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National Court of Papua New Guinea |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
CR. NO. 1029 OF 2019
THE STATE
V
ROBERT AGEN
(No 5)
Waigani: Ganaii, AJ.
2022: 14th July
CRIMINAL LAW – No case to answer application – Charges of Assault occasioning bodily harm, Rape and Grievous Bodily harm - Principles of law in Paul Kundi Rape considered – Whether evidence is sufficient to make out prima facie case
Cases Cited
State v Fasean [2014] PGNC 68; N5596
State v Paul Kundi Rape [1976] PNGLR 96; N34
State v Robert Agen (No 1) [2021] PGNC 620; N9652
State v Robert Agen (No 2) (2022) N10276
Counsel
Ms M Tamate & Ms S. Suwae, for the State
Mr J Napu, for the Defendant
RULING ON A NO-CASE TO ANSWER APPLICATION
14th July, 2022
1. GANAII AJ: This is a ruling on a no-case to answer application at the close of the state’s case. State presented an indictment against the accused, alleging the following counts:
“Count 1
.... on 30th day of April 2018 at Owers Corner, Sogeri Road, Kairuku Hiri
District, Central Province unlawfully assaulted one AHJ and in doing so caused her bodily harm, contrary to section 340 of the Criminal Code
Count 2
... on the 30th day of April 2018 at Owers Corner. Sogeri Road, Central Province sexually penetrated one AHJ by inserting his penis into her vagina without her consent, contrary to section 347 of the Criminal Code and
Count 3
..... on the 15th of September 2018 at Waigani, NCD, unlawfully did GBH to one AHJ contrary to section 319 of the Criminal Code
Alternatively to Count 3 is Count 4
Count 4
... on the 15th of September 2018, at Waignai, NCD, unlawfully assaulted one AHJ and by so doing caused her bodily harm, contrary to section 340 of the Criminal Code”.
Elements of the Charges
2. The elements of the charges as contained in the offence provisions are stated below.
Count 1 Assault occasioning bodily harm
3. The offence of Assault causing bodily harm is in the following terms:
“340. ASSAULTS OCCASIONING BODILY HARM.
(1) A person who unlawfully assaults another and by doing so does him bodily harm is guilty of a misdemeanour.
Penalty: Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years”.
4. Section 1 of the Criminal Code Act (CCA) on the interpretation of “bodily harm” says any bodily injury that interferes with health or comfort. According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, ‘injury’ means being ‘hurt’ or ‘harmed’.
Count 2 Rape
5. The offence of rape is defined under ss 6 and 347 of the CCA in the following terms:
“6. SEXUAL PENETRATION.
When the expression “sexual penetration” or “sexually penetrates” are used in the definition of an offence, so far as regards that element of it, is complete where there is –
(a) the introduction, to any extent, by a person of his penis into the vagina, anus or mouth of another person; or
(b) the introduction, to any extent, by a person of an object or a part of his or her body (other than the penis) into the vagina
or anus of another person, other than in the course of a procedure carried out in good faith for medical or hygienic purposes”.
“347. DEFINITION OF RAPE.
(1) A person who sexually penetrates a person without his consent is guilty of a crime of rape.
Penalty: Subject to Subsection (2), imprisonment for 15 years.
(2) Where an offence under Subsection (1) is committed in circumstances of aggravation, the accused is liable, subject to Section 19, to imprisonment for life.
6. The meaning of consent under the CCA is provided in sections 347A and 347B in the following terms:
“347A. MEANING OF CONSENT.
(1) For the purposes of this Part, “consent” means free and voluntary agreement.
(2) Circumstances in which a person does not consent to an act include, but not limited to, the following: –
(a) the person submits to the act because of the use of violence or force on that person or someone else; or
(b) the person submits because of the threats or intimidation against that person or someone else; or
(c) the person submits because of fear of harm to that person or to someone else; or
(d) the person submits because he is unlawfully detained; or
(e) the person is asleep, unconscious or so affected by alcohol or another drug so as to be incapable of freely consenting; or
(f) ...
(i) the accused induces the person to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; or
(j) ....
(2) In determining whether or not a person consented to that act that forms the subject matter of the charge, a judge or magistrate shall have regard to the following: –
(a)the fact that the person did not say or do anything to indicate consent to a sexual act is normally enough to show that the act
took place without the person’s consent; and
(b) a person is not to be regarded as having consented to a sexual act just because –
he did not physically resist; or
(ii) he did not sustain physical injury; or
(iii) on that or on an earlier occasion, he freely agreed to engage in another sexual act with that person or some other person”.
“347B. WHERE BELIEF IN CONSENT IS NOT A DEFENCE.
It is not a defence to a charge under this Part that the accused person believed that the person consented to the activity that forms the subject matter of the charge where –
(a) the accused’s belief arose from his –
(i) self-induced intoxication; or
(ii) reckless or wilful blindness; or
(a)the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to him at that time, to ascertain whether the person was consenting”.
Count 3 Grievous Bodily Harm
7. The offence of Grievous Bodily Harm under s 319 of the CCA is defined in the following terms:
“319. GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM.
A person who unlawfully does grievous bodily harm to another person is guilty of a crime.
Penalty: Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years”.
8. In the case of State v Fasean [2014] PGNC 68; N5596 (13 May 2014), the Court referred to the definition of "grievous bodily harm" in Section 1 of the Criminal Code which is “any
bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger or be likely to endanger life, or to cause or be likely to cause permanent injury to
health”.
State’s case
9. Defence objected to all the documents being tendered to Court at the start of trial. During evidence, several documents were tendered
by consent and others were ruled admissible and received into evidence. These are listed in the table below.
No. | Document Title | State Exhibit Number |
1 | Record of Interview of the accused Robert Agen, dated 20/09/2018, Preferred English version, 4 pages | “S1” |
2 | Affidavit of Dr Lenturut-Katal, dated 9/12/2021, attaching to it a Medical Report dated 21/09/2018 for Ms AHJ | “S2” |
3 | Affidavit of Dr Lenturut-Katu, dated 9/12/201, attaching to it the Medical Report of Dr Poyap Rooney dated 11/09/2018, for Ms AHJ | “S3” |
4 | 2 x A4 pages of printed photographs of the complainant. 2 photographs on each page, totalling to 4 photographs. | A4 page 23 - “S4” |
5 | Statement of Joshua Kraip | “S6” |
10. Sworn oral testimonies were given by witnesses, complainant AHJ; Margaret Olaba, Joshua Kraip and Dr Lenturut-Katal. A summary
of their evidence is stated below.
AHJ |
11. At the close of the State’s case, the defence counsel made a no-case to answer submission.
12. For Count 1(Assault causing bodily harm), defence argued that the charge cannot be sustained as there is no evidence of the complainant suffering from any permanent injury or injury that is life-threatening. Counsel submitted on the elements of the offence of Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) and said the evidence so far did not support the charge.
13. For count 2, on the charge of rape, Mr. Napu submitted that the charge cannot stand as there is no corroborating evidence and
further the incident was reported after lapse of five months since the date of the alleged incident. Counsel relied on the case of
State v Ugwalubu [2009] PGNC 70; N3657 (22 May 2009). In that case, the Court acquitted the accused after a no case application was upheld, where the court did some weighing
up of the evidence but kept it at an absolute minimum. In the end the court was of the view that the victim’s evidence was
discredited and cannot be relied on. Mr Napu submitted that the Court cannot rely on the complainant’s story as it was fabricated.
14. Mr Napu also argued on the validity of the charge of Rape, submitting that the accused was never initially charged with the offence
of Rape. He submitted that the Public Prosecutor cannot add new charges.
15. For Count 3, on the charge of GBH, and alternatively Assault causing bodily harm, Mr Napu argued that the charge of GBH will
not stand as there is no evidence of any grievous bodily harm on the victim due to there being no permanent injury suffered by the
victim or the injury sustained was not to an extent where it had threatened her life.
State’s response
16. Ms Suwae argued that there is sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case against the accused on all of the charges. The
Court need not weigh up the evidence at this juncture. The accused should be called to answer to his charge.
17. The State restated the charges on the indictment and submitted that the evidence of the complainant was sufficient to make out
the charges. On the charge of assault occasioning bodily harm, State submitted that the bodily harm, as defined by section 1 of the
CCA is any bodily injury that interference with health and comfort. There is evidence that the injury suffered by the complainant
due to the assault did interfere with her health and comfort.
18. State prosecutor urged the Court to consider the definition of the offence of rape and find that there is sufficient evidence
to make out a prima facie case against the accused.
19. For the charge of Grievous Bodily Harm, under s 319, alternatively s340, State submitted that the Court will consider the s 1
CCA definition of GBH to mean any bodily injury to endanger or likely to endanger life or likely or cause permanent injury. State
submitted there is sufficient evidence on the element of the offence of GBH to make out a prima facie case against the accuse.
20. In the case of State v Paul Kundi Rape [1976] PNGLR 96; N34, on the question of whether the accused could be lawfully convicted, State submitted that the Court need not concern itself
whether the State had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. The test is whether there is a prima facie case on the evidence as
it stands.
Consideration
21. The leading case principle in an application on a no-case to answer application is the seminal case of Paul Kundi Rape [1976] PNGLR 96. Mr Napu relied on both the first and the second limps for all the charges.
22. For the offence in Count 1 of Assault occasioning bodily harm, Mr Napu wrongly submitted on the elements of GBH, which is a s
319 offence and not on the elements of the charge of Assault occasioning bodily harm, under s 340 (1) of the CCA. Consequently, his
submission has no bearing on this charge.
23. I am satisfied on the evidence of the complainant, at this stage that it is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of Assault
occasioning bodily harm against the accused. The complainant said she was whipped at least more than three times for ten minutes
and felt pain. Although there is no medical report, she stated that she was treated with pain killers for bruising and pain. The
court need not assess the credibility of the witness at this juncture but will do so at the end of trial. The witness was not discredited
to an extent where her evidence cannot be relied on.
24. For the offence of Rape, in Count 2, on whether the accused can lawfully be convicted, the Court is mindful that it can convict on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness alone. That is the law in section 352A of the CCA, where it is entitled ‘Corroboration Not Required’. This provision reads: “On a charge of an offence against any provision of this Division, a person may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, and a Judge shall not instruct himself that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of corroboration”.
25. I therefore reject the defence argument that the absence of corroboration for this charge should taint the complainant’s evidence and that the accused should not be called to answer.
26. The state’s case is one that relies solely on the evidence of the complainant. Her evidence thus far is that she had not consented to the act of sexual intercourse and was in fear of her life at that time the alleged act of intercourse was forced on her. She said she was threatened. As to whether that is the truth or not, is a matter for consideration on the credibility of the witness and her evidence after trial.
27. In the case of Ugwalubu (supra), that defence relied on, the Court had done some weighing up and decided that the sole testimony of the complainant was insufficient based on the evidence in that case. In the present case, the complainant’s evidence was not discredited to the extent that the court cannot rely on. This court will do the weighing up of the evidence at the end of trial.
28. In response to defence submission that this charge should not stand given the passage of five months since the alleged acts are said to have occurred, and that it goes to the credibility of the complainant, I say this. Under the provisions of the Criminal Code and any other law, there is no time bar for the mounting of a criminal complaint against a person. Unlike summary offences, s 69. of the Summary Offences Act[1] provides for the time limit for laying criminal complaints. This provision says: “No charge for an offence against any provision of this Act shall be laid in any court after six months after the offence took place”. The Criminal Code does not have similar provisions placing a time limit for the laying of indictable criminal complaints against a person.
29. I also reject the submission that there is no-case to answer on this charge as the complainant had laid the complaint 5 months after it is said to have occurred, as there is no legal basis for raising this argument at this juncture.
30. On submissions by the defence on the validity of the charge of Rape, where the defence argued that there is no-case to answer as the accused was never initially charged with the offence of Rape and submitting that the Public Prosecutor cannot add new charges, I reject this argument for the reasons stated below.
31. At the outset, I say this, the law governing the procedure for making a no-case to answer application is one that requires the strict application of the principle in the case of Paul Kundi Rape (supra), and that is on the evidence as it stands on the elements of the charge whether the accused has a case to answer based on the two limbs.
32. For this charge of rape, there is sufficient evidence from the complainant to make out a prima facie case against the accused. Her evidence had not been discredited to an extent where the court cannot rely on it. Any weighing up of the evidence will be left to the end of the trial.
33. The Arresting Officer Mr. Kraip had given his explanations as why he did not initially charge the accused for the offence of rape and that an additional information was presented to the committal court. I take judicial notice of the Committal Notice that the accused was committed to trial for this offence. The Public Prosecutor had presented an indictment for the charges. These actions by the Police and Public Prosecutor were found to be proper and valid in a previous ruling on the same issue raised by Mr Sebby in The State v Robert Agen (No 2) (2022) N10276). That ruling has never been challenged and is intact to date.
34. In that case, I adopted the reasoning in State v Robert Agen (No 1) [2021] PGNC 620; N9652. I also do the same here. The laying of the information against the accused at the District Court containing charges under the Criminal Code Act was within the powers of the police. (State v Dau [2020] PGNC 278; N8611 (9 October 2020)). It was for the police at that stage to choose the appropriate charge(s).
“As for the National Court proceedings, it is well established that the Public Prosecutor is responsible for controlling the exercise and performance of the prosecution function of the State pursuant to s. 176 and 177 of the Constitution. As explained by the Supreme Court in Review Pursuant to Constitution Section 155(2)(b); Application by Herman Joseph Leahy (2006) SC855 at [141]:
“These provisions establish the office of the Public Prosecutor and provide for the functions of the office, one of the most important of which is "to control the exercise and performance of the prosecution function ... before the Supreme Court and the National Court". The Public Prosecutor (Office and Functions) Act fleshes out that function. Section 526 gives effect to it. It facilitates the exercise and performance of the prosecution function. It allows the Public Prosecutor to control it. It allows the Public Prosecutor to decide what cases are prosecuted in the National Court.”
36. The decision by the Public Prosecutor to refuse to elect to prosecute a matter summarily is well within law and is a control of his exercise to prosecute in the National Court. It is not an abuse of his powers.
37. This power is also essential to ensuring that accused persons are indicted on charges that appropriately reflect the nature and extent of criminal conduct which is disclosed by the evidence: The State v Douba (2018) N7627. Per Kandakasi J in The State v Louise Paraka (2002) N2317, s. 525 proceeds on the basis that the Public Prosecutor, or a State Prosecutor for that matter, “is in a better position to consider the interest of the people and the mechanics of proving a charge against an accused person and then proffer the charge he considers sustainable".
38. In this case the accused was committed for trial to the National Court after the advice from the Public Prosecutor based on the same evidence in the one and same committal file that contained an initial charge against him. The State has decided to proceed on two additional charges pursuant to its powers under s. 525 of the Criminal Code Act. I am mindful of the exercise of the powers of the Public Prosecutor under s 4 of the Public Prosecutor’s (Office and Functions) Act[2].
39. In the defence no-case application, Mr Napu argued about the lack of conduct of police interview on the accused for the additional charges. The conduct of the police interview, out of which a written record of that interview is produced is known as the accused’s Record of Interview (ROI). The police interview process is an investigative tool used by the Police to gather evidence. Such is the essence of a ROI to gather evidence that may be used by the State or the defence. Conducting a Police interview also gives the accused an opportunity to be promptly informed of his rights and his charges. It gives them the opportunity to respond to the charges at the earliest time possible. The conduct of a police interview is not legislated in any law but is a process that was developed as best practice to aid in police investigations.
40. In considering the defence argument that the opportunity was not given to the accused to respond to the charge of rape, at the earliest, I go in to say this. Not conducting a ROI does not take away the opportunity for the accused to be explained his charges. The accused still has the opportunity to be informed of his charge and to make his response during the committal process and if committed, during the trial processes.
41. Having said these, the charge of Rape has been properly laid and brought to Court through the presentation of an indictment in
the hand of the Public Prosecutor, pursuant to proper legal basis giving the Police and the Public Prosecutor the powers and the
discretion to amend the information at the Committal Court and to lay appropriate charges on an indictment at trial in the National
Court as the evidence warrants.
42. This argument does not support the application for a no-case to answer application, based on the principles of law in Paul Kundi
Rape (supra) and is hereby rejected.
43. I do find that there is sufficient evidence on the elements of the charge of Rape to make out a prima facie case against the accused
at this juncture. Any weighing up of the evidence is left to after trial.
44. For the offence of GBH in Count 3 and alternatively Assault occasioning bodily harm, in Count 4, if the evidence on the charge of GBH is lacking on the question of the permanency of the injury sustained to the complainant’s jaw, as I do note that the complainant did say the fracture had healed, there is sufficient evidence on the elements of the alternate charge of Assault causing bodily harm to make a prima facie case against the accused at this stage. The weighing up of the evidence will be considered at the end of trial.
45. For all the charges, in cross-examination of all state witnesses, they all responded to questions asked. Any assessment on their credibility and any real weighing up of their evidence against the totality of the evidence will be left to after trial. Where the witnesses have not been discredited to such an extent that their evidence is tainted and so unreliable that the Court cannot rely on, there is sufficient evidence on all the charges to make out a prima facie case at this juncture.
46. Based on all of the above, I refuse the application for no case on all the charges (and the alternative count) on both legs of Paul Kundi Rape (supra).
47. The accused has the following three options:
Ruling of the Court.
________________________________________________________________
Public Prosecutor: Lawyers for the State
Napu and Company Lawyers: Lawyers for the Defendant
[1] Chapter No 264 of 1977
[2] Chapter No 338 of 1977
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