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State v Wanpis [2025] PGNC 372; N11508 (6 October 2025)

N11508

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR NO. 1733 OF 2024

THE STATE
v

LUCY WANPIS

WABAG: ELLIS J
25 SEPTEMBER, 6 OCTOBER 2025

CRIMINAL LAW – MURDER - s. 300(1)(a) CCA – Plea – Death caused by knife wounds – First offender – Serious and prevalent offence – Need for deterrence outweighed suspending any portion of the sentence – Discount for early admissions and personal circumstances of the offender – 12 years IHL.

Brief facts
Later during the day when the offender and her husband commenced Village Court proceedings against people including the victim, the offender made comments which resulted in fighting between two brothers and their wives. The offender took a kitchen knife from the victim, named in the Village Court proceedings but not participating in that fighting, and stabbed her on the face and neck.

Held
Guilty plea
First offender
Protection of Life
Prevalent Offence
Kovi, category 2
Reduction from 18 years IHL
Offender has three daughters, aged 6, 4, and 1
Offender is HIV positive
12 years IHL
Period on remand deducted
Balance to be served

Cases cited
Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789
Marangi v The State (2002) PGSC 15; SC702
State v Hendere Roy [2015] PGNC 46; N5968
State v Pauline Muturu [2012] PGNC 322; N5163
State v Rachael Waim, CR 90 of 2021, Kundiawa, Liosi J
State v Relvie Joe [2020] PGNC 127; N2832
State v Yapa [2023] PGNC 479; N10615
Yalibakut v The State (2000) SC890

Counsel
P. Tengdui for the State
L. Toke for the defendant

SENTENCE

1. ELLIS J: Lucy Wanpis of Yango village in the Laiagam District in Enga Province, was initially charged with wilful murder but the prosecution accepted her plea of guilty to a charge of murder, based on section 300(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1974.
   
2. Section 300, so far as is presently relevant, provides as follows:
   

“(1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Code, a person who kills another person under any of the following circumstances is guilty of murder:-

(a) if the offender intended to do grievous bodily harm to the person killed ...”

Allocutus

3. Since the uncontested evidence upon which the State relied supported a conviction, the offender was provided with an opportunity to address the Court, prior to closing submissions. What she said, as translated into English, is set out below:
   

“I say sorry to the good Lord. I have done the wrong thing in His eyes. I also say sorry that I have violated the Constitution. I also say sorry to the deceased. I did not mean to kill her, but it was accidentally I did what I did.

And I say sorry to her family for that. And also her immediate family, her father, her mother, her brothers and her sisters. I have no plan to kill her. Actually, at that time I was on medication. I have three children, one I have here. At the time I was on medication, and I was sick. I have three children, and I am under medication, and I have no-one to look after those children. I have the other two children with my mother. They have been coming back and forth for medical supplies. While my mother was taking care of them, she was also infected with TB.

My father died this year, around March. For the safety of this child with me, by law she cannot be kept in for three years. I am concerned about the welfare of my children because they are sick and I do not think anyone would be willing to take care of my children. And so I would like to go and look after my kids. That is why I making mercy from this court. Finally, I say thank you for presiding over my case. Though I am unworthy, you people spare your time to preside over my case. If this court can impose punishment on me, I am willing to serve that time in Mendi, in the Southern Highlands.”

Evidence

4. The evidence placed before the Court by the State was the Police brief being pages numbered 1 to 56 (Exhibit A). The offender relied on a six-page handwritten statement, as recorded by the Magistrate (Exhibit 1).
   

Defence submissions

5. Mr Toke did not add to his written submissions, which were marked for identification (MFI 1), other than to indicate that the medication the offender was referring to was for AIDS as she is HIV positive. Those written submissions contained personal particulars for the offender, which are summarised below.
   
6. After referring to Kovi v The State [2005] PGSC 34; SC789, it was contended this case fell within category two, for which imprisonment for between 16 and 20 years was suggested. Reference was then made to five cases, summarised below:

(1) State v Hendere Roy [2015] PGNC 46; N5968, in which a sentence of 14 years was imposed but only six years was to be served, with the balance suspended. In that case the offender had been subjected to five years of domestic abuse and the Court had before it a pre-sentence report.

(2) State v Rachael Waim, CR 90 of 2021, decided in Kundiawa by Liosi J, a case where the term imposed was 10 years.

(3) State v Relvie Joe [2020] PGNC 127, N2832, in which the sentence was 12 years.

(4) State v Pauline Muturu [2012] PGNC 322; N5163 in which a sentence of 14 years was imposed but only six years was to be served, with the balance suspended. That was a case of excessive retaliation.

(5) State v Yapa [2023] PGNC 479; N10615, another case in which the offender was only required to serve six years despite a sentence of 12 years being imposed. That was a case where the offender’s husband took the victim as a second wife. Again, a pre-sentence report was before the Court.

7. It was said that those cases, each of which involved an element of marital discord, involved a sentence following a plea of guilty and revealed a highest sentence of 14 years.
   
8. Aggravating factors were said to be (1) the use of a kitchen knife, (2) an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, (3) the prevalence of such killings, and (4) that a human life was lost. Mitigating factors were listed as (1) an early plea of guilty, (2) first offender, (3) surrendering to the Police straightaway, (4) expressions of remorse, (5) no pre-planning, and (6) the victim acted alone.
   
9. It was submitted there was de facto provocation, ie provocation that does not provide a defence to the charge, in that the deceased, her brother-in-law and his wife (Jennifer) “teamed up and attacked the offender to start the fight that led to the killing”. It was suggested that version of events should be accepted as that was said by the offender in her record of interview and the State did not challenge it, and reference was made to Yalibakut v The State [2000] SC890.
   
10. Reference was made to a paragraph from the judgment in Yapa which noted that sentences for murder “committed in the midst of marital discord” were lower and suggested that “can be attributed to the proposition that a deceased person contributed to his or her own demise by associating with a married person in the first place.”
    
11. It was contended that any sentence should not exceed 12 years and that four years should be suspended. However, no submissions were made as to either why some of the sentence should be suspended or why the period should be four years.
    
12. Further, that any sentence should be served at the Bui Iebi Correctional Institution at Mendi in Southern Highlands Province. Again, the Court was not provided with either any reason why such an order should be made.
    

Prosecution submissions

13. Likewise, Mr Tengdui did not go beyond his written submissions (MFI 2) other than to indicate that the offender had been in custody for a period of one year and two months.
    
14. After referring to Kovi, it was suggested that this case fell within category 2. What were said were the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case mirrored the submissions made on behalf of the offender.
    
15. After referring to Yapa, it was noted that this kind of killing was prevalent and that sentences have not deterred people from committing this offence. The sentence for which the prosecution contended was 18 years, being the mid-point of the second category in Kovi, less time already served. Whether any portion of the sentence should be suspended was left to the discretion of the Court.
    

Relevant law

16. In Kovi, in which the Supreme Court provided guidelines for sentencing, suggested sentencing ranges for the offence of murder, under the following four categories:
    

Category 1 12-15 years

Plea No weapons used.

Ordinary cases. Little or no pre-planning.

Mitigating factor with Minimum force used.

No aggravating factors. Absence of strong intent to do GBH.

Category 2 16-20 years

Trial or plea No strong intent to do GBH.

Mitigating factors with Weapons used.

Aggravating factors. Some pre-planning.

Some element of viciousness.

Category 3 20-30 years

Trial or plea Pre-planned. Vicious attack.

Special aggravating factors. Strong desire to do GBH.

Mitigating factors reduced in Dangerous or offensive weapon used

weight or rendered insignificant eg. gun or axe.

by gravity of offence. Other offences of violence committed.

Category 4 Life imprisonment

Worst case - Trial or plea Pre-meditated attack.

Special aggravating factors. Brutal killing, in cold blood.

17. Since the prosecution bears the onus of proof and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, it follows that, when considering the findings of fact before sentencing, any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favour of the offender.
    
18. That does not necessarily mean that what the offender asserts, either in a statement made under s 96 of the District Courts Act 1963 or in a record of interview, must be accepted if not challenged by the prosecution because the evidence upon which the State relies must also be considered. Findings of fact must be based on a consideration of all the evidence before the Court.
    

Findings of fact

19. There is consistent evidence from the State witnesses which favours the view that such evidence is reliable. The evidence of the offender cannot be considered reliable for the following reasons. First, in her record of interview and in her s 96 statement, she suggested that she only stabbed the victim once but that is convincingly contradicted by both the medical report and the photos of the victim. Secondly, the offender sought to suggest that the knife she was shown during the record of interview was not the knife she used to stab the victim but the unchallenged evidence of a witness for the prosecution was that he saw the offender drop the knife she used to stab the victim which he picked up.
    
20. Submissions for the accused included the following words (emphasis added):
    

“At the time of the incident, the deceased, her brother-in-law and his wife Jennifer teamed up and attacked the offender to start the fight that led to the killing. This is evident in the Record of Interview which the State did not challenge it (sic).”

21. There are two errors in that submission. First. There is no evidence that people “teamed up” to attack the offender. Secondly, there is no evidence that the victim was involved in any fighting on that occasion either in the State’s evidence or in the record of interview. The submission quoted in the previous paragraph must be rejected.
    
22. It is also noted that Mr Toke suggested this case involved an early plea but only a few days before the hearing of the plea, when asked if this matter would be a trial or a plea, his response was that it would be a trial and, when asked what the defence would be, his response was “a general denial”.
    
23. The Court proceeds on the basis that the offender made early admissions. That should have resulted in an indication that this matter would be plea much earlier than on the morning a trial was scheduled to commence.
    
24. From the evidence contained in Exhibit A and Exhibit 1, and having regard to the submissions, the Court makes the following findings of fact, as the Court is satisfied that such matters have been established beyond reasonable doubt:
    

(1) Wanpis Kepo was married to Lasam Andrias (the deceased) but they divorced more than ten years prior to July 2024.

(2) At that time, Wanpis Kepo’s wife was the offender.

(3) At that time, his brother, Jackson Mokai, was married to Jennifer Aros.

(4) At about 4pm on Friday 19 July 2024, Wanpis Kepo and the offender commenced Village Court proceedings against Jackson Mokai, Jennifer Aros and the victim.

(5) At about 6pm to 6.30pm that day, near a trade store at Sakalias village, the offender initiated an incident by speaking to Jennifer Aros.

(6) The offender’s words included asking why Jennifer was entertaining the victim and saying words to the effect: “Yesterday I went to your house and searched for you, but you were not there, otherwise I would have killed you. If I don’t kill you, I will kill your sister (ie the victim).”

(7) Jennifer Aros responded by striking the victim on her hand with a “small umbrella iron”.

(8) While they fought, the offender said to Jennifer words to the effect “you used to buy your husband with money”.

(9) That caused Jackson Mokai to slap the offender on the face, once.

(10) That led to Jackson Mokai and Wanpis Kepo fighting.

(11) At no stage did the victim participate in that fighting.

(12) While those two brothers were fighting, the offender grabbed a kitchen knife from the victim and stabbed her on the mouth and in the neck.

(13) As the offender ran away, she dropped that knife which was picked up by a man who chased her, captured her and took her to Wabag Police Station.

(15) The victim later died from those wounds which pierced the subclavian artery and vein, punctured the top of the left lung, and cut both the carotid artery and jugular vein.

(16) The offender made admissions when she was interviewed by the Police on 14 August 2024.

(17) It was not until the morning of the day on which the case was listed for trial, that the Court became aware that the accused was entering a plea of guilty.

Consideration

25. As it cannot be sensibly suggested that the absence of a mitigating factor is an aggravating factor, so the absence of an aggravating factor cannot be considered a mitigating factor. The fact that this offender was a first offender, acted alone, and there was no evidence of pre-planning, are not considered to be mitigating factors.
    

Objective factors

26. As to the circumstances of the offence, it is necessary to record the following matters to put the offence in a proper context:
    

(1) The offender expressed a desire to kill the victim prior to stabbing her.

(2) It was words used by the offender which caused Jennifer Aros to hit her.

(3) It was words used by the offender which caused Jackson Mokai to hit her.

(4) As a result, the fighting that broke out was caused by the offender.

(5) The victim did not say or do anything to cause what occurred.

(6) The victim did not engage in any fighting on that occasion.

(7) The offender stabbed the victim in places likely to cause her death.

(8) The offender could and should have used the Village Court proceedings to deal with the issues that caused her to stab the victim.

Subjective factors

27. The circumstances of the offender are that she is aged 30 years, being the third of four children. Her father has died. Her mother is alive, but elderly. The offender is an uneducated person who has sustained herself by subsistence gardening. She is a baptised member of the Christian Apostolic Fellowship church who has three children, aged 6, 4 and 1. The youngest of those children is with her while she is breast feeding while the older two children are living with their grandmother in Yango village in Laiagam. The offender’s husband divorced the victim about ten years ago. Both she and her three children are HIV positive which is being treated by medication.
    

Determination of sentence

28. In relation to the use of a knife, the Supreme Court made the position clear in Marangi v The State (2002) SC702 when it was said:
    

“...a lot of lives are being lost in this country from the use of a knife than with any other weapon. Therefore, a strong and punitive sentence is required.”

29. Both lawyers submitted that this case fell within the second category indicated in Kovi, for which the range is 16 to 20 years. Accordingly, the Court starts with a term of imprisonment for 18 years.
    
30. It is necessary to consider what reduction should be made for early admissions and the personal circumstances of the accused.
    
31. First, this is a case where there were early admissions (but not an early plea).
    
32. Secondly, while it appears to be putting the offender’s case too high to say that there was de facto provocation, it is the case that this offence arose from what has been referred to as “marital discord” and that has been accepted as being a factor relevant to the sentence that should be imposed. This is not a case where the victim did anything to provoke the conduct of the offender who was the instigator of what occurred. Hence, what might be termed the “marital discord” aspect carries less weight in this case.
    
33. Thirdly, the age of the offender’s children, namely 6, 4 and 1 will have the effect that imprisonment has more impact on her in that her punishment will involve not only imprisonment but separation from three young children.
    
34. Fourthly, acceptance of the offender being HIV positive should be taken into consideration, regardless of how that was caused.
    
35. While it was accepted that the offender is HIV positive, the submission “It was transmitted by the deceased” cannot be accepted as it is devoid of any supporting evidence. Indeed, that claim was not even advanced by the offender either in her record of interview or in her s 96 statement.
    
36. A reduction of six years, from 18 years to 12 years is considered appropriate in this instance, having regard to the circumstances of both the offence and the offender. It is noted that the starting point of 18 years accords with what was submitted for the State and that a sentence of 12 years accords with what was submitted for the offender. The practical effect of such a sentence is that she will be able to spend time with her daughters during their teenage years.
    
37. While reference was made to cases where offenders were only required to serve six years, such cases depend on their own facts and, as they are first instance decisions, do not bind this court.
    
38. The submission that four years of the sentence should be suspended is rejected for the following reasons. First, no reasons were given in support of that submission. Secondly, no basis was provided for why four years of any sentence should be suspended. Thirdly, there was no pre-sentence report, no indication of the proposed terms of any suspension, and no consideration of the probation. Fourthly, to suspend four years of a suggested 12-year sentence would be to impose a sentence below that Kovi said should be the low end of the range for a murder case falling within category one. Fifthly, if the submission that four years be suspended were to be adopted, the time served would be at the low end of the range suggested by Kovi for a category one manslaughter case and half the low end of the range for a category two murder case. Sixthly, such a suspension would not show sufficient respect for the loss of the victim’s life. Seventhly, such a suspension would not convey the required message of deterrence.
    

Sentence

39. For those reasons, the Court considers that imprisonment for hard labour for 18 years would have been appropriate had the offender been found guilty after a trial, being the mid-point of the period of 16 and 20 years suggested by Kovi for a murder case falling within category two.
    
40. If this case could have been categorised as an early plea, a discount in the region of 25% could have been justified. Having regard to the early admissions and the personal circumstances of the offender, a higher discount is considered justified and a reduction to 12 years is considered appropriate.
    
41. Deducting the period which the offender has spent in custody of one year and two months gives a period remaining to be served of 10 years and 10 months.
    

Sentenced accordingly.

Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the defendant: Public Solicitor