =$787.13	$84,005.76 +$11,239.97 +$787.13 =$96,032.87
2001	$96,032.87	$96,032.87 x13.38% =$12,849.20	$96,032.87 x0.937% =$899.83	$96,032.87 +$12,849.20 +$899.83 =$109,781.89
2002	$109,781.89	$109,781.89 x13.38% =$14,688.82	$109,781.89 x0.937% =$1,028.66	$109,781.89 +$14,688.82 +$1,028.66 =$125,499.37
2003	$125,499.37	$125,499.37 x13.38% =$16,791.82	$125,499.37 x0.937% =$1,175.93	$125,499.37 +$16,791.82 +$1,175.93 =$143,467.11
2004	$143,467.11	$143,467.11 x13.38% =$19,195.90	$143,467.11 x0.937% =$1,344.29	$143,467.11 +$19,195.90 +$1,344.29 =$164,007.30
2005	$164,007.30	$164,007.30 x13.38% =$21,944.18	$164,007.30 x0.937% =$1,756.76	$164,007.30 +$21,944.18 +$1,756.76 =$187,488.22
2006	$187,488.22	$187,488.22 x13.38% =$25,085.92	$187,488.22 x0.937% =$1,756.76	$187,488.22 +$25,085.92 +$1,756.76 =$214,330.91
2007	$214,330.91	$214,330.91 x13.38% =$28,677.48	$214,330.91 x0.937% =$2,008.28	$214,330.91 +$28,677.48 +$2,008.28 =$245,016.67
2008	$245,016.67	$245,016.67 x13.38% =$32,783.23	$245,016.67 x0.937% =$2,295.81	$245,016.67 +$32,783.23 +$2,295.81 =$280,095.71
2009	$280,095.71	$280,095.71 x13.38% =$37,476.81	$280,095.71 x0.937% =$2,624.50	$280,095.71 +$37,476.81 +$2,624.50 =$320,197.01
2010	$320,197.01	$320,197.01 x13.38% =$42,842.36	$320,197.01 x0.937% =$3,000.25	$320,197.01 +$42,842.36 +$3,000.25 =$366,039.62
2011	$366,039.62	$366,039.62 x13.38% =$48,976.10	$366,039.62 x0.937% =$3,429.79	$366,039.62 +$48,976.10 +$3,429.79 =$418,445.51
2012	$418,445.51	$418,445.51 x13.38% =$55,988.01	$418,445.51 x0.937% =$3,920.83	$418,445.51 +$55,988.01 +$3,920.83 =$478,354.35
2013	$478,354.35	$478,354.35 x13.38% =$64,003.81	$478,354.35 x0.937% =$4,482.18	$478,354.35 +$64,003.81 +$4,482.18 =$546,840.34
2014	$546,840.34	$546,840.3 x13.38% =$73,167.24	$546,840.34 x0.937% =$5,123.89	$546,840.34 +$73,167.24 +$5,123.89 =$625,131.48
2015	$625,131.48	$625,131.48 x13.38% =$83,642.59	$625,131.48 x0.937% =$5,857.48	$625,131.48 +$83,642.59 +$5,857.48 =$714,631.55
2016	$714,631.55	$714,631.55 x12.5% =$89,328.94	$714,631.55 x0.937% =$6,696.10	$714,631.55 +$89,328.94 +$6,696.10 =$810,656.59
2017	$810,656.59	$810,656.59 x12.5% =$101,332.07	$810,656.59 x0.937% =$7,595.85	$810,656.59 +$101,332.07 +$7,595.85 =$919,584.52
2018	$919,584.52	$919,584.52 x12.5% =$114,948.06 $114,948.06 /365 days =$314.93 $314.93 x185 days =$58,261.35	$919,584.52 x0.937% =$8,616.51 $8,616.51 /365 days =$23.61 $23.61 x185 days =$4,367.27	$919,584.52 +$58,261.35 +$4,367.27 =$982,213.14 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K2,379,116.66

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$9,025.41	$9,025.41 x13.38% =$1,207.60	$9,025.41 x0.937% =$84.57	$9,025.41 +$1,207.60 +$84.57 =$10,317.58
1979	$10,317.58	$10,317.58 x13.38% =$1,380.49	$10,317.58 x0.937% =$96.68	$10,317.58 +$1,380.49 +$96.68 =$11,794.75
1980	$11,794.75	$11,794.75 x13.38% =$1,578.14	$11,794.75 x0.937% =$110.52	$11,794.75 +$1,578.14 +$110.52 =$13,483.40
1981	$13,483.40	$13,483.40 x13.38% =$1,804.08	$13,483.40 x0.937% =$126.34	$13,483.40 +$1,804.08 +$126.34 =$15,413.82
1982	$15,413.82	$15,413.82 x13.38% =$2,062.37	$15,413.82 x0.937% =$144.43	$15,413.82 +$2,062.37 +$144.43 =$17,620.61
1983	$17,620.61	$17,620.61 x13.38% =$2,357.64	$17,620.61 x0.937% =$165.11	$17,620.61 +$2,357.64 +$165.11 =$20,143.36
1984	$20,143.36	$20,143.36 x13.38% =$2,695.18	$20,143.36 x0.937% =$188.74	$20,143.36 +$2,695.18 +$188.74 =$23,027.28
1985	$23,027.28	$23,027.28 x13.38% =$3,081.05	$23,027.28 x0.937% =$215.77	$23,027.28 +$3,081.05 +$215.77 =$26,324.10
1986	$26,324.10	$26,324.10 x13.38% =$3,522.16	$26,324.10 x0.937% =$246.66	$26,324.10 +$3,522.16 +$246.66 =$30,092.92
1987	$30,092.92	$30,092.92 x13.38% =$4,026.43	$30,092.92 x0.937% =$281.97	$30,092.92 +$4,026.43 +$281.97 =$34,401.32
1988	$34,401.32	$34,401.32 x13.38% =$4,602.90	$34,401.32 x0.937% =$322.34	$34,401.32 +$4,602.90 +$322.34 =$39,326.56
1989	$39,326.56	$39,326.56 x13.38% =$5,261.89	$39,326.56 x0.937% =$368.49	$39,326.56 +$5,261.89 +$368.49 =$44,956.94
1990	$44,956.94	$44,956.94 x13.38% =$6,015.24	$44,956.94 x0.937% =$421.25	$44,956.94 +$6,015.24 +$421.25 =$51,393.43
1991	$51,393.43	$51,393.43 x13.38% =$6,876.44	$51,393.43 x0.937% =$481.56	$51,393.43 +$6,876.44 +$481.56 =$58,751.42
1992	$58,751.42	$58,751.42 x13.38% =$7,860.94	$58,751.42 x0.937% =$550.50	$58,751.42 +$7,860.94 +$550.50 =$67,162.87
1993	$67,162.87	$67,162.87 x13.38% =$8,986.39	$67,162.87 x0.937% =$629.32	$67,162.87 +$8,986.39 +$629.32 =$76,778.57
1994	$76,778.57	$76,778.57 x13.38% =$10,272.97	$76,778.57 x0.937% =$719.42	$76,778.57 +$10,272.97 +$719.42 =$87,770.96
1995	$87,770.96	$87,770.96 x13.38% =$11,743.75	$87,770.96 x0.937% =$822.41	$87,770.96 +$11,743.75 +$822.41 =$100,337.13
1996	$100,337.13	$100,337.13 x13.38% =$13,425.11	$100,337.13 x0.937% =$940.16	$100,337.13 +$13,425.11 +$940.16 =$114,702.40
1997	$114,702.40	$114,702.40 x13.38% =$15,347.18	$114,702.40 x0.937% =$1,074.76	$114,702.40 +$15,347.18 +$1,074.76 =$131,124.34
1998	$131,124.34	$131,124.34 x13.38% =$17,544.44	$131,124.34 x0.937% =$1,228.64	$131,124.34 +$17,544.44 +$1,228.64 =$149,897.41
1999	$149,897.41	$149,897.41 x13.38% =$20,056.27	$149,897.41 x0.937% =$1,404.54	$149,897.41 +$20,056.27 +$1,404.54 =$171,358.22
2000	$171,358.22	$171,358.22 x13.38% =$22,927.73	$171,358.22 x0.937% =$1,605.63	$171,358.22 +$22,927.73 +$1,605.63 =$195,891.58
2001	$195,891.58	$195,891.58 x13.38% =$26,210.29	$195,891.58 x0.937% =$1,835.50	$195,891.58 +$26,210.29 +$1,835.50 =$223,937.38
2002	$223,937.38	$223,937.38 x13.38% =$29,962.82	$223,937.38 x0.937% =$2,098.29	$223,937.38 +$29,962.82 +$2,098.29 =$255,998.49
2003	$255,998.49	$255,998.49 x13.38% =$34,252.60	$255,998.49 x0.937% =$2,398.71	$255,998.49 +$34,252.60 +$2,398.71 =$292,649.80
2004	$292,649.80	$292,649.80 x13.38% =$39,156.54	$292,649.80 x0.937% =$2,742.13	$292,649.80 +$39,156.54 +$2,742.13 =$334,548.47
2005	$334,548.47	$334,548.47 x13.38% =$44,762.59	$334,548.47 x0.937% =$3,134.72	$334,548.47 +$44,762.59 +$3,134.72 =$382,445.77
2006	$382,445.77	$382,445.77 x13.38% =$51,171.24	$382,445.77 x0.937% =$3,583.52	$382,445.77 +$51,171.24 +$3,583.52 =$437,200.54
2007	$437,200.54	$437,200.54 x13.38% =$58,497.43	$437,200.54 x0.937% =$4,096.57	$437,200.54 +$58,497.43 +$4,096.57 =$499,794.54
2008	$499,794.54	$499,794.54 x13.38% =$66,872.51	$499,794.54 x0.937% =$4,683.07	$499,794.54 +$66,872.51 +$4,683.07 =$571,350.12
2009	$571,350.12	$571,350.12 x13.38% =$76,446.65	$571,350.12 x0.937% =$5,353.55	$571,350.12 +$76,446.65 +$5,353.55 =$653,150.32
2010	$653,150.32	$653,150.32 x13.38% =$87,391.51	$653,150.32 x0.937% =$6,120.02	$653,150.32 +$87,391.51 +$6,120.02 =$746,661.85
2011	$746,661.85	$746,661.85 x13.38% =$99,903.36	$746,661.85 x0.937% =$6,996.22	$746,661.85 +$99,903.36 +$6,996.22 =$853,561.43
2012	$853,561.43	$853,561.43 x13.38% =$114,206.52	$853,561.43 x0.937% =$7,997.87	$853,561.43 +$114,206.52 +$7,997.87 =$975,765.81
2013	$975,765.81	$975,765.81 x13.38% =$130,557.47	$975,765.81 x0.937% =$9,142.93	$975,765.81 +$130,557.47 +$9,142.93 =$1,115,466.21
2014	$1,115,466.21	$1,115,466.21 x13.38% =$149,249.38	$1,115,466.21 x0.937% =$10,451.92	$1,115,466.21 +$149,249.38 +$10,451.92 =$1,275,167.50
2015	$1,275,167.50	$1,275,167.50 x13.38% =$170,617.41	$1,275,167.50 x0.937% =$11,948.32	$1,275,167.50 +$170,617.41 +$11,948.32 =$1,457,733.23
2016	$1,457,733.23	$1,457,733.23 x12.5% =$182,216.65	$1,457,733.23 x0.937% =$13,658.96	$1,457,733.23 +$182,216.65 +$13,658.96 =$1,653,608.85
2017	$1,653,608.85	$1,653,608.85 x12.5% =$206,701.11	$1,653,608.85 x0.937% =$15,494.31	$1,653,608.85 +$206,701.11 +$15,494.31 =$1,875,804.27
2018	$1,875,804.27	$1,875,804.27 x12.5% =$234,475.53 $234,475.53 /365 days =$642.40 $642.40 x185 days =$118,843.76	$1,875,804.27 x0.937% =$17,576.29 $17,576.29 /365 days =$48.15 $48.15 x185 days =$8,908.53	$1,875,804.27 +$118,843.76 +$8,908.53 =$2,003,556.56 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K4,853,014.70

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$1,410.22	$1,410.22 x13.38% =$188.69	$1,410.22 x0.937% =$13.21	$1,410.22 +$188.69 +$13.21 =$1,612.12
1979	$1,612.12	$1,612.12 x13.38% =$215.70	$1,612.12 x0.937% =$15.11	$1,612.12 +$215.70 +$15.11 =$1,842.93
1980	$1,842.93	$1,842.93 x13.38% =$246.58	$1,842.93 x0.937% =$17.27	$1,842.93 +$246.58 +$17.27 =$2,106.78
1981	$2,106.78	$2,106.78 x13.38% =$281.89	$2,106.78 x0.937% =$19.74	$2,106.78 +$281.89 +$19.74 =$2,408.41
1982	$2,408.41	$2,408.41 x13.38% =$322.25	$2,408.41 x0.937% =$22.57	$2,408.41 +$322.25 +$22.57 =$2,753.22
1983	$2,753.22	$2,753.22 x13.38% =$368.38	$2,408.41 x0.937% =$25.80	$2,408.41 +$368.38 +$25.80 =$3,147.40
1984	$3,147.40	$3,147.40 x13.38% =$421.12	$3,147.40 x0.937% =$29.49	$3,147.40 +$421.12 +$29.49 =$3,598.01
1985	$3,598.01	$3,598.01 x13.38% =$481.41	$3,598.01 x0.937% =$33.71	$3,598.01 +$481.41 +$33.71 =$4,113.14
1986	$4,113.14	$4,113.14 x13.38% =$550.34	$4,113.14 x0.937% =$38.54	$4,113.14 +$550.34 +$38.54 =$4,702.02
1987	$4,702.02	$4,702.02 x13.38% =$629.13	$4,702.02 x0.937% =$44.06	$4,702.02 +$629.13 +$44.06 =$5,375.21
1988	$5,375.21	$5,375.21 x13.38% =$719.20	$5,375.21 x0.937% =$50.37	$5,375.21 +$719.20 +$50.37 =$6,144.77
1989	$6,144.77	$6,144.77 x13.38% =$822.17	$6,144.77 x0.937% =$57.58	$6,144.77 +$822.17 +$57.58 =$7,024.52
1990	$7,024.52	$7,024.52 x13.38% =$939.88	$7,024.52 x0.937% =$65.82	$7,024.52 +$939.88 +$65.82 =$8,030.22
1991	$8,030.22	$8,030.22 x13.38% =$1,074.44	$8,030.22 x0.937% =$75.24	$8,030.22 +$1,074.44 +$75.24 =$9,179.91
1992	$9,179.91	$9,179.91 x13.38% =$1,228.27	$9,179.91 x0.937% =$86.02	$9,179.91 +$1,228.27 +$86.02 =$67,162.87
1993	$10,494.20	$10,494.20 x13.38% =$1,404.12	$10,494.20 x0.937% =$98.33	$10,494.20 +$1,404.12 +$98.33 =$11,996.65
1994	$11,996.65	$11,996.65 x13.38% =$1,605.15	$11,996.65 x0.937% =$112.41	$11,996.65 +$1,605.15 +$112.41 =$13,714.21
1995	$13,714.21	$13,714.21 x13.38% =$1,834.96	$13,714.21 x0.937% =$128.50	$13,714.21 +$1,834.96 +$128.50 =$15,677.67
1996	$15,677.67	$15,677.67 x13.38% =$2,097.67	$15,677.67 x0.937% =$146.90	$15,677.67 +$2,097.67 +$146.90 =$17,922.25
1997	$17,922.25	$17,922.25 x13.38% =$2,398.00	$17,922.25 x0.937% =$167.93	$17,922.25 +$2,398.00 +$167.93 =$20,488.17
1998	$20,488.17	$20,488.17 x13.38% =$2,741.32	$20,488.17 x0.937% =$191.97	$20,488.17 +$2,741.32 +$191.97 =$23,421.47
1999	$23,421.47	$23,421.47 x13.38% =$3,133.79	$23,421.47 x0.937% =$219.46	$23,421.47 +$3,133.79 +$219.46 =$26,774.72
2000	$26,774.72	$26,774.72 x13.38% =$3,582.46	$26,774.72 x0.937% =$250.88	$26,774.72 +$3,582.46 +$250.88 =$30,608.05
2001	$30,608.05	$30,608.05 x13.38% =$4,095.36	$30,608.05 x0.937% =$286.80	$30,608.05 +$4,095.36 +$286.80 =$34,990.21
2002	$34,990.21	$34,990.21 x13.38% =$4,681.69	$34,990.21 x0.937% =$327.86	$34,990.21 +$4,681.69 +$327.86 =$39,999.76
2003	$39,999.76	$39,999.76 x13.38% =$5,351.97	$39,999.76 x0.937% =$374.80	$39,999.76 +$5,351.97 +$374.80 =$45,726.52
2004	$45,726.52	$45,726.52 x13.38% =$6,118.21	$45,726.52 x0.937% =$428.46	$45,726.52 +$6,118.21 +$428.46 =$52,273.19
2005	$52,273.19	$52,273.19 x13.38% =$6,994.15	$52,273.19 x0.937% =$489.80	$52,273.19 +$6,994.15 +$489.80 =$59,757.14
2006	$59,757.14	$59,757.14 x13.38% =$7,995.51	$59,757.14 x0.937% =$559.92	$59,757.14 +$7,995.51 +$559.92 =$68,312.57
2007	$68,312.57	$68,312.57 x13.38% =$9,140.22	$68,312.57 x0.937% =$640.09	$68,312.57 +$9,140.22 +$640.09 =$78,092.88
2008	$78,092.88	$78,092.88 x13.38% =$10,448.83	$78,092.88 x0.937% =$731.73	$78,092.88 +$10,448.83 +$731.73 =$89,273.44
2009	$89,273.44	$89,273.44 x13.38% =$11,944.79	$89,273.44 x0.937% =$836.49	$89,273.44 +$11,944.79 +$836.49 =$102,054.71
2010	$102,054.71	$102,054.71 x13.38% =$13,654.92	$102,054.71 x0.937% =$956.25	$102,054.71 +$13,654.92 +$956.25 =$116,665.89
2011	$116,665.89	$116,665.89 x13.38% =$15,609.90	$116,665.89 x0.937% =$1,093.16	$116,665.89 +$15,609.90 +$1,093.16 =$133,368.94
2012	$133,368.94	$133,368.94 x13.38% =$17,844.76	$133,368.94 x0.937% =$1,249.67	$133,368.94 +$17,844.76 +$1,249.67 =$152,463.37
2013	$152,463.37	$152,463.37 x13.38% =$20,399.60	$152,463.37 x0.937% =$1,428.58	$152,463.37 +$20,399.60 +$1,428.58 =$174,291.56
2014	$174,291.56	$174,291.56 x13.38% =$23,320.21	$174,291.56 x0.937% =$1,633.11	$174,291.56 +$23,320.21 +$1,633.11 =$199,244.88
2015	$199,244.88	$199,244.88 x13.38% =$26,658.96	$199,244.88 x0.937% =$1,866.92	$199,244.88 +$26,658.96 +$1,866.92 =$227,770.77
2016	$227,770.77	$227,770.77 x12.5% =$28,471.35	$227,770.77 x0.937% =$2,134.21	$227,770.77 +$28,471.35 +$2,134.21 =$258,376.33
2017	$258,376.33	$258,376.33 x12.5% =$32,297.04	$258,376.33 x0.937% =$2,420.99	$258,376.33 +$32,297.04 +$2,420.99 =$293,094.35
2018	$293,094.35	$293,094.35 x12.5% =$36,636.79 $36,636.79 /365 days =$100.37 $100.37 x185 days =$18,569.33	$293,094.35 x0.937% =$2,746.29 $2,746.29 /365 days =$7.52 $48.15 x185 days =$1,391.96	$293,094.35 +$18,569.33 +$1,391.96 =$313,055.64 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K758,283.38

Year	Principle Maturity & Later years	Commercial Interest Added	Penalty Interest Added	New Principle (PM + CI + PI)
1978	$15, 512.42	$15,512.42 x13.38% =$2,075.56	$15,512.42 x0.937% =$145.35	$15, 512.42 +$2,075.56 +$145.35 =$17,733.34
1979	$17,733.34	$17,733.34 x13.38% =$2,372.72	$17, 733.30 x0.937% =$166.16	$17, 733.30 +$2372.72 +$166.16 =$20,272.22
1980	$20, 272.22	$20,272.22 x13.38% =$2,712.42	$20,272.22 x0.937% =$189.95	$20,272.22 +$2,712.42 +$189.95 =$23,174.59
1981	$23,174.59	$23,174.59 x13.38% =$3,100.76	$23,174.59 x0.937% =$217.15	$23,174.59 +$3,100.76 +$217.15 =$26,492.50
1982	$26,492.43	$26,492.40 x13.38% =$3,544.70	$26,492.40 x0.937% =$248.23	$26,492.43 +$3,544.70 +$248.23 =$30,285.43
1983	$30,285.43	$30,285.43 x13.38% =$4,052.19	$30,285.43 x0.937% =$283.77	$30,285.43 +$4,052.19 +$283.77 =$34,621.39
1984	$34,621.39	$34,621.39 x13.38% =$4,632.34	$34,621.39 x0.937% =$324.40	$34,621.39 +$4,632.34 +$324.40 =$39,578.14
1985	$39,578.14	$39,578.14 x13.38% =$5,295.55	$39,578.14 x0.937% =$370.85	$39,578.14 +$5,295.55 +$370.85 =$45,244.54
1986	$45,244.54	$45,244.54 x13.38% =$6,053.72	$45,244.54 x0.937% =$423.94	$45,244.54 +$6,053.72 +$423.94 =$51,722.20
1987	$51,722.20	$51,722.20 x13.38% =$6,920.43	$51,722.20 x0.937% =$484.64	$51,722.20 +$6,920.43 +$484.64 =$59,.127.27
1988	$59,127.27	$59,127.27 x13.38% =$7,911.23	$59,127.27 x0.937% =$554.02	$59,127.27 +$7,911.23 +$554.02 =$67,592.52
1989	$67,592.52	$67,592.52 x13.38% =$9,043.88	$67,592.52 x0.937% =$633.34	$67,592.52 +$9,043.88 +$633.34 =$77,269.74
1990	$77,269.74	$77,269.74 x13.38% =$10,338.69	$77,269.74 x0.937% =$724.02	$77,269.74 +$10,338.69 +$724.02 =$88,332.45
1991	$88,332.45	$88,332.45 x13.38% =$11,818.88	$88,332.45 x0.937% =$827.68	$88,332.45 +$11,818.88 +$827.68 =$100,979.01
1992	$100,979.01	$100,979.01 x13.38% =$13,510.99	$100,979.01 x0.937% =$946.17	$100,979.01 +$13,510.99 +$946.17 =$115,436.17
1993	$115,436.17	$115,436.17 x13.38% =$15,445.36	$115,436.17 x0.937% =$1,081.64	$115,436.17 +$15,445.36 +$1,081.64 =$131,963.17
1994	$131963.17	$131,963.17 x13.38% =$17,656.67	$131,963.17 x0.937% =$1,236.49	$131,963.17 +$17656.67 +$1,236.49 =$150,856.34
1995	$150,856.34	$150,856.34 x13.38% =$20,184.58	$150,856.34 x0.937% =$1,413.52	$150,856.34 +$20,184.58 +$1,413.52 =$172,454.44
1996	$172,454.44	$172,454.44 x13.38% =$23,074.40	$172,454.44 x0.937% =$1,615.90	$172,454.44 +$23,074.40 +$1,615.90 =$197,144.74
1997	$197,144.74	$197,144.74 x13.38% =$26,377.97	$197,144.74 x0.937% =$1,847.25	$197,144.74 +$26,377.97 +$1,847.25 =$225,369.95
1998	$225,369.95	$225,369.95 x13.38% =$30,154.50	$225,369.95 x0.937% =$2,111.72	$225,369.95 +$30,154.50 +$2,111.72 =$257,636.17
1999	$257,636.17	$257,636.17 x13.38% =$34,471.72	$257,636.17 x0.937% =$2,414.05	$257,636.17 +$34,471.72 +$2,41405 =$294,521.94
2000	$294,521.94	$294,521.94 x13.38% =$39,407.04	$294,521.94 x0.937% =$2,759.67	$294,521.94 +$39,407.04 +$2,759.67 =$336,688.64
2001	$336,688.64	$336,688.64 x13.38% =$45,048.94	$336,688.64 x0.937% =$3,154.77	$336,688.64 +$45,048.94 +$3,154.77 =$384,892.36
2002	$384,892.36	$384,892.36 x13.38% =$51,498.60	$384,892.36 x0.937% =$3,606.44	$384,892.36 +$51,498.60 +$3,606.44 =$439,997.40
2003	$439,997.40	$439,997.40 x13.38% =$58,871.65	$439,997.40 x0.937% =$4,122.78	$439,997.40 +$58,871.65 +$4,122.78 =$502,991.82
2004	$502,991.82	$502,991.82 x13.38% =$67,300.31	$502,991.82 x0.937% =$4,713.03	$502,991.82 +$67,300.31 +$4,713.03 =$575,005.16
2005	$575,005.16	$575,005.16 x13.38% =$76,935.69	$575,005.16 x0.937% =$5,387.80	$575,005.16 +$76,935.69 +$5,387.80 =$657,328.65
2006	$657,328.65	$657,328.65 x13.38% =$87,950.57	$657,328.65 x0.937% =$6,159.17	$657,328.65 +$87,950.57 +$6,159.17 =$751,438.40
2007	$751,438.40	$751,436.40 x13.38% =$100,542.46	$751,436.40 x0.937% =$7,040.98	$751,436.40 +$100,542.46 +$7,040.98 =$859,021.83
2008	$859,021.83	$859,021.83 x13.38% =$114,937.12	$859,021.83 x0.937% =$8,049.03	$859,021.83 +$114,937.12 +$8,049.03 =$982,007.99
2009	$982,007.99	$982,007.99 x13.38% =$131,392.67	$982,007.99 x0.937% =$9,201.41	$982,007.99 +$131,392.67 +$9,201.41 =$1,122,602.07
2010	$1,122,602.07	$1,122,602.07 x13.38% =$150,204.16	$1,122,602.07 x0.937% =$10,518.78	$1,122,602.07 +$150,204.16 +$10,518.78 =$1,283,325.01
2011	$1,283,325.01	$1,283,325.01 x13.38% =$171,708.89	$1,283,325.01 x0.937% =$12,024.76	$1,283,325.01 +$171,708.89 +$12,024.76 =$1,467,058.65
2012	$1,467,058.65	$1,467,058.65 x13.38% =$196,292.45	$1,467,058.65 x0.937% =$13,746.34	$1,472,911.44 +$197,075.55 +$13,801.18 =$1,677,097.44
2013	$1,677,097.44	$1,677,097.44 x13.38% =$224,395.64	$1,677,097.44 x0.937% =$15,714.40	$1,677,097.44 +$244,395.64 +$15,714.40 =$1,917207.48
2014	$1,917,207.48	$1,917,207.48 x13.38% =$256,522.36	$1,917,207.48 x0.937% =$17,964.23	$1,917,207.48 +$256,522.36 +$17,964.23 =$2,191,694.07
2015	$2,191,694.07	$2,191,694.07 x13.38% =$293,248.67	$2,191,694.07 x0.937% =$20,536.17	$2,191,694.07 +$293,248.67 +$20536.17 =$2,505,478.91
2016	$2,505,478.91	$2,505,478.91 x12.50% =$313,784.86	$2,505,478.91 x0.937% =$23,476.34	$2,505,478.91 +$313,784.86 +$23,476.34 =$2,842,140.11
2017	$2,842,140.11	$2,842,140.11 x12.50% =$355,267.51	$2,842,140.11 x0.937% =$26,630.85	$2,842,140.11 +$355,939.12 +$26,630.85 =$3,224,038.48
2018	$3,224,038.48	$3,224,038.48 x12.5% =$403,004.81 $403,004.81 /365 days =$1,104.12 $1,104.12 x185 days =$204,262.71	$3,224,038.48 x0.937% =$30,209.24 $30,209.24 /365 days =$82,77 $82.77 x185 days =15,311.53	$3,224,038.48 +$204,262.71 +$15,311.53 =$3,443,612.73 Convert this into PNGKina using exchange rate of 1AUD = 2.4222PNGK= K8,341,118.74
			Grand Total	K85,022,532.86

134. Based on these adjustments, I order the main judgment be varied to allow for judgment for each of the Plaintiffs in the respective TRPAs in the amounts specified in the foregoing with the grand total to be in the amount of K85,022, 532.86 for the Plaintiffs. The orders for costs and interests remain unchanged per the main judgment.

___________________________________________________________________
Parkil Lawyers: Lawyers for the all the Plaintiffs except those represented by other lawyers
Kandawalyn Lawyers: Lawyers for parts of Third Plaintiffs
Warner Shand Lawyers: Lawyers for parts of the Third Plaintiffs
Robert Mai Lawyers: Lawyers for parts of the Third Plaintiffs
Niuage Lawyers: Lawyers for three Interested Parties
Pang Legal Services: Lawyers for parts of First Plaintiffs
Twivey Lawyers: Lawyers for the First to Fifth Defendants
No Appearance for the Sixth Defendants

^[1] (2015) SC1459.
^[2] See: Bartel, Barry C. “Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and Potential,” Willamette L. Rev. 27 (1991): 661-92; Blankenship, John T. “Developing your ADR Attitude: Med-Arb, a Template for Adaptive ADR.” Tennessee Bar Journal Nov. (2006): 28-41; Brewer, Thomas J., and Lawrence R. Mills. “Combining Mediation and Arbitration.” Disp. Resol. J. 54:4 (1999): 32-39; Galanter, Marc. “‘A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:’ Judicial Mediation in the United States.” Brit J L & Soc’y, 12:1 (1985): 1-18; Hoffman, David. “Colliding Worlds in Dispute Resolution: Towards a Unified Field Theory of ADR.” J. Disp. Resol. 2008 (2008): 11-44; Hoellering, Michael F. “Arbitration and Mediation: A Growing Interaction.” Disp. Resol. J. 52 (1997): 23-25;Peter, James T. “Note and Comment: Med-Arb in International Arbitration.” Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 8 (1997): 83-116 and Welsh, Nancy. “Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?” Wash. U. L. Q. 79 (2002): 787-861. Unless otherwise indicated, most of the discussions are from this sources. Where need be, there will be specific reference to some of these sources.
^[3] Blankenship (supra) at 30 and 34.
^[4] See The State v. Moki Lepi (No 2) (2002) N2278 which quotes the relevant part of the preamble to the Constitution.
^[5] Sections 154, 155, 157 -184.
^[6] For a detailed discussion on the developments in ADR and in particular, mediation see for example my decision in Koitaki Plantations Ltd v. Charlton Ltd (2014) N5656; or Abel Constructions Ltd v. W.R. Carpenter (PNG) Ltd (2014) N5636; or Hargy Oil Palm Ltd v. Ewasse Landowners Association Inc (2013) N5441; or PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v. Canopus No 71 Ltd (2010) N4288.
^[7] Brewer and Mills (supra) at 34.
^[8] Blankenship (supra) at 34.
^[9] Ibid, at 29, 40-41.
^[10] Ibid, at 34.
^[11] Ibid, at 35
^[12] Hoffman (supra) at 23.
^[13] Brewer and Mills (supra) at 34.
^[14]Blankenship (supra) at 37 and Peter (supra) at 98-99, 116.
^[15] Peter (supra) at 95.
^[16] Ibid at 94-95.
^[17] Blankenship (supra) at 36.
^[18] Ibid.
^[19] Hoffman (supra) at 22-23.
^[20] Welsh (supra) at 820-26.
^[21] Blankenship (supra) at 36.
^[22] Ibid at 35.
^[23] Welsh (supra) at 823.
^[24] (2014) SC1358.
^[25] (Chp. 134).
^[26] [1993] PNGLR 285.
^[27] (2004) SC76.
^[28] at page 12-13 found at https://www.odi.org/ resources/docs.
^[29] (2006) N2968.
^[30] (2003) SC716.
^[31] [1985] PNGLR 369.
^[32] (2001) N2132.
^[33] (2001) SC705.
^[34] (1980) SC185.
^[35] (2010) SC1100.
^[36] [1988] PNGLR 20.
^[37] (2006) SC825.
^[38](2008) N3260.
^[39] (2012) N4854.
^[40] (2006) N4020.
^[41] (2001) N2288.
^[42] (2008) N3304.
^[43] See annexures “I”& “J” of Kunai Affidavit.
^[44] See Pija Grannies Ltd v. Rural Development Bank Ltd (2011) SC1327 at paragraph 12.
^[45] (Chp.81).
^[46] (2017) SC1605.
^[47] For examples of cases on point see: Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation Limited v. Jeff Tole (2002) SC694; David Raim v. Simon Korua (2010) SC1062 and John Wasis v. Margaret Elias (2016) SC1485.
^[48] (2009) SC979.
^[49] See for example the decisions in The State v. Downer Construction (PNG) Ltd (2009) SC979 and Ruth Kaurigova v. Dr. Russo Perone and Ors SC 964
^[50] [1985] PNGLR 369.
^[51] See for example, Mr. Tapes submission puts the final total figure on the investments at $60,357.50 in the case of Waripa whilst my calculations going by the terms of the agreement produces $60,798.13
^[52] (2002) N2307.
^[53] (2013) N5336.
^[54] (2017) N6713.
^[55] [2007] AZCA 590.
^[56] (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER.
^[57] (2009) SC1002.
^[58] (2016) N6861.
^[59] (2002) N2250.
^[60] (1999) N1969.
^[61] See for examples of cases on point the decisions in POSF Board v. Sailas Imanakuan (2001) SC 677; Papua New Guinea Forest Authority v. Concord Pacific Ltd (No 2) (2003) N2465; Eddie Tarsie v. Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Ltd (2010) N4142 and PNG Ports Corporation Ltd v. Canopus No 71 Ltd (2010) N4288
^[62] (2007) N3241.
^[63] (2015) SC1470.
^[64] See for similar statement of the principles: Anderson Agiru v. Aluago Alfred Kaiabe (2014) SC1384 and Moses Manwau v Andrew Trawen (2011) SC1159.
^[65] (2010) SC1063.

Each TRP areas investment in AUD$	AUD$6,900 = K10 million formula as due in 2012	Interest @ 8% added to date of judgment from 1^st January 2013	Total amounts payable
Waripa $34, 490.00	$34,490 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K49, 985, 507.24	K3,998,840.58÷365 =10,955.73 x 2,008 =K21,999,105.84	K49,985,507.24 +K21,999,105.84 =K71,984,613.08
Mabugei $13,870.00	$13,870.00 ÷ $6,900 x K10 million = K20, 101, 449.28	K1,608,115.94÷365 =K4,405.80x 2,008 =K8,846,840.58	K20,101,449.28 + K8,846,840.58 =K28,948,289.86

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1968	$34,490.00	$34,490 + $991.59 = $35,481.59	$35,481.59 + $1,020.45 = $36,502.04	$36,502.04
1969	$36,502.04	$36,502.04 + $1,049.43 = $37,551.47	$37,551.10 + $1,079.98 = $38,631.45	$38,631.45
1970	$38,631.45	$38,631.45 + $1,110.65 = $39,742.10	$39,742.10 + $1,142.98 = $40,885.09	$40,885.09
1971	$40,885.09	$40,885.09 + $1,175.45 = $42,060.54	$42,060.54 + $1,209.66 = $43,270.20	$43,270.20
1972	$43,270.20	$43,270.20 + $1,244.02 = $44,514.22	$44,514.22 + $1,280.23 = $45,794.45	$45,794.45
1973	$45,794.45	$45,794.45 + $1,316.59 = $47, 111.04	$47, 111.04 + $1,354.91 = $48,465.95	$48,465.95
1974	$48,465.95	$48,465.95 + $1,393.40 = $49,859.35	$49,859.35 + $1,433.95 = $51,293.30	$51,293.30
1975	$51,293.30	$51,293.30 + $1,474.68 = $52,767.98	$52,767.98 + $1,517.61 = $54,285.59	$54,285.59
1976	$54,285.59	$54,285.59 + $1,560.71 = $55,846.30	$55,846.30 + $1,606.14 = $57,452.44	$57,452.44
1977	$57,447.39	$57,447.39 + $1,651.61 = $59,099.00	$59,099.00 + $1,699.69 = $60,798.69	$60,798.69

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$13,870.00	$ 13, 870.00 + 398.76 =14,268.76	$14,268.76 + 410.37 = 14,679.13	$14,679.13
1970	$14,679.13	$14, 679.13 + 422.02 =15,101.15	$15,101.15 + 434.31 = 15,535.46	$15,535.46
1971	$15,535.46	$15,535.46 + 446.64 =15,981.10	$15,981.10 + 459.65 =16,441.75	$16,441.75
1972	$16,441.75	$16,441.75 + 472.70 =16,914.45	$16,914.45 + 486.46 =17,400.91	$17,400.91
1973	$17,400.91	$17,400.91 + 500.28 =17,901.19	$17,901.19 + 514.84 =18,416.02	$18,416.02
1974	$18,416.02	$18,416.02 + 529.46 =18,945.48	$18,944.58 + 544.87 =19,490.35	$19,490.35
1975	$19,490.35	$19,490.35 + 560.32 =20,050.70	$20,050.70 + 576.66 =20,627.36	$20,627.36
1976	$20,627.36	$20,627.36 + 593.04 =21,220.40	$21,220.40 + 610.30 =21,830.70	$21,830.70
1977	$21,830.70	$21,830.70 + 627.63 =22,458.33	$22,458.33 + 645.90 = 23,104.23	$23,104.23
1978	$23,104.23	$23,104.23 + 664.25 =23,768.48	$23,768.48 + 683.58 =24,452.06	$24,452.06

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$6,350.00	$ 6,350.00 + 182.56 = 6,532.56	$ 6,532.56 + 187.88 = 6,720.44	$6,720.44
1970	$6,720.44	$ 6,720.44 + 193.21 = 6,913.65	$ 6,913.65 + 198.84 = 7,112.49	$7,112.49
1971	$7,112.49	$ 7,112.49 + 204.48 = 7,316.97	$ 7,316.97 + 210.44 = 7,527.41	$7,527.41
1972	$7,527.41	$ 7,527.41 + 216.41 = 7,743.82	$ 7,743.82 + 222.71 = 7,966.54	$7,966.54
1973	$7,966.54	$ 7,966.54 + 229.04 = 8,195.58	$ 8,195.58 + 235.70 = 8,431.28	$8,431.28
1974	$8,431.28	$ 8,431.28 + 242.40 = 8,673.68	$ 8,673.68 + 249.46 = 8,923.13	$8,923.13
1975	$8,923.13	$ 8,923.13 + 256.54 = 9,179.67	$ 9,179.67 + 264.01 = 9,443.68	$9,443.68
1976	$9,443.68	$ 9,443.68 + 271.51 = 9,715.59	$ 9,715.59 + 279.41 = 9,994.59	$9,994.59
1977	$9,994.59	$ 9,994.59 + 287.34 =10,281.93	$10,281.93 + 295.71 =10,577.64	$10,577.64
1978	$10,577.64	$10,577.64 + 304.11 =10,881.75	$10,880.82 + 312.96 =11,194.71	$11,194.71

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December and January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$5,900.00	$ 5,900.00 + 169.63 = 6,069.63	$ 6,069.63 + 174.56 = 6,244.19	$6,244.19
1970	$6,244.19	$ 6,244.19 + 179.52 = 6,423.71	$ 6,423.71 + 184.75 = 6,608.46	$6,608.46
1971	$6,608.46	$ 6,608.46 + 189.99 = 6,798.45	$ 6,798.45 + 195.52 = 6,993.98	$6,993.98
1972	$6,993.98	$ 6,993.98 + 201.08 = 7,195.06	$ 7,195.06 + 206.93 = 7,401.99	$7,401.99
1973	$7,401.99	$ 7,401.99 + 212.81 = 7,614.80	$ 7,614.80 + 219.00 = 7,833.80	$7,833.80
1974	$7,833.80	$ 7,833.80 + 225.22 = 8,059.02	$ 8,059.02 + 231.78 = 8,290.80	$8,290.80
1975	$8,290.80	$ 8,290.80 + 238.36 = 8,529.16	$ 8,529.16 + 245.30 = 8,774.46	$8,774.46
1976	$8,774.46	$ 8,774.46 + 252.27 = 9,026.73	$ 9,026.73 + 259.61 = 9,286.33	$9,286.33
1977	$9,286.33	$ 9,284.33 + 266.98 = 9,553.31	$ 9,553.31 + 274.75 = 9,828.07	$9,828.07
1978	$9,828.07	$ 9,828.07 + 282.56 =10,110.63	$ 10,118.63 + 290.78 = 10,401.41	$10,401.41

Year	Principle Per TRP Area	July Interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest 2.875%	New Principle
1968	$34,490.00	$34,390.00 +$991.59 =$35,481.59	$35,481.59 +$1,020.10 =$36,501.68	$36,501.68
1969	$36,501.68	$36,501.68 +$1,049.42 =$37,551.11	$37,551.11 +1,079.59 =$38,630.70	$38,630.70
1970	$38,630.70	$38,630.70 +$1,110.63 =$39,741.33	$39,741.33 +$1,142.56 =$40,883.90	$40,883.90
1971	$40,883.90	$40,883.90 +$1,175.41 =$42,059.31	$42,059.31 +$1,209.21 =$43,268.51	$43,268.51
1972	$43,268.51	$43,268.51 +$1,243.97 =$44,512.48	$44,512.48 +$1,279.73 =$45,792.22	$45,792.22
1973	$45,792.22	$45,792.22 +$1,316.53 =$47,108.74	$47,108.74 +$1,354.38 =$48,463.12	$48,463.12
1974	$48,463.12	$48,463.12 +$1,393.31 =$49,856.44	$49,856.44 +$1,433.37 =$51,289.81	$51,289.81
1975	$51,289.81	$51,289.81 +$1,474.58 =$52,764.39	$52,764.39 +$1,516.98 =$54,281.37	$54,281.37
1976	$54,281.37	$54,281.37 +$1,560.59 =$55,841.95	$55,841.95 +$1,605.46 =$57,447.41	$57,447.41
1977	$57,447.41	$57,447.41 +$1,651.61 =$59,099.02	$59,099.02 +$1,699.10 =$60,798.12	$60,798.12

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$2,660.00	$ 2,660.00 + 76.48 = 2,736.48	$ 2,736.48 + 78.70 = 2,815.18	$2,815.18
1970	$2815.18	$ 2815.18 + 80.94 = 2,896.12	$ 2,896.12 + 83.29 = 2,979.41	$2,979.41
1971	$2,979.41	$ 2,979.41 + 85.66 = 3,065.07	$ 3,065.07 + 88.15 = 3,153.22	$3,153.22
1972	$3,153.22	$ 3,153.22 + 90.66 = 3,243.88	$ 3,243.88 + 93.29 = 3,337.17	$3,337.17
1973	$3,337.17	$ 3,337.17 + 95.94 = 3,433.11	$ 3,433.11 + 98.74 = 3,531.85	$3,531.85
1974	$3,531.85	$ 3,531.85 + 101.54 = 3,633.39	$3,633.39 + $104.50 = $3,737.89	$3,737.89
1975	$3,737.89	$3,737.89 + $107.46 = $3,845.35	$ 3,845.35 + 110.59 = 3,955.95	$3,955.95
1976	$3,955.95	$ 3,955.95 + 113.73 = 4,069.68	$ 4,069.68 + 117.04 = 4,186.73	$4,186.73
1977	$4,186.73	$ 4,186.73 + 120.37 = 4,307.10	$ 4,307.10 + 123.87 = 4,430.97	$4,430.97
1978	$4,430.97	$ 4,430.79 + 127.39 = 4,558.36	$ 4,558.36 + 131.10 = 4,689.46	$4,689.46

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$9,200.00	$ 9,200.00 + 264.50 = 9,464.50	$ 9,464.50 + 272.20 = 9,736.70	$9,736.70
1970	$9,736.70	$ 9, 736.70 + 279.93 =10,016.63	$10,016.63 + 288.08 =10,304.71	$10,304.71
1971	$10,304.71	$10,304.71 + 296.26 =10,600.97	$10,600.97 + 304.88 =10,905.85	$10,905.85
1972	$10,905.85	$10,905.85 + 313.54 =11,219.39	$11,219.39 + 322.67 =11,542.06	$11,542.06
1973	$11,542.06	$11,542.06 + 331.83 =11,873.89	$ 11,873.89 + 341.49 = 12,215.39	$12,215.39
1974	$12,215.39	$ 12,215.39 + 351.19 = 12,565.58	$ 12,565.58 + 361.41 = 12,928.00	$12,928.00
1975	$12,928.00	$12,928.00 + 371.68 =13,299.68	$13,299.68 + 382.50 =13,682.18	$13,682.18
1976	$13,682.18	$13,682.18 + 393.36 =14,075.54	$14,075.54 + 404.81 =14,480.36	$14,480.36
1977	$14,480.36	$14,480.36 + 416.31 =14,896.67	$14,896.67 + 428.43 =15,325.10	$15,325.10
1978	$15,325.10	$15,325.10 + 440.60 =15,765.70	$15,765.70 + 453.42 =16,219.12	$16,219.12

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$2,510.00	$ 2,510.00 + 72.16 = 2,582.16	$ 2,582.16 + 74.26 = 2,656.43	$2,656.43
1970	$2,656.43	$ 2,656.43 + 76.37 = 2,732.80	$ 2,732.80 + 78.60 = 2,811.40	$2,811.40
1971	$2,811.40	$ 2,811.40 + 80.83 = 2,892.23	$ 2,892.17 + 83.18 = 2,975.41	$2,975.41
1972	$2,975.41	$ 2,975.41 + 85.54 = 3,060.95	$ 3,060.95 + 88.03 = 3,148.99	$3,148.99
1973	$3,148.99	$ 3,148.99 + 90.53 = 3,239.52	$ 3,239.52 + 93.17 = 3,332.69	$3,332.69
1974	$3,332.69	$ 3,332.69 + 95.81 = 3,428.50	$ 3,428.50 + 98.60 = 3,527.11	$3,527.11
1975	$3,527.11	$ 3,527.11 + 101.40 = 3,628.51	$ 3,628.51 + 104.36 = 3,732.87	$3,732.87
1976	$3,732.87	$ 3,732.87 + 107.32 = 3,840.19	$ 3,840.19 + 110.44 = 3,950.63	$3,950.63
1977	$3,950.63	$ 3,950.63 + 113.58 = 4,064.21	$ 4,064.21 + 116.89 = 4,181.10	$4,181.10
1978	$4,181.10	$ 4,181.10 + 120.21 = 4,301.31	$ 4,301.31 + 123.71 = 4,425.01	$4,425.01

Year	Principle per TRP Area	July interest at 2.875%	December or January Interest at 2.875%	New Principle
1969	$5,120.00	$ 5,120.00 + 147.20 = 5,267.20	$ 5,267.20 + 151.43 = 5,418.68	$5,418.68
1970	$5,418.68	$ 5,418.68 + 155.79 = 5,574.47	$ 5,574.47 + 160.32 = 5,734.79	$5,734.79
1971	$5,734.79	$ 5,734.79 + 164.88 = 5,899.67	$ 5,899.67 + 169.67 = 6,069.34	$6,069.34
1972	$6,069.34	$ 6,069.34 + 174.49 = 6,243.83	$ 6,243.83 + 179.57 = 6,423.41	$6,423.41
1973	$6,423.41	$ 6,423.41 + 184.67 = 6,608.08	$ 6,608.08 + 190.05 = 6,798.13	$6,798.13
1974	$6,798.13	$ 6,798.13 + 195.45 = 6,993.58	$ 6,993.58 + 201.14 = 7,194.71	$7,194.71
1975	$7,194.71	$ 7,194.71 + 206.85 = 7,401.56	$ 7,401.56 + 212.87 = 7,614.43	$7,614.43
1976	$7,614.43	$ 7,614.43 + 218.91 = 7,833.34	$ 7,833.34 + 225.29 = 8,058.63	$8,058.63
1977	$8,058.63	$ 8,058.63 + 231.69 = 8,290.32	$ 8,290.32 + 238.43 = 8,528.75	$8,528.75
1978	$8,528.75	$ 8,528.75 + 245.20 = 8,773.95	$ 8,773.95 + 252.34 = 9,026.29	$9,026.29

National Court of Papua New Guinea

Kunai v Papua New Guinea Forest Authority [2018] PGNC 439; N7570 (4 September 2018)