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Anjo v Lawai [2025] PGNC 522; N11703 (24 December 2025)

N11703

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CIA NO. 22 OF 2025 (IECMS)

BETWEEN:
SAMSON ANJO,
THOMAS SIUNE,
VINCENT APUPINE,
BAFFORT MALANI,
MASTER STEVEN &
DICK SIMBU
Appellants

AND
MACK LAWAI
First Respondent

AND
MANDAU INVESTMENT LIMITED
Second Respondent

WAIGANI: WIMALASENA J
24 DECEMBER 2025

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Notice of Appeal - Recognisance on Appeal - Entry of Appeal - conditions precedent – discretion to waive –Motions – jurisdictional basis - written reasons unavailable - report by Magistrate - Grounds of Appeal

LAND LAW – Summary Ejectment Act – unlawful occupation – requirement of personal summons – multiple occupiers – blanket eviction orders

Cases cited

Kirin v Paroda [2004] PGNC 177; N2599
Latu v Kua (2007) PGNC 39; N3151
Pyako v Ganai [2024] PGNC 205; N10871
Kiiark v Luio [2020] PGSC 54; SC1964
Lae Rental Homes Ltd v Department of Lands & Physical Planning [2025] PGNC 161; N11294
Agmark Pacific Ltd v Cocoa Board of Papua New Guinea [2012] PGNC 199; N4902
In the matter of an Application by Linah Edward [2005] PGNC 144; N2804
Kimbe Bakery Pty Ltd v Ben Jalatang [1993] PGNC 4; N1274
Anton Angra and Oimbo Security Services Pty Ltd v Tony Ina [1996] PNGLR 303
Haino v Sai [2006] PGNC 5; N3036
Kapi v PNG Rehabilitation Centre [2025] PGNC 105; N11233
Solomon v Raim [2020] PGNC 205; N8428

Counsel

Mr B Francis, for the appellants
Mr S. Kati, for the respondents

RULING

1. WIMALASENA J: The Appeal is against the final order made by the District Court on 24 November 2025, in an action instituted under the Summary Ejectment Act 1952. The Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on 04 December 2025 with six Grounds of Appeal. The Recognizance on Appeal in the sum of K 1000.00 was also filed on 04 December 2025. Subsequently, on 15 December 2025 the Entry of Appeal was filed in the National Court.
   
2. On 19 December 2025 the Respondents filed a Notice of Motion seeking the following orders:
   
   1. Pursuant to Rule 18 Rule 12(4)(a)(i) and/ or Order 18 Rule 5(5)(d) of the National Court Rules (NCR) the appeal be dismissed on the following basis:
      1. Disclosing no serious issues to be tried and failing to disclosing any arguable grounds of appeal; and
      2. The purported appeal grounds lack sufficient specificity or clarity in that the appeal grounds fail to demonstrate that the decision was against the weight of the appellant’s evidence and the specific reasons why it is alleged in law to be wrong. Kirin v Paroda [2004] PGNC 177; N 2599 & Latu v Kua (2007)PGNC 39 N 3151, & Pyako v Ganai (2024) N10871 & Kiiark v Luio (2020) SC 1964
   2. Pursuant to Rule 18 Rule 12(4)(a)(i) and/ or Order 18 Rule 5(5)(b)(f) and / or Order 18 Rule 7(1)(c) of the National Court Rules (NCR) the appeal be dismissed for being an abuse of Court process and being incompetent.
   3. Cost of the application against the Lawyer in person on an indemnity basis.
      
3. On 23 December 2025 the six Appellants also filed a “Cross Notice of Motion” seeking the following orders:
   
   1. Pursuant to Section 155 (4) of the Constitution and Order 4, Rule 49(8) of the National Court Rules, 1983 the Respondent Applicants Notice of Motion filed dated 19 December 2025 is incompetent for lack of proper jurisdictional basis in that;
      1. The Respondent Applicants erroneously cited a Rule 18 Rule 12 (4)(a)(i) which is a non-existence law; and
      2. The Respondent Applicants erroneously cited Order 18 Rule 5(5)(d) and Order 18 Rule 5(5)(b)(f) & Order 18 Rule 7 (1)(c) of the National Court Rules which are not and do not constitute proper jurisdictional basis of their Motion;

Therefore, the Respondents Notice of Motion filed dated 19 December 2025 shall be dismissed in its entirety.

2. An order pursuant to Section 155(4) of the Constitution and/or Order 18, Rule 5(5) of the National Court Rules, 1983 that the parties shall comply with the set of First Directional Orders which is attached to the back of this Motion with the view of expediting the Appeal to a timely Trial or substantive hearing.
3. Cost of this hearing be borne by the Respondents.
   
4. The parties filed written submissions and supporting affidavits. Accordingly, the matter was taken up for hearing on 24 December 2026 and the parties agreed for both Notices of Motion to be dealt with together.
   
5. The First Respondent is the sole Managing Director and owner of the Second Respondent company. The First Respondent claims that he is the registered owner of a state lease described as Volume 114, Folio 51, Portion 5400 Milinch, Fourmil, Moreseby, NCD and the Second Respondent company is the registered owner of the state lease described as Volume 114, Folio 50, Portion 5395 Milinch, Granville, Fourmil, Moresby, NCD. The Respondents filed proceedings under the Summary Ejectment Act in the District Court to evict the illegal occupants on those two portions of land. The proceeding in the District Court was filed against six Defendants who are the Appellants in this matter. However, it appears that there are more illegal settlers/ residents on the two portions of land.
   
6. Be that as it may, I will first deal with the Appellants’ Cross-Notice of Motion, as it raises an issue concerning the alleged failure to invoke the correct jurisdictional basis for the Notice of Motion filed by the Respondents. The basis of the Appellants’ objection is that the Respondents stated in their Notice of Motion that the application was made pursuant to “Rule 18 Rule 12(4)(a)(i)”, whereas it should have been correctly stated as Order 18 Rule 12(4)(a)(i). The Appellants relied on Lae Rental Homes Ltd v Department of Lands & Physical Planning [2025] PGNC 161; N11294, to support their contention, where Dingake J stated:
   

“[8] The Plaintiff’s response to the above submission by the Fifth Defendant is that the Fifth Defendant’s Notice of Motion is also defective as it relies on a non-existent Rule, being Order 16 Rule 13(13) a and b of the National Court Rules.

[9] The Plaintiff is correct that there is no such Rule as relied upon by the Fifth Defendant. The correct Rule that the Fifth Defendant should have invoked is Order 16 Rule 13(13)(2)(a) &(b).

[10] In my mind the Fifth Defendant’s Notice of Motion is incompetent for citing a non-existent Rule and is liable to be dismissed for that reason, as I hereby do.”

7. It is settled law that when a Notice of Motion is filed it must state how the jurisdiction of the court is invoked. However, it is the discretion of the Court to strike out such a Notice of Motion if this requirement is not complied with. Order 4 Rule 49(8) provides:
   

“All motions must contain a concise reference to the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the orders being sought. Motions not containing such reference will not be accepted for filing. If accepted by the Registry staff without such reference, and it goes before the Motions Judge, the Court may strike out the motion for being incompetent and for lack of form...”

8. In Agmark Pacific Ltd v Cocoa Board of Papua New Guinea [2012] PGNC 199; N4902 (8 October 2012) N4902 Kariko J discussed the rationale behind Order 4 Rule 49(8) as follows:
   

[7] In my opinion the reasons for the requirements of Order 4 Rule 49(8) are:

(1) to ensure the applicant knows the jurisdictional basis for the orders sought; and

(2) to make the other party aware of the exact legal basis for the application in order to properly respond to it; and

(3) for the court to properly appreciate whether it has jurisdiction to grant the orders sought.

[8] There may be cases where clearly the opposing party is not prejudiced by the failure to comply with the Rule...

9. It should be noted that in the present case the Respondents’ Notice of Motion refers to “Rule 18” instead of “Order 18”, although the substance of the reference is the same. It is clear that this was merely a typographical error rather than a reference to a non-existent or irrelevant rule. It does not appear that the Appellants were misled by this error, nor has any prejudice been caused to them as a result. There is no apparent confusion as to the jurisdiction of the Court invoked or the nature of the application by the Respondents seeking summary disposal of the appeal. In these circumstances, I am of the view that this is not a case in which the Court should exercise its discretion to find the Notice of Motion incompetent due to an obvious typographical error. Accordingly, I am not inclined to accept the Appellants’ argument that the Notice of Motion is incompetent on that basis.
   
10. The Appellants’ second contention is that the Respondents have “erroneously cited Order 18 Rule 5(5)(d), Order 18 Rule 5(5)(b)(f), and Order 18 Rule 7(1)(c) of the National Court Rules”, which, it is argued, do not constitute a proper jurisdictional basis. It is clear that Order 18 Rule 5 stipulates matters to be dealt with at a Directions Hearing after the Notice of Appeal is received by the National Court, and that Order 18 Rule 7 relates to matters to be dealt with at a Pre-hearing Conference prior to the hearing of the appeal. Those Rules are therefore not relevant to the Respondents’ application and, their citation may have caused some confusion. But I am of the opinion that it does not render the Notice of Motion incompetent as the Respondent has pleaded those in the alternative using the formulation “and/or”. In those circumstances, I exercise my discretion to disregard the irrelevant Rules and reject the Appellants’ argument that the Respondent failed to cite a concise jurisdictional basis.
    
11. In addition, the Appellants sought orders requiring the parties to comply with directions drafted by the Appellants. I do not see any relevance in this application, as it is the duty of the Court to conduct a Directions Hearing pursuant to Order 18 Rule 6, to consider and determine the matters set out in Order 18 Rule 6(5), and to give such directions as may be necessary. It is premature for the Appellants to propose draft directions in the absence of a Directions Hearing. Moreover, the Notice of Motion filed by the Appellants appears to be superfluous, as the contentions regarding non-compliance with Order 4 Rule 49(8) could have been easily raised in response to the Respondents’ Notice of Motion without filing a cross-notice of motion. In the circumstances, the Cross-Notice of Motion filed by the Appellants on 23 December 2025 is dismissed.
    
12. I will now address the issues raised in the Respondents’ Notice of Motion. The Respondents assert that the Grounds of Appeal do not disclose serious issues to be tried or any arguable grounds. Furthermore, the Respondents assert that the Grounds of Appeal lack sufficient specificity or clarity. The first and second Grounds of Appeal are essentially premised on the contention that the Appellants were denied a fair hearing and that the relevant parties were not properly identified. In response the Respondents contend that all the parties were heard, and the first Ground of Appeal is not meritorious. However, it appears from the First Respondent’s affidavit filed on 19 December 2025 itself, that there were two portions of land involved in the matter before the District Court and that there were more than “50 plus” parties occupying the said land, in addition to the six Appellants.
    
13. The First Respondent in his affidavit states that one Albert Angobe made an application to be joined as a party in the District Court proceedings representing a group of persons who occupy the two lands. Although there was evidence produced to confirm that such an application was made by Albert Angobe, the parties did not submit any evidence to show that the said application to join those persons as parties was granted, and Albert Angobe was in fact, made a Defendant in the proceedings before the District Court.
    
14. The order made by the District Court on 24 November 2025 has a caption that only mentions the original six Defendants, who are the Appellants in this matter. The order made on 24 November 2025 reads as follows:
    
    1. That the judgment is entered for the Complainants.
    2. The Defendants all to deliver vacant possession of all the property, the subject of these proceedings to the Complainant.
    3. Such deliverance to be affected within twenty one (21) days in default a warrant to be issued.
    4. Costs to follow the event and Complainants can have costs for the proceedings.
       
15. Therefore, it is not clear whether the order of the District Court is directed at anyone other than the six Appellants. Surprisingly, in that backdrop, the Respondents appear to have made a subsequent application before the District Court on 01 December 2025 seeking an order to join other illegal occupants on the two lands who are not reflected as Defendants in the order made on 24 November 2025.
    
16. However, by order dated 12 December 2025, the District Court refused that application seeking to amend the caption of the order by adding the names of other parties, stating that “the Court Order of 24 November 2025 is clear and is in order, as term 2 of the order refers to all defendants, including those who were joined as defendants in the proceedings”. In any event, even in that order, the caption carries only the names of the six Defendants and not those of any others. If additional parties were added to the proceedings, that must be reflected in the caption of the order. In the absence of evidence demonstrating that a clear order was made at the time the application to join parties was made, I am not satisfied that a subsequent order made after the final determination could remedy that lapse.
    
17. The Summary Ejectment Act requires personal notice before a person may be removed from a land. When a person is in possession of premises without right, title or licence, the owner must first make a complaint to a Magistrate, upon which the Magistrate "may issue a summons in the prescribed form to the person in illegal occupation" pursuant to Section 6(1). Only where a summoned occupier fails to appear, or appears but fails to show reasonable cause, may the Court proceed to issue a warrant authorising entry by force and delivery of possession under Section 6(2). On plain reading of the provisions under the Summary Ejectment Act it appears that every unlawful occupant requires to be individually summoned and it prevents the eviction of persons who were never notified or heard.
    
18. As such, there is no doubt that the law requires all persons occupying land to be given sufficient and proper notice before they can be evicted. However, it does not appear that all such persons were even identified in this matter, let alone issued with summonses. The manner in which the First Respondent himself refers to the occupants of the two parcels of land as being “50 plus” persons clearly demonstrates that the relevant requirements stipulated in the Summary Ejectment Act were not complied with.
    
19. Moreover, it is not clear whether the District Court in fact made an order adding the parties who applied to be joined as defendants. No such order appears in the evidence before this Court. In a matter of this nature, a blanket eviction order cannot be made against multiple persons merely by naming a few occupants of the land. Accordingly, I am of the view that this issue warrants consideration at the substantive hearing of the appeal, with due regard to the reasons given in the District Court’s ruling. Therefore, I am of the view that the First and Second grounds are arguable.
    
20. The Appellants have stated in their submissions that they seek leave to withdraw the Third Ground of Appeal.
    
21. I have considered the submissions made by the parties with regard to the other Grounds of Appeal, and I am of the view that the remaining Grounds of Appeal appear to be arguable as well and need to be evaluated at a proper hearing of the appeal, as they do not appear frivolous or untenable on the face of it.
    
22. The second argument of the Respondents is that the appeal is incompetent and an abuse of court process. The Respondent contends that the compliance with conditions precedent to filing an appeal is mandatory and in this case the Appellants failed to meet them by not paying a Recognizance fee.
    
23. The Clerk of the District Court stated in the Deposition Certificate dated 15 December 2025, that was submitted to the National Court, that the Appellants did not pay the sum of K 1000.00 as per the condition set by the District Court. However, it is not clear what the exact order made by the learned Magistrate with regard to Recognizance, as no such order can be found in the documents submitted.
    
24. The Respondents submitted that the failure to meet the condition precedent is fatal and therefore the appeal becomes incompetent. To buttress this contention the Respondents submitted that in Kiiark v Luio [2020] PGSC 54; SC1964 (12 June 2020) the Supreme Court held that condition precedents as set out in PART XI of the District Court Act are mandatory quoting part of paragraph 68 of the judgment. It must be noted that this is a misrepresentation of what was held in that judgment and what it actually says is that the conditions precedent in Part XI are important and are expected to be complied with, but they are not mandatory in an absolute sense. Non-compliance does not divest the National Court of jurisdiction. Section 231(a) of the District Court Act expressly preserves a discretion in the National Court to waive compliance where the appellant has done whatever was reasonably practicable to comply with the Act. Paragrapgh 68 of Kiiark states:

“His Honour’s reasoning in the Seravo case puts paid to any suggestion by the appellant before us that compliance with those conditions precedent to the right of appeal prescribed by Part XI of the Act is mandatory to the point where any non-compliance, irrespective of whether reasonable explanation is given or not, divests the National Court in its appellate jurisdiction of discretion to waive compliance with those conditions precedent. The situation is the reverse. Section 231(a) of the Act expressly confers on the National Court the power of waiver “if in its opinion, the appellant has done whatever is reasonably practicable to comply with the provisions of this Act”.” (emphasize added)

25. It appears that contrary to this contention by the Respondents the Appellants seem to have filed a Recognizance on Appeal on 03 December 2025. The Notice of Appeal and the Recognizance on Appeal bear the stamps of the District Court and therefore it appears to have been properly filed in the District Court. Section 220 of the District Court Act 1963 stipulates that an appeal shall be instituted by filing a:
    
    • (a) Notice of appeal; and
    • (b) By entering into a recognizance on appeal, or by giving other security as specified in Section 222.
      
26. The requirement of recognizance was discussed by Cannings J in Linah Edward [2005] PGNC 144; N2804 (11 February 2005) as follows:
    

“Recognisance or payment into court

The requirement to enter into a recognisance or make a payment into court is imposed by Section 222(1), which states:

Subject to Subsection (2), within one month after the day when the decision is pronounced an appellant shall enter into a recognizance with a surety before a Magistrate in such sum as the Magistrate thinks fit, conditioned—

(a) to prosecute the appeal; and

(b) to abide the order of the National Court on the appeal; and

(c) to pay such costs as are awarded by the National Court,

or the appellant may, instead of entering into a recognizance, deposit with the Clerk of the Court by which the conviction, order or adjudication was made such sums of money as a Magistrate in writing directs.

The appellant thus has a choice:

• enter into a recognisance and surety (ie she promises to prosecute the appeal, abide by the National Court decision and pay any costs awarded against her and if she breaks that promise she has to pay the amount of the surety fixed by the magistrate); or
• pay an amount directed by a magistrate to the Clerk of the District Court.

One of those two things must be done within one month after the District Court decision. If neither is done within one month, this can render the appeal incompetent, ie it is liable to be struck out by the National Court (Kimbe Bakery Pty Ltd v Ben Jalatang (1993) N1274, National Court, Sevua AJ (as he then was)).”

27. It is not clear on what basis the Clerk of the District Court, stated in the Deposition Certificate, that the conditions precedent for filing the appeal were not met by the Appellants in relation to the Recognizance on Appeal. An appellant has a choice either to enter into a Recognizance with a surety before a Magistrate or to deposit the amount directed by the Magistrate. In the present case, the Appellants filed a Recognizance on Appeal on 04 December 2025, and it appears that the recognizance was executed before a Magistrate on 03 December 2025. Even if there were any discrepancy or strict non-compliance with this condition precedent, Section 231 of the District Court Act expressly confers upon the National Court the power to dispense with compliance with such a condition precedent to the right of appeal. If necessary, the appropriate stage at which any issue of dispensation should be considered is at the Directions Hearing conducted pursuant to Order 18 Rule 6(5) of NCR. In those circumstances, the Respondents’ argument that the appeal is incompetent on the basis of non-compliance with a condition precedent cannot be sustained.
    
28. The Respondents further contends that the Entry of Appeal was filed by the Appellants prematurely when it was not ready for hearing. The Respondents allege that the reasoning or the written ruling of the Magistrate is vital and earlier filing of Entry of Appeal without the written ruling is an abuse of process.
    
29. It appears that clerk of the District Court has confirmed that the written reasons for the decision of the learned Magistrate was not ready by 15 December 2025 when the Depositions of the District Court were submitted. The Appellants filed the Entry of Appeal on the same day, i.e. 15 December 2025. Section 226 of the District Court Act provides that “within 40 days after the institution of an appeal, the appellant shall enter the appeal for hearing on a date to be fixed by the Registrar of the National Court”.
    
30. To shed light on the issue raised by the Respondent in respect of filing the Entry of Appeal it would be pertinent to note the following remarks by Cannings J in Linah Edward (supra):
    

“What does the Clerk of the District Court have to do?

Immediately after the notice of appeal is lodged, the Clerk of the District Court must forward a bundle of certified true copies of documents to the Registrar of the National Court; the District Court conviction, order or adjudication; the reasons for decision; the complaint; depositions; all other proceedings, ie documents; and exhibits. (District Courts Act, Section 224.)

The Clerk must always check to see whether the presiding magistrate gave reasons for his or her decision. If no reasons were given the Clerk must notify the magistrate immediately after the appeal is lodged. (District Courts Act, Section 225(1).)

The magistrate must then immediately forward a written report to the Registrar of the National Court setting out the reasons for the making of the conviction, order or adjudication. (District Courts Act, Section 225(2).)

The magistrate’s report should state the main issues of fact and law that arose and the processes of reasoning by and the principles of law upon which such issues were resolved. The report should be sufficiently comprehensive to allow the National Court to decide whether the magistrate erred. The report should address the grounds of appeal. If a magistrate does not forward a report as required, an order to do so may be granted by the National Court on application by either the appellant or the respondent. Costs of such an application can be awarded personally against the magistrate in an appropriate case. (See Bougainville Copper Ltd v Liu [1978] PNGLR 221, National Court, Greville-Smith J and Anton Angra and Oimbo Security Services Pty Ltd v Tony Ina [1996] PNGLR 303, National Court, Doherty J.)

What else does the appellant have to do?

The appellant must enter the appeal for hearing in the National Court. This is a separate and distinct step to lodging the notice of appeal and entering into a recognisance or making a payment into court. The appeal must be entered within 40 days after it is instituted. An entry is made by delivering a memorandum in the prescribed form to the Registrar of the National Court. (District Courts Act, Section 226.)”

31. The Respondents contend that the Appellants abused the process by filing the Entry of Appeal at a time when the written reasons of the learned Magistrate were not available. There is no dispute that the purpose of an Entry of Appeal is to signify that an appeal is ready to be set down for hearing. However, whether an appeal is in fact ready for hearing must be assessed having regard to the procedural steps stipulated in NCR.
    
32. Upon receipt of a Notice of Appeal, Order 18 Rule 5(1) of NCR requires the Registrar to fix a Directions Hearing within 14 days. At that Directions Hearing, the Court is required to give necessary directions, including directions relating to the compilation of the Appeal Book and other preparatory matters. Thereafter, once those matters are addressed, the appeal proceeds to a Pre-hearing Conference under Order 18 Rule 7. Order 18 Rule 7(2) provides that the judge may adjourn the Pre-hearing conference as may deem necessary for the parties to fully comply with the directions. The Registrar is then required to issue a Notice of Hearing in accordance with Order 18 Rule 7(3) when the appeal is fixed for hearing.
    
33. In practical terms, therefore, an appeal will rarely be in a position to be substantively ready for hearing within the 40-day period prescribed by Section 226 of the District Court Act. Where written reasons are not available, the District Court Act expressly provides for the Magistrate to forward a report setting out the reasons for the decision. Any delay in the preparation or forwarding of such a report, or in the completion of the procedural steps stipulated by NCR prior to fixing an appeal for hearing, is a matter beyond the control of the Appellants and should not operate to the Appellants’ prejudice. Because Section 227 of the District Court Act provides that if, within 40 days after the institution of an appeal, the appellant does not enter the appeal for hearing, the order becomes enforceable as if no appeal had been filed. It follows that there may be circumstances in which an appellant is effectively compelled to file an Entry of Appeal before receiving the Magistrate’s written reasons or report. In those circumstances, the filing of an Entry of Appeal in the absence of written reasons cannot, of itself, be characterised as an abuse of process.
    
34. In Haino v Sai [2006] PGNC 5; N3063 (1 March 2006) Injia DCJ discussed this issue as follows:
    

“[5] In a situation where an entry of appeal is filed within the 40 days, the question whether the entry of appeal was genuine or an abuse of process is a discretionary matter to be decided after taking into account all relevant circumstances and considerations. If for instance the appellant files an entry of appeal early within the 40 day period but is not actually ready for hearing, but he files it in anticipation of getting the appeal ready for hearing before the 40 days expires, and if he takes meaningful steps to prepare the appeal for hearing in the remaining days of the 40 day period, then it is unreasonable exercise of discretion to dismiss the appeal simply because the appeal was entered for hearing at a particular point in time. If the appellant simply files an entry of appeal and does not take any meaningful steps at all to prepare the appeal for hearing on the date to be appointed by the Court, then it is only proper that the appeal be dismissed for that reason. The critical factor here is not the timing of the filing of the entry of appeal within the 40 days but meaningful steps taken within the 40 days to prepare the appeal for hearing before or after filing the entry of appeal. In order to decide this question fairly and properly, the question should be considered after the expiry of the 40 day period.”

35. If the circumstances of a particular case justify the early filing of an Entry of Appeal, I am of the view that such filing may not amount to an abuse of process. However, this should not be taken as encouragement for practitioners to routinely file an Entry of Appeal along with the Notice of Appeal and the Recognizance of Appeal merely as a matter of convenience. Each matter must be determined on its own facts.
    
36. The importance of avoiding a rigid, across the board approach to the filing of an Entry of Appeal was considered in Kapi v PNG Rehabilitation Centre [2025] PGNC 105; N11233 (7 April 2025), where Sully J emphasised that questions concerning the timing and propriety of an Entry of Appeal must be assessed contextually, as follows:
    

“[24] Each case must turn on its own facts and it is clear that the steps taken by appellant to progress his appeal and the arguability of the appeal are likely weighty matters that would inform the Court’s discretion when considering the question of dismissal (see for example Solomon v Raim [2020] PGNC 205; N8428). However, what is relevant on the facts in Haino v Sai is that there was overall no undue delay, the appellant progressing his appeal, indeed the District Court documents received within a very short time after the filing of the entry of appeal, a possible relevant consideration, along with other factors, in informing the Court’s discretion. It would be wrong however, in my respectful view, to draw from the observations of the learned Judge some broad licence to litigants to file an entry of appeal with the notice of appeal as a matter of general practice or routine. In my view that would not only encourage lazy practice but would ignore the purpose of the two documents and indeed, the recognizance of appeal and the work expected of an appellant prior to the filing of the entry of appeal to prosecute their appeal with due diligence by meeting their duty that emanates from section 226 of the Act, which speaks of getting an appeal ready for hearing within a stipulated time period.”

37. In the present case, the Appellants did not file the Entry of Appeal along with the Notice of Appeal. Rather, the Entry of Appeal was filed on 15 December 2025, after the depositions were received, together with a Certificate of Depositions confirming the unavailability of the written reasons for the order made by the District Court. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the filing of the Entry for Appeal cannot be considered an abuse of process.
    
38. For the foregoing reasons, the Notice of Motion filed by the Respondents is dismissed.
    
39. Orders of the Court:
    
    1. The Notice of Motion filed by the Respondents on 19 December 2025 is dismissed.
    2. The Cross Notice of Motion filed by the Appellants on 23 December 2025 is dismissed.
    3. The parties to bear their own costs in respect of each Notice of Motion.
    4. The appeal is fixed for Directions Hearing.

________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the appellants: Craneworth & Cartwright Lawyers
Lawyers for the first and second respondents: Gibson Bon Lawyers