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Police v Wright [2016] WSSC 190 (9 September 2016)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA
Police v Wright [2016] WSSC 190

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA

HELD AT MULINUU

BETWEEN:

POLICE
Prosecution

AND:

TAGAOLO IOSEFATU WRIGHT male of Luatuanuu
Defendant

Counsel: L Sio for prosecution
L R Schuster for defendant

Hearing: 18, 19 & 20 July 2016, 23 August 2016

Ruling: 09 September 2016

RULING OF NELSON J

1. There are six (6) charges facing the defendant: firstly S3028/15 alleging that at Matautu-tai between 01 January and 31 December 2014, being a servant of the Ministry of Police, he did steal 40 litres of petrol valued at $104.00 the property of Ministry of Police. The next charge is S3034/15 that at Matautu-tai between the 01^st and 31^st of March 2014, being a servant of the Ministry of Police, he did steal 40 litres of petrol valued at $104:00 property of the Ministry of Police. Third charge is S3025/15 that at Matautu-tai, between the 01^st and 31^st of October 2014, the defendant being a servant of the Ministry of Police did steal 60 litres of petrol valued at $156.00, the property of said Ministry of Police. Fourth charge S3026/15 at Matautu-tai on or between the 01^st of December and 31^st of December 2014 he did being a servant of the Ministry of Police steal 20 litres of petrol valued at $52.00. Fifth charge is S3029/15, that at Matautu-tai between the 01^st and 30^th of January 2015, being a servant of the Ministry of Police the defendant did steal 2 x 44 gallon drums of diesel valued at $1,081.16. Final charge is S1369/15, that on 16 January 2015, the defendant being a servant of the Ministry of Police did steal four (4) hardboard plywoods valued at $688.00 the property of said Ministry of Police.

Application to amend:

2. Two preliminary points required to be considered, firstly an application by the prosecution to amend information S3028/15. During the course of the trial prosecution sought leave seeking to amend the information to read “between 01 January 2011 and 31 December 2012” as opposed to “between 01 January 2014 and 31 December 2014.” This was considered necessary because the evidence of some of the witnesses related to this period. The application did not address the issue of the alleged offending predating the Crimes Act 2013 under which the defendant had been charged, the Act having come into force on or about 01 May 2013. Counsel must therefore by necessity also be seeking amendment of the charging legislation to the relevant sections of the Crimes Ordinance 1961.
3. Section 36 of the Criminal Procedure 1972 confers on the court a wide power of amendment. Section 36(1) relevantly provides that “the court may amend the information in any way at any time during the trial.” As noted in Police v Lokeni (unreported judgment of 07 December 2007):

“That the court has power to amend an information even after the evidence has closed is clear from Police v Eteuati [2005] WSSC 10 and the authorities cited therein. As stated by the learned Chief Justice “the trial lasts until the courts decision is given.”

As to how this power is to be exercised, the authorities uphold the discretionary nature of the power and how the interests of justice are paramount. In discussing the equivalent New Zealand provision the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Jones v Police [1998] 1 NZLR 447 at 451 said:

“The policy behind s.43 is that amendments should be allowed when appropriate and subject to the procedural safeguards contained in the section. Whether to allow an amendment will usually involve striking a balance between the interests of the prosecution and the policy of the section on the one hand and what if any prejudice there may be to the defendant on the other.”

Generally, the longer the interval of time between arraignment and an amendment, the more likely it is that the defendant will be prejudiced in his defence and that injustice will be caused: Police v Johnston [1974] 2NZLR 660 (CA), R v Johal & Ram [1973] QB 475, 481 (CA), Police v Apelu Aiga and others [1987] SPLR 416.”

4. The history of this matter from the records of the court shows that at the first assigned hearing date the prosecution withdrew a number of charges and amended others including S3028/15. That was on 16 May 2016 when Justice Tuatagaloa recused herself from presiding because her brother was one of the key prosecution witnesses. The proceedings have since been called a number of times but only after trial commenced was the application to amend made. No forewarning of this was given to defendants counsel who indicates he has prepared for trial on the basis that all the charges against his client relate to the 2014/2015 period. There was equally no previous indication the allegations pre-dated 2014 or would be brought under the old Crimes legislation.
5. In the circumstances I am not inclined to grant the prosecution application. The amendment sought is not minor. The application could and should have been made much earlier. The prejudice to the defendant in allowing it at this stage would be substantial and cannot be cured by an adjournment, as the court has been advised the prosecution witnesses by and large comprise the crew of the Motor Vessel Nafanua which is due to ship out next week for an unknown period of time. Leave to amend S3028/15 is accordingly refused.

Admissibility of photographs:

6. The second preliminary issue concerns the admissibility of certain photographic evidence. Counsel objected to the introduction of photographs Exhibit “P-4” and “P-5” of the defendants vehicle with three red coloured jerry can containers in the boot. I did not understand the objection to extend to Exhibit “P-6” for the prosecution, a photograph of sheets of plywood and wire-mesh that the defendant is charged with taking. But my observations in relation to “P-5” and “P-4” equally apply to “P-6.”
7. The defence argues that because the defendant gave no permission for the photographs to be taken and because of their obvious prejudicial value, they should be excluded as unfairly or improperly obtained evidence. Counsel also argued such evidence should have been obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued under section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1972 and this was a further basis for exclusion. No authorities were cited in support of the proposition or submission that the evidence should be excluded as being improperly or unfairly obtained.
8. Counsel also raised concern about the reliability of the evidence, given that no dates are shown in the various photographs. Exhibits “P-4” and “P-5” were according to the evidence, taken by Constable Sosaia Latu who also testified about the defendants practice of instructing officers under his command to siphon petrol from the 44-gallon drums stored in the Maritime Division Storeroom. Such petrol is used for the Nafanua and its associated vessels. The Constable said in his evidence recorded at page 40 of the transcript as follows:
   

“Fesili: fa’afefea na e pu’eina au ata?

Tali: na ou pueina fa’aāoga ai la’u telefoni.

Fesili: fea la na ave ai au ata ia?

Tali: sa ou teuina lava, leaga na ou iloa e iai le taimi e sue ai nei mea.

Fesili: e iai se mafua’aga na lē lipotia ai i le Ofisa o Leoleo le gaioiga na sa e va’ai ai i le aso lea?

Tali: na ou pu’eina e fai ma self-defence ia kaika e pei o aso fa’apenei

Fesili: lea le uiga o lau tala?

Tali: e puipui mai ai foi ta ita mai le fa’atonuga lea sa fai

Fesili: o ai sa faia le fa’atonuga lea e te taua?

Tali: o le susuga ia Tagaolo.”

9. In cross examination, the witness clarified that while the instruction to siphon was not given to him directly, he was present when it was issued to Constable Ena Tuileutu, then a Fitter Machinist for the Nafanua. This was in October 2014. Sosaias evidence was corroborated by the said Constable Ena Tuileutu.
10. There is no doubting the Court has a discretion to exclude unfairly obtained evidence. This is commonly exercised in relation to statements made by defendants during a police interview, whether under caution or otherwise. See Police v Vailopa [2009] WSSC 69 and Police v Masame [2007] WSSC 66. The relevant principles in this regard were recently restated by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Smith [2000] NZCA 99; [2000] 3 NZLR 656:

“It is well settled at common law that the Courts of New Zealand have a discretion to exclude legally admissible evidence on the ground of unfairness. An obvious example is where voluntary admissions or confessions are made in circumstances rendering the use of the evidence unfair. R v Ali (CA 253/99, 8 December 1999) is a recent case in this Court where the authorities are discussed. In other situations, not involving admissions and confessions as such, the discretion exercisable on policy grounds is concerned with the quality of the conduct of those who obtained the evidence. As Eichelbaum CJ observed in R v Dally [1990] NZHC 145; [1990] 2 NZLR 184, 192, that inquiry involves weighing the need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences and the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair treatment. Another way of expressing the foundation of the discretion, he said, is that it relates to the rejection of evidence where its admission would be calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In R v Convery [1967] NZCA 37; [1968] NZLR 426 Turner J emphasised that the Court may consider not only the case immediately before it, but also the necessity of maintaining effective control over police procedure in the generality of cases.”

11. The learned authors of Cross on Evidence 7^th New Zealand Edition at paragraph 1.67 et seq have this to say on the matter:

“Oppressiveness, false representations, tricks, bribes and traps – all these kinds of police conduct, if proved on a voir dire, call for the exercise of the discretion (which is different from saying that the evidence obtained as a result of that conduct must be excluded). In one case the fact that a traffic officer had misrepresented his powers to enter private property was the main reason for regarding evidence as unfairly obtained and excluding it. All kinds of police tricks have led to actual exclusion of evidence. Thus in one case an accused was not told that his solicitor had arrived at the police station and wanted to see him: evidence obtained subsequently to that arrival was excluded. According to the English Court of Appeal in the important case of R v Christou [1992] 4 AIIER 559 it is not every trick producing evidence against an accused which results in unfairness. The Judge, it was held, had exercised his discretion correctly because the police trick, an undercover operation in which criminals were deceived into thinking that they were dealing with a jeweler willing to trade in stolen property, was not applied to the appellants: they voluntarily applied themselves to the trick. Similarly, a person who makes an admission when there was no deliberate attempt by a constable to trap the person into making it will not succeed with a claim that evidence was unfairly obtained........

Before the discretion is exercised in favour of exclusion there will normally have to be shown some improper conduct “of which Crown ought not to take advantage”: King v R [1969] 1 AC 304, 319 (PC). The Judge should weigh the public interest in the conviction of the guilty against the public interest in the protection of individuals from unlawful and unfair treatment. The discretion must be exercised on proper principles.

The Judge should inquire whether the evidence in question resulted from or involves either an infringement of a recognized right, protection or privilege, or a breach of a recognized duty or obligation, or something which “so offends public conscience as to outweigh the wider public interest in securing the conviction of an offender”: Police v Gray (1991) 6 CRNZ 701 (emphasis mine).

On appeal to the Court of Appeal in Gray v Police [1991] 3 NZLR 697 Cooke, P as he then was, in delivering the judgment of the court observed at 699:

“We accept the argument for the accused to the extent that it is urged that this Court should not confine the unfairness or abuse of process principle to a closed and narrowly limited category of cases. No doubt it is a somewhat versatile principle and every kind of situation in which it might appropriately be applied cannot be foreseen. Still it gives exceptional jurisdiction, never to be invoked without strong reason.”

12. In applying these principles to the instant case I am unable to say the police officers action in photographing the jerry-cans in the boot of the defendants vehicle “so offends public conscience as to outweigh the wider public interest in securing the conviction of an offender.” I am equally unable to conclude the photographic exercise was otherwise conducted in circumstances that would render such evidence unfairly obtained.
13. I have also considered section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Act as raised by counsel. I am of the respectful view it has no application to the present matter. Much like a witness to a thief breaking and entering a building, the Constable witnessed what he thought was inappropriate possibly criminal behaviour on the part of his superior officer. He documented what he saw as he said “for his own protection.” He was well entitled to do that, in fact he should have done more. It is disturbing to note the Constable and fellow officers of the Police Maritime Division seemed to be part of a culture of blind obeisance and acceptance of highly questionable and potentially criminal activities of their superior officer. In the circumstances a search warrant was neither required nor appropriate as the items in question were in full view of everyone.
14. For these reasons I find the two photographs objected to are good and admissible evidence as against the defendant.

The police evidence: the petrol charges

15. I move now to consider the police evidence in relation to the charges of theft of petrol. In respect of those charges a large number of witnesses were called by the prosecution, all of them officers who had served under the defendant over the period January 2011 to January 2015 or thereabouts. Their evidence was cogent and consistent. On diverse dates, the defendant would instruct junior officers, usually around the end of the working day or when few people were around, to siphon petrol from the 44-gallon petrol drums in the Maritime Division Store into small 20 litre red jerry-cans. Which would then be placed in the boot of the defendants silver mini-van parked nearby. The quantities varied but the evidence of Constable Sosaia and Constable Ena including the photographs were specific to December 2014. And to the effect that there were 2 x 20 litre jerry-cans involved on that occasion. The third one according to Constable Ena being empty. Constable Samuelu Vailopas evidence was also specific as to December 2014 as it was him who held the jerry-cans in question, while Constable Poasa Malofou another witness, siphoned the petrol. The latter said this was done a number of times over the 2011 to 2015 period on the defendants instructions.
16. The evidence of many other police officers was to the same effect. The defendant habitually siphoned petrol from the 44-gallon drums into smaller jerry-cans which he took away. Not surprisingly the witnesses were unable to provide dates with any degree of accuracy but all agreed it was an ongoing practice engaged in by the defendant who was at the time in charge of the Police Maritime Division and the Motor Vessel Nafanua. This behaviour according to the testimonies spanned 2014 and possibly earlier as well. Chief Electrician for the Nafanua Talia Nukulaelae recalls he did this six times on the defendants instruction over the period of his employment 2010 to 2014. The defendant was able to do this because no separate record was kept covering the ingoings and outgoings of the Division Oil Store. And because he kept the key. In his absence on leave the witnesses were unsure as to who kept the key, but presumably it would have been in the custody of the acting Head of the Maritime Division.

The defence case:

17. The defendant does not dispute he was Head of the Maritime Unit at the relevant time. But he argues the prosecution have not proved beyond reasonable doubt the petrol was the property of the Police. There was no proof of purchase of the petrol and no documentary evidence of any kind produced to establish the petrol in fact belonged to the Police. He also says there was no report of petrol going missing. No logbook or record of petrol being stored and then disappearing. The evidence of the witnesses it is submitted does not establish ownership of the petrol or that it was purchased by the Police.
18. The defendant also maintains the similar fact evidence adduced should not be accepted as they fail to meet the requirements of similar fact evidence. How they were deficient was not clear from counsels oral submissions. But he also stated that in any event the quality of such evidence was poor and should not be relied upon.

Analysis

19. I cannot accept the defendants ownership argument. The evidence showed that the petrol was stored in 44-gallon drums in the Maritime Division Oil Store situated within the Maritime Division Compound at Matautu Wharf. Exhibits “P-1” and “P-3” show the room is adjacent to where the Division cars are parked which is next to the Base of Operations and offices of the Maritime Division. The room is locked and the key resides in the custody of the defendant as the officer in charge at the time. Exhibit “P-2” and the evidence of the police officers show other equipments were stored in the Oil Store apart from petrol. There is no evidence properties belonging to any other person or divisions of the police or any other entity were stored in the room or that the petrol was purchased by others and kept in the Oil Store. Petrol used by the Nafanua and its associated vessels was from the Oil Store room.
20. This gels with the evidence of Senior Sergeant Avele Tuilaepa who was the Maritime Division supplies officer responsible for the ordering of petrol. He explained that all petrol ordered for the use of the Nafanua and its support craft is stored in the Oil Store. But there is no Oil Store Log. He also testified that as time went on it became necessary to order more and more petrol. He suspected it was being stolen as replacement 44-gallon drums were required every two months or so. This was unusual and out of the ordinary. However he did not report the irregularity because his suspicions were directed at the defendant who was his superior and the officer in charge of the Maritime Division. It was only when the defendant was removed that he was able to comfortably report on these matters.
21. The irresistible inference from all this is the petrol belonged to the Police Maritime Division. For who else could it possibly belong to. The lack of documentary evidence confirming this is not fatal. I find it proven beyond reasonable doubt the petrol was the property of the Maritime Division and was at the relevant time under the control of its commanding officer the defendant. As to proof petrol had gone missing, again the defendant is correct, there is no documentary evidence indicating stores went missing. But this is not surprising since any documentation would have been the defendants area of responsibility. The lack of a logbook or Oil Store record represented poor management zero accountability and poor monitoring. Something the defendant was not inclined to improve upon.
22. None of these matters alters the witnesses evidence that petrol was being siphoned from the Oil Store drums into smaller jerry-cans on the defendants instructions. Jerry-cans which were then placed in the defendants vehicle and removed from the compound. Exhibits “P-4” and “P-5” are most damning evidence of this.
23. The evidence establishes to the required standard that notwithstanding the lack of documents and records, petrol was being taken by the defendant. There being no evidence he was authorized to do so for any purpose, the inference can readily be drawn that there was an unlawful taking committed on his part.

Similar fact evidence

24. The classic pronouncement of the rule emanates from the Privy Council judgment in Makin v Attorney General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57:

“It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused had been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused.”

25. The New Zealand position was laid out by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Guy (1996) 13 CRNZ 589, 593:

“The principles governing the admission of similar fact evidence have been authoritatively defined, however difficult they may be in their application to particular cases. As was said by this Court in R v Accused (CA 247/91) [1992] 2 NZLR 187, 191:

We do not consider that it maters which description is used. While the description “similar facts” and the associated one “strikingly similar” have been used in New Zealand in the past, largely in deference to English authority, and will no doubt continue to be used as convenient labels, the real question is always whether, as a matter of common sense, the evidence is sufficiently supportive of the prosecution case to justify allowing it to go to the jury notwithstanding any illegitimate prejudicial effect that it might have.”

26. Further in R v M [1990] NZCA 358; [1991] 1 NZLR 315 at 320, the court stated:

“There can be circumstances where evidence of past conduct can strengthen an inference that the accused has repeated that conduct but there must be some significant additional feature which lifts the evidence above showing only bad character or disposition to offend generally. That will be where some special characteristic or pattern emerges from the evidence, or where there is some underlying unity between the separate events. In those circumstances evidence of the presence of the characteristics or pattern on separate occasions may increase the likelihood that they are linked.”

27. This approach has been followed in this jurisdiction most recently in cases such as Police v Edwards [2013] WSSC114 and Police v Tiatia [2013] WSSC 116.
28. In the instant case the defendants actions on other occasions demonstrate a clear pattern. In instructing subordinate officers to carry out his wishes; in respect of the timing of such instructions i.e. after work or when there were few officers on duty; in the manner of siphoning the petrol from the 44-gallon drums into smaller red jerry-cans and having them placed in the boot of the defendants silver mini-van parked in close proximity to the Oil Store. These are special characteristics sufficient to satisfy the requirements of similar fact evidence. The defendants conduct on those other occasion are relevant and admissible as tending to establish not a propensity to commit crime in general but to establish the theft of petrol charges in particular. Furthermore I am fully satisfied as to the quality of the evidence provided by the many testifying officers who were called.
29. I have therefore come to the following conclusions:
    • (v) Based on the similar fact evidence and particular evidence of Constable Sosaia and Constable Ena, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendants guilt on information S3025/15 that in October 2014 he did steal from his employer the Ministry of Police 60 litres of petrol, but of indeterminate value as no evidence was called in relation the value of the petrol at that time;
    • (vi) Based on the similar fact evidence and the particular evidence of Constable Samuelu and Constable Poasa, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendants guilt on information S3026/15 that in the month of December 2014 the defendant did steal from his employer the Ministry of Police 20 litres of petrol of indeterminate value;
    • (vii) Based on the similar fact evidence and the testimony of the many witnesses called by the prosecution, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt in respect of information S3028/15 that the defendant did between January 2014 and December 2014 steal from his employer the Ministry of Police 40 litres of petrol of indeterminate value;
    • (viii) That in the absence of specific evidence relating to the month of March 2014, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt in relation to information S3034/15 and that charge is dismissed.

Theft of diesel:

30. Information S3029/15 alleges that in January 2015, the defendant committed theft of 2 x 44-gallon drums of diesel valued at $1,081.16 being the property of the Ministry of Police. The police evidence establishes this was diesel aka “dirty diesel” removed from the vessel Nafanuas diesel tanks after they were cleaned as part of the regular servicing of the tanks. The diesel was sold to the Samoa Soccer Federation who presumably used it for purposes such as line-marking playing fields, for the sum of $400.00. This money was used for the end of the year party for the Maritime Division. There was no evidence this money was misappropriated by the defendant and instead applied for his own personal purposes. The evidence of Constable Jordan Vonheider was that the diesel was no longer usable and was “leaga”.
31. The offence of theft as a servant requires there be a dishonest taking. Although no evidence was called as to the limits of the defendants authority, I am satisfied he would have been authorized to dispose properly of such non-usable materials. He may have been deficient in not following proper procedures as to documentations and such like. But I am not satisfied the evidence goes as far as establishing a dishonest taking. An essential ingredient of the offence has not been made out beyond reasonable doubt. The charge of theft of diesel is dismissed.

Theft of plywood:

32. Information S1369/15 charges the defendant with stealing from his employer the Ministry of Police four hardboard plywoods valued at $688.00. The evidence of Senior Sergeant Simaile Tuatagaloa was that in January 2015 he witnessed the plywood and some wire mesh loaded onto a dyna truck belonging to Sergeant Avele Tuilaepa on the defendants instruction. The plywood came from the Oil Store and belonged to the Maritime Division. It had been ordered for cyclone repair work to the Maritime Base. He said that when he returned from a meeting earlier that particular day, he saw what was happening so took a photo of the plywood and mesh wire in the tray of the dyna. This was produced as Exhibit “P-6” for prosecution. He said he took the photo because many things had been happening but there was no evidence. At page 75 of the transcript of his evidence he says:

“Ua tele mea ua ou vaaia, leai se mau maumau tutu o lea tulaga. ua tele mea ua ou vaaia, leai se mau maumaututu o la lea tulaga. Ona ou sau lea o’u tau mai ai loa ile la’uga plywood ia ma mea ia ei totonu o le loli a Avele ou sau loa pu’e le ata.”

He also said in cross examination at page 82 that he had witnessed on some occasions the theft of petrol described by the other police officers.

33. Sergeant Aveles evidence was that on 16 January 2015 the defendant instructed him to take the plywood to his home “for him to use” (“na te faaaogaina”). He removed the plywood from the Oil Store and loaded it onto his dyna truck. He delivered the load to the defendants house at Luatuanuu. He confirmed telling Sergeant Tuatagaloa about this matter and that the Senior Sergeant took a photo. The transaction was not logged or otherwise recorded in the Police Occurrence Book or any other record of the Maritime Division.
34. The third witness concerning this matter was Inspector Sefo Hunt, the then Captain of the Nafanua. He testified that on 23 February 2015 he received a call from the then suspended defendant that he was returning the plywood as he no longer needed them. The defendants son did just that at 5:30 pm as recorded by him in the Police Occurrence Book. Relevant excerpt produced as Exhibit “P-7” for the prosecution. Five (5) plywoods is there recorded as being returned but no wire mesh. In cross examination he stated there were holes in the plywood when returned but could not say if these were there when the materials were initially taken.
35. A close examination of “P-6” shows one possibly two holes in the bottom plywood sheet but no holes in the top one or the third sheet. It appears therefore only one sheet had been pre-used. S1369/15 does not include the wire mesh and the witnesses did not suggest the mesh came from the Oil Store or was Maritime Division property. I therefore ignore any reference to the mesh.
36. The defendants argument is he had no intention to deprive the Police permanently of ownership. The plywood sheets were returned in fact with an additional sheet as perhaps some kind of compensation for the loaning of the plywood sheets for his use. It is clear however the plywood was returned when the defendant was under suspension, as part of a Police Ministry inquiry into the defendants activities. I am accordingly not convinced as to the bona-fides of his intent. The stronger inference is that without authorization he took the sheets for his own personal use and was only driven to return them once an investigation had been launched.
37. I am accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on the 16 January 2015 he did steal from his employer the Ministry of Police the four (4) plywood sheets, again of indeterminate value as no evidence of value was adduced. A finding of guilty on S1369/15 will be recorded.
38. That completes all the charges against the defendant. It now remains an issue of sentencing and a probation report. Tusa ai ma le fa’aiuga o le Fa’amasinoga mo le mataupu lenei Tagaolo o lea ua tolopo i le ta o le 12:00 i le aso 11 o Oketopa, sei fa’ata’atia mai se lipoti mai le Ofisa Fa’anofo Va’ava’aia ma se lauga a lau loia e uiga i moliga lea ua fa’amaonia e fa’asaga i lau susuga. Tulaga o le tatalaga o oe i tua e fa’aāuau pea.
    

JUSTICE NELSON