Independent State of Papua New Guinea v Grand Columbia Ltd [2025] PGSC 129; SC2827 (12 December 2025)

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WAIGANI: KARIKO J, NAROKOBI J, KOSTOPOULOS J
30OCTOBER, 12DECEMBER 2025

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - APPEAL - Objection to Competency – late filing by appellant; absence of leave; grounds mischaracterization; ground directed to non-appealed order - Appeal from the National Court – Timing for filing Notice of Appeal – computation of 40 days – whether late when registry is closed on weekend; Section 17 Supreme Court Act; leave to appeal on questions of fact and law – Supreme Court Act s. 14(1)(c) – whether required; adequacy and specificity of grounds – Supreme Court Rules O. 7 RR. 9–10; whether grounds relate to order appealed – application in place under section 17 of SCA where there is inadequate or no precedent for filing of appeal on first day Registry is open for business.

CROSS – VESTING OF NCR TO SCR – Supreme Court Rules cross vesting National Court Rules in relation to proceedings when Registry is closed for filing of appeals on weekend when 40 days expired – application of sections 184 and 185 of the Constitution – application of Order 2 Rule 1 of SCR.

NATIONAL COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – default judgment for failure to defend; assessment on the papers; discretion to refuse statutory interest where contractual interest awarded

CLAIMS BY AND AGAINST THE STATE ACT (AS AMENDED) – s 5 and s 5A notices – sufficiency and service, effect on competence of proceedings and default judgment.

FRAUDS AND LIMITATIONS ACT 1988 – s 16 limitation for rent arrears; accrual of causes of action for rent under monthly tenancy and continuing occupation; whether time-bar affects assessment - Commercial Lease – holding-over month-to-month; CPI review; contractual interest 8% p.a. on unpaid rent “until paid”; assessment of arrears and contractual interest following default judgment.

COMMERCIAL LEASE – Holding over clause in commercial lease between the parties where Clause 8 provides or dispute to be referred for Arbitration.

The National Court entered default judgement against the appellant (the State) and subsequently ordered damages, among others, in favour of the respondent (Grand Columbia Limited). The State appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court to which the respondent filed an objection to the competency of the appeal.

Cases cited
Avia Aihi v The State [1981] PNGLR 81
Bank of Papua New Guinea v Ruh [2021] SC2124
Coca Cola Amatil (PNG) Ltd v Joshua Yanda [2012] SC1221
Felix Bakani v Rodney Daipo (2001) SC659
Grand Colombia Limited v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2025] N11268
Haiveta v. Wingti (No.2) [1994] PNGLR 189
Hegele v Kila [2011] SC1124
Iangalio v National Development Bank Ltd [2016] SC1499
Inakambi Singorom v Klaut [1985] PNGLR 328
In re Chan v Arendi [2007] SC858
Ipili Porgera Investments Limited v. Bank South Pacific Limited and Resources & Anor [2007] SC1322
Jay LW Contractors Limited v. Covec (PNG) Limited [2023] SC2498
Kalgregos Electrical Limited v Mamun Investments Ltd [2024] SC2655
Kauba v Willie [2021] SC2162
Kimbu v Pakira [2023] SC2387
Kuman & Ors v Digicel (PNG) Limited [2017] SC1638
Kunangel v The State [1985] PNGLR 144
Lama v. NDB Investments Ltd [2015] SC1423
Layo v Pala [2024] SC2597
Marat v Hanjung Power Ltd (2014) SC1357
National Capital District Water & Sewerage Ltd (trading as Eda Ranu) v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited [2023] PGSC 17; SC2365
National Development Bank v Noka Builders Limited [2024] SC2703
National Executive Council v Toropo (2023) SC2451
Neville v National Executive Council of Papua New Guinea [2015] SC1431
Nivani Ltd v Independent State of Papua New Guinea (2020) SC1945
PLAR No 1 of 1980 [1980] PNGLR 326
PNG Forest Authority v Securimax Security Pty Ltd [2003] SC717
Polling v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust & Ors [1986] PNGLR 228
Public Officers Superannuation Fund Board v Imanakuan (2000) SC677
Serowa v Dowa [2023] SC2381
Tiensten v Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2014] SC1468
Torobert v Torobert [2011] SC1130
Tsang v Credit Corporation (PNG) Ltd [1993] PNGLR 112
Turia v Nelson [2009] SC989
Waghi Savings and Loans Society Ltd v Bank South Pacific Ltd [1980] SC185
Wood v Watkins (PNG) Pty Ltd [1986] PNGLR 88
Yambaki Surveys Ltd v Nambawan Super Ltd [2020] SC1901

1. KARIKO J: Before this Court is the respondent’s objection to competency to this appeal from the decision of the National Court at Waigani given on 5 May 2025 in proceedings WS No. 21 of 2024 which has been published as Grand Colombia Limited v Independent State of Papua New Guinea (2025) N11268.

2. I have had the benefit of reading the draft opinion of my brother Kostopoulos J. With due respect, I differ from His Honour’s reasoning and conclusions relating to the first ground of objection which contends that the appeal was filed outside the time limit prescribed by s 17 of the Supreme Court Act.

3.Proceedings WS No. 21 of 2024 concerned a claim by the respondent (Grand Columbia Limited) against the appellant (the State) for outstanding rental payments pursuant to a commercial lease agreement of a property commonly known as Fincorp Haus in Port Moresby.

Where a person desires to appeal to or to obtain leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, he shall give notice of appeal, or notice of his application for leave to appeal, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court within 40 days after the date of the judgement in question, or within such further period as is allowed by a Judge on application made to him within that period of 40 days.

If the last day of a period prescribed or allowed by a statutory provision for the doing of an act falls on a Sunday or a public holiday, the act may be done on the day next following that is not a Sunday or public holiday.

Where a person desires to appeal to or to obtain leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, he shall give notice of appeal, or notice of his application for leave to appeal, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court within 40 days after the date of the judgement in question, or within such further period as is allowed by a Judge on application made to him within that period of 40 days. (Emphasis added)

“1. This is an ex parte trial on the paper for assessment of damages for breach of a lease agreement following entry of default judgment for failure by the defendant to file a notice of intention to defend and defence filed on 24th July 2024...

3. I have read the affidavit of Mr. Stack (sworn on 13^th September 2024) – at this point his Honour records the evidence in the affidavit on which he relies on in his judgment is this Court’s observations of the evidence.

4. That entry of default judgment does not relieve a plaintiff from proving its claim, corroboration is usually required...based on the above findings I am satisfied that the plaintiff has corroborated its claim for unpaid rentals by producing the unpaid invoices and a Statement of Account showing a sum of K42,300,860.05 as due and owing.

5. Secondly, that I am satisfied that this is not a vague and a false claim but one of a genuine service provider to the defendant where the plaintiff provides its Fincorp Haus to house the offices of the Department of Education over the years and the defendant terribly failed to honour its part of the bargain. Finally, I accept the learned counsel’s submissions that the action is not statute-barred under Section 16 of the Frauds and Limitation Act, 1988, because the breach is continuous, and a fresh cause of action arises each time a breach occurs...”^[6]

1 The Independent State of Papua New Guinea (hereafter referred to as "the Appellant") appeals from whole of the judgment and orders of His Honour, Makail J (hereafter 'Primary Judge') given on 5th May 2025 at Waigani National Court in matter entitled WS No. 21 of 2024 (CC1) (IECMS) – Grand Columbia Limited v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea (hereafter referred to as "the National Court proceeding") which ordered as follows (hereafter referred to as "the subject Order"):

(i) Judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of K42,300,860.05 as outstanding rentals.

(ii) Judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of K13,396,653.13 as contractual interest up to 24^th July 2024 and until final settlement to be calculated by the Plaintiff.

2 The appeal lies without Leave as the appeal is against the final decision of the National Court and is pursuant to Section 14(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act.

3.1. The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion by acting on wrong principles in assessing and awarding damages as per the subject Order when he only relied on six (6) national court cases at paragraph 4 of his written judgement and failed to rely on the well settled principles in the case of Mel v Pakalia [2005] PGSC 36; SC790:

(a) To discharged his duty as a judge in a trial on assessment of damages after entry of default judgment as follows:

i) Failing to make a cursory inquiry so as to be satisfied that the facts and the cause of action are pleaded with sufficient clarity;

ii) Failure to ascertained whether the facts and cause of action is reasonably clear and that liability is regarded as proven; and

iii) Failure to ascertain whether the facts or the cause of action pleaded make sense and would not make the assessment of damages a futile exercise and whether or not to revisit the issue of liability.

(b) To revisit the issue of liability and award no damages or alternatively to award damages only on a quantum meruit basis for the reasons that;

i) The facts and cause of action pleaded is statute barred as this is a claim to recover outstanding rental arrears from the period after a Commercial Lease dated 31 December 2010 (hereafter referred to as "the Agreement") between the Appellant and the Respondent expired however purportedly continued on a month-to-month basis contrary to section 47C,(2) and (3) of the Public Finance Management Act; and

ii) The Agreement is statute barred pursuant to section 2A(2) of the Claims By & Against the State Act 1996 (as amended in 2022) and section 47D(2) and (3) of the Public Finance Management Act as the Respondent has failed to produce a properly authorized Integrated Local Purchase Order and Claim ( hereafter referred to as "ILPOC"); or an Authority to Pre-commit Expenditure (hereafter referred to as "APCE"), relating to the property and lease services, the subject of the claim, to the full amount of the claim.

3.2 The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion at paragraph 4 of the written judgement by giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matter such as the invoices and the Statement of Accounts in the Affidavit of Edmund Stack ("Mr Stack") sworn on 13 September 2024 and filed on 27^th September 2024 as corroboration of the claim for unpaid rentals totalling K42,300,860.05; however are in fact not corroboration of the claim from an independent source but are evidence from Mr Stack himself as the managing director of the Respondent.

3.3 The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion when he failed to take into account relevant consideration such as the fact that the Appellant has been denied the principle of natural justice after the entry of default judgement in 24 July 2024 and proceeded to assess and award damages as per the subject Order when it was plainly clear that:

i) The Respondent for over nine (9) months (from the date of default judgment to the date of trial by paper) never served on the Appellant the Order for default judgement of 24 July 2024 to give the Appellant an opportunity to either challenge the entry of default judgment, to appeal, to negotiate settlement or to prepare and file necessary documents such as Notice of Intention to Defend or Affidavits etc. to respond during the trial on assessment of damages;

ii) There was no Affidavit of Service filed by the Respondent confirming service of the Order for default judgement of 24 July 2024 on the Appellant from date of the default judgement to date of trial on paper;

iii) There was no Mention Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(7) of the Listing Rules 2006 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to consider the matters outlined in Order 10 Rule 9A(7)(4) of the Listing Rules 2006;

iv) There was no Directions Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(8) of the Listing Rules 2006 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to give directions for parties to attempt out of court settlement, filing of witness statement or affidavits or give directions regarding other matters set out in Rule 7 (4) and fix a date for pre-trial conference.

v) There was no Pre-trial Conference Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(9) of the Listing Rules 2006 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to confirm legal representation, give directions for parties to file relevant notices under the Evidence Act or directions regarding other matters set out in Rule 9 (2) and fix a date for trial and a date for status conference.

vi) There was no Notice of Trial issued by the Registrar of the National Court on the Court file pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9 of the National Court Rules, Order 10 Rules 9A(9)(3) and 12(1) of the Listing Rules 2006 of the National Court Rules and no evidence of service of a Notice of Trial on the Appellant either by the Registrar or the Respondent;

vii) There was no Status Conference Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(10) of the Listing Rules 2006 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to confirm whether directions issued during Directions Hearing and Pre-trial Conference Hearing have been complied with and that the matter is ready for trial;

viii) Prior to the subject Order, the matter came before the Court on only two (2) occasions; firstly for the hearing of the Respondents application for default judgement on 24 July 2024 and secondly on 8 April 2025 when the Primary Judge gave directions for trial on assessment of damages to be on paper, for the Respondent to file its written submissions by on or before Friday, 25 April 2025 and an order for parties to be advised on the date for the delivery of the reserved decision on assessment of damages; and

(viii) The Respondent did not file or serve on the Appellant any notice to rely on any Affidavit pursuant to section 35(1) of the Evidence Act.

3.4 The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust as the Appellant was denied the principle of natural justice when the trial on assessment of damages was conducted by the Primary Judge on paper, in the Primary Judge's chambers, not listed pursuant to Order 10 Rule 7 of the National Court Rules and not tried in open court resulting in:

i) The Appellant being denied the opportunity to be notified by the court listings and denied the opportunity to attend to the trial in open court and respond;

ii) The Appellant has been denied the opportunity to scrutinize the judicial process in open court as the trial on assessment of damages was not recorded by the Court Reporting Services hence there is no transcript of the trial; and

iii) The Appellant has been denied the opportunity to test or examine the Respondent's case in a trial in open court as outlined in the case of Bromley v Finance Pacific Ltd [2001] PGNC 89; N2097.

3.5 The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust in conducting trial on assessment of damages on paper and in chambers when there were no practice direction or provisions under the National Court Rules for the trial to be conducted in such a manner.

3.6. The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust in conducting trial on assessment of damages on paper and in chambers when there was no evidence showing either special circumstances or balance of convenience for the trial to be conducted in such a manner.

3.7 The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust when he conducted the trial on assessment of damages on paper and in his chambers in the absence of the Appellant or noting that there are no documentation or participation from Appellant and no evidence of a Notice of Trial or the Appellant being notified of the Trial rather than be guided by Order 10 Rule 12(1) of the National Court Rules by ordering that the trial be not held unless the Appellants are notified by the Respondent or adjourning the trial.

3.8 The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust when he conducted the trial on assessment of damages on paper in his chambers in the absence of the Appellant and awarded damages to the Respondent as per the subject Order but failed to order the Respondent to serve on the Appellant the subject Order forthwith to enable the Appellant to file a Notice of Motion to set aside or vary the judgement pursuant to Order 10 Rule 12(2) and (3) of the National Court Rules for the reasons that:

i) The trial was on paper, in chambers and in the absence of the Appellant hence the Appellant will not be aware of the trial or the subject Order;

ii) The Appellant is the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and it is a matter of national interest and it is in the interest of justice that the Appellant ought to be notified forthwith of the subject Order; and

iii) The subject Order was for a judgement against the Appellant of a substantial amount of money totalling K55, 697,513.18 which would be paid out of the public funds.

(b) Whole of the judgment and orders of the Primary Judge given on 5th May 2025 at Waigani National Court in the National Court proceeding styled WS No. 21 of 2024 (CC1) (IECMS) – Grand Columbia Limited v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea be quashed.

(c) Pursuant to section 155(4) of the Constitution and sections 6 and 16(b) and (c) of the Supreme Court Act, the Supreme Court make no award as to damages.

(d) Alternatively, pursuant to section 16(d) and (e) of the Supreme Court Act, the National Court proceedings shall be remitted back to the National Court to be tried before a different judge.

1. “The Judgement of his Honour Justice Makail appealed against in this appeal was delivered on 5 May 2025. Pursuant to section 17 of the Supreme Court Act, the 40 day period within which the appellant was required to file the appeal expired on Saturday, 14 June 2025 (such day not being a Public Holiday or a Sunday), and the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal instituting this appeal on 16 June 2025, which was outside of the 40 day appeal period, and therefore the entire appeal is incompetent.

2. Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.2 and 3.3 are questions of fact for which questions an appeal only lies with the leave of the Supreme Court pursuant to section 14(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37). Such leave has not been obtained by the appellant and therefore these grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.

3. Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.

4. Further or in the alternative, all the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 June 2025 fail to satisfy the requirements of Order 7 Rule 9(c) and 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 2012 in the following respects:

(a) Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 improperly pleaded that the "Primary Judge erred in fact and law" when in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), it is required to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right (see Alfred Kimbu v Serah Eme Pakira (2023) SC2387 and National Capital District Water & Sewerage Limited v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited (2023) SC2365); and

(b) Grounds 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 completely fail to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37) so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right,

Objection to competency – rulings by the Court on each of the grounds of objection filed by the respondent

The Application of Section 17 of the Supreme Court Act – the last day for filing an Appeal falling on a day that the Registry is closed under the 40-day rule

“Where a person desires to appeal to or to obtain leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, he shall give notice of appeal, or notice of his application for leave to appeal, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court within 40 days after the date of the judgment in question, or within such further period as is allowed by a Judge on application made to him within that period of 40 days.”

“The following Rules of the National Court shall apply as if they were, with necessary modifications, Rules of the Supreme Court with regard to—

(h) Any other matter where there is a relevant provision in the National Court Rules, no provision in these Rules and no order has been made as to the procedure to be followed.”

“If in the circumstances of a particular case before a court has no provision, or no adequate provision, is made in respect of a matter of practice or procedure, the court shall give ad hoc directions to remedy the lack or inadequacy.”^[14]

“where any party or practitioner or any person having any interest in any proceedings pending or about to be commenced has any proper business to transact with the Registrar at any time when his office is not open to the public which business for any reason could not be transacted when the office is next to be opened in the normal course or which might if so transacted involve the person concerned or any other person in serious risk of prejudice that person may, on payment of a fee of K5.00,^[15] require the Registrar to open his office to transact the business in question at some proper and convenient time.”

No	Ground	Objection	Determination
	Filing of the Notice of Appeal in breach of Section 17 of the Supreme Court Act (outside the day period prescribed by the Act.)	The Judgement of his Honour Justice Makail appealed against in this appeal was delivered on 5 May 2025. Pursuant to section 17 of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), the 40 day period within which the appellant was required to file the appeal expired on Saturday, 14 June 2025 (such day not being a Public Holiday or a Sunday), and the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal instituting this appeal on 16 June 2025, which was outside of the 40 day appeal period, and therefore the entire appeal is incompetent.	Objection refused. By application of Order 1 Rule 14 of the NCR in the reasons set out in paragraphs 69 – 95 of this judgment the appellant filed its appeal in time on Monday 16 June 2025 when the Registry re-opened following the weekend it was closed.
3.1	The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion by acting on wrong principles in assessing and awarding damages as per the subject Order when he only relied on six (6) national court cases at paragraph 4 of his written judgement and failed to rely on the well settled principles in the case of Mel v Pakalia [2005] PGSC 36; SC790: (a) To discharged his duty as a judge in a trial on assessment of damages after entry of default judgment as follows: i) Failing to make a cursory inquiry so as to be satisfied that the facts and the cause of action are pleaded with sufficient clarity; ii) Failure to ascertained whether the facts and cause of action is reasonably clear and that liability is regarded as proven; and iii) Failure to ascertain whether the facts or the cause of action pleaded make sense and would not make the assessment of damages a futile exercise and whether or not to revisit the issue of liability. (b) To revisit the issue of liability and award no damages or alternatively to award damages only on a quantum meruit basis for the reasons that; i) The facts and cause of action pleaded is statute barred as this is a claim to recover outstanding rental arrears from the period after a Commercial Lease dated 31 December 2010 (hereafter referred to as 'The Agreement') between the Appellant and the Respondent expired however purportedly continued on a month-to-month basis contrary to section 47C,(2) and (3) of the Public Finance Management Act, and ii) The Agreement is statute barred pursuant to section 2A(2) of the Claims By & Against the State Act 1996 (as amended in 2022) and section 470(2) and (3) of the Public Finance Management Act as the Respondent has failed to produce a properly authorized Integrated Local Purchase Order and Claim (hereafter referred to as "ILPOC"); or an Authority to Pre-commit Expenditure (hereafter referred to as "APCE"), relating to the property and lease services, the subject of the claim, to the full amount of the claim.	Further or in the alternative, all the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 June 2025 fail to satisfy the requirements of Order 7 Rule 9(c) and 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 2012 in the following respects: (a) Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 improperly pleaded that the "Primary Judge erred in fact and law" when in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), it is required to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right (see Alfred Kimbu v Serah Eme Pakira (2023) SC2387 and National Capital District Water & Sewerage Limited v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited (2023) SC2365); and	Objection refused as to 3.1(a)(i)-(iii). It is sufficient for a ground of appeal to make a broad statement that in fact and law the trial judge erred in failing to consider, analyse and draw conclusion from the totality of the evidence on the failure to make a ‘cursory inquiry’ to be satisfied that the facts and cause of action are pleaded with sufficient clarity as a complaint of the denial of natural justice in trial below. Objection refused as to 3.1(b)(i)-(ii). It is sufficient for a ground of appeal to plead and challenge on appeal that the cause of action and claim below was statute barred under a contract being the commercial lease. Further, the appeal pleads that the Public Finance Management Act was breached, the Claims By and Against the State Act was breached and the complaint was in breach of inferred authorization under the local procedure order and claims and Authority to pre – commit expenditure.
3.2	The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion at paragraph 4 of the written judgement by giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matter such as the invoices and the Statement of Accounts in the Affidavit of Edmund Stack ("Mr Stack") sworn on 13 September 2024 and filed on 27th September 2024 as corroboration of the claim for unpaid rentals totalling K42,300,860.05; however are in fact not corroboration of the claim from an independent source but are evidence from Mr Stack himself as the managing director of the Respondent.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.2 and 3.3 are questions of fact for which questions an appeal only lies with the leave of the Supreme Court pursuant to section 14(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37). Such leave has not been obtained by the appellant and therefore these grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal. Further or in the alternative, all the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 June 2025 fail to satisfy the requirements of Order 7 Rule 9(c) and 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 2012 in the following respects: (a) Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 improperly pleaded that the "Primary Judge erred in fact and law" when in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), it is required to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right (see Alfred Kimbu v Serah Eme Pakira (2023) SC2387 and National Capital District Water & Sewerage Limited v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited (2023) SC2365); and	Objection refused. It is sufficient for a ground of appeal to refer to the challenge to the independence of the evidence as a material fact that would have led to a mistrial on damages.
3.3	The Primary Judge erred in fact and law by wrongly exercising his discretion when he failed to take into account relevant consideration such as the fact that the Appellant has been denied the principle of natural justice after the entry of default judgement on 24 July 2024 and proceeded to assess and award damages as per the subject Order when it was plainly clear that: i) The Respondent for over nine (9) months (from the date of default Judgment to the date of trial by paper) never served on the Appellant the Order for default Judgement of 24 July 2024 to give the Appellant an opportunity to either challenge the entry of default judgment, to appeal, to negotiate settlement or to prepare and file necessary documents such as Notice of Intention to Defend or Affidavits etc. to respond during the trial on assessment of damages; ii) There was no Affidavit of Service filed by the Respondent confirming service of the Order for default judgement of 24 July 2024 on the Appellant from date of the default judgement to date of trial on paper; iii) There was no Mention Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(7) of the Listing Rules 2005 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to consider the matters outlined in Order 10 Rule 9A(7)(4) of the Listing Rules 2005; iv) There was no Directions Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(8) of the Listing Rules 2005 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to give directions for parties to attempt out of court settlement, filing of witness statement or affidavits or give directions regarding other matters set out in Rule 7 (4) and fix a date for pre-trial conference. v) There was no Pre-trial Conference Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(9) of the Listing Rules 2005 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to confirm legal representation, give directions for parties to file relevant notices under the Evidence Act or directions regarding other matters set out in Rule 9 (2) and fix a date for trial and a date for status conference. vi) There was no Notice of Trial issued by the Registrar of the National Court on the Court file pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9 of the National Court Rules, Order 10 Rules 9A(9)(3) and 12(1) of the Listing Rules 2005 of the National Court Rules and no evidence of service of a Notice of Trial on the Appellant either by the Registrar or the Respondent; vii) There was no Status Conference Hearing after the entry of default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rule 9A(10) of the Listing Rules 2005 of the National Court Rules hence the Primary Judge failed to confirm whether directions issued during Directions Hearing and Pre-trial Conference Hearing have been complied with and that the matter is ready for trial; (vii) Prior to the subject Order, the matter came before the Court on only two (2) occasions; firstly for the hearing of the Respondents application for default judgement on 24 July 2024 and secondly on 8 April 2025 when the Primary Judge gave directions for trial on assessment of damages to be on paper, for the Respondent to file its written submissions by or before Friday, 25 April 2025 and an order for parties to be advised on the date for the delivery of the reserved decision on assessment of damages; and (viii) The Respondent did not file or serve on the Appellant any notice to rely on any Affidavit pursuant to section 35(1) of the Evidence Act.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.2 and 3.3 are questions of fact for which questions an appeal only lies with the leave of the Supreme Court pursuant to section 14(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37). Such leave has not been obtained by the appellant and therefore these grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal. Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal. Further or in the alternative, all the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 June 2025 fail to satisfy the requirements of Order 7 Rule 9(c) and 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 2012 in the following respects: (a) Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 improperly pleaded that the "Primary Judge erred in fact and law" when in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), it is required to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right (see Alfred Kimbu v Serah Eme Pakira (2023) SC2387 and National Capital District Water & Sewerage Limited v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited (2023) SC2365); and	Objection refused. It is easy to identify in this ground of appeal from the evidence in the judgment below to argue the principles of a fair trial and violations of the principles of natural justice have been offended in the determination of a default judgment against the State in effect breaching of Section 59 of the Constitution guarantees where leave is not required.
3.4	The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust as the Appellant was denied the principle of natural justice when the trial on assessment of damages was conducted by the Primary Judge on paper, in the Primary Judge's chambers, not listed pursuant to Order 10 Rule 7 of the National Court Rules and not tried in open court resulting in: i) The Appellant being denied the opportunity to be notified by the court listings and denied the opportunity to attend to the trial in open court and respond; ii) The Appellant has been denied the opportunity to scrutinize the judicial process in open court as the trial on assessment of damages was not recorded by the Court Reporting Services hence there is no transcript of the trial; and iii) The Appellant has been denied the opportunity to test or examine the Respondent's case in a trial in open court as outlined in the case of Bromley v Finance Pacific Ltd [2001] PGNC 89; N2097.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.	Objection refused. It is a clear point that is arguable on appeal, and the reasons are repeated and relied upon in the reasons referred to in grounds 3.1 – 3.3 above.
3.5	The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust in conducting trial on assessment of damages on paper and in chambers when there were no practice direction or provisions under the National Court Rules for the trial to be conducted in such a manner.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.	Objection refused. The argument is clear: it must be read together with grounds 3.5 to 3.8 of the appeal that the appellate suffered prejudiced by the case -management of the trial below in the non-application of the National Court Rules denying the State a right to be heard contained in ground 3.1 – 3.4 above as the introductory grounds of appeal.
3.6	The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust in conducting trial on assessment of damages on paper and in chambers when there was no evidence showing either special circumstances or balance of convenience for the trial to be conducted in such a manner.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.	Objection refused. It is further supplementary grounds of appeal on the conduct of the trial below alleging a mistrial not having a chance to be heard at trial.
3.7	The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust when he conducted the trial on assessment of damages on paper and in his chambers in the absence of the Appellant or noting that there are no documentation or participation from Appellant and no evidence of a Notice of Trial or the Appellant being notified of the Trial rather than be guided by Order 10 Rule 12(1) of the National Court Rules by ordering that the trial be not held unless the Appellants are notified by the Respondent or adjourning the trial.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.	Objection refused. Relevantly, this ground of appeal is granular in that it is argued that the specific National Court Rule Order 10 Rule 12(1) of the NCR were breached prejudicing the rights of the State to be heard at the trial below.
3.8	The Primary Judge exercise of discretion is unreasonable and plainly unjust when he conducted the trial on assessment of damages on paper in his chambers in the absence of the Appellant and awarded damages to the Respondent as per the subject Order but failed to order the Respondent to serve on the Appellant the subject Order forthwith to enable the Appellant to file a Notice of Motion to set aside or vary the judgement pursuant to Order 10 Rule 12(2) and (3) of the National Court Rules for the reasons that: i) The trial was on paper, in chambers and in the absence of the Appellant hence the Appellant will not be aware of the trial or the subject Order; ii) The Appellant is the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, and it is a matter of national interest, and it is in the interest of justice that the Appellant ought to be notified forthwith of the subject Order; and iii) The subject Order was for a judgement against the Appellant of a substantial amount of money totalling K55, 697,513.18 which would be paid out of the public funds.	Further or in the alternative, Grounds 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 relate to the order of the Primary Judge made on 8 April 2025 in the National Court proceeding WS No. 21 of 2024, in which the Primary Judge ordered that the trial on assessment of damages be on the papers, which order is not the subject of this appeal, and as such the grounds are incompetent and should be struck out from the Notice of Appeal.	Objection refused. The end result is that the appellant complains that a denial of procedural fairness occurred in that orders ought to have been made by the Court below and served on the appellant for the respondent to secure default judgment on the State so that the State had the opportunity to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Order 10 Rules 12(2) and (3) as a matter of procedural fairness.
All		Further or in the alternative, all the grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 June 2025 fail to satisfy the requirements of Order 7 Rules 9(c) and 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 2012 in the following respects: (a) Grounds 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 improperly pleaded that the "Primary Judge erred in fact and law" when in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37), it is required to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right (see Alfred Kimbu v Serah Eme Pakira (2023) SC2387 and National Capital District Water & Sewerage Limited v Yambaran Pausa Saka Ben Limited (2023) SC2365); and (b) Grounds 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 completely fail to specify whether the Primary Judge "erred in law" or "erred in mixed fact and law" in accordance with section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Supreme Court Act (Chapter 37) so as to properly identify the grounds as grounds for which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right, and are therefore incompetent.	Objection refused. The form of the grounds of appeal is substantially compliant with Supreme Court Rules and any alleged defect in form is trivial. The objection as to competency must demonstrate that all grounds of appeal are invalid which is not the case in our reasons above. The end result is that if one ground of appeal is valid and survives the respondent’s challenge, the appeal is valid, and the objection fails. In any event the debate that the words were not precisely used in that the trial judge ‘erred in “law” or erred in “mixed fact and law” is overtaken by the totality of the appeal which points to the arguments that a mistrial occurred in that the State was prejudiced by the fact and laws and violation of procedures relating to natural justice and the conduct of a ‘fair trial’ prescribed by Section 59 of the Constitution and the Constitution guarantees of natural justice and procedural fairness and the fact that the appellant is appealing against the whole of the judgment of the trial judge below.

In any dispute or proceeding between the parties, both shall act reasonably and without delay and make all admissions necessary to enable the real issues to be decided by the person specified in Item 12 of the Schedule to whom the subject matter of the dispute shall be referred who shall act as an expert and whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties.”^[19]

_________________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the appellant: Solicitor General
Lawyers for the respondent: Ashurst PNG

^[1] Commercial Lease between Grand Columbia Ltd and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (Department of Education) dated 31 December 2010 – AB 113-125
^[2] Annexure ES 2 of the Affidavit of Edmond Stack filed 27th September 2024, AB 194-197
^[3] Court Order 24 July 2024, AB 24-25
^[4] Court Order 8 April 2025, AB 22-28
^[5] Annexure GA13 of the Affidavit of George Akia filed 24 June 2025, AB 316-326
^[6] Judgment of Makail J in Grand Columbia Ltd v Independent State of Papua New Guinea N11268, AB 33-37
^[7] Ibid, AB 37
^[8] Notice of Appeal filed 16 June 2025, AB 3-9
^[9] Ibid, AB 8
^[10] Ibid, AB 9
^[11] Notice of Objection to Competency filed 1 July 2025, AB 18-19
^[12] [2024] PGSC 61; SC2597
^[13] [2023] PGSC 38; SC2381
^[14] Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
^[15] D. H. Katter, R. J. Gordon and E. G. Andersen (ed.), Civil Procedure in Papua New Guinea National Court of Justice, Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2016, p.20.
^[16] [2024] SC2703
^[17] [2020] PGSC 1 SC 1901
^[18] [2007] SC 858
^[19] Annexure BW1 of Affidavit of Bernietha Wagun filed 5^th July 2025, AB 122
^[20] Ibid, AB 124-125

Year	Quarter	Amount	Amount Outstanding
2017	1st Qtr.	K269, 905.98	K2,775,763.92
	2nd Qtr.	K269, 905.98
	3rd Qtr.	K1,117, 975.98
	4th Qtr.	K1,117, 975.98

2018	1st Qtr.	K466,897.11	K1,867,576.44
	2nd Qtr.	K466,894.11
	3rd Qtr.	K466,894.11
	4th Qtr.	K466,894.11

2019	1st Qtr.	K677,671.41	K2,118,788.69
	2nd Qtr.	K677,671.41
	3rd Qtr.
	4th Qtr.	K763,446

2020	1st Qtr.	K985,017.28	K5,753,899.22
	2nd Qtr.	K814,547.74
	3rd Qtr.	K2,712,290.10
	4th Qtr.	K1,242,044.10

2021	1st Qtr.	K1,483,363.02	K11,357,022.00
	2nd Qtr.	2,496,194.98
	3rd Qtr.	K3,688,732.02
	4th Qtr.	K6,688,732.02

2022	1st Qtr.	K3,946,943	K15,787,773.36.4
	2nd Qtr.	3946943.34
	3rd Qtr.	3946943.34
	4th Qtr.	3946943.34

*Total Rent outstanding 2017 to 2022*			*K39,660,832.66*

Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea

Independent State of Papua New Guinea v Grand Columbia Ltd [2025] PGSC 129; SC2827 (12 December 2025)