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Police v FG [2015] WSYC 4 (3 July 2015)

SAMOA YOUTH COURT
POLICE v FG [2015] WSYC 4


Case name:
Police v FG


Citation:


Decision date:
3 July 2015


Parties:
Police (informant) and FG (young person) male of Satuimalufilufi


Hearing date(s):
4 June 2015


File number(s):
D707/15, D708/15, D709/15, D710/15


Jurisdiction:
CRIMINAL


Place of delivery:
Youth Court of Samoa, Mulinuu


Judge(s):
Judge Mata Tuatagaloa


On appeal from:



Order:
- The charges of sexual connection by way of oral sex and the alternative charge of indecent assault in relation to the 7 year old victim, M.S are hereby dismissed by the court.

- I hereby find the young person, F.G guilty of the offence of sexual connection by way of oral sex involving the 6 year old victim, I.S.

- There is no need to deal with the alternative charge of indecent assault regarding I.S.


Representation:
L Su’a-Mailo for Informant
A Su’a for Young Person


Catchwords:
Sexual connection – unlawful sexual connection – sexual violation – maximum penalty – circumstances of indecency – indecent assault – sentence.


Words and phrases:
Voir dire.


Legislation cited:


Cases cited:
Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599(PC);
The Queen v Shard Amad Ali [1999] NZCA 242; Nansen v R (1971) NZLR 269;
Police v Su’a [2007] WSSC 85;
R v McDermott (1948) 76 CLR 501;
Tofilau v The Queen [2007] HCA 59;
Police v Aotua Leilua [1998] WSSC 15;
Police v Junior Sale [2000] WSSC 49;
Police v Tagaloa Runi Masame [2007] WSSC 66; DPP v Pin Lin [1975] 3 All ER 175;
R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13;
R v Convery [1967] NZCA 37; [1968] NZLR 426;
Police v Vailopa [2009] WSSC 69;
R v Ali [1999] NZCA 292.


Summary of decision:

IN THE YOUTH COURT OF SAMOA
HELD AT MULINUU


BETWEEN


P O L I C E
Informant


A N D

F.G male of Satuimalufilufi.
Young Person


Counsel:
Ms L Su’a-Mailo for Prosecution
Mr A Su’a for Young Person


Hearing: 27 May 2015.


Decision: 3 June 2015


RULING OF DCJ TUATAGALOA
(On Voir dire)

Introduction:

  1. I announced my ruling on 27 May 2015 after hearing the evidence but I indicated that I would provide my reasons later. This I now do.
  2. The accused is a young person aged 13 years old at the time of the offending. He is charged with two counts of sexual connections under section 58(1) and two counts of indecent assault under section 58(3) of the Crimes Act 2013.

Grounds of Challenge:

  1. Counsel for the young person, Mr Alex Su’a challenged the admissibility of the cautioned statement on two common law grounds: (i) voluntariness and (ii) improperly obtained evidence.
  2. The defense contested on the grounds that the police:

(i) Continued to interrogate or interview the young person in the absence of his mother;

(ii) The manner in which the young person was interrogated in the absence of the mother;

(iii) The overwhelming feeling of fear and worry experienced by the young person during the interrogation without his mother which lead to his admission of the allegations against him; and

(iv) The persistent interrogation of the young person by the police despite the continuous denial by the young person.

The Evidence:

  1. The Prosecution called two witnesses, namely, Constable Valmarie Leala who interrogated the young person and obtained the cautioned statement and
    Constable Mataio Lemamea who witnessed the interrogation and the obtaining of the cautioned statement.

6. Constable Valmarie Leala gave evidence that:

  1. Constable Mataio Lemamea basically confirmed the evidence of Constable
    Valmarie Leala and further said that:
  2. The prosecution called two witnesses, the young person, F.G and his mother,
    G.F.

9. The young person, F.G gave evidence that :

10. The young person’s mother, G.F:

The Law:

  1. Where the admissibility of a confession made by an accused to the police is challenged on the ground that it was not voluntary, the position in Samoa has been that a confession is admissible if it was voluntary.
  2. In Adams on Criminal Law – Evidence at ED4.03 the voluntariness rule is explained as follows:

It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority.

(See also Nansen v R (1971) NZLR 269.)
  1. In The Queen v Shard Amad Ali [1999] NZCA 242 (referred to by Chief Justice Sapolu in Police v Su’a [2007] WSSC 85) Richardson P in delivering the judgment of New Zealand Court of Appeal at para [44] said:

“[44] At common law, no statement made by an accused is admissible unless it is affirmatively shown to have been made voluntarily. It has to be made voluntarily in the sense of not being made by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority; and also in the broader sense of being made in the exercise of the accused’s own free choice. As Dixon CJ said in R v McDermott (1948) 76 CLR 501:

“If he speaks because he is overborne, his confessional statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by which means he has been overborne. If his statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity or sustained or undue insistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary.”

  1. The Chief Justice in P v Su’a [2007] WSSC 85 further referred to Tofilau v The Queen [2007] HCA 59 where Gummow and Hayne JJ state that:

“...duress, intimidation, persistent importunity or sustained or undue insistence or pressure are all species of compulsion.”

  1. The onus of proving that a confessional statement is voluntary is on the prosecution and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. (see: Police v Aotua Leilua [1998] WSSC 15 per Moran J; Police v Junior Sale [2000] WSSC 49 per Wilson J; Police v Tagaloa Runi Masame [2007] WSSC 66 per Chief Justice Sapolu ); proof beyond reasonable doubt is also the standard required in England (see: DPP v Pin Lin [1975] 3 All ER 175) and in New Zealand (see: R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13).
  2. The common law rule of voluntariness is said to be qualified by section 18 of the Evidence Ordinance 1961 which is, a confession, whether obtained under a promise or threat or any other inducement (not being the exercise of violence or force or other form of compulsion) is admissible if the Court is satisfied that the means by which the confession was obtained were not in fact likely to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made.
  3. The test is simply whether the prosecution have proved that a statement made by an accused was voluntary in the sense that it was not made or obtained from the accused either because some person in authority exercised fear or prejudice or held out hope or advantage.
  4. On the issue of unfairly obtained statements Turner J in R v Convery [1967] NZCA 37; [1968] NZLR 426 at 438 said:

“ The Court, in deciding whether a statement has been so unfairly obtained as to result in its rejection in the exercise of the Judge’s discretion, does not narrowly inquire whether the Judges’ Rules, or any of them, technically construed, have been broken in the course of the inquiry under review, but rather whether the course of the inquiry, as proved in evidence, makes it unjust that the statements should be received.”

The Judge continued:

“In answering this inquiry the Court may consider not only the case immediately before it, but also the necessity of maintaining effective control over police procedure in the generality of cases.”

  1. In Police v Vailopa [2009] WSSC 69 Nelson J referred to R v Ali [1999] NZCA 292 where that Court at para.51 said:

“It is then a matter of looking at the totality of the police conduct. What is important is the overall question of the fairness of the police methods and the issue of fairness is determined by the Judge as a matter of judgment rather than by reference to the onus of proof.”

20. However, the Chief Justice in P v Tagaloa Runi Masame [2007] said:

“The Samoan courts have also, on the rare occasion, excluded a confession which, though voluntary, was unfairly obtained by the police from the accused. In doing so, the Samoan Courts were applying the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Convery [1967] NZCA 37; [1968] NZLR 426 per Turner J at 438. Under the principle stated by Turner J, a confession may be excluded in the exercise of the Courts common law discretion on the ground that it was unfairly obtained.”

Discussion:

  1. In the course of the evidence it became clear the grounds of challenge arose when the mother was not present as she had gone outside leaving the interviewing police officer Constable Valmarie Leala and the young person in the room. This was also confirmed by Counsel for the young person Mr Su’a in his verbal submissions to the court.

Q: Was there duress, intimidation, persistent importunity or sustained or undue insistence or pressure?

  1. Defense Counsel submitted that the admission made by the young person when the mother was outside was not voluntary because the interviewing officer Constable Valmarie Leala persistently told the young person to tell or speak the truth. Furthermore, while the mother was still outside another police officer named Henry came in the room and said to the young person to tell the truth and that he will only ask him once. It was then that the young person made the admission because he was scared.
  2. There is no doubt that the mother went outside and was not present when the young person allegedly made the admission. It is irrelevant whether she went outside on her own volition or was asked by Constable Valmarie Leala to go outside. It is also irrelevant how long the mother was outside whether 7 minutes, 20 minutes or 30 minutes. The question is, what happened in the room when the mother was outside? Did the young person continue to be interviewed in the absence of his mother?
  3. I have seen and heard the young person give evidence in court and I find his evidence credible, coherent and more plausible than the mother whose evidence was disjointed and at times confusing. I accept the following evidence by the young person:
  4. Even if no other police officer went in to the room and questioned the young person, the continuous and persistent interrogation by Constable Leala of the young person in the absence of the mother, placed undue pressure upon the young person, given the young person had denied the allegations all along.
  5. The time the mother went back in the room and what took place in her absence is causally connected and shows the persistence on the part of the police for the young person to admit to the allegations. The way the question was asked and the timing makes it more a threat rather than a warning and places the young person under undue pressure.

F: Ua lelei F.G o le taimi nei ou te faailoa atu mo lou silafia e ono molia oe ile tulafono i lou tuuina mai o faamatalaga sese i leoleo ae e tatau lava ona e tautala saoia pe sa iai se mea na e faia.

T: Ia sa ou faia

  1. In situations where involuntariness is argued, the issue for the courts is ultimately one of credibility, credibility of police witnesses as opposed to the credibility of the accused.
  2. In Police v Su’a[2007] WSSC 85 the accused was interrogated for 9 hours went to sleep on a wooden chair at the police station and was continued to be interrogated the next morning for another 4 ½ hours. The Chief Justice held both cautioned statements made by the accused inadmissible as it was not made voluntary in the exercise of the accused own free choice. His Honour said:

“..given the length of time the accused was interrogated, the gravity of the allegation with which the accused was being questioned, the persistent nature of the questioning in spite of the continuing denials by the accused and the coercive nature of the environment in which the accused was in, there is no doubt that the accused was both physically and mentally very tired...”

His Honour continued:

“In the circumstances, it is clear that this statement was the inevitable result of the interrogation that had taken place the previous day and night.”

  1. In the present case, the accused is 13 years old, the gravity of the allegation with which the young person was being questioned is found in its penalty being the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the persistent nature of the questioning in spite of the continuing denials (even in the absence of the mother) and the coercive nature of the environment in which the young person was (being at a police station is scary and intimidating to a young person especially so if a parent is not present, raises a real question of voluntariness.
  2. I find that the manner in which the interrogation of the young person was conducted in the absence of the mother amounted to persistent importunity (that is persistent and pressing questioning for an admission), or sustained or undue insistence or pressure. The part of the cautioned statement whereby the young person allegedly made the admission in the absence of the mother was not made voluntary. The next question then is whether s.18 of the Evidence Ordinance 1961 applies to admit the statement.
  3. Section 18 applies only to admit a confessional statement made as a result of a promise or threat or any other inducement held out to or exercised upon the accused provided the other conditions in s.18 are satisfied. It does not apply to confessional statement made as a result of “the exercise of violence or force or other form of compulsion”.
  4. The Chief Justice in P v Su’a [2007] WSSC 85 further referred to Tofilau v The Queen [2007] HCA 59 where Gummow and Hayne JJ state that:

“...duress, intimidation, persistent importunity or sustained or undue insistence or pressure are all species of compulsion.”

  1. As I have said in paragraph 30, I find that the manner in which the interrogation of the young person was conducted in the absence of the mother amounted to persistent importunity (that is persistent and pressing questioning for an admission), or sustained or undue insistence or pressure. As s.18 expressly does not apply to a confessional statement obtained as a result of “the exercise of violence or force or other form of compulsion’, it follows that it does not apply to admit part of the cautioned statement by the young person that I find not voluntary.
  2. Should I be wrong that the statement was involuntary, section 18 applies in that, a voluntary statement could nevertheless be excluded in the courts discretion if it was unfairly obtained or ‘obtained by improper or unfair methods.’ (see R v Ali [1999] NZCA 292). The Chief Justice in P v Tagaloa Runi Masame [2007] said:

“The Samoan courts have also, on the rare occasion, excluded a confession which, though voluntary, was unfairly obtained by the police from the accused. In doing so, the Samoan Courts were applying the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Convery [1967] NZCA 37; [1968] NZLR 426 per Turner J at 438. Under the principle stated by Turner J, a confession may be excluded in the exercise of the Courts common law discretion on the ground that it was unfairly obtained.

  1. The Prosecution submitted that a test of ‘likelihood of truth’ is to apply as is contained in s.18. Their submissions on this issue seemed to be a repeat of their submissions in the P v Vailopa (ibid) case. I agree with Nelson J in P v Vailopa (ibid), p4,[paras. 2 -3] on the issue of the ‘likelihood of truth’ test. I have come to the conclusion that s.18 does not apply to the circumstances of this case and therefore, such a test is not relevant.

Q: Was the statement by the young person unfairly and improperly obtained?

36. At page 5 of the cautioned statement the following is recorded:

2.13pm: Talosaga mai le tina ia Gafua Fiamalo mo se taimi e agai atu ai i fafo ae fa’atalanoa lona alo aua masalo e ala ona le tautala sa’o ona ole fefe ia te ia.

Leoleo: Ua lelei Fiamalo e le mafai ona fa’aauauina ona fa’amauina o le fa’amatalaga a lou alo se’i vagana ua e auai mai ae ua lelei o lea o le’a e aga’i atu i fafo mo sina taimi ae se’i ma talatalanoa ma le tama ae ou te fa’ailoa atu ou te le taina i lalo pe faamauina se taimi toe vala’au atu ma fa’ailoa atu ai loa ia te oe ona e toe susu mai lea i totonu ma o le’a fa’amauina ai loa i lalo. (my emphasis)

2.20pm: Toe aga’i mai le tina ia Fiamalo i totonu ma fa’ailoa ai loa le tulaga ua iai le talanoaga sa faia ma le o lo’o masalomia. (my emphasis)

  1. Constable Leala confirmed in court that what is recorded on p.5 of the cautioned statement is what she said to the young person’s mother before the mother went outside. She was then asked as to whether that means she can still talk with the young person while the mother is outside and she said ‘very correct’ (sa’o lelei).
  2. It is clear that Constable Valmarie Leala told the mother that she would talk with the young person but that nothing will be recorded without her being present. Mr Su’a rightly puts it that Constable Valmarie Leala should not and cannot interrogate and/or record anything the young person may say in the absence of his mother. That was the whole thrust of the decision in P v Vailopa [2009] WSSC 09 which has been adopted and is considered good police practice where young persons are being interviewed, they should only be interviewed in the presence of a parent, guardian, senior family member, caregiver or lawyer.
  3. In P v Vailopa (supra) Justice Nelson held that one of the cautioned statements made by the young person was inadmissible on the ground that it was unfairly and improperly obtained because the young person was interviewed in the absence of his mother who was in another part of the police station at the time of the interview.
  4. In P v Vailopa the whole interview was conducted without the presence of the mother. In the present case the mother was present except the time she went outside.
  5. I find that Constable Valmarie Leala continued to interview the young person in the absence of the mother. On this ground, I find that the admission made by the young person in the absence of his mother is inadmissible.

Conclusion:

  1. I rule that part of the cautioned statement which followed the alleged admission made by the young person in the absence of his mother is inadmissible. The inadmissible parts of the cautioned statement are on pages 5-7 of the cautioned statement.
  2. The message that comes through very clear where young persons are involved with the law is that police should realize that young people are vulnerable and police must adopt practice and procedure that are geared towards the vulnerabilities of young people.

JUDGE MATA KELI TUATAGALOA


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