PacLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

National Court of Papua New Guinea
You are here:  PacLII >> Databases >> National Court of Papua New Guinea >> 2025 >> [2025] PGNC 149

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

James v Talau [2025] PGNC 149; N11277 (9 May 2025)

N11277


PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]


OS NO. 332 OF 2023


BETWEEN
DANNY JAMES for himself and for and
on behalf of Zaganza Tribe of Kanagogi, Menyama District
Applicant


AND
JOB TALAU for himself and for and
on behalf of Yanguya Tribe of Tsewi, Menyama District
First Respondent


ROAP GEMUNG in his capacity as the
Local Land Court Magistrate
Second Respondent


SAPANO MATAN & WAGO UMPUNO
in their capacity as Land Mediators
Third Respondent


JAMES MOROG in his capacity as
Local Land Court Magistrate
Fourth Respondent


LAE: COLLIER J
9 MAY 2025


JUDICIAL REVIEW – review of decisions of Local Land Court under Land Disputes Settlement Act Chapter 45 – whether decisions attended by unreasonableness, bad faith or error of law.


The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions of the Local Land Court referable to ownership of customary land and enforcement of eviction orders. The Local Land Court had ordered that ownership of the land lay with the first respondents. Leave was granted to the applicants for an application for judicial review to be filed. The applicants claimed that the decisions of the Local Land Court were attended by unreasonableness, bad faith and/or error of law.


Held:


Judicial review granted. In circumstances where the Local Land Court had recognised the historical and physical connection of the applicants to the land but nonetheless found without giving reasons that “overall” the evidence favoured the first respondents as the owners of the land, that decision was unreasonable within the meaning of the principes explained in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223. The second decision of the Local Land Court enforcing its earlier decision was also set aside.


Cases cited
Air Niugini Ltd v Beverley Doiwa [2000] PNGLR 347
Allolim v Kirokim [2018] SC1735
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374
Jimmy v Clan [2010] N4101
Kani v Barrick (Niugini) Ltd (formerly Placer Dome (PNG) Ltd) [2024] SC255
Kariko v Korua (2020) SC1939
Kekedo v Burns Philip (PNG)s Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122
Kiuk (trading as Nikiuma Lawyers) v Iduhu [2021] SC2128
Ombudsman Commission v Yama [2004] SC747
Sahale v Karogo [2021] SC2129


Counsel
Mr K Aisi, for the applicant
No appearance, for the first respondent
Ms N Kibikibi, for the second, third and fourth respondents


  1. COLLIER J: This is a notice of motion whereby the applicants seek judicial review of two decisions. Leave to apply for judicial review of those decisions was granted by Dowa J on 21 February 2024.
  2. At the hearing before me, for the hearing of the present Notice of Motion, there were appearances by Counsel for the applicants, and the second, third and fourth respondents. There was no appearance by the first respondents. Insofar as I am aware no explanation was provided by the first respondents for their failure to attend the hearing, although Counsel for the applicants informed the Court that a member of the first respondents’ clan was present in the body of the Court at the hearing. I note that the hearing of the Notice of Motion on 6 May 2025 has been set down for several months. I further note that the present Notice of Motion has been set down for hearing but then adjourned on numerous occasions (19 August 2024, 21 October 2024, and 11 February 2025).
  3. I am satisfied that the first respondents had adequate notice of the hearing. I further consider that it is inappropriate that the matter be adjourned off again to a future date.

BACKGROUND FACTS


  1. The events leading to the present proceedings are summarised in his Honour’s judgment of 21 February 2024, to which I am indebted in respect of the following summary of background facts.
  2. The decisions in respect of which judicial review is sought are as follows:

(collectively: the relevant decisions)

  1. As Dowa J noted, the dispute commenced in 2001 when a land mediation took place between February and November of that year. The first decision following that mediation was in the following terms:
IN THE MATTER OF A LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN KANAGOGUI AND TSIWE OVER A LAND CALL KWAPEKE AND ITS BOUNDARY
That before the Local Land Court proceeding the land in question or in dispute was inspected by both parties and their clansmen on 13, 14, 15 – 3/2001.
The dispute covered quite a large area of land with mountains and valleys half covered with kunal grass and the other half covered with thick forest with Kotai river running in between.
Kanagoke clan claim Kwepeki land as theirs because during the tribal fight Kanagoke have conquered the land and have evidence to show like old villages and karuka trees. But later they all have returned to where they are now at Kangoke.
Tsiwe on the other hand claimed that they were with Zakanza tribe but because of tribal war they were chased by Zakanza tribe from one place to another until they came to Tsiwe where they are staying now.
I have considered the historical evidence as well as physical evidence and have walked the land in dispute and have considered the size of the land each clan owns and the distance from Kanakoki to Tsiwe I come to this conclusion.
  1. The Kwapeki land belong to Tsiwe.
  2. The historical and physical evidence claim by Kanakoge were used at the time of their fore fathers and the ancestor. They are no longer using it now.
  3. Visa versa what ever physical evidence and land mark claim by Tsiwe at the side of Kanago was not in use.
  4. This Court thereby rules that the Common boundary between Zakanza tribe and Yasuwga tribe be placed at Kotai river up and onto Malgol river to the next clan land.
COURT ORDER
  1. Having considered the over all evidence in this land dispute between Kongold clan of Zaganza tribe and Tsiwe clan of Yesurga tribe over the land known as Kwakepki land, entered the judgment in favour of Tsiwe and awarded Kwapeki land to Tsiwe.
  2. This Court also place a common boundary between Tsiwe and Kangold at Kotai river up and turning right into Malgol river where it touches the other clans land
  3. This Court makes a further order that both sides be given three (3) years to return to their respective area.
  4. After three (3) years if either party whether Kanagold or Tsiwe fail to comply with the Court order force be used and the property be destroyed.
  5. The Yesurge clan shall refund to Kangold the K200.00 pai for land mediator allowance and cost within One (2) month.
(errors in original)
  1. The applicants appealed the first decision to the Provincial Land Court, however the appeal was not set down for hearing by the Provincial Land Court despite repeated requests over several years by the applicants.
  2. In August 2023 the first respondents filed a notice of motion in the Menyamya Local Land Cout seeking orders against the applicants to give up vacant possession of the land to the first respondents. On 2 October 2023 the fourth respondent ordered the applicants to deliver up vacant possession of the land to the first respondents.

DECISION OF DOWA J


  1. The applicants filed an originating summons and statement of claim on 1 December 2023 seeking leave to apply for judicial review of the relevant decisions.
  2. Justice Dowa granted the applicants leave to apply for judicial review, noting, inter alia, that despite the orders of 5 November 2001 the applicants had continued to live on the land undisturbed until the orders of 2 October 2023. His Honour accepted the explanation for the lengthy delay on the part of the applicants in filing the application for leave. His Honour noted the finding of the learned Magistrate that the applicants were the original owners of the land but were chased away by the first respondents, although the first respondents had since returned to their earlier land and the applicants back to the land in question. His Honour also considered that the first respondents had waited too long to enforce the orders of the Local Land Court, and that the appeal of the applicants had been frustrated by Court process.
  3. In granting leave to apply for judicial review, Dowa J also ordered that the applicants file an application for judicial review by Notice of Motion within 21 days from the date of the Order.

NOTICE OF MOTION


  1. By Notice of Motion filed on 1 March 2024 the applicants sought the following Orders:
    1. An Order by way of Writ of Certiorari issued to bring to this Court the decision of the Second Respondent in the Local Land Court dated 5th November 2001 and Fourth Respondent’s decision dated 2nd October 2023 and quash these said decisions accordingly.
    2. The matter be remitted back to Local Land Court for rehearing of the dispute over “Kwapeki” land between the parties.
    3. Costs be in the cause.
    4. ...
    5. ...
  2. All respondents filed Notices of Intention to Defend.

EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES

Evidence of the applicants


  1. At the hearing before me the applicants relied on an affidavit of Mr Danny James sworn on 24 November 2023 (filed 1 December 2023) and a Statement of Facts filed by them on 1 December 2023.
  2. In his affidavit Mr James relevantly deposed:

Evidence of the respondents


  1. The second, third and fourth respondents were represented by Counsel, however Counsel made no submissions and relied on no evidence.
  2. Notwithstanding the failure of the first respondents to appear, I note the following affidavits filed by them in this proceeding.
  3. First, an affidavit of Mr Maulaso Eboling sworn 27 November 2024. Mr Eboling relevantly deposed:
    1. I am a senior member of the YANGUYA TRIBE of Tsewi, Menyamya District, Morobe Province and am very well versed with the situation surrounding this proceeding and as such am authorised to deposed to the content this affidavit.
    2. I was the Spokesman and the leader for my Yanguya Tribe who disputed the ZAGANZA CLAN who claiming our land known as Kwapeki. The ZAGANZA TRIBE spokesman was Mr Wetenga and Mr Giden Kamango. They has lost the court battle.
    3. After mediation process failed, I further represented my tribe in the Local Land Court held in Menyamya before His Worship, Roap Gemung on 5th November 2005, which the Local Land Court ruled in Favor of my YANGUYA TRIBE.
    4. Today I remain the spokesman and leader of my people of Yanguya Tribe.
    5. Since the mediation and physical inspections of the Land, I knew the spokesmen of the disputing and am named hereunder. A Danny James filing this review and claiming to sue for himself and on behalf of Zaganza Tribe is misleading and he is impersonating. He is not a member of ZAGANZA TRIBE, and has no standing to file this Review on behalf of ZAGANZA TRIBE. He is from other tribe. His tribe is not related to Zaganza tribe now in dispute. We have not disputed his tribe Kapini ward 13 of Wapoi Local Level Government, a village located along the highway linking Menytamya/Aseki and to Bulolo/Lae.
  4. Second, an affidavit of Mr Job Talau, the first named of the first respondents, sworn 27 November 2024. Relevantly Mr Talau deposed:
    1. I am the former Provincial Member for Menya Constituency in Menyamya District from 1988-1995 until government reform abolished the system. Later I was elected the LLG Ward Councilor and Deputy President for Kome LLG for two terms,
    2. I have been awarded a British Empire Medal (BEM) by the Governor General in recognition for display of Leadership at Menyamya District and Morobe Province. Today I remain the Leader of Yanguya Tribe of Tsewi people of Menyamya.
    3. YANGUYA TRIBE is the legitimate owner of the customary land known as “Kwapeki”. The said land was owned and used by my ancestors passed on from generation to generations util to my generation and will continue to next.
    4. Historically during primitive days my clan fought, killed and chased trespasser to protect KWAPEKI land and its boundary until modern day the Church activity and Law and order introduced which reduced fighting and killing.
    5. Recently in the 1960s to early 1970s the KWAPEKI LAND was used as a cattle farm, owned by my families. In the 1980s the cattle farm was abandoned, and the land was left vacant, used for hunting and gardening.
    6. The dispute over KWAPEKI LAN started in 1996 when members of ZAGANZA TRIBE intruded and trespassed by crossing over common boundaries which is the fast-flowing river known as Kotai River for hunting, gardening and continue with settlement.
    7. On the 11th of December 1996 YANGYUYA TRIBE took out a Temporary Order at the Menyamya Local Land Court against ZAGANZA TRIBE of Kanagogi from gardening and doing any new development on the said KWAPEKI LAND.
    8. We have registered our disputes at the Local Land Mediation. On the 13th September 2000 Nakas Tamonkepe of a/LCM did a list of outstanding land matters and referred to Local and Court for mediation...
    9. The Local Land Court commenced at Menyamya as requested and all parties were present during the three (3) days mediation through to the final dates of hearing and decision on the 5th November 2001. The decision of the Local Land Court was delivered verbally and both parties YANGUYA TRIBE and ZAGANZA TRIBE are fully aware of the order of the Local Land Court Order.
    10. The Local Land Court’s decision of 05th November 2001 was never appealed by the ZAGANZA TRIBE of Kanagogi. As such the Local Land Court order remains outstanding and is enforceable in the circumstances.
...
  1. On the 13th November 2002, the Applicants (ZAGANZA TRIBE) continue residing and expanding new settlements, gardening, destruction to our food gardens, stealing and harassing clan members, burnt down houses and that habit have increased and multiplied. Therefore, we sought assistance through the Menyamya District Administration for immediate eviction.
  2. Nothing happened to our demands and the Applicants continued to disobey the LLC Order and as such on the 19th March 2009 Notice to Quit was issued by the Morobe Provincial Administrator to quit whatever and vacate the land.
  3. After numerous letters and warning made to the Applicants by us and the authorities the Applicants continue and threatening clan members/harassment, environment and property destruction and other intrusion and cultivate onto our legitimate land and destroy our natural resources.
  4. On the 5th September 2023 we wrote to the Local Land Court Magistrate and he advised to file Notice of Motion to enforce the order of the 5th November 2001.
  5. On the 2nd of October 2023 after considering all facts and evidence provided the Provincial Land Court Ordered the Applicants to give vacant possessions of the said KWAPEKI LAND within 30 days from the date of order and further ordered the Police to use reasonable force to enforce the order.
  6. I know the Applicant, DANNY JAMES very well. He is not a member of ZAGANZA TRIBE, and has no standing to file this Review on behalf of ZAGANZA TRIBE. He is from Tamoi village, a member of HIKI JUNGA CLAN of TINAUYAQA TRIBE. His tribe is not related to Zaganza tribe now in dispute...
...
(references to annexures omitted)
  1. Third, an affidavit of Mr Peto Kaldagaso of Yanguya Clan sworn 27 November 2024 in which Mr Kaldagaso similarly deposed that Mr James was not a member of the Zaganza Tribe.
  2. At the hearing I directed the attention of Mr Aisi for the applicants to these affidavits filed by the first respondents and asked if he had any submissions he sought to make in respect of that evidence. In light of the tenor of the evidence in those affidavits, I granted leave to Mr Aisi to call Mr Danny James to give evidence in respect whether Mr James was a member of the applicant’s clan group as he claimed. Mr James gave sworn evidence that he was a member of the applicant’s clan group.
  3. In the absence of cross-examination testing Mr James’ evidence, further evidence from the respondents rebutting Mr James’ evidence, and the absence of the first respondents at the hearing to make submissions concerning this issue, I accept Mr James’ evidence as to his identity as a member of the applicants’ clan in preference to that of the affidavit evidence of the first respondents.

SUBMISSIONS


  1. To date only the applicants have filed submissions in relation to the Notice of Motion presently before the Court. Those submissions were filed on 7 May 2024. In summary the applicants submitted:
  1. At the hearing Mr Aisi for the applicants relied on those written submissions.


CONSIDERATION


  1. Principles relevant to consideration of an application for judicial review are settled. In Kekedo v Burns Philip (PNG) Ltd [1988 - 89] PNGLR 122 the Supreme Court said:
“... the circumstances under which judicial review may be available are where the decision-making authority exceeds its power, commits an error of law, commits a breach of natural justice, reaches a decision which is no reasonable tribunal could have reach or abuses its powers.
The purpose of judicial review is not to examine the reasoning of the subordinate authority with the view to substituting its own opinion. Judicial review is concerned not with the decision, but with the decision-making process.”
  1. See also Allolim v Kirokim [2018] SC1735 at [21].
  2. More recently the Supreme Court in Kani v Barrick (Niugini) Ltd (formerly Placer Dome (PNG) Ltd) [2024] SC255 stated:
    1. Earlier leading authorities on judicial review are the twin decisions in Avia Aihi v. The State [1981] PNGLR 81 and Avia Aihi v. The State (No 2) [1982] PNGLR 44 (Kidu CJ, Kearney DCJ, Greville–Smith, Andrew & Kapi, JJ, which make it clear that an applicant must make out a case and the Court must find on the merits of the application that the applicant has demonstrated “exceptional circumstances where some substantial injustice is manifest, or the case is of special gravity”. An insightful discussion of these principles by Deputy Chief Justice Kearney is set out in those cases.
    2. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have followed these principles. The decision in Independent State of Papua New Guinea v. Colbert [1988] PNGLR 138 (Kapi DCJ, Bredmeyer & Amet, JJ) referred to applicable case law up to that point and concluded that the discretionary power of the Court should be exercised only where:
(a) it is in the interest of justice;
(b) there are cogent and convincing reasons and exceptional circumstances, where some substantial injustice is manifest or the case is of special gravity; and
(c) there are clear legal grounds meriting a review of the decision.
  1. In Kekedo v Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122 the following principles fundamental to judicial review were enunciated Kapi DCJ at p. 124:
The circumstances under which judicial review may be available are where the decision-making authority exceeds its powers, commits an error law, commits a breach of natural justice, reaches a decision which no reasonable tribunal court have reached or abuses its powers.
The purpose of judicial review is not to examine the reasoning of the subordinate authority with the view to substituting its own opinion. Judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the decision-making process.
  1. A clear statement of the difference between the appeal process and judicial review was provided by Supreme Court in Avei v Maino [2000] PNGLR 157 (Hinchliffe, Sheehan, Jalina JJ) where it was said at paragraphs 161-162:
It is common ground that there are fundamental differences between appeals and reviews. They are in fact different jurisdictions.
In the appeal process an aggrieved person may, as of right, created by the Constitution or statute, call on a higher court or authority to examine the findings of fact and law of a determination against him. In the hearing of that appeal, the appellate Court may consider both facts and law, forming its own judgment of the issues. If error is found it will deliver the judgment it considers that should have been given in the court or by the authority below. That is, the appellate court may substitute its own findings for that of the court or authority appealed from.
Review on the other hand is not an appeal procedure. It is concerned not with the decision itself but with the decision making process. It is the supervisory jurisdiction of the ... Supreme Court empowering it to intervene, at its discretion, to ensure that the decisions of inferior courts or authorities made are within the limits of, and in accordance with, duties imposed on them by law. But it is not part of this jurisdiction of the Court to substitute its own findings or opinions for that of the authority that Parliament has appointed to determine the matters in question. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the Court as the decision-maker... Nonetheless the Court may intervene by judicial review where a Court or authority acts outside the jurisdiction given it by law, that is where it makes determinations it is not authorized to make. It can intervene where there is error of law on the face of the record, procedural irregularity or when it is plain that the decision reached is such as to be unsustainable in law or reason.
  1. This explanation as to the distinction between appeals and judicial review has been endorsed by the Supreme Court on many occasions: see for example Waranaka v Dusava (2009) SC980 (Kandakasi J as he then was, Lay & Gabi, JJ) and Sigianisi v Aimo (2013) SC1237 (Salika DCJ as he then was, Manuhu & Poole, JJ).
  2. In summary, judicial review may be available where a superior court can be satisfied that:
(1) the decision-making authority has abused or otherwise exceeded its powers;
(2) there is an important point of law which clearly has merit or on points of evidence where there is an error clearly manifest on the face of the record;
(3) there has been a breach of natural justice, such as the denial of a party’s right to be heard;
(4) the decision-making authority has made a decision that no reasonable tribunal could have reached.
  1. As Cannings J properly observed in Jimmy v Clan [2010] N4101 at [11], the National Court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership of customary land. The ownership of the customary land is not the issue before me. The key issue before me rather is whether the first decision was made fairly and in accordance with the law. If the first decision is quashed it follows that the second decision should also be quashed.
  2. The first decision was made by the Local Land Court. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Sahale v Karogo [2021] SC2129:
    1. The ownership of customary land is often very contentious. The Land Dispute Settlements Act provides the machinery for the resolution of such matters in accordance with the principles of traditional ispute resolution. It is in the interests of justice that the substantive issues in dispute be resolved once and for all in accordance with those processes... It is important that all concerned have confidence in the ultimate decision.
  3. The LDS Act provides, inter alia, that a Local Land Court is not bound by any rule of law, evidence, practice or procedure other than the LDS Act, and may inform itself on any question before it in such manner as it thinks proper (s 35(1)(a), (c)). However, where a Local Land Court proceeds to hear and determine a dispute it is bound, as far as is practicable, by the same rules of law, evidence, practice and procedure as those by which the Village Court or Local Court having jurisdiction in the matter would be bound (s 35(3)). Section 39 of the LDS Act provides for Orders generally, including that the Local Land Court shall apply the customs of the area generally (s 39(2)) and consider those customs. Customary interests in relation to land which can be taken into consideration include those set out in s 39(3).
  4. Section 41 of the LDS Act relevantly provides:
(1) As soon as practicable after the conclusion of a hearing, the Local Land Court shall–
(a) explain the reasons for its decision; and
(b) state clearly the terms of its order,
in the presence of the parties to the dispute.
  1. In the present case while there is no complaint from the applicants concerning the processes adopted by the second and third respondents in reaching the first decision, the applicants contend in respect of the first decision of the second and third respondents that the decision was unreasonable and/or in bad faith.
  2. Whether a decision should be set aside as “unreasonable” as explained by Lord Green MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223 has been the subject of frequent attention by the Courts in this country. In Air Niugini Ltd v Beverley Doiwa [2000] PNGLR 347, Amet CJ referred to the English case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 where Lord Diplock described the Wednesbury “unreasonableness” principle as:
a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.
  1. More recently in Kiuk (trading as Nikiuma Lawyers) v Iduhu [2021] SC2128 the Supreme Court, citing the earlier decision in Kariko v Korua (2020) SC1939, observed:
59. The principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness referable to the authority of Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223 was recently explained by the Supreme Court in Kariko v Korua (2020) SC1939, as follows:
  1. The ' Wednesbury principle' the appellants rely on is laid down in the oft-cited case of Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223. Under this principle, the superior court may set aside an administrative or judicial decision if it can be objectively determined to be unreasonable. The test as stated in Henry Kwan v Collin Bining (2014) N5836 (Cannings J) following a host of past precedents is whether, the decision is so unreasonable or absurd, having regard to all the circumstances, no reasonable decision-maker could have made the decision.
  2. In Hari John Akipe v Rendle Rimua (2018) N7381 Higgins J said: “The test comes down to whether the decision is or is not one to which any reasonable authority could rationally come. In essence, a decision maker is not empowered to make arbitrary or whimsical decisions.”
  3. In Air Niugini Ltd v Beverley Doiwa [2000] PNGLR 347 Amet CJ referred to the English case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 in which Lord Diplock described the Wednesbury "unreasonableness" principle as: "a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."
  4. While the threshold for demonstrating that a decision is “unreasonable” is high, I am satisfied in the present case that the applicants have been successful in so arguing. Critically, the applicants referred to the findings of the second and third respondents that the land had been the subject of tribal fighting between the applicants and the first respondents, and that the historical and physical evidence produced by the applicants showed that their forefathers and ancestors had owned the land, but nonetheless the second and third respondents found that the overall evidence resulted in the proper award of the land being made to the first respondents. There are no reasons given in the first decision as to why, notwithstanding that the second and third respondents identified the traditional, historical, physical and customary presence of the applicants on the land, the second and third respondents would nonetheless find that “overall” the evidence supported a finding of customary ownership of the land in favour of the first respondents. This is notwithstanding the requirement of s 41 of the LDS Act that reasons for findings be given.
  5. The decision of the second and third respondents appears to be one which no reasonable decision maker could reach.
  6. In the circumstances, and on this basis, I am satisfied that the application of the applicants for judicial review of the first decision succeeds.
  7. It is unnecessary for me to make any further findings as to whether judicial review ought be granted in respect of the first decision. As I noted earlier, it follows that if the first decision is quashed the second decision must also be quashed.

39. The Court orders that:

(1) A Writ of Certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the Second Respondent dated 5 November 2001 and the decision of the Fourth Respondent dated 2 October 2023.
(2) The matter be remitted to the Local Land Court for rehearing of the dispute over Kwapeki land between the parties.
(3) Costs be in the cause.
(4) Time be abridged to the date of settlement which shall be forthwith.


Lawyers for applicant: Aisi Lawyers
Lawyers for second, third and fourth respondents: Gamoga & Co

PacLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2025/149.html