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State v Namaliu [2020] PGNC 234; N8506 (17 September 2020)

N8506

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR 71 OF 2018

THE STATE

V

RICHARD JASON MAGIAU NAMALIU

Waigani: Berrigan, J
2020: 18^th March, 14^th August and 17^th September

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence - S. 302 of the Criminal Code - Manslaughter – Conviction following trial – Deliberate intention to cause some harm – Serious aggravating factors - Death in domestic setting an aggravating factor –15 years of imprisonment imposed.

On the morning of 11 February 2017 Richard Jason Magiau Namaliu unlawfully killed Ruby-Anne Laufa.

Sometime between 10 am and 11 am the offender drove to the deceased’s home at 5^th Street, Fort Banner, inside the gated residential area of the University of Papua New Guinea. The offender had been out all night. He was tired and under the influence of alcohol. As he arrived at the deceased’s residence he was driving at sufficient speed to draw attention to the vehicle and throw up dust from the road. His speed was such that one disgruntled resident stood out on the road to stop the offender and ask him why he was driving so fast. The offender picked up the deceased from her home and almost immediately started assaulting her. As he drove away from her home he punched the deceased, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, to the head three times. He drove back the way he came, at speed, failing to stop for the person standing on the road, and causing the latter to jump back to avoid being hit. Just a short time later, as the offender travelled down from 5^th Street, he was seen by others again punching the deceased twice to the head. He was driving erratically, swerving from side to side, with the blinkers of the vehicle on. He drove on at speed towards the Fort Banner gate where the security guard stationed there raised his hands to stop the vehicle. The offender again refused to stop. He also ignored the obvious pleas of the deceased who was signalling to the guard to stop the vehicle. The guard made a second attempt to stop the offender’s vehicle but the offender drove over a speed hump and over the red cone that was blocking the exit lane, taking the cone with the vehicle, and failing to give way to an approaching vehicle as he did so. The offender then struck the deceased again, in the mouth with his elbow before driving on at increasing speed away from the deceased’s home and out towards the main road. As he slowed to take the sharp corner at the UPNG rugby ground the deceased jumped from the vehicle in fear for her life and safety. She suffered head injuries upon impact with the road. She was taken to hospital but died later the same day from her injuries. The deceased and the offender had previously been boyfriend and girlfriend. It was unclear whether the relationship was still on foot or had already broken down at the time of the offence.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter contrary to s. 302 of the Criminal Code following a trial. The State established that the offender was guilty of manslaughter through criminal negligence. By repeatedly assaulting the deceased whilst in charge of a moving motor vehicle and by continuing to drive the vehicle in those circumstances, at speed, over a period of time and for some distance, the accused’s conduct showed such disregard for the life and safety of his passenger as to amount to a crime against the State and deserving of punishment.

Held:

(1) Conviction followed trial in this case. There was a deliberate intention to cause harm, together with several other aggravating factors. Accordingly, the appropriate range for sentence is 13 to 16 years of imprisonment: Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789 applied.

(2) In mitigation the offender has no prior convictions. He is previously of good character and has contributed to the community through the employment of unemployed youth and the conduct of charitable works through his companies. After initially asking a bystander to do so, he took the deceased to hospital and remained with her there until he was arrested by police. The impact of the offence has been grave. Any term of imprisonment will have a significant impact on him, his family and businesses. He has expressed genuine sadness at the death of the deceased, and attempted to reconcile with her family, but he has refused to accept responsibility for his conduct that morning or its deadly consequences. There are no extenuating circumstances in this case.

(3) The factors in mitigation are far outweighed by the aggravating factors in this case. In establishing manslaughter through criminal negligence the State proved that the risk of harm was extreme and obvious and that the offender’s use and management of the vehicle showed complete disregard for the life and safety of the deceased. The degree of criminal negligence in this case was, however, particularly egregious. The offence involved the deliberate and repeated use of violence, which was directed at the deceased’s head, and showed an intention to cause at least some harm. The offender used the moving motor vehicle to effectively trap the deceased whilst he assaulted her. There was some planning of the assault by the offender. The offence took place over a period of time, for some distance and whilst the vehicle was travelling at speed. The offender not only failed to stop the vehicle but deliberately refused to do so on at least three occasions. The offender was fatigued and under the influence of alcohol. The offence resulted in the tragic loss of a young woman’s life, and the inevitable and enduring consequences of that for her family and friends.

(4) Furthermore, the death occurred in the domestic setting. The domestic context of any offending makes it all the more serious because it represents a violation of the trust and security that normally exists between people in an intimate or close family relationship. This principle is particularly applicable in a case involving violence or death. Death in such circumstances is a significantly aggravating factor.

(5) Women are an integral part of society. They are entitled to be treated with respect and dignity. They have the same rights and privileges as men. They are entitled to fully participate in, and benefit from, the development of the country: ss. 35 of the Constitution, Preamble to the Constitution, National Goals and Directive Principles.

(6) Death in a domestic context has long been recognised as a prevalent crime. There are increasing calls by the Courts and the community for these offences to stop. These crimes cannot be tolerated and the Court has a duty to ensure that sentences imposed in such cases contain a strong element of both personal and general deterrence.

(7) Only service of the sentence in custody will ensure that the offender is adequately punished for his conduct, that the Court appropriately denounces such offences, and that the offender and others are deterred from committing similar offences in the future.

(8) A sentence of 15 years of imprisonment is imposed.

Cases Cited:

Regina v Peter Ivoro [1971-72] PNGLR 374
Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653
The State v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91
The State v Frank Kagai [1987] PNGLR 320
Wellington Belawa v The State [1988-1989] PNGLR 496
Rex Lialu –v- The State [1990] PNGLR 487
The State v Steven Kenny (1991) N1881
Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38
Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216
The State v Kasira (2002) N2269
The State v Kaupa (2002) N2266
The State v Mana (2003) N2367
The State v Karo (2004) N2600
The State v Lavin (2004) N2607
Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789
The State v Kirafe (2005) N3660
The State v Tovut (2005) N4964
Ume v The State (2006) SC836
Daniel Ronald Walus v The State (2007) SC882
The State v Kailomo (2007) N5023
The State v Ruben (2008) N3941
The State v Albert Kududu (2010) N4108
The State v Christopher Dubun (2010) N4109
The State v John (2010) N4116
The State v Melchior Gunan (2011) N4317
The State v John Yeon Bekeram (2011) N4319
The State v Kalu (2011) N5270
The State v Albert Tiki (2013) N5219
The State v Joel (2014) N5797
The State v Ben Narogi (2014) N5798
The State v Mambe (2014) N6527
State v Pilota (2015) N5963
The State v Nicholson (2016) N6442
The State v Simon Moses (2017) N6617
The State v Aiwa (2017) N6948
The State v Parker (2017) N6838
The State v Leahy (2017) N6880
The State v Steward Yambukai (2018) N7465
The State v Warur (2018) N7545
The State v Lahuwe (2018) N7625
The State v Samuel Roth (2019) N7770
The State v Julu Tumpi (2019) N7912
The State v Vealolo (2019) N7802
The State v Mano (2019) N8238

References Cited

Preamble to the Constitution, National Goals and Directive Principles, Sections 35 and 55 of the Constitution
Sections 19, 302of the Criminal Code (Ch. 262) (the Criminal Code).

Counsel

Mr. D. Kuvi,for the State
Mr F. Kirriwom, for the Accused

DECISION ON SENTENCE

17 September, 2020

1. BERRIGAN J: On 11 February 2017 Ruby-Anne Laufa, a young woman with her whole life ahead of her, died when she jumped to her death from a moving vehicle to escape the violent assault of someone she knew well and should have been able to trust.
   
2. The young man who drove her to her death was found guilty of her manslaughter, contrary to s. 302 of the Criminal Code (Ch. 262) (the Criminal Code).
   
3. Sometime between 10 am and 11 am the offender drove to the deceased’s home at 5^th Street, Fort Banner, inside the gated residential area of the University of Papua New Guinea. The offender had been out all night. He was tired and under the influence of alcohol. As he arrived at the deceased’s residence he was driving at sufficient speed to draw attention to the vehicle and throw up dust from the road. His speed was such that one disgruntled resident stood out on the road to stop the offender and ask him why he was driving so fast. The offender picked up the deceased from her home and almost immediately started assaulting her. As he drove away from her home he punched the deceased, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, to the head three times. He drove back the way he came, at speed, failing to stop for the person standing on the road, and causing the latter to jump back to avoid being hit. Just a short time later, as the offender travelled down from 5^th Street, he was seen by others again punching the deceased twice to the head. He was driving erratically, swerving from side to side, with the blinkers of the vehicle on. He drove on at speed towards the Fort Banner gate where the security guard stationed there raised his hands to stop the vehicle. The offender again refused to stop. He also ignored the obvious pleas of the deceased who was signalling to the guard to stop the vehicle. The guard made a second attempt to stop the offender’s vehicle but the offender drove over a speed hump and over the red cone that was blocking the exit lane, taking the cone with the vehicle, and failing to give way to an approaching vehicle as he did so. The offender then struck the deceased again, in the mouth with his elbow before driving on at increasing speed away from the deceased’s home and out towards the main road. As he slowed to take the sharp corner at the UPNG rugby ground the deceased jumped from the vehicle in fear for her life and safety. She suffered head injuries upon impact with the road. She was taken to hospital but died later the same day from her injuries. The deceased and the offender had previously been boyfriend and girlfriend. It was unclear whether the relationship was still on foot or had already broken down at the time of the offence.
   
4. Despite the use of intentional and repeated violence, the State proceeded on the basis that the offender was guilty of manslaughter through criminal negligence. I found that the charge was made out on that basis. The offender breached his duty to take reasonable care and precaution to avoid danger to the life and safety of his passenger in the use and management of his vehicle when he created the very real and foreseeable risk that the deceased would suffer serious harm in attempting to escape the moving vehicle when he first assaulted the deceased whilst in charge of that vehicle, and he continued to breach that duty by continuing to assault the deceased, and further, by failing to stop the vehicle in those circumstances. The danger, or the risk of harm, was extreme and obvious. This is particularly so given that jumping from the vehicle was the only means of escape available to the deceased. The negligence involved was gross. The accused’s conduct greatly departed from the standard of care required, or from that which a reasonable member of the community would use in the same circumstances. By repeatedly assaulting the deceased whilst in charge of a moving motor vehicle and by continuing to drive the vehicle in those circumstances, at speed, over a period of time and for some distance, the accused’s conduct showed such disregard for the life and safety of his passenger as to amount to a crime against the State and deserving of punishment.
   
5. I also found that the offender was guilty of manslaughter without recourse to criminal negligence. The offender caused the death of the deceased by his voluntary acts, such that the deliberate and repeated use of violence by the offender against the deceased, in which death in attempting to flee his assault, whilst not intended, was not an accident pursuant to s. 24(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.
   

Submissions on Sentence

6. Before turning to the submissions made by the parties on sentence, I note that in Manu Kovi v The State (2005) SC789 the Supreme Court suggested the following scale of sentences for a conviction of manslaughter:

7. The State submits that the guidelines in Manu Kovi do not specifically provide for manslaughter through criminal negligence. It further submits that this case shares a number of the features identified under category one of Manu Kovi but that category one only applies in the case of a guilty plea. It calls for a sentence of no less than 15 years of imprisonment. The State was unable to find any comparable cases. It submits that the following aggravating factors are present: the tragic loss of life; the degree of criminal negligence, the danger and risk of harm; the violent assault to the deceased’s head; the influence of alcohol, the emotional impact on the immediate family of the deceased and the prevalence of intimate partner violence resulting in death.
   
8. Defence counsel submits that whilst this case “ought” to fall within category one of Manu Kovi but thatthe sentence range proposedin that category is too great having regard to present circumstances.
   
9. Defence counsel refers to the following cases in support of his submissions:
   
   1. The State v Steward Yambukai (2018) N7465, Geita J, in which the offender was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. The offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his pregnant wife in which the wounds inflicted were “vicious and many” inside their village home in East Sepik Province;
      
   2. The State v Lahuwe (2018) N7625, Geita J, in which the offender was sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, after pleading guilty to stabbing his wife in the abdomen following an argument at their home in the village in East Sepik Province;
      
   100. The State v Nicholson (2016), N6442, Liosi J, in which the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband following an argument over money at a school in Chimbu Province, which led to a fight, during which she stabbed her husband on the right thigh, severing a main artery. She was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody. 6 years and 9 months was suspended with the prisoner to serve 12 months;
        
   4. The State v Samuel Roth (2019) N7770, Cannings J. The offender was charged with murder but found guilty of manslaughter following trial and sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment. The offender inflicted severe injuries on the deceased in the course of a domestic dispute in the family home at Divine Word University in Madang. The offender struck the deceased with a leather belt and by other means assaulted and injured her severely, inflicting blunt trauma on her back with considerable force; and
      
   5. The State v Julu Tumpi (2019) N7912, Gora AJ, the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of two passengers, who were sitting in the back tray of her vehicle, when at the top of a junction her brakes failed and she lost control of the vehicle and it ran off the road. Both deceased were thrown from the vehicle, dying instantly. She was sentenced to three years on each count to be served cumulatively, wholly suspended on conditions including compensation and community service.
      
10. Defence counsel submits in mitigation that this is the offender’s first offence; he has cooperated with police and surrendered immediately following the incident; he is previously of good character and has contributed to the community through the provision of employment to unemployed youth. Defence counsel concedes that the prevalence of domestic violence offences is an aggravating factor. He submits, however, that there was no pre-planning, no use of a weapon and no intention to cause grievous bodily harm. Further, the fact that the injuries were sustained as a result of the deceased’s act of jumping from the vehicle to avoid further assault, rather than the assault itself, reduces the offender’s criminal responsibility for the purpose of sentencing, as death was not “directly connected to the actions of the offender; in that the offender caused the injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased”. In addition, the offender has suffered and will continue to suffer shame, humiliation and guilt for the rest of his life.
    
11. Defence counsel submits that a sentence in the range of three to five years of imprisonment is appropriate. Further, that the sentence should be wholly suspended having regard to the good works of the offender and that imprisonment is not the only means of achieving the three pillars of sentencing; punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.
    

Comparative Cases

12. In The State v Steven Kenny (1991) N1881, Kirriwom J, in noting the “prevalence and rising trend of violent deaths in totally unacceptable circumstances” said:
    

"Men who physically assault their wives or women generally must realise by now that spleen related deaths are common and frequent where men indiscriminately batter their women-folk without the slightest regard for their health and life. Resorting to physical violence to resolve one’s anger is not the right behaviour of decent and respectable men. Men who expect respect and support from their women must earn that respect by their conduct deserving of praise and dignity. The prisoner simply lost his control and as the consequence an innocent life is lost.

Counsel for the prisoner referred to the case of Rex Lialu –v- The State [1990] PNGLR 487. I must say categorically that Rex Lialu is out of date and in view of the prevalence and rising trend of violent deaths in totally unacceptable circumstances, reliance on this authority is no longer of any force or effect... [T]he tide has changed.

Manslaughter cases with no aggravating circumstances can now attract up to 6 or 7 years imprisonment on a plea or more on trial. Where there are aggravating circumstances and on a plea matter the prisoner should expect nothing less than 8 years."

13. That case was decided thirty years ago. In addition to the cases referred to by defence counsel, a review of sentences for manslaughter reveals an increasing trend in tariffs both generally and in respect of cases involving violence in the domestic setting, together with growing condemnation of violence against women by the Courts:
    
    1. The State v Kasira (2002) N2269, Jalina J, in which the offender pleaded guilty to killing his wife in their village in Oro Province. He and his wife argued. During the argument he became angry and hit the deceased twice over the head with a piece of bamboo. He then kicked her twice in the abdominal area. She collapsed and died about 15 minutes later. In noting the prevalence of manslaughter resulting from men assaulting their wives, the offender was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
       
    2. The State v Kaupa (2002) N2266, Jalina J: The offender pleaded guilty to unlawfully killing the deceased who was his second wife through a single punch to her abdominal area during a domestic argument at their home in Lae. She died almost instantly. Whilst accepting the offender’s co-operation with the police, his plea of guilty, his expression of remorse, his lack of prior conviction, absence of use of weapon and the single punch, the judge noted that “the prisoner has reacted in a manner that most men do these days as described by Kirriwom, J in Kenny’s case (supra) which I with respect endorse.” The offender was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
       
    100. Similarly, in The State v Lavin (2004) N2607, Kandakasi J (as he then was), a prisoner pleaded guilty to killing his wife after quarrelling with her over some fish at their home in the village in New Ireland. He became angry and slapped her on the mouth then kicked her on her left side once. She fell down and never got up again. She was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital as a result of a ruptured spleen. In sentencing the offender to 10 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, Kandakasi J said (emphasis mine):
         

“People, especially men, must realize that women are an integral part of our society today. The Constitution accords equal rights and opportunities to women. They are human beings with dignity and value. Therefore, men like you cannot continue to treat women like rubbish. Women are not football that men can kick around. A man who kills his wife, like the prisoner in the present case, must pay the price for his action. He cannot come to Court and give all kinds of reasons to escape a heavy penalty for the life he has taken.”;

4. The State v Mana (2003) N2367, Kandakasi J (as he then was), in which the offender was at a club drinking beer in Wewak. Another person there bought him two bottles of beer. The deceased repeatedly asked that person what sort of person the offender was that he would do that. The offender asked him to stop but the deceased continued so he slapped him on the face causing him to fall down on the hard concrete floor. The offender tried to resuscitate the deceased but he died later the same night at the hospital. The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
   
5. The State v Karo (2004) N2600, Kandakasi J (as he then was): the offender was a security guard working at a club in Popondetta. The deceased, who was drunk, walked in and refused to pay the club gate fee. An argument then a fight developed with the deceased punching the offender on his ear. The offender returned the punch by hitting the deceased around the face, momentarily blinding him and causing him to fall onto the ground. The offender then pulled the deceased up by his shirt collar and threw him out of the gate. That caused him to land on a hard surface, causing his already moderately enlarged spleen to rupture, leading to his death. The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
   
6. The State v Kirafe (2005) N3660, Kandakasi J (as he then was), in which the offender was on a work vehicle together with other employees and their families bound for base camp near Vanimo. The offender was drunk and a nuisance to other passengers and the driver. About a kilometre from the camp, he banged on the cabin roof of the vehicle, calling upon the driver to stop so he could relieve himself. The driver could not stop immediately but did so as soon as he was able to find a safe place. When he did the offender got off the vehicle and started arguing with the driver about why he didn’t stop earlier. The driver explained but the offender threw a beer bottle at the driver which hit him just above the right eyebrow. He died from his injury in hospital two days later. The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
   
7. The State v Tovut (2005) N4964, Cannings J, in which the deceased was drunk and had an argument with the offender near Kimbe. They were cousin-brothers and good friends. The offender punched the deceased and he fell. The offender then kicked him and ruptured his spleen, causing him to die. The offender surrendered soon afterwards, then showed remorse by paying for the deceased's funeral and paying compensation to the deceased's widow and children. He was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, with the possibility of 4 years suspension at the expiration of 6 years;
   
8. The State v Kailomo (2007) N5023, Cannings J, in which the offender was found guilty after trial of the manslaughter of his wife. He punched her once in the stomach during the course of a domestic dispute in the village near Hoskins, West New Britain, and she died of a ruptured spleen. A sentence of 15 years was imposed, less time spent in custody;
   
9. Daniel Ronald Walus v The State (2007) SC882 in which the Supreme Court upheld the sentence of 18 years following trial (but dismissed that part of the sentence that allowed for the prisoner to apply for suspension after 10 years). The offender killed his wife’s cousin sister after his wife reported their argument to him. The offender walked from his house to the deceased’s house in a settlement in West New Britain where he found her sitting on the steps. The offender punched her on the side of the face, which caused her to fall down. He then punched her on each side of her stomach and kicked her in the ribs, while she was still on the ground. She died shortly afterwards from a broken neck sustained from falling from the steps and a ruptured spleen sustained when the offender kicked her;
   
10. The State v Ruben (2008) N3941, Cannings J, the offender was not happy that he had not slept under a mosquito net and had been bitten by mosquitoes as a result. He argued with his wife in their home in the village in Madang Province and threw unripened paw paws at her, one of which struck her on the left side of her body and ruptured her spleen causing her death. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
    
11. The State v Albert Kududu (2010) N4108, Cannings J, the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his wife. She argued with him over domestic matters at their home in Madang Province. He responded by hitting her three times on the back with an open hand, which ruptured her spleen and caused her death soon afterwards. The offender was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
    

50. The State v Christopher Dubun (2010) N4109, Cannings J: the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his wife at their village home in Madang Province. He kicked his wife on the buttocks and on the sides of her body. She died shortly afterwards due to a ruptured spleen. He was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody, 3 years of which was suspended on conditions;
    

13. The State v John (2010) N4116, Cannings J: the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his mother, from Chimbu. The deceased was selling food at the roadside in the company of other women when the offender approached and without warning hit her on the mouth and punched her in the abdomen, the effect being that her spleen was ruptured. She died six days later. A sentence of 12 years was imposed, less time spent in custody, 3 years of which was suspended on strict conditions;
    
14. The State v John Yeon Bekeram (2011) N4319, Cannings J: the offender was convicted after a trial. He was angry with his wife for being away for a week and assaulted her when she returned to their home in a remote village in Madang Province. She died shortly afterwards. The sentence was 14 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
    
15. The State v Melchior Gunan (2011) N4317, Cannings J: the offender pleaded guilty. He argued with his wife at their home in the village in Madang Province, then assaulted her, rupturing her spleen and fracturing her neck. He was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, less time spent in custody, four years of which was suspended;
    
16. The State v Kalu (2011) N5270, Batari J, the offender and the deceased had a fight at a function at Lihir Island at which alcohol was consumed. The offender punched the deceased in the head; the deceased fell down, then the offender kicked him in the ribs. The deceased died from a ruptured spleen. Elements of provocation not amounting to a legal defence were present. The offender surrendered to police, made early admissions, pleaded guilty and paid compensation to the victim’s family. He was sentenced to 7 years less time spent in custody;
    
17. In The State v Albert Tiki (2013) N5219 the deceased and three other persons were sitting outside a trade store in Mt Hagen when the offender and his wife had an argument inside. The prisoner's wife then ran out of the trade store and was pursued by the prisoner. One of the persons sitting with the deceased grabbed the prisoner to prevent him from assaulting his wife. The offender picked up a brick-like object from the ground and hurled it intending to hit his wife. The scuffle between the offender and the other person caused the brick-like object to ricochet of the wall of the store and hit the deceased at the base of his skull. The deceased was admitted to hospital but died from his injuries four days later. The offender was convicted of manslaughter through criminal negligence following a trial for murder. He was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment from which time spent in custody awaiting trial was deducted.
    

Whilst David J agreed with the prosecution submission that the guidelines in Manu Kovi do not “specifically” cover manslaughter by criminal negligence he considered that the case fell within the range of sentences recommended in category 1 of Manu Kovi as the circumstances of death demonstrated that there was no preparation by the prisoner to kill the deceased by a brick-like object or at all;

18. The State v Joel (2014) N5797, Cannings J, in which the offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The deceased had been drinking all night at Kimbe Lodge when an argument was about to start between he and his brother. The offender tried to intervene, to stop the fight, and in the process of doing so, stabbed the deceased in the chest with a knife. The deceased collapsed and died soon afterwards. He was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
    
19. The State v Ben Narogi (2014), Cannings J: the offender pleaded guilty. He came back from the garden and saw his wife talking with neighbours in their village in West New Britain. He got angry and slapped her. When she fell to the ground, he kicked her in the ribs, rupturing her spleen. He was sentenced to 12 years’, less time spent in custody;
    
20. The State v Mambe (2014) N6527, Batari J, in which the offender was convicted of manslaughter following a trial. The offender confronted the deceased on the road in a settlement in West New Britain. After a short altercation over complaints that the offender still owed the deceased K50.00, the offender assaulted him with his fists. After he fell and was lying on the ground, the deceased kicked him on the side of his ribs. He died a week later due to internal bleeding. Batari J found that the offending fell within category two having regard to the not guilty plea, and the violence used, showing a deliberate intention to harm. He was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, with two years, 9 months suspended leaving 6 years to serve;
    
21. State v Pilota (2015) N5963, Toliken J: the accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter. His wife swore at him in front of his friends after he had assaulted her earlier that day. He got angry and pulled her into the living room in their village in Milne Bay Province and slapped her twice on both cheeks and kicked her once on the buttocks. She died soon after from a ruptured spleen. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, two years of which was suspended upon conditions;
    

5. The State v Parker (2017) N6838, Salika DCJ (as he then was), the prisoner was the owner of a helicopter company. The deceased was a licenced air craft engineer engaged by the offender’s company to make the helicopter operational for the purposes of obtaining an airworthy certificate from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). He failed to attend the inspection on the designated day. Later that eveningthe offender went to look for the deceased at the house where they both lived in separate parts. The deceased was not there and the offender went out to the Aviat Club and then to Lamana returning at about 230 am. At about 4 am the offender went outside and called to the deceased. They argued and the offender pulled the deceased outside and punched him three or four times on his head and face. He then held the deceased by his shirt and swung him causing the deceased to hit his head on the stone wall. The deceased died two days later from his injuries. The offender was convicted following trial. Salika DCJ expressed the view that the sentences in Manu Kovi may now be out of date but found that the offence fell into category two and sentenced the offender to 13 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
   

23. In The State v Leahy (2017) N6880, Cannings J: the offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter of a young man whom he shot and killed in the course of his employment as a security officer in Madang. The offender was a licensed firearm user. He believed that the deceased was escaping after committing an armed robbery. He fired warning shots to get the deceased to surrender but he did not. The deceased was swimming in the sea at the time he was shot dead. Death was caused by negligence rather than by deliberate act. Cannings J held that the offence fell in the second category of Manu Kovi given the use of an offensive weapon but sentenced the offender to 12 years of imprisonment having regard to the mitigating circumstances, six years of which was suspended;
    

10. The State v Simon Moses (2017) N6617, Cannings J, in which the offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his baby child. The baby was in Modilon General Hospital and the offender assumed the task of swinging the baby, which was in a bilum, to relax the child. He negligently swung the bilum with too much force, causing the baby’s head to hit a hard metal object. The baby died instantly due to intra-cranial bleeding. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. The court found that whilst it was mitigating that death arose from negligence rather than a deliberate act, the high degree of negligence was an aggravating factor;
    

25. In The State v Aiwa (2017) N6948, Salika DCJ (as he then was), the offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The offender met his uncle in the village in Chimbu and had an argument over an accident that injured seven people. His uncle started his motorbike attempting to leave when the offender removed a bush knife from his motorbike. He wanted to scare his uncle when the deceased got in the way and was cut by the bush knife on his neck. He sustained a 10-15 cm wound on his neck that led to his death. The State submitted that the accused had negligently handled the bush knife. Whilst finding that the case fell within category two (2) of Manu Kovi at the upper range and being guided by that decision the sentencing judge expressed the view that the ranges provided in that case were now outdated. He sentenced the offender to 20 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody;
    
26. The State v Mano (2019) N8238, Kaumi J, the offender had been drinking with the deceased at the offender’s house in Lae. Later that night the deceased sent the offender out on an errand. When the offender returned, he heard the deceased calling the name of his wife. This made him angry and he kicked the deceased on the chest and he fell down and hit the back of his head on the cement floor. The deceased died a week later from blunt force trauma to the head. The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment, less time spent in custody, but for three years to be served in custody, the balance was suspended on conditions;
    
27. In The State v Vealolo (2019) N7802, Susame AJ, the offender was with his wife at their home in the village in East New Britain Province. The prisoner asked the deceased for the file to sharpen his knife. He became angry when she handed it to him and it was wet. In his anger the prisoner swung the bush knife against the bamboo seat. The knife slid on the surface of the bamboo seat and cut his wife on the right calf muscle at back of the knee causing a deep wound. The deceased was rushed to the nearby aid post at Lau. From there she was referred to the aid post at Rali but died along the way. The prisoner voluntarily surrendered to police and confessed to the killing. He was sentenced to serve 8 years of imprisonment, which was wholly suspended.
    

Considerations on Sentence

14. The maximum penalty for manslaughter under s. 302 of the Criminal Code is life imprisonment. It is well established that the maximum penalty is reserved for the most serious instances of the offence: Goli Golu v The State [1979] PNGLR 653. Whilst not in that category this offence remains very serious.
    
15. Section 19 of the Criminal Code provides the Court with broad discretion on sentence. Whilst guidelines and comparative cases are relevant considerations, every sentence should be determined according to its own facts and circumstances: Lawrence Simbe v The State [1994] PNGLR 38. In a case of homicide, careful regard must be had to the circumstances of death and the way death was caused: Rex Lialu (supra).
    
16. Both counsel have submitted on the basis of manslaughter through criminal negligence. I will direct my comments on sentence accordingly.
    
17. At trial the State established that the danger or risk of harm was extreme and obvious and that the offender’s use and management of the vehicle was grossly negligent and showed complete disregard for the life and safety of the deceased. The degree of negligence involved in a case in which s. 287 of the Criminal Code has been established is obviously very great. This was, however, a particularly egregious case of criminal negligence.
    
18. First and foremost, the offence involved the deliberate and repeated use of violence.
    
19. Defence counsel has submitted that there was there was an absence of intent to cause grievous bodily harm. That issue was not determined at trial. The State removed it from the Court when it charged manslaughter and not murder. As I said in my decision on verdict, the choice of charge is a matter for the State over which the Court has no control (The State v Ngasele(2003) SC731). In my view, however,given the nature and circumstances of the case, the issue of whether or not the offender intended to cause grievous bodily harm at the time he assaulted the deceasedshould have been fully ventilated and determined. It was not, however, and in the circumstances I will proceed on the basis that it was not established. Regardless of that, it is clear that there was a deliberate intention to cause some harm as evidenced by the deliberate and repeated blows to the deceased’s head.
    
20. Furthermore, this was an unprovoked and cowardly offence. Whilst there was no use of a weapon as such, not only did the offender breach his duty to the deceased as his passenger, he used the moving vehicle to effectively trap the deceased whilst he assaulted her multiple times.
    
21. Whilst the death of the deceased was not planned, I am satisfied that there was an element of planning to the assault. This is established when regard is had to the manner and speed at which the offender drove to and from the deceased’s home, together with the fact that the assault commenced almost immediately after the deceased joined the vehicle, and the evidence excluded any rational inference that the assault commenced following an argument.
    
22. In addition, the offending took place over a period of time and for some distance, from soon after leaving the deceased’s home, until she jumped from the vehicle in a desperate act of self-preservation.
    
23. The offender not only failed to stop the vehicle having assaulted the deceased but deliberately refused to stop on at least three occasions despite clear attempts by bystanders and the deceased for him to do so. He failed to stop for the bystander near the deceased’s home, and he failed to stop again near the gate from the residential compound, twice ignoring the efforts of a guard stationed there, and the obvious efforts of the deceased herself.
    
24. The fact that the offender was fatigued and under the influence of alcohol is further aggravating.
    
25. I reject entirely any suggestion that the fact that the killing took place in what might be described as a “domestic setting” diminishes in any way the seriousness of it. On the contrary, death at the hand of a current or former partner or boyfriend and someone that the deceased knew well and should have been able to trust is a significantly aggravating factor.
    
26. A breach of trust not just by a fiduciarybut anyone in a special relationship with the victimhas long been recognised as an aggravating factor in cases involving property: see Wellington Belawa v The State [1988-1989] PNGLR 496 and the multitude of cases since.
    
27. In general terms, the domestic context of any offending makes it all the more serious because it represents a violation of the trust and security that normally exists between people in an intimate or close family relationship. [1] To my mind such a principle is even more applicable in a case involving violence or death.
    
28. In this regard it has been 15 years since the guidelines were articulated by the Supreme Court in Manu Kovi. It is my respectful view that the reference to “killing in a domestic setting” should be removed from category one, which is concerned only with those cases in which there are no aggravating factors. In my view this factor alone is seriously aggravating.
    
29. It is clear that the offender and the deceased had been boyfriend and girlfriend at some time prior to the offence. I was unable to find at trial whether the relationship was still on foot at the time of the offence or had broken down by that stage. Regardless of that, this was an offence in the domestic setting given their past relationship, as properly conceded by defence counsel.
    
30. Finally, this case involves a tragic loss of life. The deceased was just two days shy of her 25^th birthday at the time of her death. She was an adored and adoring daughter, sister and friend. Her short life had already seen much success and she was an aspiring leader. She was school captain when she graduated from Year 10 at the ACE Maranatha Baptist School, and obtained her Year 12 Certificate at the Sunshine Senior Campus in Melbourne, Australia, winning the English prize category. Despite offers to study at two Australian universities she followed her parents’ advice to return to Papua New Guinea, where she was on the cusp of beginning a career in law, having obtained her Bachelor of Laws from the University of Papua New Guinea in 2014.
    
31. Just the year before the deceased had been crowned Miss PNG and represented the country across the Pacific, winning several awards, before going on to become the runner-up in the Miss South Pacific contest in Samoa in 2013.
    
32. The impact on the deceased’s family has been profound. Her father’s grief at trial was palpable and the statement by her mother to Probation Services speaks to her great loss. She says that not only did Ruby-Anne excel academically, socially, professionally and spiritually but she inspired others to also strive for a better future by saying:
    

“Women, take courage and have faith to know your purpose in life. Only you can make a difference in life if you set your own goals and dreams to realise your own strength to succeed in life.”

33. A detailed report has been provided by Probation Services.
    
34. The offender is 28 years old. He is originally from Vunapope Village in Kokopo, East New Britain. He currently lives in his own home in Port Moresby. He was raised in a loving and disciplined home with six siblings by his parents, who are highly respected members of the community, and active members of the Christian Mission Fellowship International (CMFI).
    
35. He is well educated, having completed high school at Port Moresby International High School and later Tilak High School in Fiji under the care of Pastor Laisiasa V. Jioji, the Chairman of CMFI. He attended the Nelson Aviation College in New Zealand in 2010 and obtained his Private Pilot Licence. Prior to this case he was on his way to obtaining his Commercial Pilot Licence.
    
36. The offender is regarded by his family as an independent and caring leader with strong Christian values. His father speaks of his hard work and generosity and the large number of skilled personnel and previously unemployed youth who are employed through his companies, many of whom he supports with school fees and other assistance. The offender’s mother describes him as loving and kind to all people. His brothers and sisters met with Probation Services to confirm their support for the offender.
    
37. The offender is recently reunited with his former girlfriend and the mother of his seven year old son, who has returned after living overseas for several years. She has known the offender for the past 10 years and regards him as a kind and loving father with a big heart who helps those around him, especially the boys in the settlements.
    
38. His Pastor, Laisiasa V. Jioji, Director World Mission, CMFI, Suva, Fiji, has known the offender and his family since 1992, and was the offender’s guardian when he was studying in Fiji. He regards the offender as a fine young man, polite, honest and responsible, with many friends, and committed to his family. He witnessed the great care he provided to his younger brother for the two years they were both in Fiji. He was shocked to hear of the offence.
    
39. The Secretary to the National Board of the CMFI in Papua New Guinea, Diury M Tolopa, states that the offender is quiet and hardworking, and has done much for the young men his companies employ. She witnessed the offender and the deceased together on at least two occasions and says that he loved and cared for the deceased.
    
40. A member of the CMFI, Rosamund. M Teria, has known the offender since their families met in 2007. Her son studied in Fiji with the offender and his brother and she knows the offender to be a respectable and mature young man, and a committed and active Christian.
    
41. Similar sentiments are expressed by Shiam Kattapuram, Chartered Accountant, and close friend of the family who has known the offender since he was born.
    
42. One of the youths employed by the offender is grateful to the offender for supporting him through school and giving him a job. The offender helped him to enrol at Don Bosco Technical College to become an electrician and is a mentor and role model to him and other boys. Probation Services also spoke to a number of his employees, all of whom spoke highly of the offender and expressed their gratitude to him.
    
43. In mitigation this is the offender’s first offence. The offender is previously of good character.
    
44. Despite his relative youth, the offender is a successful businessman and entrepreneur in his own right. Following graduation, he worked as a loans officer with a finance company whilst also working as an assistant chef before starting two small businesses, KC Catering Services Ltd and POM Rustic Art Ltd, a catering and construction company, respectively. His businesses employ thirteen individuals from various settlements across Port Moresby. He also pays the fees of two individuals to attend technical institutions.
    
45. His companies support charitable work. Since 2014 his catering company has delivered meals to patients at Port Moresby General Hospital every Christmas. Since 2017 the company has delivered meals at the end of every month to persons held in police cells across Port Moresby. His catering company also donates cash and food to charitable events every year, up to a value of K5000, including to the Islands Petroleum Colour Run and Cheshire Homes Fundraisers. The company also supports community sporting teams. Every year he and his employees pay tithes as a percentage of total revenue to the church.
    
46. He has recently registered a new company to run a restaurant and is in the process of recruitment, with plans to commence this year. His catering company also plans to open a branch in Lae later this year, and eventually hopes to open branches across the country to provide employment and opportunities for farmers to sell their local produce and build communities.
    
47. His construction business, POM Rustic Art Ltd, primarily services his community’s estate and has helped neighbouring home owners with improvements since 2018, in addition to maintenance and construction in the 8 and 9 Mile area. They are looking to expand in Port Moresby and nationally.
    
48. Ultimately, he hopes to establish his own aviation company, to serve rural farmers and provide a cheaper alternative for cargo and medical emergencies across the country.
    
49. On allocutus the offender said:
    

“Your Honour, I stand before you today to accept the court’s decision on the handed judgement, I also would like to take this time to apologise, for it has not been an easy past three years. It’s a heavy burden that has been placed not only on my life, my shoulders but all those who were associated with Ruby-Anne and I. For the pain and suffering, I am sorry. I acknowledge some of Ruby’s family and friends that are here, I am deeply sorry that you lost your daughter, your sister, and your friend, for that I am sorry, forgive me. To my family and friends, I also extend the same sentiment for the shame and the pain this experience has caused. I also thank you for your support, I am deeply sorry, forgive me.

Your Honour, for this past three years and prior to the incident, I have continued to build myself up to be a person towards others. Your Honour, there’s a young gentleman here who’s part of a bigger team that I help support. I employ youths from various settlements around Port Moresby city. The source of income that they receive also puts food on the table, sends their children to school and impacts their communities. In addition to this my company and my line of work also assists many non-profit organizations and corporate companies in their charitable events: Book Belong Pikinini; Equal Playing Field; Cheshire Homes; and Highland Petroleum Culinary Event just to name a few. We provide food and logistics especially to culinary events to help raise funds to build and support rural health services around the country. In addition to this at the end of every month my team and I, prior to the incident and up to now, deliver 200 meal packs to all prison cells around the city, to police personnel and prisoners. We also have an initiative to support community development, we sponsor sporting teams such as the Southern Chiefs Rugby Union Club. In the festive season Your Honour, we deliver food to patients at the Pom General Hospital, these are some of the work that we’ve done, that I have continued to do even carrying this burden.

Your Honour, I understand that this experience has caused a lot of pain not just for myself but everyone involved, for that I ask for forgiveness. To date I have been cooperative with the police in their investigations and all associated parties. I have strictly complied to this court’s bail conditions and will continue to do so pending the Judge’s decision. Your Honour, I also stand before you to humbly seek your mercy, you may be able to impose a lighter sentence, and an all-suspended sentence so I may can continue the work that I have started. This Your Honour, is at your discretion as the Law’s hand.”

50. The offender, and his extended family, have apologised to the deceased’s family for the loss of their daughter. In the spirit of reconciliation the offender has attempted to pay compensation. Those attempts have been rejected.
    
51. It has been submitted that the offender cooperated with police. It is unclear what is meant by this. The offender did not surrender to police. After initially asking a security guard at the university to do so, the offender did take the deceased to one hospital, and then a second hospital, and remained with her there before he was arrested by police. It is true that he did not abscond or resist arrest but that is hardly a matter in mitigation, it is simply not a matter in aggravation. It was the UPNG security service that brought the police to the hospital, not the offender.
    
52. There was some cooperation with police in the form of limited admissions in his record of interview and confessional statement as to certain facts, including that he was driving the vehicle at the time, and that he hit the deceased once after leaving the gate. To be very clear the offender was at all times entitled to remain silent. A failure or a refusal by an offender to provide cooperation to law enforcement agencies does not aggravate his offending. See a similar discussion in The State v Warur (2018) N7545 at [31] to [34] regarding guilty pleas.
    
53. However, cooperation with authorities, like an early guilty plea, will only be a significant factor in mitigation when it constitutes genuine contrition and remorse, or reflects a willingness to assist authorities in their investigations and facilitate the course of justice[2].The nature and extent of the cooperation and its value to authorities are relevant factors in this regard. The offender lied to police and told them that it was the deceased who started the argument, assaulted him and jumped out of the vehicle in an attempt to commit suicide. He doesn’t get credit in mitigation for that.
    
54. The impact of the offence on the offender has been and will continue to be grave. I have no doubt that his conviction has caused both shame and a loss of standing. Any time spent in custody will have a significant impact on his businesses, his family and friends, the offender himself, his new partner, and of course, his very young child.
    
55. I reject the defence submission that there were extenuating circumstances in this case, or that the fact that the deceased jumped from the vehicle diminishes the offender’s culpability for manslaughter. Extenuating circumstances are “some relevant circumstances which operate so as to diminish the culpability of the prisoner, not in the strict legal sense but broadly, regard being had not only to moral considerations but to all the considerations which might reasonably be taken into account in order to determine whether it would not be just that the law should be applied in its full rigour”: see Regina v Peter Ivoro [1971-72] PNGLR 374; Ume v The State (2006) SC836.The offender’s moral culpability is not diminished by the fact that the deceased jumped from the vehicle. The deceased’s death was directly connected to the actions of the offender. It was the offender’s conduct that drove the deceased to jump from the moving vehicle and caused her death. There was no means of escape available to the victim other than to jump from the car. Her last moments would have been spent in pain and fear.
    
56. In my view this case falls within the second category of Manu Kovi having regard to the fact that conviction followed trial, there was a deliberate intention to harm, and the presence of several aggravating factors discussed above. Accordingly, an appropriate sentence range is within 13 and 16 years of imprisonment.
    
57. I have taken into account the offender’s age and personal circumstances. I have also taken into account his lack of previous conviction, his prior good character, his contribution to the community and charitable works, together with his attempts at reconciliation, and expression of remorse, a matter I will return to below. These are factors in his favour but they are far outweighed by the aggravating factors in this case.
    
58. The degree of criminal negligence in this case was extremely high. The offence involved the deliberate and repeated use of violence, which was directed at the deceased’s head, and showed an intention to cause at least some harm. The offender used the moving motor vehicle to effectively trap the deceased whilst he assaulted her. There was some planning of the assault by the offender. The offence took place over a period of time, for some distance and whilst the vehicle was travelling at speed. The offender not only failed to stop the vehicle but deliberately refused to do so on at least three occasions. The offender was tired and under the influence of alcohol. The offence took place in the domestic setting. It resulted in the tragic loss of a young woman’s life, and the inevitable and enduring consequences of that loss for her family.
    
59. This is yet another case where a woman has died at the hands of a current or former partner or boyfriend and someone she should have been able to trust. The prevalence of intimate partner violence resulting in death is high and this case calls for both strong specific and general deterrence.
    
60. Having considered all of the above matters, including the guidelines contained in Manu Kovi and comparative cases, I sentence the offender to 15 years of imprisonment.
    
61. The offender’s family and those who have provided references in support of him have expressed their shock at the offence, which does not reflect the offender that they know. They support the offender’s call for suspension so that he can continue to contribute to the development of the country through his businesses and charitable work.
    
62. Probation Services regards the offender as suitable for probation and recommends a prison term partially suspended. With respect, I cannot agree.
    
63. In The State v Tardrew [1986] PNGLR 91 the Supreme Court set out three broad, but not exhaustive, categories in which it may be appropriate to suspend a sentence, namely: where it will promote the general deterrence or rehabilitation of the offender; where it will promote the repayment or restitution of stolen money or goods; or where imprisonment would cause an excessive degree of suffering to the particular offender, for example because of bad physical or mental health. Suspension is not an act in leniency but a form of punishment that is to be served outside the prison system in the community interest to promote restitution or rehabilitation: The State v Frank Kagai [1987] PNGLR 320; affirmed Kumbamong v The State (2008) SC1017.
    
64. The offender expressed deep sorrow on allocutus for the loss of the deceased. I have no doubt that the offender genuinely grieves for the loss of the deceased’s lifebut the extent of his remorse for the offence itself is limited. Whilst the offender has at all times respected the Court process, and to that extent its decision, he has not demonstrated regret for his actions. In his written statement to Probation Services the offender expressly states that he regards his conviction as “wrong”. He is entitled to do so but the effect of that is that he still refuses to accept responsibility for his conduct that morning, or its deadly consequences. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that suspension would promote either his deterrence or rehabilitation.
    
65. There is no evidence that he would suffer exceptionally in prison. Restitution has no relevance here.
    
66. Nor would a suspended sentence be in the interest of the community.
    
67. I am not persuaded that his sentence should be suspended so that he may continue to operate his businesses and contribute to the community through his charitable work. The consequences of incarceration for both the offender and others are regrettable but in a case like this one they cannot on their own constitute grounds for suspension. It would be an error of principle in general terms that offenders with means or business interests might serve their sentences outside prison whilst less wealthy or entrepreneurial offenders who commit the same crimes do not.
    
68. Moreover, as demonstrated by the cases outlined above, domestic violence causing death can occur anywhere and at any level of society and it must be condemned accordingly. The charitable works of the offender are commendable but they must be balanced against the seriousness of the offence in this case.
    
69. Manslaughter is a serious offence as demonstrated by the maximum punishment, which is life imprisonment. “This reflects the value the society places on human life and its total condemnation of one person’s unlawful taking of another’s life under any circumstances”: Tanga v The State [1999] PNGLR 216.
    
70. The fundamental right to human life is enshrined in the Constitution: s.35. In its preamble, the Constitution also recognises that respect for the dignity of all individuals is a basic principle of society. All citizens have the same rights, privileges, obligations and duties irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex: s. 55. In declaring that all citizens should have, not only the freedom but, an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of the country, the National Goals and Directive Principles explicitly call for equal participation by women citizens in all political, economic, social and religious activities.
    
71. Women are an integral part of society. They are entitled to be treated with respect and dignity. They have the same rights and privileges as men. They are entitled to fully participate in, and benefit from, the development of the country. This is only possible when women live free from the fear of violence or death in their own homes or at the hands of their husbands, partners or boyfriends.
    
72. Death in a domestic context has long been recognised as a prevalent crime. There are increasing calls by the Courts and the community for these offences to stop. These crimes cannot be tolerated and the Court has a duty to ensure that sentences imposed in such cases contain a strong element of both personal and general deterrence.
    
73. Only service of the sentence in custody will ensure that the offender is adequately punished for his conduct, that the Court appropriately denounces such offences, and that the offender and others are deterred from committing similar offences in the future.
    

Orders

(1) The offender is sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in hard labour to be served at Bomana Correctional Institution.

(2) Any bail monies are to be immediately refunded.

(3) As a precautionary measure during the Coronavirus State of Emergency, the offender is to be held in an isolation facility at the Bomana Correctional Institution for at least two weeks before transfer to the main compound, subject to medical assessment.

_______________________________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Public Solicitor: Lawyer for the Accused

[1] See the discussion in the UK’s Sentencing Council’s Guideline on Domestic Abuse.

[2]Cooperation may also be relevant where an offender assists in the apprehension or conviction of a co-accused, with information which is full and frank, and which could significantly assist authorities: see R v Cartwright (1989)17 NSWLR 243 per Hunt and Badgery-Parker JJ at 252.